MANAMA  CANM 


\\mm\ 


I! 


I  'II 


ill: 


|i  I 
iii! 


I  ;  1 


iilllli! 


mm 


II 


il 


I 


wM 


ill! 


I  III 


i 


iBi 


THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF 
THE   PANAMA  CANAL 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/constructionofpaOOsiberich 


Close  View  op  Steel  Forms,  Gatux  Locks. 


Starting  to  Fill  the  Gatun  Locks  for  the  First  Time. 


THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF 
THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


BY 

WILLIAM  L.  SIBERT 

Bbigadikr  General,  U.  S.  A.,  fohmeklt  Mb^ber  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 

Commission  and  in  charge  of  the  building  of  the  Gatun  Locks 

AND  Dam  and  of  the  channel  from  Gatun  to 

THE  Atlantic  Ocean 

\ 

AND 

JOHN  F.  STEVENS 

FOBliEBLT  Chief  Engineer  and  Member  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

1915 


Copyright,  1915,  by 
D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


f\^65 


PKEFACE 

While  the  authors  of  this  book  are  in  general  accord 
as  to  its  entire  contents,  Mr.  John  F.  Stevens  wrote  and 
is  responsible  for  Chapters  II  to  VI,  inclusive.  These 
chapters  cover  the  operations  in  connection  with  build- 
ing the  Canal  prior  to  the  spring  of  1907,  often  referred 
to  as  the  ''Preparatory  Period." 

The  introductory  chapter  and  Chapters  VII  to  XX, 
inclusive,  descriptive  of  the  work  after  the  spring  of 
1907,  often  referred  to  as  the  "Construction  Period," 
were  written  by  William  L.  Sibert. 


V  )i/^.  }.  (i  1 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

I.    Introduction 


PAGE 
1 


PEEPAEATOKY    PERIOD:     1904    TO    MARCH,    1907 

II.     Sea-level  versus  Lock  Type  of  Canal  .        .  17 

III.  The  Reconstruction  of  the  Panama  Rail- 

road         40 

IV.  Prosecution  of  the  Work      ....  58 
V.    Development  of  Working  Plans  ...  69 

VI.    The  Housing  and  Feeding  of  the  Force    .  92 
VII.    The  Assemblage  and  Management  of  the 

Force 110 


CONSTRUCTION  PERIOD:     MARCH,   1907,   TO  APRIL,  1914 

VIII.    The  Adopted  Project 131 

IX.    Changes  in  the  Adopted  Project  .        .        .  139 

X.    Changes  in  Dimensions  of  Parts  of  Canal  .  149 

XL    Designs  for  Permanent  Buildings  and  Locks  162 

XII.    Construction  from  Colon  to  Gatun      .        .  188 

XIII.  Excavation  and  Concrete  Work  at  Gatun  .  203 

XIV.  Construction  of  Gatun  Dam  ....  223 
XV.    Gatun  Lake 250 

XVI.    Construction  from  Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel 

— CuLEBRA  Cut 263 

XVII.    South  End  of  Culebra  Cut  to  the  Pacific 

Ocean 281 

XVIII.    Municipal  Engineering 296 

XIX.    Shops  and  Terminal  Facilities     .        .        .  305 

XX.    Operation  of  Panama  Canal  ....  312 

XXI.    The  Work  and  Its  Cost 322 

Index 329 

vii 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS       / 

Close  View  of  Steel  Foniis,  Gatun  Locks 

Starting  to  Fill  the  Gatun  Locks  for  the  First  Time 

Frontispiece 

FACINQ 
PAGE 

First  Bucket  of  Concrete,  Gatun  Locks  ,  ...  60 
The  Crossing  of  the  American  and  French   Canals  at 

Mindi 60 

The  Pedro  Miguel  Lock 120 

Towing  Locomotive,  Gatun  Locks 120 

North  Guide  Wall,  Gatun  Locks 178 

Dam  Construction  Through  Gatun  Village       .         .         .  178 

Views  of  Emergency  Dam  at  Gatun  in  Operation  .        .  182 

The  Opening  of  the  First  Gate,  Gatun  Spillway  .         .  184 

Gatun  Spillway  with  Seven  Gates  Open  ....  184 
Toro  Point  Breakwater,  Looking  Towards  Water  End, 

June  12,  1913 192 

A   Dredge   Grounded   Fifty-five   Feet   Below    Sea-level, 

Gatun  Locks       . 192 

Sea  Gates,  Gatun  Locks,  Under  Pressure  for  the  First 

Time 210 

Slide  into  Space  Excavated  for  North  Guide  Wall,  Gatun 

Locks 210 

Steel  Forms,  Gatun  Locks 218 

Steel  Forms,  Gatun  Locks 220 

Remains  of  the  North  Diversion  Dam,  Gatun  Dam  .  234 
Slipping  of  the  South  Toe  of  Gatun  Dam,  Top  View, 

November  21,  1908 234 

Slides  into  Wet  Fill,  Gatun  Dam 242 

Slides  into  Hydraulic  Fill,  Gatun  Dam  .        .        ,        .  242 

ix 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING 
PAGE 

Removing  Cars  from  Wet  Fill,  Gatun  Dam  .  .  .  246 
Spillway  Channel  during  Construction,  Gatun,  Canal  Zone  246 
Gatun  Spillway  Dam  Under  Construction  .  .  .  254 
Flood  Water  Passing  Over  Incompleted  Spillway  Dam 

at  Gatun 254 

Tug  Gatun,  the  First  Boat  to  Pass  from  Sea-level  to 
Summit  Level  of  the  Panama  Canal,  September  26, 

1913 260 

Gatun  Upper  Locks,  Miter  Gate-moving  Machine ;  Struc- 
tural  Steel  Girders  for  Towing  Locomotive  Track 
Supports  in  Foreground,  June,  1912       .         .         .     260 
Ship  Passing  Through   Gatun  Locks       ....     316 
Gatun  Spillway  as  Seen  from  the  Lake  ....    316 


DIAGKAMS 


PAGE 


1. — Pedro  Miguel  to  Miraflores 147 

2. — Gatun  Dam  Section  Proposed  by  International  Board  152 

3.— Gatun  Dam  Section  Approved  Sept.  30,  1907  .        .  152 

4.— Gatun  Dam  Section  Adopted  for  105  Feet  Height    .  159 

5.— Culebra  Cut         ........  165 

6. — Location  of  Rivers  as  They  Were  Before  Dam  Was 

Built 229 

7. — Ideal  Section  of  Deforming  and  Sliding  Ground  Near 

Culebra,  C.  Z 280 


THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF 
THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


CARIB.BEAN 

SEA  ^^^ 


'akwater^ 


TABOGA  iNv^o 

P   A    0    I    F    I     C 
OCEAN 


TABOQUILU  U 

a 

a         Oo 


THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE 
PANAMA  CANAL 


CHAPTER   I 
INTRODUCTION 

The  Panama  Canal,  probably  the  greatest  ma- 
terial contribution  of  any  nation  to  the  world's 
commerce,  was  constructed  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States  through  a  commission  of  seven 
men,  under  authority  granted  by  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States. 

The  first  Commission  was  appointed  under  this 
authority  March  3,  1904,  and  was  constituted  as 
follows:  John  G.  Walker,  rear-admiral,  U.  S. 
Navy;  George  W.  Davis,  major-general  (retired), 
U.  S.  Army;  "William  Barclay  Parsons,  C.  E., 
New  York  City;  William  H.  Burr,  C.  E.,  New 
York  City;  Benjamin  M.  Harrod,  C.  E.,  New  Or- 
leans, Louisiana;  Carl  E.  Grunsky,  C.  E.,  San 
Francisco,  California;  Frank  J.  Hecker,  Detroit, 
Michigan. 

The  personnel  of  the  second  Commission,  nom- 
inated March  4,  1905,  was  as  follows:  Theodore 
P.  Shouts,  chairman;  Charles  E.  Magoon,  mem- 

1 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

ber  and  governor  of  the  Canal  Zone;  Jolin  F. 
Wallace,  member  and  chief  engineer;  Eear- 
Admiral  Mordecai  T.  Endicott,  U.  S.  Navy; 
Brigadier-General  Peter  C.  Hains,  U.  S.  Army 
(retired) ;  Colonel  Oswald  H.  Ernst,  Corps  of 
Engineers,  U.  S.  Army. 

John  F.  Wallace  was  appointed  chief  engineer 
of  the  first  Conmiission  and  served  in  that  ca- 
pacity from  June  1, 1904,  to  June  28,  1905. 

During  Mr.  Wallace's  term  of  office  no  deci- 
sion had  been  made  as  to  type  of  canal,  and  his 
service  was  largely  in  making  investigations  with 
a  view  to  determining  this  question.  Mr.  Wal- 
lace resigned  his  position  in  June,  1905,  and  John 
F.  Stevens  was  appointed  chief  engineer. 

Mr.  Stevens,  in  addition  to  his  position  as  chief 
engineer,  was  made  a  member  of  the  Commission 
in  July,  1906. 

Appreciating,  whatever  the  type  of  canal 
finally  adopted,  that  a  large  amount  of  excavation 
would  be  necessary,  Mr.  Stevens  commenced  to 
plan  and  procure  the  necessary  plant  and  to  cre- 
ate a  needed  organization  for  such  excavation. 
He  also  made  a  thorough  study  of  the  rail  trans- 
portation problems  and  solved  them  by  rebuilding 
and  double-tracking  the  Panama  Eailroad  and 
providing  the  necessary  rolling  stock.  Notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  it  was  not  until  June  29, 
1906,  that  a  decision  was  made  as  to  the  type 

2 


INTRODUCTION 

of  canal,  by  the  spring  of  1907  he  had  created  a 
working  organization,  procured  an  excavation 
plant,  and  had  conunenced  to  prosecute  rapidly 
that  part  of  the  work. 

In  the  development  of  the  working  plans  for 
the  great  excavation  problem,  prominent  parts 
were  taken  by  such  men  as  John  G.  Sullivan,  W. 
E.  Dauchy,  F.  B.  Maltby,  William  Gerig,  D.  W. 
Bolick,  W.  G.  Comber,  Geo.  D.  Brooke,  J.  G.  Hoi- 
combe,  A.  L.  Robinson,  A.  B.  Nichols,  and  Wil- 
liam G.  Bierd. 

As  soon  as  the  type  of  canal  was  determined 
a  force  for  designing  the  locks  and  dams  was  or- 
ganized under  Joseph  Ripley.  Upon  Mr.  Ripley's 
promotion  to  assistant  chief  engineer,  his  former 
assistant,  M.  G.  Barnes,  was  placed  in  charge  of 
the  designing  force. 

In  connection  with  the  procuring  of  material, 
disbursing  of  funds,  and  the  housing  and  feeding 
of  the  men,  prominent  parts  were  taken  by  Jack- 
son Smith,  R.  E.  Wood,  Edward  J.  Williams,  Da- 
vid W.  Ross,  William  G.  Tubby,  William  M.  Beld- 
ing,  and  P.  0^  Wright,  Jr. 

The  term  of  Mr.  Stevens,  as  chief  engineer,  can 
truly  be  said  to  have  covered  the  preparatory  pe- 
riod of  the  work.  Mr.  Stevens  resigned  April  1, 
1907. 

In  March,  1907,  the  President  reorganized  the 
Isthmian   Canal  Commission,   appointing  Major 

3 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

George  W.  Goethals,  Corps  of  Engineers,  as 
chairman  and  chief  engineer,  and  Colonel  W.  C. 
Gorgas,  Medical  Department,  U.  S.  Army;  Major 
D.  D.  Gaillard,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army; 
Major  William  L.  Sibert,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U. 
S.  Army;  H.  H.  Eousseau,  civil  engineer,  U.  S. 
Navy;  Senator  J.  C.  S.  Blackburn,  and  Jack- 
son Smith,  members  of  the  Commission.  All 
members  were  to  reside  on  the  Isthmus  and  assist 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  work. 

Jackson  Smith  resigned  in  July,  1908,  and  Ma- 
jor H.  P.  Hodges,  Corps  of  Engineers,  TJ.  S. 
Army,  was  appointed  to  fill  the  vacancy.  Jack- 
son Smith  had,  under  Mr.  Stevens,  been  largely 
responsible  for  the  adopted  system  of  housing 
and  feeding  the  canal  employees. 

Senator  J.  C.  S.  Blackburn  resigned  December 
4,  1909,  and  Maurice  H.  Thatcher,  of  Kentucky, 
was  appointed  April  12,  1910,  in  his  place.  Mr. 
Thatcher  resigned  in  August,  1913,  and  Eichard 
L.  Metcalf  served  in  his  place  until  April  1,  1914, 
on  which  date,  in  pursuance  of  an  Act  of  Con- 
gress, the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  was  abol- 
ished. The  Canal  was  essentially  finished  and 
the  organization  of  an  operating  force  was  nec- 
essary. 

The  period  covered  by  the  service  of  this  last 
Commission  was  the  construction  period  of  the 
canal. 

4 


INTRODUCTION 

Major  George  W.  Goethals,  wlio  was  soon  pro- 
moted to  the  rank  of  Colonel,  was  the  chief  engi- 
neer and  chief  executive  officer  of  the  Commis- 
sion during  this  entire  period. 

The  duties  of  the  Commission  during  this  pe- 
riod were  defined  in  the  following  extract  from 
an  executive  order  signed  by  President  Roosevelt 
on  January  6,  1908: 

The  Commission,  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  subject  to  the  approval  of 
the  President,  is  charged  with  the  general  duty 
of  the  adoption  of  plans  for  the  construction  and 
maintenance  of  the  canal;  with  the  employment 
and  the  fixing  of  the  compensation  of  engineers 
or  other  persons  necessary  for  the  proper  and 
expeditious  prosecution  of  said  work;  with  the 
making  of  all  contracts  for  the  construction  of 
the  canal  or  any  of  its  needful  accessories;  with 
the  duty  of  making  to  the  President  annually,  or 
at  such  other  periods  as  may  be  required  either 
by  law  or  the  order  of  the  President,  full  and  com- 
plete reports  of  all  their  actings  and  doings  and 
of  all  moneys  received  and  expended  in  the  con- 
struction of  said  work  and  in  the  performance 
of  their  duties  in  connection  therewith;  and  with 
the  duty  of  advising  and  assisting  the  Chairman 
in  the  execution  of  the  work  of  canal  construction, 
with  the  government  and  sanitation  of  the  Canal 
Zone  and  with  all  matters  of  sanitation  in  the 
cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  the  harbors 
thereof,  and  with  the  purchase  and  delivery  of 
supplies,  machinery  and  necessary  plant. 

5 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  members,  in  addition  to  service  on  the 
Commission,  were  assigned  the  following  duties: 

Colonel  W.  C.  Gorgas  was  placed  in  charge  of 
sanitation,  hospitals,  and  all  quarantine  work. 

Major  (afterwards  Lientenant-Colonel)  D.  D. 
Gaillard  was  in  charge  of  all  excavation,  both 
steam-shovel  work  and  dredging,  until  June  30, 
1908. 

Major  (afterwards  Lieutenant-Colonel)  Wil- 
liam L.  Sibert  was  in  charge  of  design  and  con- 
struction of  all  locks,  dams,  and  regulating  works 
until  June  30,  1908. 

H.  H.  Eousseau,  civil  engineer,  U.  S.  Navy,  was 
in  charge  of  municipal  engineering  and  of  the  Me- 
chanical Division  until  June  30,  1908. 

J.  C.  S.  Blackburn  was  in  charge  of  civil  admin- 
istration until  he  resigned,  which  duties  were  as- 
sumed in  turn  by  M.  H.  Thatcher  and  Eichard  L. 
Metcalf. 

Civil  administration  comprised  all  the  ordinary 
functions  of  civil  government,  such  as  courts, 
schools,  police,  taxation,  mails,  fire  protection, 
etc. 

When  Major  (later  Colonel)  H.  F.  Hodges  re- 
ported for  duty  as  member  of  the  Commission,  a 
redistribution  of  the  duties  of  the  engineers  was 
made. 

Colonel  H.  F.  Hodges,  as  assistant  chief  engi- 
neer, was  placed  in  charge  of  the  design  of  the 

6 


INTRODUCTION 

locks,  dams,  regulating  works,  and  accessories; 
of  the  design  and  construction  of  aids  to  naviga- 
tion ;  the  inspection  of  the  manufacture  and  erec- 
tion, by  contract  or  otherwise,  of  the  lock  gates, 
operating  machinery,  valves,  emergency  dams, 
and  fender  chains. 

Major  William  L.  Sibert  was  placed  in  charge 
of  the  Atlantic  Division,  which  comprised  the  con- 
struction of  the  Gatun  Locks  and  Dam,  the  exca- 
vation of  the  seven  miles  of  canal  from  Gatun 
to  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  the  construction  of  the 
breakwaters  in  Colon  Harbor,  and  of  the  munici- 
pal engineering  within  the  limits  of  the  divi- 
sion. 

Major  D.  D.  Gaillard  was  placed  in  charge  of 
the  Central  Division,  which  embraced  all  steam- 
shovel  excavation  from  Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel, 
including  the  difficult  excavation  through  the  Con- 
tinental Divide  at  Culebra.  Municipal  engineer- 
ing in  his  division  was  also  a  part  of  his  duty. 

H.  H.  Eousseau,  civil  engineer,  U.  S.  Navy,  was 
assigned  to  duty  as  assistant  to  the  Chief  Engi- 
neer, retaining  supervision  over  shops  and  termi- 
nal construction,  including  the  dry  docks  and  per- 
manent shops. 

S.  B.  Williamson,  a  civil  engineer,  was  placed 
in  charge  of  the  Pacific  Division.  This  work  com- 
prised the  construction  of  the  Pedro  Miguel  and 
Miraflores  Locks  and  Dams,  the  excavation  of 

7 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  Canal  from  Miraflores  to  tlae  Pacific  Ocean, 
and  the  municipal  engineering  in  his  division. 

Under  Colonel  H.  F.  Hodges,  the  following  civil 
engineers  were  at  the  head  of  important  subdivi- 
sions of  design :  Henry  H.  Goldmark,  design  and 
installation  of  lock  gates;  Edward  Schildhauer, 
electrical  and  mechanical  design  and  installation ; 
L.  D.  Cornish,  general  lock  and  masonry  design ; 
E.  C.  Sherman,  spillway  design,  and  T.  B.  Mon- 
nicke,  emergency  dams. 

Under  Lieutenant-Colonel  D.  D.  Gaillard,  the 
following  served  as  division  engineers:  L.  K. 
Ronrke,  D.  W.  Bolich,  William  Gerig  and  W.  G. 
Comber ;  and  A.  S.  Zinn  as  resident  engineer. 

Under  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  L.  Sibert, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Chester  Harding  served  as  as- 
sistant division  engineer;  Majors  Edgar  Jadwin, 
James  P.  Jervey,  and  George  M.  Hoffman  served 
as  resident  engineers,  and  Captain  Horton  W. 
Stickle  as  assistant  engineer.  Mr.  George  W. 
Wells  served  as  designing  engineer  for  the  divi- 
sion. 

Under  S.  B.  Williamson,  J.  M.  G.  Watt  served 
as  assistant  division  engineer ;  W.  B.  Corse,  H.  0. 
Cole,  and  Frank  Cotton  as  resident  engineers,  and 
James  Macf arland  as  superintendent  of  dredging. 

Under  H.  H.  Rousseau,  U.  S.  Navy,  J.  G.  Hol- 
combe  served  as  division  engineer;  George  D. 
Brooke  as  superintendent  of  motive  power  and 

8 


INTRODUCTION 

macMnery;  A.  L.  Eobinson  as  superintendent  of 
mechanical  division;  P.  0.  Wright,  Jr.,  as  archi- 
tect; Major  T:  C.  Dickson  as  inspector  of  shops, 
and  A.  B.  Nichols,  as  office  engineer. 

Colonel  (afterwards  Brigadier-General)  C.  A. 
Devol,  assisted  by  Captain  E.  E.  Wood,  was 
charged  with  housing  the  employees  and  procur- 
ing all  material  during  the  construction  period. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Eugene  T.  Wilson  was 
charged  with  feeding  the  employees  and  operat- 
ing the  supply  stores. 

E.  J.  Williams  continued  as  disbursing  officer 
practically  through  the  construction  period  and 
was  one  of  the  few  officials  that  served  through 
both  the  construction  and  preparatory  periods. 

Lieutenant  George  E.  Goethals,  son  of  the 
Chairman  and  Chief  Engineer,  was  charged  with 
the  construction  of  the  fortifications  at  both  ends 
of  the  Canal. 

All  of  the  engineer  members  of  the  Commission 
in  charge  of  work  during  the  construction  period 
lived  to  see  a  completed  canal,  except  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  D.  D.  Gaillard,  who  died  December  5, 
1913,  just  as  his  work — the  great  Culebra  Cut — 
was  essentially  finished.  He  was  lying  uncon- 
scious in  a  hospital  at  Baltimore  the  day  that  the 
dyke  at  Gamboa  was  destroyed — the  last  barrier 
that  held  the  waters  of  Gatun  Lake  out  of  Cu- 
lebra Cut.     The  destruction  of  this  barrier  al- 

9 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

lowed  the  waters  impounded  by  the  dam  on  the 
Atlantic  side  of  the  Isthmus  to  connect  with 
the  Pacific  Ocean  through  the  locks  on  that 
slope. 

A  West  Point  classmate  has,  in  the  following 
lines,  fittingly  expressed  the  spirit  of  the  services 
rendered  by  Colonel  Gaillard: 

To  lay  down  one's  life  upon  the  field  of  battle 
in  voluntary  service  of  fatherland  has  been  con- 
sidered in  all  ages  the  loftiest  expression  of  pa- 
triotism, if  not  of  heroism  itself.  To  fall  as  Gail- 
lard has  fallen — is  it  any  less  true  heroism?  Any 
less  self-sacrifice  upon  the  altar  of  country!  Not 
amid  the  din  of  armed  conflict,  nerved  by  the 
frenzy  of  an  hour  or  a  day,,  but  at  the  end  of 
long  years  of  patient,  exacting  work,  of  terrific 
responsibility,  the  tragic  end  has  come.  But  it 
is  just  as  much  a  direct  result  of  the  struggle  it- 
Svilf  as  if  it  were  the  work  of  a  hostile  bullet,  and 
the  exalted  standard  of  duty  which  his  career  ex- 
emplified will  command  the  increasing  admiration 
of  men  as  long  as  his  work  in  the  Isthmian  hills 
endures. 

We  grieve  that  he  could  not  have  remained  to 
enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  well-earned  fame.  But 
there  is  compensation  in  the  thought  that  to  him 
was  reserved  the  higher  privilege  of  laying  down 
his  lifework  just  as  it  was  crowned  with  success. 
Like  Wolfe  on  the  Plains  of  Abraham,  he  has  been 
called  with  the  plaudits  of  victory  ringing  in  his 
ears.  Whatever  may  come  to  others,  his  record 
is  secure. 

10 


INTRODUCTION 

STATUS  OF  WORK  AS  LEFT  BY  THE  FRENCH 

The  status  of  the  Canal  work  at  the  time  it  was 
transferred  to  the  United  States  differed  but 
little  from  that  in  which  the  first  French  Com- 
pany left  it  in  1889.  The  new  French  Company- 
took  charge  in  1894  and  did  but  little  construction 
work. 

The  French  companies  made  extensive  surveys 
and  plans  which  were  excellently  recorded  and 
proved  to  be  of  great  use.  Their  value  to  the 
United  States  was  estimated  in  1911  at  $2,000,- 
000.  They  also  erected  m^ny  buildings,  shops, 
hospitals,  etc.,  but  had  confined  their  operations 
along  the  Canal  practically  to  excavation,  except 
for  the  construction  of  a  small  dry  dock  near 
Colon,  and  some  docks  for  the  discharge  of  mate- 
rial and  machinery  for  use  in  building  the  Canal. 

A  large  amount  of  material  had  been  excavated 
in  the  nine-mile  cut  through  the  continental  di- 
vide and  much  of  it  deposited  on  the  low  ground 
in  close  proximity  to  the  Canal.  The  deepest  cut- 
ting was  about  165  feet  below  the  original  surface 
and  this  surface  was  333  feet  above  sea-level.  In 
the  sea-level  sections  of  the  project  last  adopted 
by  the  French  much  excavation  had  been  done. 

A  navigable  channel  along  the  Canal  line  had 
been  excavated  from  Cristobal  to  Bohio,  at  which 
latter  point  a  dam  was  to  have  been  built  across 

11 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  Chagres  Valley.  On  the  Pacific  side  a  chan- 
nel had  been  excavated  from  La  Boca  (Balboa) 
to  deep  water  in  the  Pacific  and  considerable  work 
done  on  channel  from  La  Boca  to  Miraflores, 
where  the  first  lock  on  that  side  was  to  have  been 
built. 

None  of  the  work  on  the  Atlantic  side  formed  a 
part  of  the  project  carried  out  by  the  Americans 
and  was  of  no  value  except  as  an  aid  during  con- 
struction. Practically  all  of  the  rock,  sand,  and 
cement  for  the  locks  and  spillway  at  Gatun,  as 
well  as  a  large  part  of  the  supplies  for  dam  con- 
struction at  that  place,  were  transported  on  the 
old  French  canal  from  Cristobal  to  Gatun.  This 
channel  is  still  open  and  may  be  of  use  in  connec- 
tion with  terminal  developments  for  military  or 
naval  needs.  That  part  of  the  old  French  canal 
between  Gatun  and  Bohio  is  of  course  covered  by 
Gatun  Lake. 

Practically  all  the  channel  excavation  from  Bal- 
boa to  Miraflores  was  useful,  but  only  a  small 
part  of  that  from  Balboa  to  deep  water  in  the 
Pacific  was  utilized,  the  location  of  this  part  of 
the  Canal  having  been  changed. 

On  the  Atlantic  side,  in  addition  to  channel  ex- 
cavation, the  French  had  dug  twenty  miles  of  di- 
version channel  on  the  east  side  of  the  Canal  and 
thirteen  on  the  west  side.  The  west  diversion 
was  of  some  use  in  transporting  supplies  for  the 

12 


INTRODUCTION 

dam  at  Gatun,  and  the  east  diversion  was  utilized 
as  a  reserve  to  the  Colon  water  supply. 

A  total  amount  of  about  80,000,000  cubic  yards 
had  been  excavated  by  the  French  along  the  line 
of  the  Canal,  but  a  large  portion  of  this  had  been 
dumped  so  close  to  the  Canal  that  it  had  to  be 
moved  again  in  excavating  the  enlarged  section 
adopted  by  the  Americans. 

A  committee,  appointed  in  1911,  estimated  that 
the  useful  excavation  made  by  the  French 
amounted  to  30,000,000  cubic  yards.  The  value  of 
the  first  30,000,000  cubic  yards  should,  however, 
not  be  measured  by  later  excavation  costs.  Pio- 
neer work  is  exceedingly  expensive,  but  the  expe- 
rience gained  should  be  of  great  value  difficult  to 
fix.  It  may  find  expression  in  methods  to  avoid 
as  well  as  methods  to  copy.  This  committee  gives 
this  useful  excavation  the  value  of  $25,389,240. 

Immense  quantities  of  material  and  machinery 
were  found  distributed  along  the  entire  line.  The 
book  value  of  this  was  about  $29,000,000 ;  but  al- 
though much  of  it  was  housed  and  in  good  condi- 
tion, it  was  of  little  value  because  it  was  obsolete. 
Splendid  workmanship  was  shown  on  these  ma- 
chines and  good  material  was  used  in  their  con- 
struction. They  were  good  appliances  of  their 
date,  but  had  to  give  way  to  more  recent  mechan- 
ical developments. 

The  French  left  2,148  buildings  of  which  1,536 

13 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

were  utilized  after  repair.  The  estimated  value 
of  these  buildings  was  over  $2,000,000.  Six  ma- 
chine shops,  containing  a  considerable  quantity  of 
usable  tools,  were  left.  These  were  put  into  serv- 
ice and  were  of  great  assistance  in  forming  a  nu- 
cleus for  the  development  of  larger  shops  as 
needed.  Their  value  was  estimated  at  over 
$2,000,000. 

The  committee  before  mentioned  estimated  the 
total  value  of  the  construction,  property,  etc.,  ac- 
quired from  the  French,  at  $42,800,000,  which  is 
a  conservative  figure,  without  taking  into  consid- 
eration the  value  of  the  French  experience. 


PREPAEATOEY  PEEIOD :    1904  TO  MAECH, 

1907 


CHAPTEE  II 

SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK  TYPE  OF  CANAL 

The  Act  of  Congress  which  authorized  the 
President  to  proceed  with  the  construction  of  the 
Canal,  placed  almost  unlimited  power  in  his  hands 
as  to  details  of  route,  type  and  size,  the  chief  lim- 
iting clause,  which,  it  may  be  noted,  left  much  to 
his  judgment,  reading  as  follows:  The  Canal 
'  ^  shall  be  of  sufficient  capacity  and  depth  as  shall 
afford  convenient  passage  for  the  vessels  of  the 
largest  tonnage  and  greatest  draft  now  in  use,  and 
such  as  may  be  reasonably  anticipated.'^ 

In  order  to  obtain  the  advantage  of  the  best  en- 
gineering advice  upon  the  many  problems  in- 
volved, the  President  appointed  a  board  of  con- 
sulting engineers,  the  members  being  eminent  in 
their  profession,  both  American  and  European. 
The  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  consisted  of 
General  George  W.  Davis,  chairman,  and  Alfred 
Noble,  William  Barclay  Parsons,  William  H. 
Burr,  General  Henry  L.  Abbot,  Frederic  P. 
Stearns,  Joseph  Kipley,  Herman  Schussler, 
Isham  Randolph — all  Americans;  and  William 
Henry  Hunter,  nominated  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment; Eugen  Tincauzer  by  the  German  Gov- 

17 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

eminent ;  Adolpli  Guerard  by  the  French  Govern- 
ment; J.  W.  Welcker  by  the  Government  of  The 
Netherlands,  and  E.  Quellennec,  consulting  engi- 
neer of  the  Suez  Canal. 

By  executive  order  dated  June  24,  1905,  the 
President  directed  that  this  board  should  convene 
in  Washington  on  September  1,  1905,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  considering  various  proposed  plans  for 
the  construction  of  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  between  Cristobal  and  La  Boca  and  to 
make  a  report. 

At  the  meeting  held  on  September  1,  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission  submitted  to  the  Board 
plans,  maps  and  data  in  four  parts : 

Part  L  Eeport  Comite  Technique  dated  No- 
vember 16,  1898,  with  map  scale  of  1  to  5000. 

Part  IL  Report  American  Commission  dated 
November  16,  1901. 

Part  IIL     Data  for  **sea-leveP'  scheme. 

Part  IV.  Pamphlet,  plans  by  Lindon  W.  Bates, 
and  plans  by  P.  Bunau-Varilla. 

The  opinion  of  the  Board  was  solicited  as  to  the 
best  plan  to  be  followed  in  the  completion  of  the 
Panama  Canal  within  reasonable  limits  of  cost 
and  time;  the  option  of  the  Board  was  not  to  be 
based  alone  upon  the  plans  submitted  but  upon 
any  variation  of  them,  or  upon  any  entirely  dif- 
ferent plan  which  might  suggest  itself  to  the 
Board. 

18 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

The  Board  received  no  plans  originating  with 
the  Commission  and  because  of  requirements  of 
the  act  of  Congress  respecting  dimensions  and 
capacity  of  the  Canal  preventing  the  adoption  of 
plans  of  former  commissions,  the  Board  was 
obliged  to  act  as  a  creative  body  as  well  as  a  con- 
sulting board. 

The  committee  on  the  sea-level  canal  was  ap- 
pointed September  16,  and  consisted  of  Chairman 
Davis  and  members  Guerard,  Burr,  and  Hunter. 

The  lock-canal  committee  appointed  October  12, 
consisted  of  Chairman  Davis,  and  members 
Stearns,  Tincauzer,  and  Ripley.  Both  commit- 
tees were  increased  by  the  addition  of  two  mem- 
bers on  October  30;  the  *' sea-level"  committee  by 
members  Parsons  and  Quellennec,  and  the  lock- 
canal  by  members  Noble  and  Abbot.  The  com- 
mittee on  unit  prices  for  purpose  of  estimate  con- 
sisted of.  members  Parsons,  Welcker  and  Ran- 
dolph. 

Thirty  regular  stated  meetings  were  held  by 
the  Board  lasting  from  six  to  eight  hours  each 
and  stenographic  notes  were  taken  of  all  discus- 
sions. 

The  Board  made  an  inspection  of  the  Wachu- 
sett  Reservoir  at  Clinton,  Massachusetts,  on  Sep- 
tember 27,  and  on  the  following  day  sailed  on  the 
steamer  Panama  for  the  Isthmus. 

During  the  eight  days'  stay  on  the  Isthmus,  the 

19 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Board  accompanied  the  Canal  commissioners  in 
making  a  careful  inspection  of  the  entire  route  of 
the  Canal,  paying  particular  attention  to  sites  for 
locks  and  dams  and  to  localities  where  extensive 
slides  had  already  taken  place. 

The  numerous  cores  taken  by  diamond  drills 
all  along  the  line  of  the  Canal  were  examined 
and  carefully  studied. 

Hearings  were  given  to  Chief  Engineer  Jphn 
F.  Stevens  and  several  of  his  assistants  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  their  views  and  desired  in- 
formation as  to  many  particulars. 

Every  day  during  the  trip  to  and  from  the  Isth- 
mus was  spent  by  all  the  members  of  the  Board 
in  committee  work  or  attending  regular  sessions 
of  the  Board. 

Eeturning  to  Washington,  the  Board  continued 
work  on  the  sea-level  and  lock-canal  plans  and  es- 
timates and  at  the  regular  sessions  discussed  the 
details  of  each  feature  of  the  various  Canal  prob- 
lems. Hearings  were  also  given  to  former  Chief 
Engineer  John  F.  Wallace  on  November  3,  and 
to  the  presentation  of  proposed  projects  by  Lin- 
don  W.  Bates,  and  those  proposed  by  P.  Bunau- 
Varilla. 

The  plans  for  the  sea-level  canal,  but  more  par- 
ticularly those  for  the  lock  canal  required  exten- 
sive calculations  and  study  as  the  structures  had 
to  be  designed  in  sufficient  detail  for  assured  saf e- 

20 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

tj  and  to  conform  within  reasonable  limits  as  to 
quantities.  A  force  of  six  computers  and  drafts- 
men were  assigned  to  the  Board,  but  in  order  to 
expedite  the  work  it  was  necessary  for  all  mem- 
bers of  the  Board  to  make  many  computations 
themselves. 

Early  in  November,  plans  for  the  sea-level  and 
those  for  the  lock  canals  were  so  far  progressed 
that  a  thorough  discussion  was  had  of  the  advan- 
tages and  disadvantages  of  each.  While  the  lo- 
cation of  the  old  French  canal  was  generally  fol- 
lowed across  the  Isthmus,  the  approaches  in  Li- 
mon  Bay  and  in  Panama  Bay  were  materially 
changed,  and  the  general  curvature  alignment  was 
entirely  eliminated  and  canal  laid  out  on  tangents 
with  a  widening  at  the  inner  angle  of  each  inter- 
section of  adjacent  courses. 

For  a  lock  canal  the  committee  submitted  for 
consideration  four  variants: 

No.  1.  Summit  elevation  85  feet  with  three 
locks  in  flight  at  Gatun,  one  lock  at  Pedro  Miguel 
and  two  locks  at  Sosa. 

No.  2.  Elevation  85.  Three  Locks  at  Gatun, 
two  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  one  at  Miraflores. 

No.  3.  Elevation  60.  Two  locks  at  Gatun,  one 
at  Pedro  Miguel  and  one  at  Miraflores. 

No.  4.  Elevation  60.  One  lock  at  Gatun,  one  at 
Bohio,  one  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  one  at  Miraflores, 
and  with  the  last  plan  (No.  4)  a  dam  at  Alhajuela. 

21 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  Board  voted  ^s  to  type  of  canal  to  be  rec- 
ommended on  November  18,  and  by  a  majority  of 
8  to  5,  decided  in  favor  of  the  sea-level  canal. 

With  the  exception  of  Mr.  Quellennec,  who  re- 
mained until  December  5,  the  European  members 
on  November  5,  left  Washington  for  New  York 
to  take  steamer  for  home. 

The  American  members  at  once  proceeded  to 
prepare  a  report  including  plans,  maps  and  esti- 
mates. Chairman  Davis  and  members  Noble  and 
Burr  were  appointed  a  committee  to  supervise  the 
preparation  of  the  report. 

The  minority  members,  Noble,  Abbot,  Stearns, 
Ripley  and  Eandolph,  in  accordance  with  the  re- 
quest of  the  President  for  minority  reports,  if 
there  should  be  a  difference  of  opinion  between  the 
members  of  the  Consulting  Board,  proceeded  to 
prepare  a  minority  report,  with  recommendation 
for  a  lock  canal  with  summit  level  at  elevation  85. 

As  parts  of  the  majority  report  were  prepared, 
they  were  discussed  at  regular  meetings  by  all 
the  members  and  agreement  reached  as  to  subject- 
matter  and  wording.  After  the  completion  of  this 
majority  report,  it  was  taken  to  Europe  by  Chair- 
man Davis.  A  meeting  of  the  European  members 
was  held  in  Brussels  January  9  and  10,  and  after 
revising  this  report  as  to  wording,  it  was  signed 
by  those  present. 

During  January  the  minority  report  was  pre- 

22 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

pared,  Alfred  Noble  editing  the  written  state- 
ments prepared  by  the  different  members  of  the 
minority  on  the  parts  assigned  to  each,  and 
finally,  two  meetings  were  held  at  which  careful 
revision  of  the  report  was  made  jointly  by  all 
members. 

The  majority  report  included  a  history  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  projects,  reference  text  and  the 
maps  accompanying  the  report;  physical  charac- 
teristics, climate,  sanitation  and  hygiene  work 
done  and  present  conditions  and  new  field  work, 
various  projects  hitherto  proposed ;  control  of  the 
Chagres  Eiver,  dams,  alignment  and  estimates 
of  cost  and  time. 

The  minority  report  included  the  following  sub- 
jects : 

1.  The  lock-canal  project  recommended 

(a)  Colon  entrance 

(b)  The  Gatun  Dam 

i.  Stability  of  an  earth  dam 
ii.  Eegulating  works 
iii.  Eeduction  in  cost 

(c)  Water  supply  of  the  Canal 

(d)  The  summit  level 

(e)  Lake  Sosa 

(f )  Channel  in  Panama  Bay 

(g)  Dimensions  and  cost 

2.  Comparison    with    the    Board's    lock-canal 

project 

23 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

3.  Comparison  with  tlie  Board's  sea-level  canal 

project 

4.  Eelative  time  for  completion  of  sea-level  and 

85-foot  projects 

5.  Eelative  time  of  transit 

6.  Capacity  for  traffic  of  the  two  projects 

7.  Safety  of  locks  and  other  structures 

8.  Eelative  safety  of  ships  in  the  two  types  of 

Canal 

9.  Land  damages 

10.  Eelocation  of  the  Panama  Eailroad 

11.  Estimated  cost  for  project  recommended 

12.  Cost  of  maintenance  and  operation 

13.  Safety  of  dams 

14.  Conclusions  and  recommendations 

The  report  was  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  on  February  5.  The  recommendations  of 
the  minority  members  were  indorsed  by  all  mem- 
bers of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  with  the 
exception  of  Admiral  M.  T.  Endicott,  who  voted 
in  favor  of  the  sea-level  canal. 

On  June  25,  1906,  Congress  adopted  for  con- 
struction the  lock  canal  as  recommended  by  the 
minority  members  of  the  Board. 

As  representing  the  views  of  the  members  of 
the  Commission,  with  the  exception  above  noted, 
the  following  extract  from  a  report  made  to  the 
Commission,  by  its  Chief  Engineer,  of  date  Jan- 
uary 26, 1906,  will  be  of  interest : 

24 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

The  sum  of  my  conclusions  is,  therefore,  that, 
all  things  considered,  the  lock  or  high-level  canal 
is  preferable  to  the  sea-level  type,  so-called,  for 
the  following  reasons : 

It  will  provide  a  safe  and  quicker  passage  for 
ships,  and,  therefore,  will  be  of  great  capacity. 

It  will  provide  beyond  question,  the  best  solu- 
tion of  the  vital  problem  of  how  safely  to  care  for 
the  flood-waters  of  the  Chagres  and  other  streanas. 

Provision  is  made  for  enlarging  its  capacity  to 
almost  any  extent  at  very  much  less  expense  of 
time  and  money  than  can  be  provided  for  by  any 
sea-level  plan. 

Its  cost  of  operation,  maintenance,  and  fixed 
charges  will  be  very  much  less  than  any  sea-level 
canal. 

The  time  and  cost  of  its  construction  will  not 
be  more  than  one-half  that  of  a  canal  of  the  sea- 
level  type. 

The  element  of  time  might  become,  in  case  of 
war,  actual  or  threatened,  one  of  such  importance 
that  measured,  not  by  years  but  by  months  or 
even  days,  the  entire  cost  of  the  Canal  would  seem 
trivial  in  comparison. 

Finally,  even  at  the  same  cost  in  time  and 
money  for  each  type,  I  would  favor  the  adoption 
of  the  high-level  lock-canal  plan  in  preference  to 
that  of  the  proposed  sea-level  canal. 

I,  therefore,  recommend  the  adoption  of  the 
plan  for  an  eighty-five-foot  summit-level  lock  ca- 
nal, as  set  forth  in  the  minority  report  of  the 
Consulting  Board  of  Engineers. 
Very  respectfully, 
John  F.  Stevens,  Chief  Engmeer, 
25 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

This  report  received  the  approval  of  all  mem- 
bers of  the  Commission  except  one. 

The  arguments  which  were  urged  pro  and  con, 
by  the  advocates  of  the  two  types,  would  fill  hun- 
dreds of  pages.  As  the  lock  type — the  one  adopt- 
ed— is  described  in  detail  elsewhere  in  this  vol- 
ume, a  brief  description  of  the  sea-level  type,  as 
reported  favorably  by  the  majority  of  the  Con- 
sulting Board,  will  be  given  here. 

The  channel  was  to  begin  at  the  41-foot  con- 
tour in  Limon  Bay,  on  the  Atlantic  side,  about 
5,000  feet  north  of  a  line  between  Toro  and  Man- 
zanillo  lights,  the  two  lights  which  mark  the  ap- 
proach to  the  Bay.  The  entrance  was  to  be  pro- 
tected by  two  diverting  jetties,  with  a  width  of 
opening  of  1,000  feet.  Thence  the  channel,  500 
feet  wide  at  the  bottom  and  40  feet  deep,  was  to 
run  in  a  straight  line  to  Mindi,  where  the  land 
canal  proper  was  to  begin,  protected  by  a  parallel 
jetty  on  the  west  and  by  Manzanilla  Island  on  the 
east. 

The  land  canal  was  designed  with  a  depth  of 
40  feet,  and  a  width  of  150  feet  at  the  bottom,  in 
earth,  with  such  side  slopes  as  the  nature  of  the 
ground  might  permit.  In  rock  the  section  was  to 
have  widths  of  200  and  208  feet,  at  the  bottom 
and  top  respectively. 

At  La  Boca  (now  Balboa)  the  Pacific  end,  the 
Canal  was  to  be  protected  by  a  tidal  lock  placed 

26 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

between  Ancon  and  Sosa  hills.  Such  a  lock  was 
necessary  as  there  is  a  difference  of  about  twenty 
feet  between  the  tides  of  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  oceans  at  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
those  of  the  latter  being  much  higher  than  the 
former. 

It  was  thought  that  this  difference  in  tides  in 
such  a  narrow  channel,  would  produce  currents 
that  would  make  navigation  by  large  vessels  haz- 
ardous, if  not  impracticable. 

Beyond  the  tidal  lock,  there  was  to  be  a  straight 
channel  projecting  into  the  Bay  of  Panama,  300 
feet  in  bottom  width,  3|  miles  long,  to  be  45-foot 
contour. 

At  Gamboa,  the  north  end  of  Culebra  Cut,  and 
the  point  where  the  Chagres  Eiver,  making  a 
right-angled  turn  to  the  north,  first  strikes  the 
line  of  the  Canal,  was  to  be  erected  an  immense 
dam,  either  of  masonry  or  earth,  or  both  com- 
bined, 180  feet  in  height.  The  object  of  this  dam 
was  to  control  the  flood-waters  of  the  river,  which 
have  reached  the  enormous  volume  of  65,000  cubic 
feet  per  second  during  the  past  forty  years.  This 
dam  would  have  formed  a  lake,  some  30  miles  in 
area,  with  a  maximum  depth  of  170  feet.  It  was 
to  be  provided  with  regulating  sluices,  so  that 
the  flood-waters  could  be  drawn  off  gradually,  in 
only  such  volumes  that  (as  estimated)  would  not 
interfere  with  the  navigation  of  the  Canal,  and 

27 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

still  be  sufficient  in  amount  to  prevent  any  over- 
flow of  the  dam  proper. 

In  addition  to  the  Chagres,  there  are  more  than 
thirty  other  streams,  large  and  small,  the  waters 
of  which  would  have  discharged  directly  into  the 
Canal.  Eegulation  of  the  floods  of  these  streams 
was  to  be  provided  for  in  various  ways,  mostly 
by  masonry  spillways  or  steps,  designed  to  break 
the  fall  of  the  water  immediately  before  its  en- 
trance into  the  Canal. 

When  any  canal  is  built  solely  for  purposes  of 
navigation,  it  follows  that  marked  points  of  dif- 
ferences which  affect  navigation,  are  to  be  most 
seriously  considered  in  balancing  the  merits  of 
different  types.  This  was  eminently  true  at  Pati- 
ama;  but  there  were  also  other  very  important 
considerations  there,  which  a  failure  to  properly 
appreciate,  would  have  resulted  in  serious  conse- 
quences, and  might  have  proved  fatal  to  the  suc- 
cess of  the  whole  project. 

As  planned,  the  sea-level  canal  was  to  be  only 
150  feet  in  width,  for  20i  miles ;  200  feet  for  the 
same  distance;  300  to  350  feet  for  8  miles;  and 
500  feet  for  10  miles.  Or,  for  nearly  one-half  of 
its  length  it  was  to  be  only  150  feet  in  width,  and 
for  five-sixths,  not  over  200  feet.  The  alignment 
through  this  narrow  channel  was  tortuous,  and 
for  long  distances  the  lower  part  of  the  section 
would  have  been  through  submerged  rock,  a  state 

28 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

of  affairs  constituting  an  absolute  menace  to  safe 
navigation. 

Contrasted  with  these  features,  are  those  of 
the  lock  type,  which  was  adopted:  for  a  distance 
of  nearly ^0  miles,  a  minimum  width  of  1,000  feet; 
for  16  miles  500  to  800  feet;  and  excluding  the 
locks  the  remaining  9  miles  of  300  feet,  with  in- 
finitely better  alignment.  Lake  Gatun  alone  fur- 
nishing miles  of  easy,  long  stretches  of  navigation, 
where  a  fair  rate  of  speed  can  be  maintained  for 
almost  any  class  of  vessel. 

Men  experienced  in  navigation  have  expressed 
the  opinion  that  it  would  have  been  extremely  haz- 
ardous, if  not  impracticable,  to  have  driven  a  ship 
of  any  large  size  through  the  sea-level  channel, 
as  designed.  A  certain  rate  of  speed  must  be 
maintained  to  provide  for  steerage,  and  at  such 
necessary  speeds,  the  danger  of  colliding  with 
the  banks  would  have  been  very  imminent.  Bear- 
ing this  fact  in  mind,  with  the  knowledge  that 
these  banks  would  have  been  of  rough,  and  in 
many  cases,  of  jagged  rocks  and  the  whole  situa- 
tion complicated  with  cross-currents  formed  by 
the  flood-waters  of  the  many  streams,  the  propo- 
sition seemed  one  of  more  than  doubtful  value. 

The  momentum  of  even  a  20,000-ton  ship  at  the 
low  speed  of  five  miles  per  hour,  striking  such 
rocks,  would  have  torn  out  every  plate  which  was 
in  contact.     The  consequences  of  disabling  and 

29 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

possibly  sinking  a  ship  in  a  narrow  channel,  can 
be  readily  appreciated.  It  would  have  been  se- 
rious enough  in  time  of  peace ;  in  time  of  war,  it 
might  have  decided  the  whole  issue  at  stake  for 
the  nation. 

It  has  been  argued  that  similar  calamities  can 
occur  in  the  locks  of  the  type  constructed.  It  is 
possible,  but  the  chances  are  so  extremely  remote 
as  to  be  practically  negligible.  In  the  locks  the 
ships  would  move  at  slow  speed,  not  under  their 
own  power,  but  towed  by  locomotives  on  shore, 
handled  by  men  especially  trained  for  the  purpose, 
along  lock  walls  perfectly  smooth,  and  through 
still  water.  This  problem  is  entirely  different  from 
the  one  which  would  have  been  encountered  in 
such  a  sea-level  canal  as  was  proposed. 

The  well-planned  and  well-wrought-out  precau- 
tions that  have  been  installed  to  provide  safety 
at  the  lock  gates,  would  seem  to  insure  suffi- 
ciently that  no  danger  should  be  apprehended  at 
those  points.  It  should  be  remembered  that  these 
locks  are  in  duplicate,  and  that  the  disabling  of 
one  set  does  not  mean  the  closing  of  the  Canal. 

As  far  as  the  protection  of  the  locks  in  war  time 
is  concerned,  the  same  problem  would  have  arisen, 
no  matter  what  type  had  been  chosen ;  either  type 
is  vulnerable  and  could  be  put  out  of  commission, 
if  not  held  by  force.  A  lock  was  considered  an 
essential  feature  of  the  proposed  sea-level  type, 

30 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

and  that  was  to  be  located  within  easy  short-dis- 
tance range  of  comparatively  small  battleship 
guns. 

The  question  as  to  what  effect  probable  slides 
in  Culebra  Cut  would  have  on  any  canal  was  given 
some  consideration  in  discussions,  but  such  effect 
was  not  foreseen  to  its  full  extent,  as  is  evidenced 
from  the  developments  which  have  already  taken 
place. 

These  slides  are  serious  enough,  in  the  case  of 
the  present  type  of  canal,  and  what  they  would 
have  been  in  case  of  the  sea-level,  with  a  depth 
of  eighty-five  f^et  more,  can  somewhat  be  imag- 
ined. They  are  occurring  along  the  very  deepest 
part  of  the  cut,  and  no  one  realized  the  extent  to 
which  they  would  occur.  While  a  quick  remedy 
may  be  found,  so  far  none  has  been  proposed  that 
is  publicly  known.  The  only  one  being  in  opera- 
tion at  the  present  time  is  to  let  the  slides  come 
down,  removing  the  material  by  dredging  as  fast 
as  possible.  Even  by  this  method,  it  has  so  far 
been  impracticable  to  maintain  either  the  full  nor- 
mal width  or  depth  of  the  Canal.  This  condition 
would  have  been  largely  aggravated  by  the 
greater  depth  of  the  sea-level  type.  Bad  as  the 
situation  is,  it  would  have  been  very  much  worse 
had  the  lower-level  type  been  adopted. 

Undoubtedly  engineering  skill  could  have 
planned  and  built  the  Gamboa  Dam  so  that,  ex- 

31 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

cepting  througli  some  extraordinary  convulsion 
of  nature,  it  would  have  been  more  than  reasona- 
bly safe  from  destruction  and  consequent  disaster 
to  a  sea-level  canal.  But  the  fact  that  there  was 
such  an  immense  body  of  water,  with  an  elevation 
of  170  feet  above  the  Canal  level,  subjected  to  the 
tremendous  floods  which  prevail  in  the  Chagres 
River,  and  less  than  a  mile  from  the  line  of  navi- 
gation, would  naturally  cause  a  feeling  of  appre- 
hension as  to  what  might  happen. 

The  argument  can  of  course  be  advanced  that  a 
similar  criticism  can  be  made  in  regard  to  'the 
Gatun  Dam,  as  planned  and  built,  probably  the 
most  important  feature  of  the  lock  type.  Such  a 
criticism  is  a  just  one,  to  a  certain  extent.  But 
the  depth  of  water  against  the  Gatun  Dam  is,  and 
never  can  be,  more  than  one-half  that  what 
it  would  have  been  at  Gamboa — a  difference  of 
thirty-six  pounds  per  square  inch  in  favor  of 
Gatun. 

As  far  as  the  effect  of  earthquakes  is  concerned, 
the  Gatun  Dam,  built  entirely  of  earth,  of  such 
tremendous  proportions,  represents,  it  is  believed, 
the  very  best  construction  that  the  skill  and  expe- 
rience of  centuries  has  evolved  to  prevent,  or  at 
least  to  minimize,  the  effect  of  shocks.  Such 
would  not  have  been  the  result  at  either  place  had 
a  masonry,  or  a  combination  of  masonry  and 
earth,  structure  been  built.    It  might  have  been 

32 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

practicable  to  have  made  the  Gamboa  Dam  en- 
tirely of  earth,  but  no  decision  was  ever  reached 
on  this  very  important  point. 

The  matter  of  an  ample  water  supply  for  any 
high-level  lock  type  of  canal  was  given  grave 
consideration.  The  average  yearly  rainfall  does 
not  vary  greatly  on  the  Isthmus,  and  in  computing 
the  amount  of  water  available  for  lockages,  80 
per  cent,  of  the  amount  which  has  prevailed  as 
an  average  during  the  three  dryest  months  on  rec- 
ord was  taken  as  a  safe  assumption.  This  net 
amount  is  the  normal  discharge  into  the  high- 
level  from  its  tributary  watershed.  To  this  was 
added  the  amount  that  could  be  obtained  by  rais- 
ing the  level  of  Gatun  Lake  only  one  foot  above 
normal,  at  the  end  of  the  wet  season;  and  also 
that  which  would  be  produced  by  drawing  the  lake 
down  three  feet  below  its  normal  level. 

After  allowing  for  evaporation,  leakage  at 
gates,  infiltration,  power  for  gates,  lighting,  etc., 
there  remains  ample  water  under  the  assumed 
conditions  for  twenty-six  lockings  per  day,  or, 
based  upon  passing  only  a  single  ship  of  3,000 
tons  at  each  lockage,  a  yearly  capacity  of  28,500,- 
000  tons.  With  ships  of  5,000  tons  each,  there 
would  be  a  yearly  capacity  of  47,500,000  tons.  But 
as  there  is  room  in  the  locks  to  handle  two  or 
more  small  ships,  such  theoretical  possible  ton- 
nage as  indicated  above  can  be  largely  increased 

33 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

in  practice.  The  lock  walls  were,  however,  built 
two  feet  higher  than  originally  contemplated, 
which  would  permit  a  greater  allowable  oscilla- 
tion in  the  lake-level  and  increase  the  number  of 
lockages. 

Should  the  tonnage  passing  the  Canal  ever  in- 
crease beyond  the  present  water  supply,  the 
amount  can  be  largely  increased  by  the  construc- 
tion of  a  reservoir  dam  at  Alhajuela,  a  few  miles 
up  the  Chagres  River,  where  a  most  perfect  nat- 
ural site  for  a  dam  on  rock  foundations  exists.  A 
description  of  the  water  supply  for  the  lock  type 
has  been  given  for  the  reason  that,  as  the  sea- 
level  type  would  provide  an  unlimited  supply,  the 
fact  that  the  lock  type  is  amply  provided  also,  is 
very  germane  to  the  discussion. 

The  character  of  the  foundation  of  the  Gatun 
locks  and  dam  was  the  subject  of  a  long-drawn- 
out  and  somewhat  heated  controversy.  The  peo- 
ple who  were  responsible  for  the  adoption  of  the 
lock  type,  were  early  satisfied  as  to  its  stability 
and  permanence.  But  in  deference  to  continual 
clamor,  raised  by  the  advocates  of  the  sea-level 
type,  further  and  more  exhaustive  tests  were 
made,  after  the  work  of  construction  was  well  un- 
der way.  The  result  of  these  later  tests  fully  con- 
firmed the  previous  judgment,  and  nothing  occur- 
ring during  construction  or  since  has  raised  any 
doubts  as  to  its  correctness.    As  far  as  the  foun- 

34 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

dations  are  concerned,  the  works  should  stand  as 
long  as  do  the  surrounding  hills. 

The  time  of  passage  through  the  Canal  is  a  very 
important  matter.  There  are  many  factors  which 
affect  this  time,  and  in  making  practical  compari- 
sons between  the  two  types  under  discussion,  the 
balance  is  strikingly  in  favor  of  the  lock  type. 

In  such  a  sea-level  canal  as  proposed,  it  would 
have  been  necessary  for  one  of  two  ships  of  me- 
dium or  large  size,  about  to  meet,  to  stop  and 
make  fast  to  mooring  posts  while  the  other  passed 
at  reduced  speed.  This  is  done  in  the  Suez  Canal, 
regular  mooring  places  being  supplied,  excepting 
through  sections  where  the  canal  is  in  rock,  where 
no  meetings  are  allowed.  Such  a  procedure  pro- 
duces certain  delays,  which  would  have  become 
more  and  more  serious  as  traffic  increased.  The 
narrow,  tortuous  channel,  with  its  cross-currents 
and  frequent  stoppages,  would  ^lave  entailed  de- 
lays at  least  equal  to  those  caused  by  the  locks  of 
the  present  Canal. 

A  theoretical  calculation  was  early  made  as  to 
the  comparative  time  which  would  be  required  for 
passage  by  two  types  of  vessels :  one,  540  feet  in 
length,  60-feet  beam,  drawing  32  feet  of  water — 
result  by  sea-level,  at  the  rate  of  20  ships  per 
day,  time  required  10^  hours;  by  lock,  9tV  hours; 
one  of  type  700  feet  in  length,  75-feet  beam,  draw- 
ing 37  feet  of  water — result,  by  sea-level,  at  the 

35 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

rate  of  same  number  of  ships  per  day,  time  re- 
quired 14: i\  hours;  by  lock,  10 3%  hours,  speed  in 
every  case  being  at  5  miles  per  hour. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  ships  have  already  been 
passed  through  the  Canal  in  eight  hours,  and  it 
is  entirely  probable  that  this  time  may  be  mate- 
rially shortened  when  speed  conditions  are  more 
fully  understood,  and  the  operating  force  is  more 
experienced. 

It  is  also  a  fair  assumption  that  in  the  case  of 
the  sea-level  canal,  ships  arriving  at  terminals 
late  in  the  day,  and  desiring  passage,  would  have 
had  to  lay  up  until  morning  of  the  succeeding 
day,  as  it  is  not  believed  that  it  would  be  prac- 
ticable to  navigate  such  a  channel  by  night.  Cases 
of  this  kind  probably  would  have  been  the  excep- 
tion, but  it  is  certain  many  would  have  occurred. 
The  cost  of  such  delays  in  each  individual  case, 
would  have  been  a  burden,  and  in  a  year's  aggre- 
gate, would  have  capitalized  to  many  millions  of 
dollars.  All  such  delay  and  expense  can  be  ob- 
viated in  the  type  as  built. 

With  regard  to  relative  capacity,  it  has  been 
shown  conclusively  that  the  lock  type  can  handle 
for  years  to  come  all  the  traffic  which  the  most  op- 
timistic forecast  will  justify,  and  that  when,  if 
ever,  the  time  comes  that  it  cannot,  it  will  be  en- 
tirely practicable  to  rebuild  the  Canal,  to  one  of 
a  true  sea-level  type,  and  carry  on  traffic  coinci- 

36 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

dently  with  such  reconstruction.  And  by  so  doing 
the  enormous  additional  cost  entailed  will  be 
borne  by  future  generations,  and  not  by  the  pres- 
ent, as  should  be  the  case. 

But  while  it  has  been  shown  by  the  discussion 
so  far  conducted,  that  the  advantages  of  the  lock 
type  far  outweighed  those  of  such  a  sea-level  type 
as  was  recommended,  there  remains  the  question 
of  comparative  cost  and  time  of  completion  of  the 
two  types. 

In  this,  as  in  all  others,  the  preponderance  of 
what  may  safely  be  termed  facts  is  very  largely 
in  favor  of  the  lock  type. 

All  estimates  as  to  the  cost  of  any  project  which 
are  made  in  advance  of  actual  construction  are 
merely  intelligent  guesses,  based  upon  the  most 
reliable  data  that  technical  knowledge  and  expe- 
rience afford.  Generally  such  data  are  available, 
and  fairly  accurate  forecasts  can  and  should  be 
made,  in  ordinary  cases. 

But  the  Panama  Canal  was  no  ordinary  case. 
Its  very  magnitude ;  its  complexity  of  details ;  the 
unknown  elements  entering  into  it ;  the  discourag- 
ing results  which  had  been  achieved  by  previous 
attempts  at  construction,  all  made  up  an  extreme- 
ly uncertain  proposition. 

Added  to  all  these  were  the  factors  of  climate, 
sanitation,  inferior  labor,  distance  from  base  of 
supplies,  and  it  must  be  added,  up  to  a  certain 

37 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

time,  failure  to  evolve  a  practical  working  organ- 
ization, all  making  np  a  mass  of  uncertainties,  out 
of  which  no  man  or  class  of  men  could  be  certain 
of  deducing  more  than  a  rough  guess.  This  state- 
ment may  be  questioned  by  some  eminent  engi- 
neers, but  it  was  a  fact  nevertheless. 

As  is  often  the  case,  even  where  conditions  are 
altogether  better  in  every  respect,  and  data  are 
available,  the  estimates  as  made  for  both  lock 
and  sea-level  types  were  too  low,  as  has  been 
proven  by  the  actual  construction  of  the  present 
Canal.  It  should  be  said,  however,  in  reference  to 
this  that  important  changes,  involving  increases 
in  cost  amounting  to  many  millions  of  dollars, 
were  made  in  the  details  of  the  Canal,  some  of 
which,  without  doubt,  added  to  its  value,  while 
others,  possibly,  did  not. 

But  admitting  this  increase  over  the  estimate 
in  the  cost  of  the  lock  type,  it  is  a  fact  which  can- 
not be  successfully  questioned,  that  a  much  heav- 
ier increase  would  inevitably  have  been  entailed 
had  the  sea-level  type  been  chosen. 

Experience  is  a  great  teacher,  and  it  is  safe  to 
say  that  there  is  not  a  man  whose  word  would 
carry  weight,  who  was  actively  connected  with  the 
building  of  the  Canal,  from  1905  to  1914,  but  who 
will  go  on  record  that  in  his  opinion  a  sea-level 
canal,  even  of  the  very  unsatisfactory  type  pro- 
posed,   would    have    cost    probably    double    the 

38 


SEA-LEVEL  VERSUS  LOCK-TYPE  CANAL 

amount  that  has  been  expended  upon  the  lock         ^ 
type. 

It  is  the  consensus  of  opinion  among  the  best- 
informed  men,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  in  the  re- 
port of  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Commission, 
under  date  of  January  26,  1906,  already  quoted, 
that  the  selection  of  the  85-feet  lock  type  for  the 
Canal  was  eminently  wise,  and  that  such  wisdom 
will  become  more  and  more  apparent  as  time 
goes  on. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  reference  to  a  sea- 
level  tjrpe,  of  the  kind  proposed,  has  been  made 
several  times.  As  far  as  value  is  concerned,  if  a 
real  sea-level  canal  of  a  width  sufficient  to  assure 
open,  free  navigation,  could  have  been  built  with-  • 

in  a  reasonable  limit  of  time,  and  with  a  permis- 
sible amount  of  money,  then  the  problem  would 
have  been  simplified,  and  the  decision  would  un- 
doubtedly have  been  different.  While  the  skill 
and  resources  of  the  United  States  are  ample, 
these  resources  could  not  have  been  drawn  upon 
with  the  consent  of  our  people  through  Congress 
for  such  enormous  amounts  as  the  construction 
of  the  so-called  **  Straits  of  Panama '^  would  have 
entailed. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE  RECONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA 
RAILROAD 

The  importance  of  the  Panama  Eailroad  as  a 
necessary  adjunct  in  the  construction  of  the  Canal, 
under  whatever  type  of  canal  might  be  adopted, 
was  early  and  clearly  recognized  by  the  United 
States  Government,  and  its  control  and  ownership 
were  taken  over  by  the  Government  before  any 
construction  work  was  undertaken,  or  even 
planned.  Lying  immediately  along  the  line  of 
the  proposed  canal,  it  afforded  the  only  practi- 
cable machine  for  handling  the  commercial  busi- 
ness, which,  for  more  than  fifty  years,  had  been 
passing  over  its  rails.  This  business  was  to  be 
very  largely  augmented  by  the  great  traffic,  in 
the  shape  of  material  and  supplies  required  in 
canal  construction.  It  was  also  called  upon  to 
handle  the  millions  of  cubic  yards  of  waste,  rock, 
and  earth  from  the  Culebra  Cut. 

In  passing  through  the  backbone  of  the  Cordil- 
leras, the  construction  of  the  Canal  required  the 
excavation  of  a  mass  of  material  of  over  one  hun- 
dred millions  of  cubic  yards,  nine  miles  in  length, 
and  of  a  maximum  depth  of  360  feet  at  its  highest 

40 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

point.  As  comparatively  little  of  the  immense 
bulk  of  this  cutting  could  be  disposed  of  adjacent 
to  it,  by  far  the  greater  part  had  to  be  handled 
long  distances  north  and  south,  into  the  Gatun 
Dam,  into  the  works  at  Balboa  (the  southern  ter- 
minal of  the  Canal  and  of  the  railroad),  and  into 
spoil  or  waste  banks,  wherever  they  could  be  most 
advantageously  and  economically  located.  Thus 
the  Panama  Railroad  was  an  absolute  necessity 
in  the  carrying-out  of  the  work  of  canal  construc- 
tion, and  well  has  it  proved  its  worth. 

Originally  built  as  a  single  track  of  five-foot 
gauge,  it  had  been  fairly  well  maintained  during 
more  than  fifty  years  of  its  existence,  as  far  as 
track  conditions  went,  but  it  was  sadly  lacking  in 
many  other  important  features.  With  but  a  single 
track,  practically  no  sidings  or  station  buildings, 
a  worn-out  telegraph  line,  no  terminals  worthy 
the  name,  and  with  motive  power  and  rolling  stock 
obsolete  years  before,  it  presented  a  problem 
which  had  to  be  grappled  with  and  solved  without 
loss  of  time.  Trafiic,  both  commercial  and  that 
pertaining  to  the  Canal,  was  about  at  a  standstill 
in  the  summer  of  1905.  Thousands  of  tons  of 
freight  were  piled  in  cars,  on  docks  and  in  ware- 
houses, some  of  which  had  lain  from  three  to 
eighteen  months  in  the  hands  of  the  railway  com- 
pany, and  in  many  cases,  even  the  shipping  papers 
and  records  of  this  freight  were  lost. 

41 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Owing  to  the  long  delay  in  deciding  upon  the 
type  of  the  canal,  whether  sea-level  or  lock,  it  was 
impossible  at  the  beginning  of  construction,  to 
rebuild  the  railroad  upon  its  final  definite  loca- 
tion. If  the  former  type  for  the  canal  were 
chosen,  then,  comparatively  few  of  the  fifty  miles 
of  the  railroad  needed  to  be  relocated.  If  the  lat- 
ter, then  some  forty  miles  must  be  relocated  and 
built  at  a  safe  working  height  about  the  85-foot 
level  of  the  proposed  Gatun  Lake,  and  of  the 
waters  of  the  completed  canal  through  Culebra 
Cut.  As  the  necessities  of  the  case  admitted  of 
no  delay,  it  was  decided  to  double-track,  and 
otherwise  improve  and  add  to  the  existing  facili- 
ties of  the  road,  upon  its  then  present  location, 
and  later  to  rebuild  it  upon  its  final  location, 
when  the  necessary  data  for  such  action  should 
become  available. 

This  explanation  of  the  situation  which  con- 
fronted the  engineers  in  1905,  will  make  clear  the 
fact  that  the  rebuilding  of  the  Panama  Eailroad 
involved  two  entirely  distinct  problems:  one  to 
place  the  road  in  proper  shape  to  handle  ordinary 
current  trafiic,  and  the  construction  of  the  Canal 
proper,  and  the  other,  to  rebuild  it  for  future 
needs  of  the  years  to  come,  after  the  completion 
of  the  great  waterway. 

The  work  of  rejuvenation,  or  rebuilding  the  rail- 
road—the solution  of  the  first  problem — was  be- 

42 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

gun  promptly  during  the  summer  of  1905,  and  was 
vigorously  pressed  through  1905  and  1906.  Em- 
bankments and  excavations  were  widened ;  bridges 
and  culverts  renewed  and  rebuilt  to  proper  width 
for  double  track;  an  entire  new  telegraph  line, 
using  old  rails  for  poles,  was  erected,  and  new 
sidings  and  yards  of  capacity,  sufficient,  and 
properly  planned  to  take  care  of  not  only  the 
immense,  but  great  variety,  of  business  to  be 
cared  for — such  variety  introducing  complications 
which  are  seldom  met  with  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  railway  operations. 

Large  amounts  of  new  and  heavy  rail  were  laid, 
ties  by  the  shipload  were  brought  in,  miles  of  old 
and  new  track  were  ballasted,  new  stations  and 
other  accessories  were  installed,  and  a  complete 
set  of  new  shops,  provided  with  modern  machin- 
ery, especially  designed  for  the  rapid  and  eco- 
nomical repair  of  locomotives  and  cars,  were  con- 
structed. Orders  were  placed  for  the  necessary 
motive  power  and  equipment,  which  were  received 
and  placed  in  service  within  a  reasonable  length 
of  time,  considering  the  distance  of  the  work  from 
the  base  of  supplies,  and  the  necessity  of  con- 
ducting a  great  part  of  the  negotiations  by  cable. 

The  only  delay  that  was  encountered,  other  than 
the  minor  ones  arising  from  the  constantly  in- 
creasing traffic  to  be  handled  while  the  recon- 
struction and  improvement  were  being  carried  on, 

43 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

came  from  the  apparent  ignorance  or  the  failure 
of  the  contracting  car  company  to  understand,  or 
to  provide  for  the  existing  conditions.  The  neces- 
sary cars  were  built  in  the  United  States,  and 
shipped  ^^ knocked  down,'^  to  be  erected  at  Colon 
by  the  car  company.  This  delay  was  largely  over- 
come by  the  railroad  company  taking  prompt 
action,  by  supplying  labor,  plant  and  supervision 
necessary  to  complete  the  contract. 

New  and  large  modern  docks,  warehouses  and 
coaling  plants  were  constructed  at  Colon  and  Bal- 
boa, of  capacity  ample  to  receive  and  transfer  eco- 
nomically the  very  many  varieties  of  materials, 
supplies  and  equipment,  coal,  etc.,  from  ship  to 
rail,  and  well-arranged  terminals  were  built  at 
both  Atlantic  and  Pacific  ports.  During  all  of  this 
time,  the  work  of  classifying,  sorting  out  and 
finally  disposing  of,  as  far  as  possible,  the  vast 
amount  of  freight,  which  had  by  reason  of  ineffi- 
cient service  been  allowed  to  accumulate,  was  suc- 
cessfully carried  out.  As  portions  of  this  freight 
were  found  to  belong  to  consignees,  at  almost 
eve^ry  port  from  San  Diego,  California,  to  Anto- 
fagasta,  Chile,  it  can  perhaps  be  realized  how  in- 
tricate and  serious  the  problem  really  was. 

The  personnel  of  the  working  force  of  the  rail- 
road was  thoroughly  reorganized  from  manager 
to  foreman.  New  and  experienced  men  of  all 
grades  of  railway  service  were  brought  from  the 

44 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

United  States  and  modern  systems  of  accounting 
and  storekeeping  were  installed,  so  that  the 
Panama  Railroad  can  truthfully  be  said  to  have 
then  become  what  it  imperatively  had  to  be — 
a  proper  machine  to  undertake  the  great  work, 
which  was  so  suddenly  thrust  upon  it. 

As  an  example  of  the  various  unique  situations 
which  had  to  be  met  promptly  and  without  failure, 
may  be  mentioned  one,  which  from  its  importance, 
showed  strikingly  the  readiness  and  versatility 
of  the  railroad  management  to  meet  all  crises. 

The  city  of  Colon  had  for  years  been  supplied 
with  water  by  a  small  and  wholly  inefficient  plant 
belonging  to  the  railroad  company.  Like  much 
of  the  property  of  the  company,  this  plant  had 
been  allowed  to  deteriorate,  until  it  had  arrived 
at  a  condition  where  the  drinking  and  culinary 
requirements  of  the  people  of  Colon  were  barely 
provided  for,  to  say  nothing  of  their  protection 
from  dangers  of  fire,  or  their  ordinary  hygienic 
necessities. 

A  new,  modern  system  was  being  constructed, 
but  it  was  not  humanly  possible  to  complete  this 
plant  until  late  in  the  season  of  1906.  During  the 
long,  unusually  dry  summer  of  that  year,  the  old 
system  began  to  show  symptoms  of  a  total  col- 
lapse, the  serious  consequences  of  which,  largely 
aggravated  by  the  rapid  increase  in  population, 
would  have  been,  unless  prevented  by  extraor- 

45 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

dinary   efforts,   nothing  less  than   a   disastrous 
calamity. 

The  railroad  company  had  a  few  old  tanks 
mounted  on  cars,  which  could  be  utilized  as  water 
carriers,  but  these  were  of  altogether  too  small 
capacity  to  meet  the  exigency.  It  had,  however, 
just  received  a  few  refrigerator  cars,  which  were 
calked  and  coopered  up  until  they  were  practically 
watertight.  These  cars  were  put  into  special  serv- 
ice as  water-trains,  and  by  dint  of  unremitting 
supervision,  night  and  day,  the  company  managed 
to  haul  from  its  distant  tanks  out  on  the  line, 
sufficient  water  to  take  care  of  the  emergency 
until  the  new  plant  went  into  operation.  Thus 
the  situation  was  saved. 

As  an  important  part  of  the  duties  of  the  rail- 
road company  was  the  purchase,  transportation 
and  distribution  of  all  the  food  supplies,  not  only 
for  its  own  employees,  but  for  the  entire  force 
employed  in  Canal  construction — an  aggregate  of 
fifty  thousand  persons — unusual  facilities  were 
necessary  to  enable  it  to  carry  on  this  work  suc- 
cessfully, remembering  always  that  it  was  two 
thousand  miles  from  the  base  of  supplies,  and  in 
a  tropical  climate.  The  Panama  Steamship  Com- 
pany was  the  property  of  the  railway  company, 
and  was  managed  by  its  officials  and  formed  the 
link  between  Colon  and  New  York,  from  which 
port  nearly  all  food  supplies  were  shipped. 

46 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAIVIA  RAILROAD 

Meats,  vegetables,  eggs,  milk,  and  similar  sup- 
plies all  had  to  be  forwarded  from  producers  in 
the  United  States,  to  ultimate  consumers  on  the 
Isthmus,  under  refrigeration.  Suitable  plants  for 
such  purpose  were  installed  on  the  ships  of  the 
company,  and  all  such  supplies  were  landed  into 
Colon,  in  as  perfect  condition  as  the  day  they  left 
the  United  States.  But  this  part  of  the  work  was 
the  easiest  to  successfully  accomplish.  The  care 
and  the  proper  distribution  of  the  perishable  food 
after  its  arrival  on  the  Isthmus,  in  a  tropical, 
humid  climate,  where,  night  and  day,  the  mercury 
ranged  from  80°  to  95°,  presented  a  problem  re- 
quiring careful  thought  and  thorough  preparation. 

Coincident  .with  the  renovation  and  improve- 
ment of  the  railroad  proper,  as  a  transportation 
machine,  during  1905  and  1906,  the  company 
planned  and  built  on  the  docks  at  Colon,  a  large, 
thoroughly  modern,  concrete  refrigeration  and 
ice-making  plant,  into  which  all  supplies  were 
handled  directly  from  the  plants  on  the  ships, 
without  contact  with  the  outer  air,  three  sepa- 
rate gradations  of  temperature  being  provided  to 
care  properly  for  every  variety  of  food.  At  this 
plant  each  and  every  parcel,  no  matter  how  small, 
required  for  morning  delivery,  by  the  thousands 
of  employees  of  the  Canal,  or  railroad  company, 
was  separated,  packed  and  forwarded  by  special 
train  of  refrigeration  cars  across  the  width  of  the 

47 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Isthmus.  So  perfectly  were  the  plans  of  the  rail- 
road conceived,  that  the  last  of  such  food  supplies 
were  delivered  at  Panama  and  Balboa,  at  the 
Pacific  end  of  the  works,  not  later  than  nine 
o'clock  each  morning. 

In  connection  with  this  plant,  the  railroad  com- 
pany installed  a  modern  bakery,  capable  of  pro- 
ducing forty  thousand  loaves  of  bread,  large  quan- 
tities of  pastry,  etc.,  each  day ;  also,  a  thoroughly 
up-to-date  laundry,  which,  in  addition  to  caring 
for  the  work  of  more  than  forty  hotels  and  eating- 
houses,  handled  a  vast  amount  of  necessary  work 
for  private  parties,  at  reasonable  charges.  The 
installation  of  immense  commissary  store  build- 
ings required  a  stock  of  over  half  a  million  dollars 
in  value,  of  every  conceivable  kind  and  character. 

This  general  description  has  been  given  of  these 
accessories,  as  their  installation  was  properly  a 
part  of  the  necessary  rejuvenation  and  improve- 
ments of  the  railroad,  without  which  its  work 
could  not  have  been  done,  and  without  such  work 
the  Canal  construction  could  not  have  been  car- 
ried out.  And  all  of  these  features  of  the  recon- 
structed railroad  were  planned  and  carried  out 
in  1905  and  1906.  The  phantom  railroad,  which 
existed  early  in  1905,  unable  to  conduct  properly 
its  ordinary  commercial  business,  had  been  at  the 
beginning  of  1907  transformed  physically  and 
otherwise,  into   a  modern,  high-class,   smoothly 

48 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

running  transportation  machine,  and  capable  of 
meeting  the  extraordinary  demands  made  npon  it. 
In  amount  and  complicated  variety  of  service  re- 
quired probably  no  similar  undertaking  can  be 
found  in  the  annals  of  the  railway  world. 

As  originally  built,  the  Panama  Railroad  from 
Colon,  its  Atlantic  terminal,  on  its  way  to  the 
Pacific  followed  the  low-lying  swamps  of  the  lower 
Chagres  River  Valley,  reaching  the  northern  foot 
of  the  Cordilleras,  at  a  point  called  Gamboa,  at 
which  point,  the  Chagres  River,  coming  from  its 
source  among  the  mountains  far  to  the  east,  makes 
an  abrupt  turn  to  the  north  and  northeast  on  its 
way  to  the  Atlantic.  From  this  point,  the  line 
of  the  railroad  climbed  by  comparatively  easy 
grades,  up  and  across  the  summit,  through  prac- 
tically the  lowest  point,  dropping  down  to  the 
level  of  the  swamps  on  the  west  side  of  the  Cor- 
dilleras, at  a  point  just  south  of  Pedro  Miguel. 
The  entire  distance  through  the  mountain  range 
was  about  ten  miles.  For  the  greater  part  of 
this  distance,  the  railroad  did  not  conflict  with  the 
line  or  elevation  of  the  Canal.  The  retention  of 
this  piece  of  the  railroad,  as  a  part  of  the  main 
line,  would  have  forced  a  crossing  of  the  Canal 
by  a  bridge  in  the  Culebra  Cut,  a  proposition 
to  be  avoided,  if  practicable  to  do  so. 

The  adoption  of  the  lock  type  of  canal,  with 
the  dam  and  locks  at  Gatun,  distant  some  seven 

49 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

miles  from  Colon,  together  with  the  locks  at  or 
near  Pedro  Miguel,  at  the  south  end  of  Culebra 
Cut,  created  Gatun  Lake.  This  lake  in  connection 
with  Culebra  Cut,  formed  a  body  of  water  some 
thirty-two  miles  in  length,  and  would  have  sub- 
merged miles  of  the  track  of  the  railroad,  to 
depths  ranging  from  forty  to  seventy-five  feet. 
In  addition  to  this,  several  miles  at  each  end  of 
the  lake,  approaching  Gatun  from  the  north,  and 
Pedro  Miguel  from  the  south,  had  to  be  relocated 
and  rebuilt  on  proper  gradients,  to  overcome  the 
height  of  the  lake  waters,  and  to  place  the  per- 
manent railroad  at  a  safe  working  elevation  above 
them. 

All  these  conditions  meant  that  a  low-lying  line 
of  railroad,  encountering  no  serious  or  expensive 
obstacles  in  its  construction,  must  be  replaced  for 
many  miles  by  a  new  high-level  line,  which  must 
find  supporting  ground,  as  far  as  practicable, 
along  the  lower  slopes  and  spurs  of  the  Cordil- 
leras, through  which  countless  lateral  streams, 
large  and  small,  found  their  way  to  discharge  into 
the  Chagres  Eiver,  the  great  drainage  sewer  of 
the  entire  district.  The  fact  that  both  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  terminal  cities  of  the  railroad — Colon 
and  Panama — were  located  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Canal,  made  it  at  once  obvious  that  the  new  rail- 
road must  follow,  for  its  entire  length,  the  same 
side,  to  avoid  any  crossing  of  the  Canal  itself. 

50 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

Accordingly,  with  the  then  known  conditions  of 
the  problem,  the  preliminary  surveys  for  the  new 
line  were  begun  in  1906,  and  continued  during 
that  year  and  through  the  early  part  of  1907, 
when  a  trial  location  was  completed.  Actual  work 
of  construction  upon  small  sections  was  then  com- 
menced, leaving  the  details  over  the  greater  part 
of  the  line  to  be  worked  out,  as  far  as  standards 
and  consequent  cost  were  concerned.  In  con- 
sideration of  these  governing  features,  the  per- 
tinent question  of  the  future  use  and  consequent 
value  of  the  new  line  became  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. 

The  then  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Canal  Commis- 
sion, whose  duty  it  was  to  decide  upon  the  charac- 
ter of  the  line,  held  the  belief  that  once  the  Canal 
was  put  into  operation,  aside  from  local  passenger 
travel,  supplemented  to  a  small  extent  by  tourists, 
the  business  that  the  road  might  do  would  be 
extremely  light.  Consequently,  only  such  mini- 
mum amounts  should  be  expended  upon  its  con- 
struction as  would  result  in  a  road  good  enough 
to  handle  such  comparatively  unimportant  traffic. 
Whether  these  views  were  held  by  the  parties  suc- 
ceeding him  or  not,  the  new  line  has  been  built, 
being  completed  in  May,  1912,  after  about  ^ve 
years  of  actual  construction  work,  at  a  cost  of 
$9,000,000  or  at  an  average  of  about  $200,000  per 
mile  of  single  track. 

51 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

It  is  but  fair  to  say,  in  explanation  of  this  high 
cost,  that  it  was  originally  intended  to  locate  the 
line  through  the  mountains,  along  the  berme  or 
flat  space,  left  below  the  upper  slope  of  the  Cule- 
bra  Cut.  The  development  of  the  slides  along  this 
portion  to  the  cut,  however,  necessitated  the 
abandonment  of  this  route. 

This  resulted  in  a  location  of  the  line  back  from 
the  cut  for  several  miles,  through  a  heavy  moun- 
tain country,  increasing  the  cost  of  this  particular 
section,  it  is  said,  some  $1,200,000  over  what  it 
would  have  been  if  laid  through  the  cut  proper. 
Without  any  intention  to  criticize  adversely  the 
expenditure  incurred,  it  is  a  question  if  several 
millions  could  not  have  been  saved,  and  a  road 
amply  sufficient  in  character  have  resulted.  The 
cost  of  any  road  built  across  the  Isthmus,  and 
under  the  conditions  forced  by  natural  and  arti- 
ficial obstacles,  would  have  been  extremely  heavy, 
and  the  suggestion  here  made  is,  that  possibly  the 
road  as  completed  is  of  a  higher  class  and  conse- 
quent cost,  than  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
called  for. 

All  the  business  that  the  Panama  Eailroad  is 
handling  today — January,  1915 — is  its  passenger- 
and  local  freight-train  traffic  for  Isthmian  points. 
And,  as  it  was  recently  announced,  unofficially, 
that  the  railroad  would  operate  its  ships  through 
the  Canal,  the  probability  is  that,  to  avoid  re- 

52 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

handling,  the  greater  part  o^  the  latter  business 
will  be  diverted  from  the  railroad. 

A  part  of  the  old  main  line  of  the  railroad,  lying 
west  of  Culebra  Cut,  has  been  retained,  being  con- 
nected with  the  new  main  line  by  a  pontoon  swing- 
bridge  across  the  Canal,  near  the  south  end  of 
the  cut.  Movements  should  be  infrequent  over 
this  piece  of  track  as  it  is  operated  simply  as  a 
branch.  Possibly,  it  may  be  abandoned  entirely 
in  the  future,  as  the  necessity  for  its  retention 
may  disappear. 

Generally  speaking,  the  floors  of  the  valleys, 
which  the  line  had  to  cross  by  high  embankments 
in  order  to  maintain  the  requisite  elevation  above 
the  waters  of  the  Canal,  were  composed  of  soft 
clay  and  vegetable  matter  of  varying  thicknesses. 
Before  reaching  a  solid  foundation,  such  blankets 
of  treacherous  material  proved  of  insufficient 
strength  to  carry  such  embankments,  necessitating 
the  placing  of  large  extra  amounts  of  material, 
before  the  roadbed  could  be  brought  to,  and  held 
to,  its  proper  elevation.  One  of  these  embank- 
ments contained  5,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material. 
The  cuttings  are,  as  a  rule,  heavy,  and  taken 
altogether,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  new  line, 
while  involving  no  extraordinary  technical  en- 
gineering features,  presented  problems  requiring 
infinite  patience  in  execution  and  large  amounts 
in  expenditure. 

53 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

There  were  no  radical  departures  in  methods 
of  construction,  from  those  which  obtain  in  carry- 
ing out  similar  pieces  of  railway  work  in  the 
United  States.  Wherever  possible,  machinery  de- 
veloped and  provided  for  the  construction  of  the 
Canal,  was  utilized  to  its  fullest  extent  in  prose- 
cution of  the  work.  This  machinery,  and  in  fact, 
all  of  the  plant,  was  of  a  type  representing  the 
latest  and  most  scientific  development  which 
human  skill,  supplemented  by  practically  un- 
limited financial  resources,  has  up  to  this  date  yet 
produced.  Manual  labor-saving  inventions,  such 
as  steam-shovels,  work-trains,  rapid  unloaders, 
track-shifters,  and  the  numberless  devices  which 
could  be  economically  used,  were  supplied  to  any 
extent  that  seemed  advisable,  and  were  an  abso- 
lute necessity.  The  amount  of  material  the  work 
called  for,  could  not  have  been  completed  without 
the  aid  of  such  plant,  in  double  the  length  of  time 
that  was  actually  expended  upon  it. 

As  the  railroad  company  could  draw  at  will 
upon  the  enormous  working  force  assembled  for 
the  building  of  the  Canal,  which  force  could  at 
all  times  be  renewed  and  supplemented  by  fresh 
supplies,  the  labor  situation  was  easy  to  handle, 
and  the  problem  of  keeping  it  up  to  maximum  re- 
quirements was  a  comparatively  simple  proposi- 
tion. All  the  labor  camps  for  men  of  all  grades 
and  races  were  under  the  watchful  supervision 

54 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

and  strict  regulations  of  the  very  efficient  Sani- 
tary Department  of  the  Canal  Zone.  The  polic- 
ing, housing,  and  feeding  arrangements  were 
taken  care  of  under  the  same  general  arrange- 
ments that  obtained  along  the  line  of  the  Canal 
itself;  arrangements  that,  in  scientific  planning 
and  fidelity  of  execution,  probably  were  never 
equaled  in  the  history  of  the  world,  as  the  results 
so  eloquently  testify. 

While  the  terminal  facilities  at  Colon  at  the 
Atlantic  end,  and  at  Balboa  at  the  Pacific  end, 
installed  in  1905  and  1906  to  meet  the  necessities 
arising  from  the  first  problem,  as  before  described, 
have  been  utilized  as  far  as  possible  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  final  plant,  they  have  been  added 
to  and  modified  largely  to  make  them  suitable  for 
future  needs,  as  far  as  such  needs  can  be  foreseen. 
Shipping  docks,  warehouses,  coal  handling  plants, 
dry  docks,  and  the  many  facilities  needed  as 
accessories  to  the  physical  road  itself  and  to  the 
steamship  lines,  have  been  constructed,  and  are 
of  a  first-class  permanent  nature.  Machinery  to 
provide  for  efficient  and  economical  handling  of 
all  classes  of  freight  has  been  installed,  and  in 
such  matters  the  road  is  up  to  date.  Considering 
its  comparatively  short  length,  it  is  probably  in 
a  class  by  itself. 

As  far  as  the  entire  new  plant  is  concerned, 
it  is  built  on  very  high  standards.    A  private  re- 

55 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

port  recently  made  by  a  first-class  railroad  man, 
who  was  not  connected  with  its  construction, 
says:  *^It  is  absolutely  the  neatest  up-to-date 
little  railroad  I  have  ever  seen. ' '  Laid  with  heavy 
rail,  well  supplied  with  ties  and  with  the  best  of 
modern  track  fastenings,  thoroughly  ballasted,  it 
should  be  easily  and  cheaply  maintained.  It  is 
equipped  with  automatic  signals  over  its  entire 
length,  and  its  operation  should  be  conducted  with 
economy  and  efficiency.  The  only  blemish  on  the 
fair  picture  is  the  more  than  doubt  which  can 
be  entertained,  that  it  will  not  have  sufficient 
traffic  to  justify  its  creation,  at  the  high  standards 
and  at  the  expense  which  its  construction  has. en- 
tailed. 

During  the  fifty  years  and  more  while  the  prop- 
erty was  under  private  ownership,  and  during  the 
construction  of  the  Canal,  the  headquarters  of  the 
company  were  maintained  at  Colon,  the  real  estate 
of  which  city  was  owned  by  the  railway  company. 
But  since  the  completion  of  the  new  line,  the  head- 
quarters have  been  moved  to  the  new  Administra- 
tion Building  of  the  Canal  Government,  at  Balboa 
Heights,  adjoining  the  Pacific  terminal  of  the 
Canal,  and  the  residences  of  the  principal  operat- 
ing officers  established  nearby — a  much  pleasanter 
and  probably  a  healthier  location  than  the  former 
one. 

Before  the  completion  of  the  locks  at  Pedro 

56 


RECONSTRUCTION  OF  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

Miguel,  and  the  final  closing  of  the  Gatun  Dam, 
the  rails  of  the  old  road  and  all  movable  property 
of  value  on  its  line,  were  taken  away,  and  the 
rising  waters  of  Lake  Gatun  soon  covered  its 
roadbed,  to  remain  forever  submerged,  or  as  long 
as  the  locks  and  dams  shall  exist,  until  the  story 
of  the  great  works  and  the  memories  of  the  men 
who  planned  and  executed  them  will  have  become 
more  of  a  legendary  than  of  a  historical  character. 


CHAPTEE   IV 
PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WORK 

The  first  great  work  to  be  undertaken  on  tlie 
Isthmus  by  the  Americans  after  their  accession 
to  all  the  rights  of  the  French  Company  early 
in  1904  was  that  of  sanitation.  An  organization 
was  created  to  handle  this  overshadowing  prob- 
lem, the  solution  of  which  was  necessary  as  a 
foundation  for  the  successful  prosecution  of  the 
work  of  canal  building.  Hand  in  hand  with  sani- 
tation should  have  gone  active  measures  looking  to 
preparation  along  all  lines  for  the  systematic 
operations  of  construction,  and  to  some  extent 
progress  was  made  in  that  direction.  But  the  un- 
certain and  dilatory  methods — they  can  hardly  be 
called  policies — which  were  pursued  by  the  first 
Commission,  precluded  the  achievement  of  any 
great  results. 

While  it  was  true  that,  owing  to  the  absolute 
uncertainty  which  existed  as  to  the  type  of  canal 
to  be  built,  no  ultimate  working  plans  could  be 
adopted,  still  it  was  obvious  that  in  any  case 
there  were  certain  important  features  of  the  prob- 
lem which  could  be  grappled  with  at  once.  The 
treaty  which  the  United  States  made  with  the  new 

58 


PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WORK 

Republic  of  Panama  excluded  from  the  Canal  Zone 
the  cities  of  Colon  and  Panama.  The  power  to 
exercise  sanitary  and  quarantine  control  over 
these  cities  was  given  to  the  United  States  in 
December,  1904. 

This  provided  the  authority  necessary  for  the 
Engineering  Department  to  undertake  the  work 
of  street-paving,  sewer  and  water-supply  construc- 
tion necessary  to  change  these  pestholes  into 
places  where  life  would  be  reasonably  safe.  The 
engineers,  therefore,  prepared  plans  for  the  work 
in  the  two  cities.  Locations  for  gravity  supplies 
of  water  were  selected,  material  was  ordered  and 
the  construction  of  reservoirs  and  pipe  lines  was 
undertaken  early  in  1905.  Considerable  progress 
had  been  made  on  the  water  supply  for  Panama 
by  the  middle  of  that  year.  Orders  for  large 
amounts  of  paving  materials  had  been  placed  in 
the  United  States,  and  altogether  fairly  good 
progress  had  been  made  at  that  time  for  the  city 
of  Panama,  but  little  at  Colon. 

After  July  of  that  year  plans  for  the  rapid 
improvement  of  both  cities  were  vigorously 
pushed.  The  organization  of  the  Division  of 
Municipal  Engineering  was  enlarged  and  per- 
fected and  the  work  moved  along  with  satisfactory 
speed  and  results.  Concurrent  with  these  opera- 
tions, the  similar  task  of  providing  safe  water 
supplies,  sewerage  and  other  adjuncts  of  the  many 

59 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

new  towns  and  camps,  which  were  being  estab- 
lished to  care  for  the  rapidly  increasing  force, 
was  being  accomplished.  Quarries  were  opened, 
supplied  with  plant,  and  operated  to  provide  the 
necessary  material  for  the  street-making.  As  ma- 
terial became  available,  the  working  force  of  the 
division  was  increased,  and  by  the  summer  of 
1906  the  more  important  parts  of  all  this  work 
were  completed  and  the  Sanitary  Department  was 
placed  on  a  secure  basis. 

All  this  time  the  very  necessary  reconstruction 
of  the  decrepit  Panama  Eailroad  was  going  for- 
ward, as  previously  described,  and  in  1907  the  rail- 
road had  been  placed  in  shape  to  handle  creditably 
the  vast  and  complicated  traffic  forced  upon  it. 

The  work  which  the  French  carried  on  was  con- 
fined almost  wholly  to  dredging  and  excavation 
in  Culebra  Cut,  and  the  number  of  cubic  yards 
they  handled  seemed  great.  But  ill  regard  ta 
the  dredging  necessary  for  the  new  Canal,  nothing 
of  much  value  could  be  done  with  it  until  the  type 
was  decided  and  plans  to  conform  to  it  could  be 
formulated.  A  few  of  the  old  dredges  were 
raised,  repaired  and  put  at  work,  deepening  and 
improving  the  existing  channels  approaching  the 
docks  at  Cristobal  and  La  Boca  (now  Balboa). 
This  work  was  done  principally  to  facilitate  and 
make  safe  the  then  current  traffic  and  not  primar- 
ily for  permanent  Canal  construction.    When  the 

60 


First  Bucket  of  Concrete,  Gatun  Locks. 


The  Crossing  of  the  Amercian  and  French  Canals  at  Mindi. 


PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WORK 

final  plans  for  the  Canal  were  completed,  it  was 
found  that  a  part  of  this  dredging  work  was  of 
value,  as  it  had  been  carried  out  along  the  line 
finally  adopted  from  deep  water  to  the  locks. 

Mention  has  been  repeatedly  made  as  to  the 
necessity,  which  was  to  a  great  extent  ignored  by 
the  first  Commission,  for  thorough  and  compre- 
hensive preparation.  While  the  type  of  Canal 
was  yet  undecided  and  in  a  way  all  plans  for  per- 
manent work  were  nebulous,  still  there  was  a  vast 
amount  of  it  which  was  perfectly  apparent  must 
be  done,  whatever  type  was  chosen.  And  the 
delay  in  planning  and  pushing  such  work  is  open 
to  fair  criticism.  It  is  easy  in  almost  any  experi- 
ence to  look  back  and  see  where  better  judgment 
could  have  been  exercised,  but  in  this  case  it  is 
perfectly  clear  that  the  better  part  of  a  year  was 
lost  by  indecision  or  lack  of  appreciation. 

As  before  remarked,  the  amount  of  work  that 
the  French  had  accomplished  in  Culebra  Cut  was 
quite  impressive ;  practically  it  was  of  much  less 
value  than  a  superficial  judgment  would  indicate. 
The  many  changes  in  plans  which  had  occurred 
during  the  time  of  French  occupation,  and  the  fact 
that  all  work  that  had  been  done  since  the  De 
Lesseps  failure  had  been  desultory  in  character, 
carried  on  merely  to  keep  the  concession  alive, 
precluded  any  intelligent  results.  As  a  conse- 
quence the  American  engineers  found  simply  a 

61 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

big  gash  in  the  hills,  a  part  of  which  they  knew 
they  could  utilize,  a  part  which  they  knew  they 
could  not,  and  some  of  it  at  least  that  they  could 
not  even  guess  at.  But  it  was  early  known  by 
them  that  only  by  the  use  of  steam-shovels  and 
railroad  trains  could  the  cut  be  removed.  There- 
fore, the  correct  procedure  would  have  been  to 
have  shaped  up  such  parts  of  the  cut  as  were  rea- 
sonably sure  to  become  a  portion  of  the  great 
work. 

The  intelligence  and  experience  of  the  Ameri- 
can engineer  have  taught  him  that  the  essential 
factor  of  rapid  and  economical  steam-shovel  oper- 
ations, when  material  must  be  conveyed  long  dis- 
tances, lies  in  a  practical  track  arrangement.  Not 
only  must  adequate  facilities  be  provided  for 
loading  cars,  but  also  as  perfect  a  system  of  tracks 
for  their  transportation  must  be  installed  as  the 
conditions  will  permit.  This  was  especially  true 
at  Culebra  Cut,  owing  to  its  immensity  and 
peculiar  location  through  the  backbone  of  a  moun- 
tain  range.  But  in  deference  to  what  may  be 
termed  the  clamor  of  ignorance,  the  Commission 
decided  that  *  *  dirt  must  fly, ' '  and  without  proper 
plant — excepting  a  few  modern  shovels — and  in 
the  utter  absence  of  any  intelligent,  comprehen- 
sive plan,  work  was  begun  and  carried  along  in 
an  expensive  and  unsatisfactory  manner  until  Au- 
gust 1,  1905.    At  that  time  all  this  desultory  work 

62 


PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WORK 

of  excavation  was  stopped,  and  the  entire  force  in 
the  cut  was  started  in  making  preparations  for 
the  real  task,  the  execution  of  which  had  so  far 
baffled  every  effort. 

Confidently  relying  on  his  grounded  belief  that 
the  85-foot  lock  type  would  be  selected,  the  Chief 
Engineer  then  laid  his  plans  accordingly,  but  al- 
ways with  the  idea  in  mind  that,  should  the  sea- 
level  be  chosen,  these  plans  with  little  modification 
would  apply  to  it  also. 

An  explanation  of  the  general  features  of  such 
plans  has  been  made  elsewhere.  As  large  a  force 
as  could  be  gotten  together  and  as  much  material 
as  could  be  collected  were  devoted  to  the  work. 
With  the  arrival  of  proper  plant  of  all  kinds  and 
material  in  abundance,  progress  was  steady  and 
continuous.  Only  a  comparatively  short  time  had 
elapsed  when  it  became  possible  not  only  to  go  on 
with  preparation,  but  to  place  a  number  of  shovels 
actually  on  the  real  work  itself ;  so  that,  when  final 
decision  in  favor  of  the  lock  type  was  made  at  the 
end  of  June,  1906,  not  only  was  the  greater  part 
of  the  plant  installed  and  the  organization 
effected,  but  a  very  appreciable  amount  of  ma- 
terial had  been  removed. 

But  far  more  satisfactory  was  the  actual  demon- 
stration that  had  been  made,  that  the  plans  as 
evolved  and  carried  out  were  a  success,  even  be- 
yond expectation.    Even  with  the  limiting  factor 

63 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

of  the  Gatun  dam  and  locks  in  mind,  the  Chief 
Engineer  was  able  to  assure  the  Washington  offi- 
cials and  representatives  of  the  press  in  1906  that 
the  Canal  could  be  completed  in  1914  and  formally 
opened  January  1, 1915.  This  was  not  mere  guess- 
work, but  a  judgment  made  after  careful  calcula- 
tion. How  far  his  prediction  came  true,  the  events 
of  the  last  year  will  indicate.  After  the  decision 
of  the  type  was.  made,  things  moved  faster  and 
faster  in  the  cut  and  elsewhere.  As  the  latter 
work  developed,  room  was  made  for  more  shovels 
and  trains,  forces  were  constantly  increased,  until 
at  the  beginning  of  1907,  it  can  truly  be  said  that 
the  operations  were  in  full  swing.  Nothing  but  a 
convulsion  of  nature,  or  a  stoppage  of  appropria- 
tions could  delay  completion  in  the  time  named. 

Pending  decision  as  to  the  type  of  canal,  tenta- 
tive plans  and  close  surveys  had  been  made  of  the 
lock  sites,  which,  under  the  proposed  lock  type, 
would  be  built.  Immediately  the  decision  was 
made,  no  time  was  lost  in  amplifying  such  plans 
so  that  construction  could  proceed.  Vigorous 
measures  were  taken  to  provide  housing  and  feed- 
ing arrangements  for  the  large  forces,  which  the 
work  on  the  dam  and  locks  at  Gatun,  as  well  as 
the  locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Sosa,  would  neces- 
sitate. This  required  little  time,  as  provision  for 
quick  action  had  been  foreseen  and  arranged  in 
advance. 

64 


PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WORK 

The  site  of  the  proposed  dam  at  Gatun  was 
cleared.  Spur  tracks  leading  from  the  main  line 
of  the  railroad  were  arranged  for  along  the  base 
of  the  proposed  dam.  These  tracks  would  enable 
rock  waste  to  be  hauled  from  Culebra  Cut  to  form 
an  integral  part  of  the  dam.  Steam-shovels,  with 
necessary  complement  of  railway  trains  and  other 
plant,  were  installed  at  Gatun,  and  the  work  of 
excavation  for  the  lock  foundations  and  spillway 
of  the  dam  was  begun  and  pushed  with  vigor. 
Similar  plant  was  placed  at  work  at  Pedro  Miguel, 
so  that  by  the  end  of  1906,  the  actual  task  of  build- 
ing these  great  works  was  well  under  way. 

As  already  described,  the  crushed  rock  and  sand 
for  the  masonry  of  Gatun  locks  and  dam  were 
brought  by  water  from  a  point  on  the  coast  about 
twenty  miles  east  of  Colon.  To  enable  this  to  be 
done,  the  old  French  canal,  or  what  remained  of 
it,  between  Gatun  and  Limon  Bay  (Colon),  was 
dredged  and  extended  to  the  site  of  the  proposed 
works  at  Gatun.  This  made  it  practicable  for  tugs 
and  barges  to  make  delivery  of  material  imme- 
diately at  the  works  and  simplified  the  handling 
of  it.  "Work  was  carried  on  on  the  proposed  dam 
at  Sosa  Hill  (Balboa)  until,  by  a  change  of  plans 
hereafter  described,  these  operations  were  discon- 
tinued. 

Dredging  at  both  ends  of  the  Canal  was  pushed 
with  all  available  plant,  utilizing  as  much  of  the 

65 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

old  material  as  practrcable,  and  all  of  the  new  was 
put  into  commission  on  arrival. 

The  inauguration  of  active  construction  of  these 
immense  works  called  for  the  planning  and  build- 
ing of  many  auxiliary  plants  of  a  variety  and 
character  impossible  to  enumerate.  Some  of  them 
were  of  a  magnitude  and  complexity  to  justify 
them  as  being  worthy  of  extended  notice.  They 
were  accessories  to  the  greater  operations  and 
were  carried  out  with  all  the  minuteness  of  detail 
possible  to  provide.  And  as  far  as  human  fore- 
sight could  predict,  all  plant  necessary  for  future 
operations  was  placed  under  order  for  the  quick- 
est practicable  delivery.  From  all  that  has  been 
said,  it  may  be  clearly  seen  that  the  work  of  thor- 
ough preparation  along  all  lines  of  activity  was 
in  every  sense  of  the  word  the  one  great  and  over- 
shadowing imperative  necessity  during  the  first 
two  years  of  American  occupation.  That  the  work 
of  preparation  was  well  accomplished,  the  rapid 
progress  attained  and  the  successful  completion  of 
the  gigantic  task  abundantly  testify. 

In  considering  the  length  of  time  required  to 
build  the  Canal,  it  may  be  of  interest  to  discuss 
somewhat  the  probable  effect  of  systematic  night 
work.  This  policy  was  under  serious  considera- 
tion by  the  management  early  in  1907,  but  no  deci- 
sion had  been  reached  by  it  when  the  change  of 
management  took  place  on  April  1,  that  year.    The 

66 


PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WORK 

two  governing  factors  in  point  of  time,  the  works 
at  Gatun  and  the  Culebra  Cut,  would  have  re- 
quired the  employment  of  several  thousand  more 
of  skilled  and  common  laborers,  but  with  no  ma- 
terial increase  in  general  supervision  or  plant. 

One  consideration  to  be  taken  into  account  was 
the  mosquito  problem.  These  pests  were  always 
more  numerous  and  active  during  the  night  hours. 
However,  the  success  of  the  Sanitary  Department 
in  reducing  materially  their  numbers  practically 
eliminated  that  handicap. 

Considering  the  entire  cost  of  the  Canal,  and 
including  all  payments  made  in  connection  with  it, 
the  interest  charge  on  the  grand  total  is  not  far 
from  one  million  dollars  per  month.  Conserva- 
tively speaking,  one  week's  interest  would  have 
paid  for  all  the  cost  to  secure  and  provide  housing 
and  feeding  for  the  extra  laborers.  By  dividing 
to  a  greater  extent  the  orders  for  the  material 
and  equipment  needed  for  the  locks,  and  possibly 
paying  a  moderate  increase  in  price,  the  delivery 
of  such  material  and  equipment  could  undoubtedly 
have  been  much  hastened. 

The  situation  of,  and  the  conditions  which 
existed  at  each  of  these  great  pieces  of  work,  were 
such  that  night  work  could  have  been  successfully 
carried  on.  Taking  the  time  lost  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  American  occupation,  together  with 
what  might  have  been  gained  by  employing  night 

67 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  Pi^NAMA  CANAL 

shifts,  it  is  believed  that  the  Canal  could  have  been 
completed  in  at  least  two  years  less  time  than  was 
the  case ;  more  than  this  even,  had  the  decision  as 
to  the  type  not  been  so  long  delayed.  In  any  case, 
had  the  management  of  early  1907  continued  in 
charge,  the  policy  of  night  work  would  undoubt- 
edly have  been  inaugurated. 


CHAPTER  V 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

DESIGNING   ANI>  ACQUISITION   OF   PLANT 

In  a  description  that  may  be  given  covering  the 
general  features  of  plans  and  plant,  it  will  be  un- 
derstood that  it  covers  engineering  features  only. 
The  coordinate  factors,  which  at  the  same  time 
were  as  necessary  as  engineering  to  the  success- 
ful prosecution  of  the  work  of  the  canal  building, 
such  as  sanitary  and  governmental  functions,  are 
not  included.  The  details  embraced  under  the 
term  of  engineering  are  not  merely  such  as  usually 
pertain  to  the  profession  from  a  technical  stand- 
point, but  also  those  varied  and  numerous  req- 
uisites, which  the  unique  conditions  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  presented. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  allude  briefly  to  the 
first  nebulous  plan  for  a  canal  through  the  Isth- 
mus of  Panama.  This  was  probably  in  1879,  when 
De  Lesseps  forced  the  ** Congress"  in  Paris  to 
vote  in  favor  of  a  sea-level  canal.  The  advice  of 
experienced  engineers  against  this  plan  was  re- 
jected.   A  sea-level  canal  it  was  to  be,  and  with  a 

69 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

loud  flourish  of  trumpets  so-called  preparations 
were  hurried  to  open  the  work. 

One  of  the  first  steps  taken  by  the  company 
which  was  organized  was  the  purchase  of  the 
Panama  Eailroad  in  1882.  Finally,  without  in- 
telligent, adequate  preparation,  work  was  begun 
and  carried  on,  until  the  state  of  the  company's 
finances  made  it  apparent  even  to  De  Lesseps  that 
the  construction  of  a  sea-level  canal  was  beyond 
its  power. 

So  in  1887  the  company  changed  its  plans  from 
a  sea-level  to  one  of  a  lock  type,  but  nothing  but 
a  series  of  misfortunes  pursued  it.  And  after 
several  modifications,  all  tending  to  lessen  the 
cost  of  the  Canal  under  the  new  plans,  work  was 
stopped  entirely,  and  the  company  broke  with  a 
crash  that  attracted  world-wide  attention. 

During  the  period  Avhich  then  elapsed  up  to  the 
time  of  the  American  ownership,  a  new  company, 
which  had  taken  over  the  franchise  after  three 
years  of  study  by  a  commission  of  experienced 
engineers,  adopted  a  plan  for  a  lock-type  canal. 
A  very  limited  amount  of  work  was  carried  on 
under  it,  without,  however,  providing  any  intelli- 
gent solution  of  the  most  important  problem  in- 
volved, viz.,  the  control  of  the  flood-waters  of  the 
Chagres  Eiver. 

The  above  resume  is  given  to  enable  the  reader 
to  gain  a  faint  idea  of  how  small  value  was  the 

70 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

general  information  which  the  Americans  came 
into  possession  of  in  1904.  In  matters  of  tech- 
nique, the  French  were  past  masters  in  engineer- 
ing on  the  Isthmus,  and  they  collected  as  the  re- 
sults of  their  surveys  a  vast  volume  of  detailed 
data,  mostly  in  the  form  of  maps,  plans  and  pro- 
files, many  of  which  were  utilized,  but  only  to 
extract  necessary  information. 

When  the  American  engineers  took  charge  of 
the  work  of  planning  and  building  the  Panama 
Canal,  they  were  entering  terra  incognita.  They 
met  problems  of  a  magnitude  and  complexity  that 
had  set  at  naught  the  efforts  of  their  predecessors. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  the  work  of  the  French  was 
of  much  value,  and  their  labors  and  superb  cour- 
age in  the  face  of  great  obstacles  should  be  justly 
appreciated.  But  the  fact  remains  that  not  to 
them,  but  to  the  American  engineers,  is  due  the 
credit  of  solving  so  successfully  the  many  and  in- 
tricate problems  which  were  encountered  in  carry- 
ing out  the  great  work. 

As  a  general  description  has  heretofore  been 
given  of  the  methods  and  discussions,  out  of  which 
came  the  decision  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment to  build  a  lock-level  canal,  nothing  more  need 
be  said  in  regard  to  that  phase  of  the  situation. 
But  the  length  of  time  which  elapsed  between  the 
date  when  the  Canal  Zone  and  our  rights  were, 
acquired  and  the  date  when  the  type  was  chosen 

71 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

— from  May,  1904,  to  June,  1906,  more  than  two 
years — rendered  the  formation  of  any  definite 
plans  for  construction  an  absolute  impossibility. 

Owing  to  unfortunate  defects  in  organization, 
a  large  part  of  this  time  was  practically  wasted. 
The  necessity  for  thorough  preparation  for  the 
carrying-out  of  the  great  work  under  whatever 
tj^pe  was  selected  did  not  seemingly  impress  the 
Commission.  Thus  the  engineers  were  hampered 
in  their  efforts,  and,  while  some  work  of  real  value 
was  accomplished  meanwhile,  it  was  not  until  well 
into  the  year  1905  that  even  preliminary  plans  be- 
gan to  take  intelligent  shape. 

While  the  line  of  the  proposed  Canal,  as  laid 
out  by  the  American  engineers,  followed  gener- 
ally that  of  the  French,  especially  through  the 
backbone  of  the  Cordilleras,  it  differed  from  it  in 
some  important  particulars,  notably  at  the  termini 
at  both  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans.  A  line 
securing  much  more  tangent  and  much  less  curva- 
ture was  projected  and  laid  out  on  the  ground. 
Cross-sections  were  taken  to  develop  the  condi- 
tions, to  fix  approximately  the  amount  and  char- 
acter of  the  required  work  and,  incidentally,  to 
check  the  French  data.  Hundreds  of  miles  of 
levels  were  taken,  and  finally,  after  much  adjust- 
ment made  necessary  to  meet  properly  all  condi- 
tions, particularly  at  Culebra  Cut,  a  definite  loca- 
tion was  established  for  the  center  line  of  the 

72 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

Canal,  one  that  would  have  required  little  or  no 
change,  whatever  type  of  canal  was  chosen. 

Many  considerations  were  weighed  carefully  in 
fixing  the  details  of  such  location.  Primarily  to 
reduce  quantities  to  the  lowest  practicable  limit, 
it  was  necessary  to  follow  the  lowest  ground.  This 
was  complicated  to  some  extent  by  the  necessity 
of  utilizing  the  work  of  the  French  Company  as 
far  as  practicable,  with  respect  for  the  known 
slides  and  for  those  that  the  future  might  develop. 

In  addition  to  all  this  work,  a  vast  amount  of 
surveying  was  carried  on  at  many  different  points 
to  secure  data  for  the  proper  location  of  towns 
and  camps  for  various  needs  of  the  Sanitary  De- 
partment and  for  many  other  purposes.  All  such 
data  had  to  be  secured  as  original  matter,  using 
whatever  of  value  the  French  had  left  to  supple- 
ment and  check  the  new  work. 

Besides  the  work  of  all  these  field  surveys,  the 
Engineering  Department  was  making  tests  of  the 
strata  and  character  of  the  material,  not  only 
along  the  line  of  the  Canal,  but  particularly  at 
the  site  of  the  proposed  Gatun  dams  and  the  vari- 
ous lock  sites.  The  whole  question  of  the  prac- 
ticability of  the  lock-type  plan  depended  upon  suc- 
cessfully establishing  the  safe  and  permanent 
character  of  the  foundations  for  these  works.  An 
absolutely  perfect  knowledge  of  details  was  essen- 
tial in  order  to  make  proper  plans  for  them. 

73 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Once  the  necessary  data  were  secured  and  the 
lock  type  approved,  then  a  special  force  of  ex- 
perienced designers  was  organized,  and  the  real 
work  of  designing  the  dam  and  locks  was  begun  in 
August,  1906.  This  important  matter  was  placed 
in  charge  of  a  capable  engineer,  one  who  had  long 
experience  in  both  construction  and  operation  of 
the  largest  locks  then  in  existence. 

Steady  and  intensive  studies  of  the  many  intri- 
cate problems  involved  were  rapidly  and  system- 
atically carried  on,  and  in  March,  1907,  all  the 
essential  features  of  this  vital  problem  had  been 
successfully  worked  out.  As  illustrating  the  mul- 
tiplicity of  detail  involved  in  these  studies,  men- 
tion may  be  made  that  they  covered  designs  of 
stoney  gates,  culverts,  valves,  sections  of  lock 
walls,  piers,  miter  wall,  side  walls,  floor  sills,  roll- 
ing gates,  miter  gates,  interlocking  pin  devices, 
operating  bridges  and  machinery,  and  the  action 
of  sea  water  on  concrete  and  construction  plant. 

Conferences  were  held  with  different  manufac- 
turers of  steel  structural  material,  in  order  to 
adapt  the  plans  as  far  as  practicable  to,  standard 
shapes.  Consideration  was  also  given  to  numer- 
ous devices  submitted  by  various  parties  usually 
ignorant  of  the  subjects,  and  these  projects  were 
courteously  dissected  and  set  aside. 

While  the  essential  features,  as  originally  de- 
signed, were  adhered  to  in  carrying  out  the  work, 

74    . 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

some  changes  were  made  in  details,  some  of  which 
involved  a  heavy  increase  in  cost  of  construction 
without  any  apparent  benefit.  One  very  important 
change,  that  of  roller  instead  of  miter  gates,  was 
ordered  in  opposition  to  the  judgment  of  the  de- 
signing engineers.  Such  a  change  was  clearly  not 
advisable  and  would  have  added  some  thirteen 
millions  of  dollars  to  the  cost  of  the  locks.  The 
order  for  this  change  was  afterwards  rescinded, 
and  the  gates  were  built  according  to  the  original 
plans  of  the  designing  engineers,  modified  for 
increased  width. 

The  conception  and  the  preparation  of  plans 
for  the  endless  variety  of  work  involved,  for 
docks,  warehouses,  shops,  both  to  care  for  marine 
and  land  plant,  dry  docks  and  marine  railways,  for 
sewerage,  paving  and  water  supply,  went  on 
rapidly.  The  reconstruction  of  the  Panama  Eail- 
road  required  careful  consideration  as  to  details, 
which  were  all  successfully  worked  out.  The  plan- 
ning of  all  of  these  works  was  intrusted  to  the 
care  of  the  particular  department  which  was 
charged  with  their  execution,  all  being  under  the 
direction  of  the  Engineering  Department. 

Passing  over  the  plans  developed  for  the  secur- 
ing and  caring  for  the  vast  force  of  employees, 
which  will  be  treated  elsewhere,  last,  but  not  least, 
was  the  solution  of  the  overshadowing  problem  of 
taking  out  the  Culebra  Cut. 

75 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  truly  stupendous  proportions  of  this  cut 
have  been  described,  as  well  as  its  topographical 
features.  The  French  Company  early  recognized 
that  it  was  the  piece  de  resistance,  and  most  of  its 
energies  were  devoted  to  its  removal.  While  the 
amount  in  cubic  yards  which  they  accomplished 
sounds  quite  impressive,  it  was  really  of  much  less 
value  than  it  seemed,  owing  to  the  impracticable 
way  in  which  the  work  was  done  and  the  shape  in 
which  it  was  left. 

As  in  all  such  problems,  a  deluge  of  plans  as  to 
just  how  to  handle  the  cut,  complete  in  every  way 
excepting  the  quite  important  one  of  practical 
common-sense,  was  showered  upon  the  Chief  En- 
gineer. One  genius  proposed  to  wash  the  entire 
cut  into  the  oceans  by  forcing  water  from  a  plant 
on  Panama  Bay;  another,  to  erect  a  big  com- 
pressed air  plant  at  Culebra  and  blow  all  the  ma- 
terial through  pipes  out  to  sea.  Still  another, 
equally  as  brilliant,  wanted  to  drive  a  double-track 
railway  tunnel,  at  grade,  clear  through  the  entire 
length — nine  miles — and  haul  all  the  material 
above  out  in  cars.  The  matter  was  serious  enough, 
but  such  schemes  provided  plenty  of  amusement 
to  afford  relaxation. 

The  problem  was  simply  one  of  transportation, 
and  the  successful  solving  of  it  depended  entirely 
on  the  devising  of  the  correct  method.  The  cut 
lay  directly  through  a  mountain  range  with  pre- 

76 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

cipitous  slopes  and  side  valleys  of  very  small 
areas.  As  a  natural  corollary,  the  spoil  must  be 
loaded  onto  some  conveyor  that  would  take  it  to 
the  spoil  banks  and  works,  distant  from  ten  to 
thirty  miles.  This  conveyor  could  only  be  that  of 
railroad  trains,  loaded  in  the  cut  and  handled 
over  the  Panama  Railroad  to  their  destination. 

The  reconstruction  and  double-tracking  of  the 
railroad  provided  the  means  of  handling  these 
loaded  and  empty  trains,  once  they  were  upon  its 
rails.  This  was  the  simplest  part  of  the  proposi- 
tion. The  real  problem  to  be  solved  was  to  devise 
such  a  system  of  trackage  in  the  cut  itself,  as 
would  permit  the  maximum  number  of  immense 
steam-shovels  to  be  operated  with  the  least  pos- 
sible interference  with  each  other. 

After  careful  study,  and  as  the  result  of  long 
experience  in  heavy  construction  and  complicated 
transportation,  the  Chief  Engineer  outlined  such 
a  system  of  work  tracks  for  the  cut  itself  and  at 
the  spoil  banks,  together  with  the  necessary  con- 
nections with  the  main  tracks  of  the  Panama  Rail- 
road. In  conjunction  with  the  engineers  directly 
in  charge  of  the  cut,  the  details  were  steadily 
worked  out,  and  every  track  thereafter  laid  was 
made  to  conform  to  the  general  plan.  Under  this 
system  the  shovels  were  enabled  to  work  one 
above  the  other  on  horizontal  benches,  and  the 
trains  were  so  made  up  and  handled  that  the 

77 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

shovels  could  be  kept  in  actual  operation  to  a 
large  percentage  of  the  total  time. 

Thus  the  two  fundamental  results  necessary  to 
success  were  obtained:  rapid  execution  of  work 
at  the  lowest  possible  cost.  That  success  was 
achieved  to  a  marked  degree  is  admitted  by  every- 
one, not  merely  the  men  connected  with  the  work, 
but  by  experienced  engineers  and  contractors,  who 
have  visited  or  studied  the  operations.  And  no 
one  has  been  more  emphatic  in  words  of  approval 
than  the  Army  engineers,  who  took  over  this  elab- 
orate and  yet  simple  installation,  which  was  de- 
veloped and  in  running  order  early  in  1907. 

The  development  of  plans  may  be  seen  to  have 
been  in  the  nature  of  a  gradual  evolution,  rather 
than  that  of  any  sort  of  inspiration.  This  was 
forced  by  conditions,  natural  and  artificial,  the 
significance  of  which  had  to  be  properly  grasped 
before  decisions  could  intelligently  be- made.  It 
was  in  every  way  a  case  of  *^  being  sure  and  then 
going  ahead. ' '  There  was  no  time  for  long-drawn- 
out  experiments.  It  is  possible  that  now,  in  the 
light  of  nine  years  of  experience,  improvements 
could  be  effected  in  some  minor  details,  but  on  the 
whole,  and  especially  as  regards  the  greater  prob- 
lems, it  is  believed  that  no  changes,  radical  in 
character,  could  have  been  made  that  would  have 
achieved  a  more  satisfactory  result. 

The  great  amount  and  variety  of  plant  which 

78 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

came  to  us  as  the  result  of  our  purchase  of  all 
the  French  rights  and  property,  was  of  a  charac- 
ter and  complexity  to  defy  description.  While 
much  of  it  was  of  standard  European  design  of 
the  period,  some  parts  could  only  be  classed  as 
freaks. 

Apparently  every  crank  who  possessed  influence 
was  allowed  to  exploit  his  notions  in  the  furnish- 
ing of  machines  to  the  company,  the  intended  use 
of  which,  to  this  day,  one  American  chief  en- 
gineer, at  least,  has  not  been  able  to  fathom. 

Our  engineers  and  contractors  have  evolved 
machinery  for  handling  construction  work,  such 
as  was  necessary  for  the  building  of  the  Canal, 
far  in  advance  of  other  nations.  Without  this 
machinery,  the  time  of  the  completion  of  this 
work  would  have  been  postponed  for  years. 

Particularly  is  this  true  of  steam-shovels,  which 
in  heavy  land  excavations  are  the  greatest  time 
and  labor  savers  that  genius  has  yet  produced. 

In  referring  to  the  French  plant,  as  being  the 
** design  of  the  period*'  in  Europe,  it  is  but  just 
to  say  that  while  it  was  insuflScient  in  principle 
and  magnitude  for  the  task  it  attempted,  for  thor- 
oughness of  detail  and  character  of  material  it 
was  unsurpassed.  But  for  practical  purposes,  as 
far  as  the  American  engineers  were  concerned, 
most  of  it  could  economically  only  be  consigned 
to  the  scrap  heap.    Some  exceptions  there  were, 

79 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

which  will  be  noted  later,  but  as  a  general  rule  the 
above  statement  is  correct. 

During  the  life  of  the  first  Isthmtis  Canal  Com- 
mission, or  up  to  the  summer  of  1905,  some  of 
the  necessary  plant  for  land  work  had  been  sup- 
plied, notably  a  few  steam-shovels  and  accessory 
machinery.  Also,  a  limited  number  of  locomotives 
for  the  railroad  had  been  delivered,  and  some 
freight  cars  put  under  order.  Small  plant  for 
street,  sewer,  and  water-works  construction  had 
arrived  and  was -being  used.  But  for  the  great 
aggregate  and  variety  of  work  involved  in  the 
larger  problems  of  canal  construction,  practically 
nothing  had  been  provided,  or  even  planned.  It 
was  a  blank  page  of  equipment  which  confronted 
the  engineers  at  that  time,  and  probably  it  was 
best  that  such  was  the  case. 

It  was  well  known  by  the  Engineering  Depart- 
ment long  before  the  type  of  the  Canal  had  been 
decided,  that  regardless  of  type,  there  would  be 
millions  of  cubic  yards  of  waste  to  remove  from 
Culebra  Cut,  and  from  other  parts  of  the  work. 
Acting  on  this  sure  knowledge,  and  also  on  the 
fact  that  the  plans  heretofore  explained  for  the 
removal  of  the  cut,  were  the  best  that  could  be 
conceived,  no  time  was  lost  in  preparing  for  their 
execution.  All  types  of  machinery  adapted  for 
the  work  were  carefully  considered.  The  details 
of  many  that  were  of  proper  type  were  gone  over 

80 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

minutely,  and  plans  and  specifications  for 
strengthening,  enlarging  their  capacity,  and  per- 
fecting them  in  the  highest  degree,  were  wrought 
out. 

Orders  were  placed  for  large  numbers  of  steam- 
shovels,  locomotives,  cars,  rapid  unloaders,  power 
drills,  stone-crushers,  etc.  Heavy  rail,  ties,  lum- 
ber, hardware,  and  the  thousands  of  different  arti- 
cles which  then  could  be  foreseen  would  be  neces- 
sary, were  requisitioned.  Much  of  all  of  this  plant 
was  needed  in  the  work  of  preparation,  and  the 
natural  delay  in  its  delivery  somewhat  handi- 
capped the  progress. 

Some  land  work  was  done  by  utilizing  a  small 
part  of  the  best  of  the  old  French  equipment, 
but  the  amount  of  such  work  was  negligible.  In 
point  of  economy,  it  would  probably  have  been 
wiser  to  have  done  nothing  with  it,  excepting  from 
the  fact  that  the  necessary  work  of  preparation 
might  be  delayed. 

Much  of  this  new  plant  began  to  arrive  long 
before  the  type  of  the  Canal  was  decided,  and 
was  promptly  set  up  at  the  shops  of  the  Commis- 
sion, and  put  at  work.  It  was  found  that  when 
the  lock  type  was  chosen,  there  was  not  a  single 
item  of  the  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  this 
plant,  but  what  was  perfectly  adapted  to  the  pur- 
poses of  its  construction. 

Not  until  it  was  known  what  type  of  canal  was 

81 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

to  be  built,  could  much  marine  plant  be  planned 
or  ordered. 

Other  than  tugs  and  similar  light  craft,  the 
great  bulk  of  this  plant  consisted  of  dredges  of 
several  types  and  capacities.  Plans  and  specifica- 
tions for  these  dredges  and  their  accessories  were 
made  by  the  engineers  on  the  Isthmus,  and  a 
sufficient  number  to  carry  on  the  work  properly 
were  placed  on  order.  Some  were  really  sea- 
going vessels,  which  were  built  in  the  Atlantic 
states,  manned  by  crews  selected  from  the  staff 
of  the  Panama  Steamship  Company.  They  went 
under  their  own  steam  to  Colon,  and  in  one  case, 
around  Cape  Horn  to  Panama.  In  amount  and 
low  cost  of  output,  the  performance  of  these 
dredges  has  never  been  equaled. 

The  superintendent  of  motive  power,  through 
his  department,  was  made  responsible  for  the  de- 
sigTi  and  satisfactory  operation  of  all  mechanical 
features  of  the  land  plant,  and  was  in  charge  of 
all  land  shops.  These  shops  were  planned,  built, 
and  the  necessary  machinery  installed  during  the 
years  of  1905  and  1906. 

The  great  number  of  steam-shovels  made  it 
necessary  to  provide  a  shop  especially  designed 
for  their  erection  and  maintenance,  as  they  came 
to  the  Isthmus  ** knocked  down''  or  in  pieces.  An 
elaborate  shop  for  the  maintenance  of  the  engines 
employed  in  the  cut  proper,  was  erected  at  one 

82 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

point,  and  smaller  ones  elsewhere  to  avoid  loss  of 
time  and  delay  in  the  operation  of  the  shovels. 
Engine  houses,  coaling  and  water  facilities,  and  a 
complete  system  of  telephones  connecting  every 
part  of  the  work  were  installed.  In  short,  noth- 
ing was  neglected  that  the  skill  and  experience  of 
the  Engineering  Department  could  suggest,  to 
provide  the  most  complete  plant  that  could  be 
devised. 

The  distance  of  operations  from  the  points  of 
supplies,  and  the  absolute  necessity  of  depending 
upon  its  own  resources,  forced  the  Department  not 
only  to  provide  a  plant  as  complete  in  every  re- 
spect as  human  ingenuity  could  plan,  but  one  which 
should  be  made  up  of  the  very  best  materials 
that  could  be  made  in  the  shops  of  the  United 
States.  All  plant  and  material  were  bought  on 
competitive  bids,  although  in  some  cases,  factors 
of  better  values  and  time  of  delivery  influenced 
the  selection. 

As  the  greater  part  of  Culebra  Cut  was  rock, 
hard  and  soft,  it  was  necessary  to  drill  and  blast 
nearly  all  of  its  entire  bulk.  The  drilling  was 
carried  on  largely  by  power  drills,  operated  by 
compressed  air,  and  as  there  were  hundreds  of 
these  drills  in  operation  simultaneously,  the  power 
required  was  enormous.  To  provide  this  power 
three  large  air-compressing  plants  were  planned 
and  built  at  about  equi-distant  points  along  the 

83 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

cut,  and  a  supply  pipe,  nine  miles  in  length,  was 
laid  down,  from  which  compressed  air  was  led  to 
reach  separate  unit  of  drills,  wherever  located. 

In  addition  to  these  air  drills,  a  large  number 
of  gravity  drills,  mounted  upon  wheels,  were  pro- 
vided for  the  work  in  isolated  places,  where  it  was 
not  convenient  to  convey  air.  The  entire  drilling 
plant  worked  well,  and  without  such  an  installa- 
tion, neither  the  steam-shovels  nor  trains  could 
have  done  the  magnificent  work  they  did  until  the 
entire  cut  was  taken  out  and  disposed  of. 

The  construction  of  the  various  locks,  and  of 
certain  features  of  the  Gatun  Dam,  required  the 
making  and  placing  of  millions  of  cubic  yards  of 
concrete  masonry,  aggregating  the  greatest 
amount  ever  employed  in  any  engineering  project. 
This  called  for  plant  not  only  of  great  size  and 
capacity,  but  of  special  design,  fitted  to  handle 
material  in  quantities  which  before  were  thought 
to  be  impossible  in  point  of  time.  As  no  rock  of 
a  suitable  character  could  be  found  within  prac- 
ticable transportation  distance  from  Gatun,  a  lo- 
cation for  a  large  quarry  was  selected  on  the  coast, 
some  twenty  miles  from  Colon.  Arrangements 
for  its  use  were  made  with  the  Panamanian  Gov- 
ernment, whose  property  it  was. 

A  complete  crushing  plant,  probably  the  largest 
single  one  ever  erected,  was  planned  and  built 
there.    From  this  point,  crushed  rock,  and  sand 

84 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

wMch  was  found  in  the  same  vicinity,  were  con- 
veyed by  tugs  and  barges  directly  to  the  works  at 
Gatun.  The  selection  of  this  site  for  the  crushing 
plant  was  largely  influenced  by  the  fact,  that  while 
first-class  rock  could  be  obtained  at  Balboa,  the 
Pacific  end  of  the  Canal,  it  was  deemed  wise  to 
divert  from  the  Panama  Eailroad  the  enormous 
traffic  which  its  movement  would  have  entailed. 

An  elaborate  plant  was  planned  and  supervised 
in  its  erection  by  the  Engineering  Department  at 
Gatun,  to  unload  material  from  the  barges;  to 
mix,  transport  and  place  it  directly  in  the  bottom, 
walls  and  other  parts  of  the  locks.  In  many  ways 
this  plant  possessed  some  new  and  unique  fea- 
tures which  were  largely  experimental,  but  the' 
record  of  its  operation  showed  that  in  amount  of 
output  in  point  of  time,  it  was  never  equaled  or 
even  approximated. 

The  construction  of  the  Gatun  dam  and  locks 
was  really  the  limiting  feature,  in  point  of  time, 
of  the  completion  of  the  Canal.  The  enormous 
size  of  these  works,  compressed  into  a  compara- 
tively small  area  of  operations,  rendered  the  in- 
stallation of  a  plant  of  the  largest  capacity  that 
could  be  operated,  a  prime  necessity.  The  plans 
and  specifications  for  all  this  machinery  were 
made,  and  everything  was  ready  to  ask  for  ten- 
ders for  its  manufacture  and  delivery  early  in 
1907. 

85 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores,  being 
segregated  in  location,  could  be  built  in  much  less 
time  than  those  at  Gatun.  A  crushing  plant  was 
erected  near  Balboa,  where  first-class  rock  was 
available,  the  latter  point  from  which  material 
was  hauled  by  rail  to  the  locks.  Suitable  mixing 
and  erecting  plants  were  installed  at  these  locks, 
which  were  very  successful  in  operation,  both  in 
point  of  time  and  unit  costs.  These  plants  were 
planned  and  installed  in  1908,  after  the  changes  in 
the  location  of  these  locks  had  been  decided  upon, 
and  which  are  described  elsewhere. 

Eeference  has  been  made  to  the  use  of  the  old 
French  plant.  In  carrying  out  some  of  the  smaller 
items  of  the  land  work,  such  as  operations  of  small 
rock  crushers,  in  the  handling  of  materials  re- 
quired for  construction  of  various  plants,  and  in 
and  around  the  shops,  a  limited  amount  of  port- 
able cars  and  track  was  used  to  advantage.  Many 
old  boilers  and  engines  were  repaired  and  fitted 
up  and  made  to  perform  excellent  service;  some 
few  of  which  may  be  called  hand  tools,  were  found 
to  be  of  service,  but  most  of  these  were  obsolete. 

The  engineers  were  able  to  make  good  use  of 
some  of  the  smaller  types  of  the  old  dredges.  One 
type  in  particular,  a  purely  European  develop- 
ment, was  found  to  be  of  much  value.  These  ma- 
chines were  practically  wrecks  and  some  of  them 
had  lain  for  years,  sunken  beneath  the  waters  at 

86 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

the  two  ends  of  the  Canal.  As  the  use  of  cheap 
steel  had  not  become  the  practice  at  the  time  of 
their  creation,  they  were  built  of  a  superior  class 
of  iron — a  much  better  metal  to  withstand  the 
ravages  of  time  and  sea  water. 

These  dredges,  after  having  been  raised  and 
rebuilt  at  the  marine  shops,  together  with  their 
self-propelling  steam  barges,  served  a  very  useful 
purpose,  and  at  very  satisfactory  unit  costs.  An 
appreciable  amount  of  work  was  accomplished  by 
their  use,  pending  the  delivery  of  modern  large- 
sized  equipment.  It  was  also  found  practicable 
to  utilize  a  few  old  tugs  and  launches  by  renovat- 
ing them,  although  the  cost  of  this  work  would  not 
have  justified  the  expenditure,  had  not  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  case  admitted  of  no  delay. 

For  the  great  work  in  Culebra  Cut,  the  trans- 
portation problem,  there  were  required  drills, 
steam-shovels,  locomotives,  cars,  power  unloaders, 
spreaders,  track-shifters,  besides  the  many  vari- 
ous kinds  of  smaller  tools.  The  ordinary  standard 
air  drills  were  used  in  large  numbers,  as  well  as 
those  of  the  gravity  type.  As  is  the  case  in  nearly 
all  small  plants,  duplicates  in  the  whole,  and  of 
most  of  their  parts,  were  kept  in  stock  to  avoid 
delays. 

Steam-shovels  were  generally  of  two  classes,  of 
the  same  type,  but  differing  in  size  and  capacity. 
Taking  the  best  type  of  shovel  made  in  the  United 

87 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

States  as  standard,  plans  and  specifications  were 
changed  to  perfect  the  machines  to  the  utmost 
possible  limit.  Strength  and  speed  in  operation 
were  the  objects  sought  to  be  attained.  Steel  re- 
placed cast  iron,  parts  liable  to  breakage  were 
enlarged,  with  a  result  that  a  machine  in  every 
way  superior  to  any  in  existence  was  produced. 
Some  one  hundred  of  these  machines  were  re- 
quired in  the  construction  of  the  Canal.  And  to 
the  fact  that  the  skill  of  American  engineers  and 
artisans  had  been  able  to  produce  them,  can  be 
credited  to  a  very  great  extent,  the  quick  and 
economical  execution  of  the  work,  and  even  that 
it  was  possible  to  do  it  at  all. 

There  was  nothing  special  required  in  the 
proper  type  of  locomotives  to  serve  the  shovels. 
Unusual  vigilance  was  exercised  that  every  part 
should  be  of  the  best  material,  and  according  to 
the  most  improved  practice.  Owing  to  the  limited 
area  in  which  excavation  was  carried  on,  so-called 
heavy  tonnage  trains  could  not  be  handled.  The 
locomotives  were  therefore  designed  to  move  a 
fair  load  over  tracks  which,  while  of  heavy  con- 
struction, were  yet  not  main  line  in  character. 
Owing  to  the  great  density  of  the  traffic,  the  loco- 
motives were  of  necessity  of  a  type  that  could 
make  comparatively  fast  time  over  the  tracks  of 
the  Panama  Eailroad.  The  problem  of  design 
was  complicated  by  the  fact  that  they  must  be, 

88 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

not  only  switcli,  but  good  road  engines  also,  a  re- 
quirement that  only  a  practical  railroad  man  can 
appreciate.  They  served  their  purpose  admir- 
ably, and  probably  could  not  be  much  improved 
upon  at  this  day. 

The  question  of  a  proper  type  of  cars  was  a 
harder  one.  Ordinarily  some  approved  form  of 
self-dumping  type  would  have  been  used  exclu- 
sively, especially  had  the  greater  bulk  of  the  cut 
been  of  earth  instead  of  rock.  It  was  necessary, 
in  point  of  time  and  economy,  to  load  and  unload 
this  rock  in  as  large  masses  as  practicable,  and  to 
avoid  breaking  up  by  hand,  into  the  smaller  sizes 
that  dumping  cars  could  handle. 

Where  dumping  cars  could  be  used  with 
economy,  they  were  installed  and  worked  satis- 
factorily. But  the  greater  portion  of  the  cut  was 
handled  on  ordinary  flat-cars  of  the  largest  size 
and  strength.  They  were  made  much  wider  than 
the  standard  in  ordinary  use,  and  consequently, 
of  increased  capacity.  As  an  illustration  of  the 
unique  conditions  met,  and  the  service  given,  on 
one  occasion  a  rock,  blasted  from  one  of  the  levels 
of  the  cut,  containing  fifteen  cubic  yards  and 
weighing  some  thirty-four  tons,  was  loaded  by  one 
of  the  large  shovels  onto  a  car,  and  safely  carried 
several  miles  and  deposited  in  the  waste  bank. 

At  these  dumps,  or  waste  banks,  the  material 
was  unloaded  entirely  from  one  side  of  the  car  by 

89 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

rapid  power  unloaders.  The  unloader  was  simply 
a  huge  plow,  operated  by  a  winding  engine, 
mounted  on  a  car  of  its  own,  and  provided  with  a 
heavy  steel  cable,  extending  the  length  of  the 
train.  Then  this  material  was  spread,  or  thrown 
off  down  the  bank  by  a  machine  looking  much 
like  a  one-sided  snowplow  pushed  by  a  locomo- 
tive. After  two  or  three  of  such  operations,  the 
track  was  moved  its  entire  length  to  the  edge  of 
the  bank,  as  nearly  as  safety  would  permit,  and 
the  same  operations  resumed. 

In  the  moving  of  the  track,  there  was  used  a 
remarkable  machine  invented  by  the  manager  of 
the  Panama  Eailroad,  which,  in  its  idea  and  ap- 
plication, was  an  entirely  new  expedient  in  con- 
struction work.  A  technical  description  is  not 
needed  here,  but  it  suffices  to  say  that,  by  its  use, 
an  ordinary  train  crew  of  five  men  and  a  locomo- 
tive, with  half  a  dozen  laborers,  did  the  equivalent 
amount  of  work  that  before  its  introduction  re- 
quired about  two  hundred  laborers,  and  in  much 
less  time. 

This  brief  description  of  the  methods  by  which 
the  enormous  amount  of  w^aste  from  Culebra  Cut 
was  handled,  is  given  for  two  reasons :  partly,  be- 
cause of  the  magnitude  of  the  operations,  as  mark- 
ing them  as  of  a  class  by  themselves ;  but,  mainly, 
because  it  is  necessary  to  understand  clearly  that 
the  introduction  of  every  device  that  could  do 

90 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  WORKING  PLANS 

away  with  common  labor,  was  very  imperative. 

Under  any  ordinary  labor  conditions,  such  a 
policy  would  be  a  true  economic  necessity,  but  on 
the  Isthmus  these  conditions  were  many  times 
magnified.  The  low  efficiency  of  this  labor,  while 
it  increased  appreciably  up  to  a  certain  point  as 
time  went  on,  was  a  severe  enough  handicap,  even 
with  the  aid  of  such  machines.  What  it  would 
have  been  without  them,  or  with  an  inferior  plant, 
only  those  who  were  directly  in  charge  of  opera- 
tions can  realize ;  the  Canal  would  have  cost  four- 
fold what  it  did,  and  its  time  of  completion  no  man 
could  have  safely  predicted.  To  the  skill  and 
broad  conception  of  the  requirements  shown  by 
American  engineers,  backed  by  the  great  resources 
of  the  United  States,  may  be  ascribed  the  success- 
ful completion  of  the  gigantic  task. 

It  would  require  many  pages  to  properly  detail 
every  class  of  plant  that  was  needed  and  provided 
for  the  execution  of  the  work  in  all  of  its  manifold 
ramifications.  The  same  careful  consideration 
was  given  to  the  task  of  providing  not  only  the 
best  of  everything,  but  in  such  ample  quantities 
as  to  preclude  serious  delay.  The  greater  bulk 
of  all  plant  was  on  the  Isthmus  and  at  work,  early 
in  1907,  and  the  remainder  was  supplied  in  such 
time  and  amounts  as  needed.  No  chapter  of  the 
history  of  the  building  of  the  Canal  reflects 
greater  credit  than  that  of  the  story  of  equipment. 

91 


CHAPTEE  VI 
THE  HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

The  employment  of  the  thousands  of  men  neces- 
sary for  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
under  the  conditions  imposed  and  in  a  tropical 
climate,  made  imperative  the  provision  of  quar- 
ters not  only  ample  in  capacity,  but  also  of  such 
a  character  as  to  comply  in  every  respect  v^ith 
modern  sanitary  requirements.  During  the  French 
occupation  and  operations  on  the  Isthmus,  the 
company  which  was  organized  by  De  Lesseps,  be- 
ginning in  1883,  built  large  numbers  of  houses 
located  at  various  points  where  required.  These 
buildings  were  of  the  same  general  class,  all  being 
of  wooden  construction,  and  of  a  very  suitable 
character  to  house  the  large  force  employed,  as 
far  as  the  necessities  for  health  and  comfort  were 
then  known. 

During  the  long  period  which  elapsed  from  the 
date  of  the  failure  and  cessation  of  the  work  of 
the  company,  and  its  resumption  by  the  Ameri- 
cans (some  seventeen  years)  these  buildings  had 
deteriorated  largely  in  usefulness.  The  destruc- 
tive action  of  the  elements,  very  rapid  in  the 

92 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

tropics,  and  the  ravages  of  the  ants,  had  rendered 
practically  the  great  majority  of  the  whole  num- 
ber unfit  for  human  habitation.  Only  compara- 
tively few  buildings  had  been  occupied  and  main- 
tained during  these  years.  The  material  neces- 
sary for  the  restoration  of  a  limited  number  was 
provided  and  such  repairs  as  were  imperative  for 
temporary  occupancy  were  made  without  delay. 

It  will  be  obvious  that  the  construction  and  fit- 
ting-up  of  proper  quarters  for  an  ultimate  force 
of  fifty  thousand  men  of  various  ranks,  races  and 
individualities,  involved  a  large  and  systematic 
program.  To  insure  success,  it  meant  that  not 
only  must  a  comprehensive  plan  looking  to  final 
results  be  definitely  adopted,  but  also  that  an 
organization  fully  capable  of  its  execution  must 
be  provided.  The  strict  and  very  necessary  regu- 
lations governing  living  conditions,  which  were 
promulgated  and  enforced  to  the  letter  by  the 
Sanitary  Department,  added  greatly  to  the  time, 
cost  and  general  complexity  of  the  problem.  Ee- 
quirements  which  had  become  recognized  as  stand- 
ard by  the  custom  of  years,  were  no  longer  guid- 
ing or  limiting  factors.  The  Americans  took  up 
this  work  on  the  same  comprehensive  and  thor- 
ough lines  which  marked  their  methods  in  each 
and  every  direction. 

Without  the  knowledge  of  the  importance  of 
modern  sanitation,  naturally  the  French  quarters 

93 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

lacked  about  everything  that  we  now  know  is  ab- 
solutely essential,  not  only  to  comfort,  but  even  to 
safety  of  life  itself  in  the  tropics.  Their  houses 
were  generally  placed  well  above  the  ground,  sup- 
ported usually  by  small  piers  of  concrete  masonry. 
This  plan  may  have  been  adopted  for  reasons  of 
ventilation,  but  more  likely  to  avoid  the  destruc- 
tive voracity  of  a  species  of  ants,  which  will  soon 
eat  any  kind  of  common  timber  in  contact  with  the 
ground.  The  buildings  offered  eating  and  sleep- 
ing accommodations  and  very  little  else.  Some 
of  the  better  class  were  provided  with  cesspools, 
but  as  a  rule  only  crude  latrines  were  provided. 
Any  provision  for  bathing  was  confined  wholly  to 
quarters  occupied  by  employees  ranking  well 
above  common  laborers.  There  was  no  defense 
against  mosquitoes,  as  the  importance  of  such  pre- 
caution was  then  unknown.  Probably  in  many 
individual  cases,  some  casual  protection  was  em- 
ployed, but  it  was  entirely  optional. 

Under  American  management,  as  far  as  the 
hygienic  needs  of  the  employees  were  concerned, 
the  orders  and  rules  of  the  Sanitary  Department 
were  paramount.  While  the  Engineering  Depart- 
ment made  the  plans  and  constructed  the  build- 
ings, in  all  matters  affecting  health  conditions,  it 
acted  under  the  orders  of  the  Sanitary  Depart- 
ment. That  the  rules  and  requirements  of  that 
department  were  wise  and  farseeing  is  evidenced 

94 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

beyond  question  by  the  great  success  which  at- 
tended them,  and  which  enabled  the  Canal  to  be 
built. 

The  selection  of  proper  sites  for  new  towns  or 
camps  was  carefully  considered.  Convenient  ac- 
cess to  the  work  was,  of  course,  a  prime  necessity, 
but  the  selection  of  a  location  was  governed  also 
by  its  natural  features.  Ample  space  without 
crowding,  and  perfect  drainage,  not  only  by  sew- 
ers, but  by  surface  drains  as  well,  must  be  as- 
sured. The  cardinal  principle  of  elimination  of 
malaria  with  its  different  forms  of  fevers,  de- 
pended upon  the  abolition  of  the  germ-carrying 
mosquito.  This  could  only  be  accomplished  by  the 
utter  absence  of  standing  water,  which  served  as 
breeding-places.  This  requirement  was  at  times 
very  perplexing  in  a  climate  where  the  yearly  pre- 
cipitation was  so  constant  and  so  enormous. 

Definite  rules,  based  upon  scientific  research  and 
conclusions,  fixed  arbitrarily  the  amount,  not  only 
of  floor  space,  but  also  of  the  number  of  cubic 
feet  per  hour  of  fresh  air  that  must  be  allotted 
as  a  minimum  to  each  individual.  The  proportion 
of  bathing  accommodations  to  the  number  using 
them  was  fixed,  as  was  also  that  of  the  other 
proper  sanitary  arrangements.  Provision  was  re- 
quired not  only  for  ample  lounging  and  sitting- 
rooms,  but  for  the  drying  of  clothes — a  very  neces- 
sary function  in  that  wet  climate. 

95 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Under  the  Engineering  Department  the  Divi- 
sion of  Building  Construction  was  created  which 
was  given  the  work  of  planning  and  building  all 
houses  of  whatever  nature,  necessary  for  the  task 
of  Canal  construction.  An  efficient  corps  of 
trained  architects  formed  an  essential  part  of  its 
staff.  A  practical  builder  of  long  experience  was 
placed  in  charge,  and  he  was  held  responsible 
for  the  rapid  and  economical  erection  of  all  build- 
ings. 

Standard  plans  were  made,  covering  every 
variety  of  structure,  of  which  two  general  classes 
were  established — ^bachelor  and  married  men's 
quarters — the  number  and  capacity  of  the  former 
largely  predominating.  These  classes  were  segre- 
gated to  as  great  an  extent  as  practicable. 

The  great  numbers  of  men  necessarily  employed 
in  comparatively  small  areas  of  operation  ren- 
dered necessary  the  condensation  of  these  quar- 
ters into  settlements  or  towns  of  greater  or  less 
size,  according  to  circumstances.  The  housing  of 
the  great  numbers  of  bachelor  negro  laborers  re- 
sulted in  the  evolution  of  standard  barracks,  all 
furnished  with  proper  accommodations,  strictly 
in  accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down  by  the 
Sanitary  Department.  Fitted  with  ample  bathing 
and  other  sanitary  arrangements,  all  thoroughly 
screened,  drained  and  sewered,  they  were  veri- 
table palaces  as  compared  with  the  houses  to 

96 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

which  they  had  been  accustomed.  Small  but  well- 
designed  quarters,  generally  in  groups  of  two  or 
four  each  under  one  roof,  were  built  for  laborers 
with  families.  These  houses  were  provided  with 
independent  cooking  accommodations. 

All  laborers '  quarters  were  furnished  ready  for 
occupancy,  and  were  as  complete  with  regard  to 
comfort  and  health  as  close  supervision  could 
make  them.  Owing  to  the  natural  indolence  of 
these  people,  many  of  whom  would  only  labor 
enough  to  secure  daily  bread,  a  rule  was  made  that 
a  certain  minimum  number  of  hours  must  be 
worked  each  week,  to  entitle  them  to  the  occu- 
pancy of  Commission  quarters  and  privileges. 
This  rule  worked  well  and  tended  to  drive  out  the 
undesirable  class,  and  promoted  in  a  marked  de- 
gree the  efficiency  of  the  whole. 

The  housing  of  the  white  employees  presented 
a  vastly  more  complicated  problem.  After  serious 
consideration,  a  plan  was  evolved  under  which 
the  relative  size  and  character  of  the  quarters  for 
each  and  every  class  was  fixed  by  a  somewhat  ar- 
bitrary standard.  Taking  the  minimum  require- 
ments as  defined  by  the  Sanitary  Department  as 
a  basis,  the  accommodation  furnished  to  each  class 
was  worked  out  on  the  scale  of  wages  or  salaries, 
as  far  as  practicable.  The  square  foot  was  taken 
as  the  unit,  and  quarters  of  different  types  were 
planned  and  built  to  conform  to  multiples  of  such 

97 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

unit,  keeping  the  numbers  of  such  types  to  as  low 
a  limit  as  possible. 

This  method  gave  very  satisfactory  results,  and 
was  pursued  not  only  in  the  assignment  of  the 
houses,  but  also  in  their  furnishings  and  fittings. 
The  rule  applied  to  married  and  bachelor  quar- 
ters alike,  and  was  adhered  to  without  favor  or 
discrimination.  It  established  a  standard  that 
was  easily  understood  by  everybody,  and  system- 
atized a  rather  complicated  proposition.  It  also 
proved  a  strong  incentive  to  encourage  individual 
ambition.  A  promotion  in  rank  meant  not  only  a 
better  wage,  but  more  commodious  living  accom- 
modations, and  a  certain  rise  in  the  social  scale. 
Distinctive  social  lines  were  drawn  on  the  Isth- 
mus, as  sharply  as  they  are  elsewhere,  particu- 
larly after  the  advent  of  a  large  number  of  fami- 
lies. It  was  a  frequent  and  amusing  occurrence 
to  have  the  wife  of  some  employee  come  to  head- 
quarters and  enter  complaint  that  Mrs.  So-and-so, 
whose  husband  was  drawing  a  salary  only  equal 
to  that  of  her  husband's,  had  an  extra  rocking- 
chair,  or  something  of  the  sort.  Such  troubles 
were  easily  adjusted,  but  without  a  system  life 
would  have  been  a  burden  to  the  management.  It 
was  a  truly  paternal  government  the  Chief  En- 
gineer was  called  upon  to  administer. 

The  system  as  described,  under  which  quarters 
were  assigned,  was  adhered  to  in  the  case  of  subor- 

98 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

dinates  and  minor  officials,  including  as  many  as 
was  practicable  or  politic.  Houses  of  special  de- 
sign were  provided  for  the  higher  officials  of  all 
departments,  in  accordance  with  their  needs  and 
importance.  While  the  wishes  and  tastes  of  the 
intended  occupants  were  consulted  and  complied 
with,  when  expressed  within  reasonable  limits,  the 
final  decision  of  all  such  matters  rested  with  the 
Chief  Engineer.  Generally  speaking,  no  trouble 
was  experienced  in  handling  such  affairs,  al- 
though some  heart-burnings  were  occasioned  by 
the  necessary  clipping  of  exuberant  ambition. 

The  quarters  for  all  employees,  of  every  race 
and  class,  from  Chief  Engineer  to  laborer,  were 
completely  furnished  and  provided  free  of  rent  to 
their  occupants.  All  were  built  on  sanitary  lines 
as  laid  down,  and  provided  with  the  requirements 
of  modern  life,  particularly  those  made  necessary 
by  reason  of  the  tropical  climate  with  its  usual 
peculiar  diseases.  One  unique  feature  was  es- 
pecially noticeable.  Every  aperture  was  provided 
with  metal  screens,  and  in  most  cases  in  the  white 
quarters,  the  beds  were  screened  also,  although 
the  latter  was  not  obligatory.  This  feature  was 
an  essential  part  of  the  campaign  against  mos- 
quitoes, to  prevent  malaria  and  other  typical 
diseases. 

The  most  rigid  daily  inspection  of  all  quarters, 
from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  was  maintained  by 

99 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  Sanitary  Department.  No  one  was  exempted, 
and  no  excuses  prevailed  in  cases  of  neglect  of 
rules  and  regulations.  The  Chief  Engineer  was 
several  times  formally  warned  that  holes  as  large 
as  a  lead  pencil  had  been  found  in  the  screens  of 
his  veranda.  It  was  almost  a  perfect  system,  and 
eternal  vigilance  was  the  price  of  health  and  life 
itself. 

After  the  completion  of  all  quarters  by  the  Divi- 
sion of  Building  Construction,  they  were  turned 
over  to  the  Division  of  Labor  and  Quarters,  which 
had  charge  of  their  furnishing  and  fitting-up, 
ready  for  occupancy.  This  division  made  all  as- 
signments in  accordance  with  established  rules, 
and  was  also  held  responsible  for  the  continuance 
of  such  rules,  and  for  the  care  of  all  property. 
No  exchange  of  either  quarters  or  furniture  could 
be  made  excepting  with  its  consent,  and  all  super- 
vision was  subject  to  the  approval  or  disapproval 
of  the  Chief  Engineer. 

The  very  active  labors  of  the  Division  of  Build- 
ing Construction  continued  through  1905  and  1906, 
and  reached  its  culmination  in  1907,  at  which 
time  the  demands  for  quarters  were  fully  met,  and 
thereafter,  the  force  of  builders  gradually  de- 
creased. As  may  be  inferred  from  the  general 
description  given,  very  large  investments  were 
made  by  the  Commission  in  providing  housing  for 
the  great  army  of  the  employees.      While  the 

100 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

tropical  climate  and  sanitary  requirements  made 
larger  expenditures  necessary  than  ordinarily 
would  have  been  the  case,  the  fact  that  all  these 
buildings  could  only  be  regarded  as  temporary, 
complicated  the  problem.  With  a  certain  maxi- 
mum use  of  not  to  exceed  ten  years  for  90  per  cent, 
of  them,  the  most  rigid  economy  was  necessary  in 
their  construction.  These  difficult  conditions  were 
well  met  and  overcome.  Health  and  comfort  were 
the  matters  of  first  consideration,  and  all  else  was 
subordinate  to  them. 

Houses  of  all  classes  were  of  the  same  general 
style  of  construction.  The  material  in  every  case 
was  either  of  pine  lumber  brought  from  our  Gulf 
states,  or  fir  from  the  northwest  Pacific  ports. 
Owing  to  the  immense  amount  of  such  lumber  used 
on  the  Isthmus,  it  was  brought  in  by  shiploads. 
In  less  than  two  years,  a  total  of  eighty-five  mil- 
lions of  feet  board  measure  was  consumed  in 
various  buildings  and  other  improvements,  includ- 
ing all  lumber  used  by  the  Panama  Eailroad  ex- 
cept cross-ties.  The  payrolls  of  the  Division  of 
Building  Construction  carried  an  average  of  more 
than  four  thousand  names  throughout  the  same 
period. 

The  houses  were  of  the  two-story  type,  of  two 
or  four  apartment  capacity.  They  were  designed 
to  afford  the  maximum  of  air  space  and  ventila- 
tion.   They  were  placed  well  above  the  ground,  to 

101  ■ 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

promote  coolness  and  to  protect  from  the  ravages 
of  ants.  All  doors  and  windows  were  thoroughly 
screened;  also  all  porches  or  verandas,  the  latter 
generally  being  used  as  sitting-  or  lounging-room, 
and  the  most  popular  one  in  the  house.  Shower 
baths  of  the  most  modern  type  were  installed  in 
every  apartment,  and  all  sanitary  arrangements 
were  of  the  best  that  our  experts  have  produced. 
The  interior  finish  of  all  houses  was  generally  of 
planed  lumber,  painted  white,  no  plaster  being 
used  on  account  of  the  dampness  of  the  climate. 
Roofs  were  of  metal,  which  answered  admirably 
every  purpose  for  the  length  of  time  the  build- 
ings were  required. 

Of  all  the  buildings  turned  over  to  us  by  the 
French,  about  two-thirds,  or  some  fifteen  hundred 
of  all  classes,  were  rebuilt  and  made  to  conform  to 
requirements.  They  were  of  much  value,  es- 
pecially in  the  saving  of  time.  The  assembling  of 
the  force  of  skilled  laborers  was  delayed  some- 
what by  the  lack  of  necessary  quarters,  especially 
as  it  was  advantageous  to  employ  men  with  fami- 
lies, as  far  as  possible.  However,  early  in  1907, 
sufficient  quarters  had  been  provided  to  care  for 
all  men  needed  up  to  that  time,  and  thereafter 
only  such  additional  houses  were  built  as  the 
natural  increase  and  changes  in  the  force  de- 
manded, as  new  work  was  opened  up,  or  existing 
work  was  brought  to  a  finish. 

102 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

FEEDING   THE    FOECE 

In  any  study  of  the  problem  of  properly  feed- 
ing a  mixed  force  exceeding  fifty  thousand  people 
on  the  canal  work,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  Isthmus  and  adjacent  countries  produce  little 
of  food  supplies,  especially  for  the  force  of  white 
employees.  Practically  all  of  such  supplies  could 
come  only  from  the  United  States. 

For  some  years  the  Panama  Railroad  had  main- 
tained a  small  commissary,  through  which  its  em- 
ployees could  obtain  necessary  food.  But  to  a 
great  extent  such  supplies  were  obtained  from 
local  stores,  operated  by  private  parties,  where 
prices  were  generally  high,  and  quality  and  quan- 
tity uncertain. 

After  due  consideration  it  was  decided  to  con- 
tinue the  commissary  arrangement  of  the  railroad, 
enlarging  its  functions  to  cover  the  employees  of 
the  Canal  Commission.  Contracts  were  made  with 
wholesale  dealers  in  Chicago,  for  all  fresh  meats, 
prices  being  fixed  on  the  varying  daily  market 
scale.  The  five  ships  of  the  Panama  Steamship 
Company  were  fitted  with  refrigeration  facilities 
and  a  sufficient  number  of  refrigerator  cars  were 
added  to  the  equipment  of  the  railroad. 

It  soon  became  apparent  that  not  only  food,  but 
supplies  of  all  kinds  must  be  provided  through 
the  commissary.     The  building  was  rebuilt  and 

103 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

enlarged  into  an  extensive  and  general  depart- 
ment store,  capable  of  carrying  a  heavy  stock  of. 
every  line  of  merchandise. 

During  this  period,  an  extensive  and  thoroughly 
modern  refrigerator  plant,  provided  with  three 
grades  of  temperature,  was  built  on  the  docks  at 
Cristobal — the  Zone  port  at  Colon.  An  ice-making 
machine,  a  bakery,  and  laundry  were  included  in 
this  plant. 

So  perfect  were  the  arrangements,  that  from 
the  time  fresh  meats  were  loaded  on  shipboard  at 
New  York,  they  never  came  into  contact  with  the 
outside  air  until  delivered  to  the  consumer.  In 
addition  to  the  handling  of  fresh  meats  by  refrig- 
eration, the  same  system  was  employed  in  supply- 
ing all  varieties  of  perishable  food — the  list  of 
which  in  a  tropical  climate  was  formidable.  After 
the  plan  had  been  well  established  and  its  success- 
ful working  demonstrated,  the  demand  for  in- 
creased varieties  was  met.  In  addition  to  all 
kinds  of  vegetables,  dressed  fowls,  eggs,  butter, 
milk,  and  even  fresh  strawberries,  were  success- 
fully handled.  At  first,  most  of  the  fish  supply 
was  sent  from  the  United  States,  but  later,  ar- 
rangements were  made  to  secure  from  local  par- 
ties ample  quantities  of  the  finest  food  fishes  in 
the  world. 

The  commissary  and  refrigeration  plant,  being 
both  located  at  Cristobal,  made  the  concentration 

104 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

of  supervision  comparatively  an  easy  matter.  At 
first,  all  orders  for  supplies  were  filled  from  the 
main  commissary,  but  later,  branches  were  estab- 
lished in  every  important  settlement  of  em- 
ployees, where  orders  were  taken  and  filled. 

The  method  of  distribution  was  very  complete 
and  successful.  A  supply  train  of  refrigerator 
cars,  filled  with  ice,  cold  storage  and  other  sup- 
plies, loaded  at  the  big  plant,  left  Cristobal  early 
every  morning,  stopping  and  distributing  these 
stores,  at  every  station  along  the  line  of  the 
Panama  Eailroad.  Here  they  were  immediately 
taken  by  employees  of  the  Division  of  Labor  and 
Quarters  to  the  hotels,  mess-houses,  and  individ- 
ual dwellings  of  the  employees.  By  this  method, 
all  supplies  needed  for  that  day  were  in  the  hands 
of  the  consumer  not  later  than  nine  o'clock  every 
morning,  thus  securing  the  indispensable  results 
sought  to  be  obtained. 

Food  ample  in  quantity,  variety  and  character, 
was  provided  promptly,  and  with  the  least  possi- 
ble effort  on  the  part  of  the  employees.  A  simple 
system  of  coupons  was  installed,  and  books  were 
issued  to  employees  only,  for  cash,  in  varying  de- 
nominations from  one  cent  to  five  and  ten  dollars. 
These  coupons  were  good  for  their  face  value,  for 
food  supplies,  or  for  any  kind  of  merchandise  at 
the  main  commissary,  or  any  of  its  branches.  The 
organization  and  smooth  working  of  the  commis- 

105 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

saries,  under  the  Division  of  Labor  and  Quarters, 
was  one  of  the  best  features  of  the  American 
administration. 

While  all  these  plans  were  being  formulated 
and  perfected,  the  Commission,  probably  having 
little  faith  in  their  success,  awarded  a  contract  to 
a  private  party  to  furnish  meals  to  employees. 
Such  a  contract  involved  the  turning-over  to  him 
of  practically  all  of  the  elaborate  supply  arrange- 
ments that  had  been  made,  including  the  large 
number  of  hotels  and  mess-houses  that  had  been 
built  and  put  into  successful  operation.  And  the 
prices  fixed  in  the  contract  were  to  be  much  higher 
than  those  which  had  been  demonstrated  were 
necessary,  and  which  had  already  been  established. 
A  vigorous  protest  against  such  a  contract  was 
made  by  the  Chief  Engineer,  with  the  result  that 
it  was  cancelled.  If  carried  out,  it  would  have  re- 
sulted in  disaffection  and  trouble  throughout  the 
entire  organization,  and  in  large  unwarranted 
profits  to  the  contractor  at  the  expense  of  the  em- 
ployees. 

Thus,  the  policy  of  the  Commission  of  feeding 
and  supplying  the  material  wants  of  its  great 
force  of  employees  was  continued.  And  so  per- 
fect were  the  arrangements,  and  such  care  and 
business  ability  were  displayed,  that  the  cost  of 
living  on  the  Isthmus  was  materially  less  than  for 
the  same  standards  in  the  United  States.      The 

106 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

Commission  was  able  to  effect  this  result  by  cut- 
ting out  the  usual  profits  of  all  middlemen,  and 
the  only  advance  that  was  made  over  first  cost  and 
transportation,  was  enough  to  cover  handling  and 
amortization  of  cost  of  plants.  For  example,  the 
Chief  Engineer,  who  paid  the  same  prices  as 
everybody  else,  had  daily  on  his  table,  the  very 
best  cuts  of  fresh  meats,  in  superb  condition,  at 
materially  lower  cost  than  he  paid  in  Chicago — 
not  five  miles  from  the  slaughtering  pens — for  the 
same  quality.  , 

The  same  results  were  obtained  in  a  greater  or 
less  degree  all  through  the  long  list  of  goods  sup- 
plied by  the  Commissary.  On  such  as  might  T)e 
called  luxuries,  a  larger  advance  in  price  was 
mac^e  than  on  the  necessities.  But  the  aim  from 
the  first  was  to  furnish  all  supplies  just  as  near 
actual  cost  as  possible.  As  methods  improved, 
and  experience  showed  that  it  could  be  done, 
prices  were  reduced  from  time  to  time.  Weekly 
lists  were  issued,  giving  the  current  prices  of  all 
necessities,  and  attention  called  to  all  changes. 
The  *  increased  cost  of  living'*  was  never  an  is- 
sue on  the  Isthmus,  and  no  such  advances  in  the 
price  of  supplies  were  ever  made,  as  were  in  effect 
in  the  United  States  during  the  same  period.  A 
careful  study  and  close  analysis  of  the  reasons 
why  the  Commission  was  able  to  carry  out  its  pol- 
icies so  successfully,  might  throw  a  flood  of  light 

107 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

onto  a  problem  whicli  has  been  for  some  years  a 
burning  issue  with  the  American  people. 

Hotels  were  built  and  put  into  operation  in  the 
various  towns  along  the  line  of  the  Canal.  These 
were  for  the  accommodation  of  the  bachelor  mem- 
bers of  the  force,  who  were  provided  with  quar- 
ters nearby,  as  previously  described.  At  these 
hotels  the  price  of  each  meal  was  fixed,  in  1905,  at 
thirty  cents — which  price  was  maintained  until 
the  close  of  the  work,  although  the  quality  was  im- 
proved. In  no  section  of  the  United  States,  ex- 
cepting possibly  rural  communities,  could  a  meal 
of  as  good  a  character  be  obtained  for  less  than 
fifty  cents.  Ample  in  quantity  and  of  as  great 
a  variety  as  possible,  they  presented  a  forcible  il- 
lustration of  results  that  can  be  secured  by  vigi- 
lant supervision.  For  the  laborers,  both  negro 
and  Spanish,  mess-houses  of  a  character  to  meet 
the  needs  of  each  class  were  established  at  con- 
venient points.  Three  meals  each  day,  suitable  to 
their  needs  and  habits,  properly  cooked  and 
served,  were  furnished  at  the  rate  of  forty  cents 
per  day  for  the  Spanish,  and  twenty-seven  cents 
for  the  negroes. 

When  the  progress  of  the  work  had  arrived  at 
a  point  where  it  became  interesting,  and  particu- 
larly when  the  sanitary  provisions  had  assured 
comparative  safety  for  visitors,  the  flow  of  tour- 
ists became  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with.    Besides 

108 


HOUSING  AND  FEEDING  OF  THE  FORCE 

the  large  number  of  people  who  came  singly  or  in 
small  parties,  delegations  of  representative  busi- 
ness men  from  various  commercial  bodies  in  the 
United  States,  Congressional  committees,-  Wash- 
ington officials,  etc.,  began  to  visit  the  Isthmus. 
At  that  time  there  was  not  a  hotel  or  accommo- 
dations there  suitable  to  their  wants,  and  provi- 
sion for  their  comfort  became  imperative.  There- 
fore, the  Commission  erected  and  put  into  opera- 
tion a  large  hotel,  on  a  commanding  and  beautiful 
site,  overlooking  the  city  and  Bay  of  Panama. 
This  was  provided  with  modern  conveniences,  and 
thrown  open  to  all  guests  who  chose  to  avail  them- 
selves of  its  privileges.  After  the  usual  time  of 
experiment,  it  proved  valuable  in  supplying  a  se- 
riously felt  want,  and  has  been  operated  contin- 
ually and  successfully  since  the  autumn  of  1906, 
and  is  still  the  leading  hotel  on  the  Isthmus. 

Taken  altogether,  the  policy  adopted  by  the 
Commission  of  housing,  caring  for,  and  feed- 
ing its  great  army  of  employees  by  and  through 
the  organization  of  its  Engineering  Department 
was  a  marked  success.  It  not  only  created  a  state 
of  contentment,  but  it  also  proved  a  financial  ben- 
efit to  the  employees  that  no  other  system  could 
have  done.  And  wherever  else  the  policy  of  ex- 
treme paternalism  may  be  questioned,  it  was  with- 
out doubt  the  correct  one  for  the  canal  construc- 
tion. 

109 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE  ASSEMBLAGE  AND  MANAGEMENT  OF  THE 
FORCE 

The  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  called 
together  the  largest  number  of  men  that  were 
ever  employed  at  one  time  on  any  modern  or  me- 
dieval peaceful  enterprise.  It  is  possible  that 
much  larger  numbers  were  engaged  on  works  ex- 
ecuted in  ancient  times,  like  the  building  of  cities, 
irrigation  systems,  and  the  Pyramids  of  Egypt, 
but  of  this  we  can  only  theorize.  The  problem  to 
be  solved  by  the  Engineer  of  the  Canal  from  1904 
to  the  completion  of  the  work  was  not  only  large, 
but  very  intricate. 

When  the  Americans  took  over  the  control  of 
the  project,  they  inherited  from  the  French  a 
force  of  about  seven  hundred  men.  This  force 
was  not  only  incompetent,  but  was  altogether  too 
small  to  be  regarded  as  even  a  nucleus  about 
which  to  rally  an  organization.  It  consisted  of 
negroes  from -the  islands  of  the  Caribbean  Sea, 
who,  from  their  well-known  indolent  habits,  en- 
gendered by  the  lassitude  of  a  tropical  climate, 
were  not  a  sufficient  potential  factor  to  depend 
upon.    In  numbers,  with  proper  living  and  sani- 

110 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

tary  conditions,  they  could  be  counted  as  a  supply 
from  which  to  draw  by  far  the  greatest  percent- 
age of  laborers  needed,  but  in  other  ways  they 
were  woefully  deficient. 

From  the  white  man's  point  of  view,  their  wants 
are  primitive,  and  their  efforts  to  supply  them 
hardly  go  beyond  the  aim  of  securing  food  enough 
to  ward  off  starvation.  Such  an  incentive  as  am- 
bition to  lift  themselves  to  a  higher  grade  of  civ- 
ilization is  unknown  to  most  of  them.  The  only 
real  competition  that  ever  threatened  their  abso- 
lute domination  of  the  labor  market  on  the  Isth- 
mus was  the  introduction  of  Chinese  by  the 
French.  As  this  was  a  failure,  the  situation  was 
intensified. 

As  the  necessities  of  the  case  admitted  of  little 
delay,  efforts  were  at  once  made  by  the  first  Amer- 
ican Commission  to  augment  the  force  largely, 
with  the  result  that  early  in  1905  there  were  as- 
sembled some  seven  thousand  of  these  blacks, 
enough  numerically  to  have  made  an  effective 
start  in  preparatory  work  had  not  a  lack  of  defi- 
nite plans  and  a  faulty  organization  prevented  the 
achievement  of  the  best  results. 

While  the  delay  in  the  decision  as  to  the  type  of 
the  canal  to  be  built  somewhat  handicapped  the 
solution  of  the  labor  problem,  it  was  at  once  ap- 
parent to  the  engineers  that,  whatever  type  wa& 
adopted,  many  thousand  more  laborers  would  be 

111 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

needed.  Steps  were  at  once  taken  to  secure  not 
only  such  increase  as  fast  as  practicable,  but  also 
to  improve  the  efficiency  of  each  individual  unit. 
To  accomplish  the  former  result,  competent  agents 
were  established  in  the  greater  and  most  popu- 
lous of  the  British  and  French  islands.  At  first 
their  efforts  were  largely  nullified  by  the  unfa- 
vorable impression  which  prevailed,  not  only  in 
the  islands,  but  throughout  the  world,  of  living 
and  sanitary  conditions  on  the  Isthmus.  But  with 
the  prompt  and  steady  improvements  which  were 
made  in  these  conditions,  the  inflow  of  these  la- 
borers increased  to  a  gratifying  extent. 

But  their  efficiency  showed  no  improvement,  ow- 
ing primarily  to  causes  which  have  been  stated, 
and  serious  consideration  of  ways  and  means  to 
effect  progress  along  this  line  became  imperative. 
An  ill-advised  attempt  had  been  made  by  the  first 
commission  to  awaken  their  ambition  by  segre- 
gating the  mass  into  two  classes,  distinguished  by 
a  difference  in  rate  of  pay.  Owing  largely  to  the 
small  numbers  of  the  force,  this  plan  worked  as 
an  absolute  detriment  rather  than  as  a  benefit,  as, 
coupled  with  a  weak  organization,  it  simply  re- 
sulted in  a  wild  scramble  by  the  heads  of  the  vari- 
ous departments,  all  seeking  to  fill  their  own  gangs 
by  offering  the  higher  wage;  so  that  in  1905  it 
was  found  that  the  outcome  was  a  direct  and  un- 
warranted increase  in  the  wages  of  nearly  all  of 

112 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

the  force,  with  no  improvement  whatever  in  their 
effectiveness.  This  plan  was  at  once  abandoned, 
and  all  of  such  labor  was  placed  on  the  lower  wage 
basis. 

As  more  knowledge  was  gained  of  the  methods 
and  habits  of  these  negroes,  the  engineers  became 
impressed  with  the  belief  that  a  part,  at  least,  of, 
their  non-efficiency  arose  from  lack  of  proper 
nourishment;  in  other  words,  that  they  were  not 
getting  proper  food  in  sufficient  and  regular 
amounts  to  give  them  strength  for  continuous 
work.  Up  to  this  time  they  had  been  allowed  to 
get  their  food  supplies  when  and  wherever  they 
would  or  could.  The  natural  result  was  exactly 
what  might  have  been  expected  with  such  large 
bodies  of  men.  They  did  not  get  enough, 
nor  of  the  proper  kind,  owing  partly  to  lack  of 
supply,  and  partly  to  their  own  inherent  indo- 
lence. 

As  a  first  experiment,  the  plan  was  tried  of  fur- 
nishing them  at  cost  prices  with  uncooked  food  of 
such  character  as  they  and  their  ancestors  had 
been  accustomed  to  for  generations.  Supply  de- 
pots were  established  at  convenient  points  and 
placed  in  charge  of  men  conversant  with  their 
needs  and  peculiarities.  For  a  while  it  seemed 
that  success  might  attend  the  effort,  but  expe- 
rience soon  showed  that  good,  resulted  only  in  in- 
-dividual  instances  and  that  on  the  mass  it  had 

113 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

little  effect.  In  many  cases  their  natural  hered- 
itary laziness  led  them  to  secure  only  such  food 
as  they  could  eat  raw,  to  avoid  the  labor  of  cook- 
ing. 

After  a  trial  lasting  long  enough  to  establish 
the  fact  of  the  failure  of  the  plan,  a  new  one  was 
evolved  and  put  into  operation.  Mess-houses 
were  installed  along  the  line  at  proper  intervals, 
and  well-cooked  food  of  the  character  suited  to 
their  wants  was  supplied  to  them.  The  use  of 
such  food  was  made  obligatory,  the  cost  of  it  be- 
ing placed  as  low  as  possible,  and  deduction  to 
cover  the  same  made  from  their  wages.  A  very 
marked  improvement  in  their  working  efficiency 
was  soon  apparent,  and  the  success  attending  this 
plan  was  such  as  to  justify  its  continuance  to  the 
end  of  the  work.  Men  with  families  living  at 
home,  where  the  necessary  cooking  could  be  done, 
were  exempted  from  the  rule,  as  generally  such 
men  were  fairly  well  fed. 

Mention  has  been  made  of  the  very  apparent 
idea  which  these  people  had  conceived  that  they 
controlled  the  only  available  source  of  labor  which 
could  successfully  work  in  the  tropics.  This  idea 
had  assumed  such  an  importance  that  they  openly 
boasted  that  the  Canal  could  never  be  built  with- 
out their  exclusive  employment.  They  are  a  child- 
like race,  easy  to  handle,  but,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  average  child,  sometimes  a  practical  object 

114 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

lesson  is  far  more  effective  than  moral  suasion 
and  results  in  lasting  benefit. 

The  Chief  Engineer  speedily  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  prevailing  clannishness  must  be 
broken  up,  or  a  partial  failure  at  least  of  his 
hopes  and  plans  could  only  be  expected.  To  effect 
the  needed  change  in  the  morale  of  the  negroes, 
a  sufficient  number  of  laborers  of  other  races  and 
of  different  characteristics  had  to  be  secured  and 
placed  on  the  work,  and  if  possible  the  net  value 
of  the  new  labor  had  to  be  greater  than  theirs. 
Several  plans  were  considered,  most  of  which 
were  rejected  as  impracticable.  Suggestion  was 
made  that  large  numbers  of  our  Southern  negroes 
would  fill  the  want,  particularly  as  their  adapta- 
bility to  warm  climates  was  assured.  But  even 
if  their  value  as  units  had  been  established,  which 
under  the  conditions  was  considered  as  doubtful, 
the  result  of  the  withdrawal  of  an  effective  num- 
ber from  our  Southern  industries  would  have  pre- 
cluded such  a  step. 

The  Chief  Engineer,  from  his  experience  and 
observation  in  our  Pacific  states,  had  become  well 
aware  of  the  value  of  the  Chinese  as  laborers, 
notably  those  coming  from  the  Cantonese  prov- 
inces. On  his  request,  the  matter  of  securing 
them  in  large  numbers  was  taken  up  through 
Washington. 

But  the  customary  outcry  that  is  raised  in  the 
115 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

United  States  against  the  employment  of  Chinese 
inade  itself  heard  with  its  usual  violence.  It  was 
learned,  also,  that  the  attitude  of  the  then  Chi- 
nese government  was  not  altogether  favorable  to 
the  project.  The  tragic  history  of  those  unfor- 
tunate people  of  that  race  who  were  brought  to 
the  Isthmus  by  the  French  was  too  fresh  in  the 
minds  of  the  rulers  of  China.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  we  had  at  that  time  hardly  convinced 
the  majority  of  our  own  people,  as  evidenced  by 
the  opinion  of  a  large  proportion  of  our  press, 
that  our  sanitary  reforms  were  a  success  and  that 
life  on  the  Isthmus  was  as  safe  as  in  any  average 
country,  we  can  hardly  censure  the  Chinese  for 
their  skepticism.  For  these  and  other  reasons, 
the  matter  was  dropped,  after  having  been  car- 
ried to  the  point  of  receiving  several  bids  for  sup- 
plying such  labor. 

It  is  difficult  to  harmonize  the  objections  of  our 
own  people  with  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the 
millions  paid  out  for  labor  went  to  people  of  an 
alien  race,  not  one  of  whom  ever  did,  and  prob- 
ably never  will,  become  either  a  citizen  or  resi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  and  whose  place  in 
the  scale  of  civilization  ranks  very  much  lower 
than  that  of  a  people  to  whom  the  world  owes 
many  of  its  most  valuable  inventions.  The  mil- 
lions so  spent  would  have  returned  a  much  greater 
value  to  us  through  the  superiority  of  the  Chi- 

116 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

nese  as  laborers.  But  once  the  adverse  decision 
was  made,  there  seemed  nothing  more  to  be  said, 
and  a  study  was  made  of  other  possible  sources 
of  supply. 

The  attention  of  the  Chief  Engineer  was  called 
to  the  past  employment  of  Spanish  laborers  on 
various  public  and  private  works  in  Cuba.  In- 
vestigation was  quickly  made,  and  with  a  result 
sufficiently  encouraging  that  steps  were  at  once 
taken  to  test  the  truth  of  the  favorable  reports 
by  actual  experiment.  A  competent  man,  one 
somewhat  versed  in  Spanish  law  and  an  excel- 
lent linguist,  was  sent  to  Spain,  endowed  with 
fairly  full  powers  to  act.  He  soon  discovered  that 
the  people  of  Spain  who  controlled  affairs  object- 
ed to  large  numbers  of  its  laborers  leaving  for 
any  other  country  and  most  especially  for  a  place 
with  the  record  of  Panama.  Therefore,  to  avoid 
possible  complications,  the  result  of  which  might 
have  been  disagreeable,  he  left  Spain  and  estab- 
lished an  office  in  Paris. 

From  this  point,  with  the  cooperation  of  some 
of  the  transatlantic  lines  of  steamships,  which 
were  interested  as  passenger  carriers,  he  was  able 
to  secure  large  shipments  of  picked  men  from  the 
Biscayan  provinces  of  Spain.  After  a  fair  trial 
of  these  men  as  laborers,  the  results  were  so  en- 
couraging that  some  eight  thousand  were  brought 
to  the  work,  and  nearly  that  number  remained  un- 

117 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

til  its  completion.  They  were  paid  a  wage  equiv- 
alent to  twice  that  of  the  negroes  and  were,  on 
the  whole,  worth  relatively  three  times  as  mnch. 
The  requirements  in  the  housing  and  sanitation 
of  a  less  number,  with  an  equal  total  efficiency, 
was  a  distinct  advantage,  also. 

The  effect  of  the  introduction  of  this  force  was 
quickly  apparent.  Not  only  did  it  add  to  the 
number  of  laborers,  but  it  did  exactly  what  was 
expected  in  changing  the  self-confidence  of  the 
negroes.  From  an  amusing  but  embarrassing  at- 
titude of  self-complacency,  they  soon  exhibited 
the  aspect  of  men  who  were  afraid  of  losing  their 
jobs,  and  their  value  increased  accordingly. 
While  in  some  ways  the  efficiency  of  the  Spaniards 
did  not  hold  up  to  the  standard  first  developed, 
their  introduction  was  a  marked  success.  At  one 
time  apprehensions  were  aroused  that  the  force 
might  be  seriously  depleted  by  the  efforts  of  offi- 
cials of  certain  South  American  countries  to  en- 
tice them  away  from  the  Canal  work  by  induce- 
ments of  higher  wages  and  other  promises. 
Prompt  action  through  our  State  Department  ob- 
viated almost  entirely  that  source  of  anxiety  and 
they  proved  an  excellent  investment  from  every 
point  of  view. 

While  the  assemblage  and  manipulation  of  the 
common  labor  was  going  on,  the  securing  and  or- 
ganization of  skilled  labor  of  all  classes  was  being 

118 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

vigorously  pushed.  The  clerical  force  was  put 
under  United  States  Civil  Service  rules,  which 
action  was  of  great  assistance.  But  on  the  rec- 
ommendation of  the  Chief  Engineer,  the  skilled 
workmen,  as  well  as  the  subordinate  officials,  were 
exempted  from  the  rules,  and  these  men  were 
hired  on  their  records  as  practical  artisans  and 
operatives.  Proofs  of  character  and  physical  fit- 
ness were  required  in  a  general  way.  For  some 
months  the  task  of  securing  the  requisite  force 
and  keeping  its  ranks  full  looked  hopeless.  The 
bad  name  the  Isthmus  had  received,  the  influence 
exerted  by  thoughtless  newspapers  and  the  cor- 
respondence and  interviews  of  former  employees, 
who  had  been  weeded  out  for  uselessness,  were 
severe  handicaps.  Gradually  these  and  other 
drawbacks  were  overcome,  and  the  supply  of 
labor  became  ample  and  the  quality  steadily  im- 
proved. 

Agencies,  with  personal  representatives — ^men 
of  practical  knowledge  of  the  various  kinds  of 
trades — were  established  in  cities  of  the  United 
States,  centers  of  manufacturing  and  railway  ac- 
tivities. A  liberal  scale  of  wages  was  established, 
which,  together  with  certain  emoluments,  such  as 
free  rent,  medical  and  hospital  service,  vacations 
amounting  to  11^  per  cent,  of  each  year,  with  pay, 
and  nominal  rates  of  transportation  from  ports 
of  the  United  States,  resulted  in  an  advance  of 

119 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

from  60  to  70  per  cent,  over  the  standard  remu- 
neration at  home. 

The  advent  of  many  families  from  the  United 
States  soon  established  pleasant  social  relations 
in  every  town.  Church  privileges  of  different  de- 
nominations were  provided.  First-class  schools, 
thoroughly  up-to-date,  with  experienced  teachers 
from  ^^home,''  were  established,  which  were  free 
to  all,  white  and  black. 

Club  houses  were  built  and  fitted  with  the  usual 
accessories  for  amusement  and  recreation.  A 
large,  first-class  band  was  organized  from  talent 
among  the  employees,  who  were  paid  for  their 
services,  and  whose  instruments  were  provided  by 
the  Commission. 

Among  so  many  young  men  there  naturally 
were  scores  of  fine  baseball  players.  Several 
clubs  were  organized,  and  baseball  tournaments 
became  a  leading  feature  of  the  recreation  of 
leisure  hours.  And  the  quality  of  game  that  was 
exhibited  would  compare  very  favorably  with 
that  of  some  of  our  professionals.  Home  and  so- 
cial life,  with  the  certainty  of  continuous  employ- 
ment at  very  remunerative  wages  for  a  term  of 
years,  produced  a  state  of  content  and  happiness 
that  went  far  toward  assuring  the  success  of  the 
work.  As  is  now  well  known,  the  great  majority 
of  the  Canal  workers,  of  every  race  and  color, 
rank  and  class,  regretted  sincerely  when  their  la- 

120 


The  Pedro  Miguel  Lock. 


Towing  Locomotive,  Gatun  Locks. 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

bors  there  were  ended  by  the  completion  of  the 
enterprise. 

The  establishment  of  an  eight-hour  law  was 
early  ordered,  and  all  work  was  governed  by  it. 
A  grave  question  has  always  existed  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  this  regulation.  From  a  financial  point 
of  view,  it  was  not  economical,  and  most  of  the 
force  would  have  preferred  a  slight  increase  in 
wages  with  longer  hours.  In  most  cases,  such  a 
plan  would  have  been  a  benefit  to  the  morale  of 
the  organization.  It  was  not  so  much  of  a  prob- 
lem to  look  after  the  welfare  of  the  men  during 
working  hours  as  it  was  during  their  hours  of 
leisure.  However,  the  situation  settled  down  into 
a  normal  state  and  conditions  became  satisfac- 
tory. It  would  have  been  a  difficult  task  to  have 
found  on  the  face  of  the  globe  a  community  of 
fifty  thousand  or  more  persons,  coming  from 
practically  everywhere,  employees  and  nonem- 
ployees,  where  law  and  order  was  so  universally 
obeyed  and  respected. 

There  were  four  departments  represented  on 
the  Canal  work:  the  Sanitary,  Purchasing  and 
Supply,  Auditing  and  Pay,  and  the  Engineering 
departments.  The  Engineering  Department  was 
very  much  the  largest,  not  only  in  the  numbers 
employed,  but  in  the  extent  and  variety  of  work 
which  it  planned  and  supervised.  Excepting  the 
purely  technical  work  of  the  other  departments,  it 

121 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

planned  and  executed  every  item  of  the  many  de- 
tails, large  and  small,  that  were  involved  in  the 
project.  All  labor  required  for  the  special  use 
of  the  other  departments  was  furnished  by  it,  and 
a  high  degree  of  cooperation  existed  between  all 
departments. 

The  organization  of  the  Engineering  Depart- 
ment was  framed  along  lines  of  simplicity  and  ef- 
fectiveness. A  successful  organization  must  be 
based  on  two  cardinal  principles:  the  location  of 
authority,  and  the  fixing  of  responsibility.  Gen- 
eral principles,  plans  and  suggestions  only  were 
given  to  guide  the  heads  of  divisions,  and  they 
were  expected  to  work  out  the  details.  These 
were  subject  to  review  by  the  Chief  Engineer,  and 
approved,  disapproved,  or  amended,  as  seemed 
proper.  In  every  case,  the  Division  head  was 
held  responsible  for  the  correct  and  economical 
working-out  of  the  plans,  and  he  was  given  what- 
ever was  necessary,  in  forces,  plant  and  material, 
to  carry  out  the  work. 

Under  the  Engineering  Department  were  the 
Divisions  of  Motive  Power  and  Equipment,  of 
Building  Construction,  Labor  and  Quarters,  Mu- 
nicipal Engineering,  Meteorology  and  Eiver  Hy- 
draulics and  the  three  divisions  having  direct 
charge  of  the  construction  along  the  line  of  the 
Canal  prism  and  its  accessories,  such  as  locks  and 
dams. 

122 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

Eeporting  to  the  Chief  Engineer,  each  division 
engineer  was  supreme  on  his  division,  and  all  or- 
ders from  the  head  office  went  through  him  to 
subordinates.  The  divisional  organizations  were 
made  up  on  the  same  general  plan.  There  was  no 
conflict  of  authority.  Every  man's  duty,  from  di- 
vision engineer  down  to  foreman  of  the  smallest 
gang  of  laborers,  was  clearly  defined.  He  knew 
that  he  had  but  one  superior  to  look  to  for  orders, 
who  would  hold  him  to  strict  account  for  re- 
sults. 

Weekly  meetings  of  the  heads  of  all  depart- 
ments and  division  engineers,  including  an  officer 
of  the  Panama  Railroad,  were  held  at  the  office 
of  the  Chief  Engineer.  At  such  meetings  a  gen- 
eral discussion  was  held  covering  all  work  in 
progress  or  planned  to  come  up  in  the  immediate 
future.  Wherever  such  work  or  plans  did  not 
seem  to  be  for  the  best  interests  of  all  depart- 
ments, modifications  were  made  to  effect  such  a 
result.  This  secured  the  utmost  cooperation  of 
all  departments  and  in  a  very  practical  manner 
taught  each  official  that,  while  his  particular  line 
of  work  was  important,  it  was  but  a  part  of  a 
great  system,  to  the  success  of  which  each  must 
contribute.  Under  this  arrangement  perfect  team- 
work became  the  rule ;  the  department  worked  as 
a  unit  and  its  efficiency  increased  in  a  marked  de- 
gree.    If  a  cog  in  the  machine  slipped  or  was 

123 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

broken,  it  was  replaced  automatically  without  jar 
or  loss  of  time. 

All  requisitions  for  labor  were  made  upon  and 
furnished  by  the  Division  of  Labor  and  Quarters, 
this  division  being  also  charged  with  the  securing, 
housing  and  feeding  of  all  employees.  Only  in 
cases  of  doubt  or  controversy  were  such  matters 
referred  to  the  Chief  Engineer  for  decision,  once 
the  system  was  established  and  its  correct  prin- 
ciple proved  in  actual  practice.  The  fields  of 
operation  of  the  other  divisions  were  as  indicated 
by  their  titles.  Each  division  engineer  was  free 
to  select  his  own  subordinates  and  was  held  re- 
sponsible to  the  last  degree  for  their  conduct  of 
work.  Such  a  policy  developed  a  spirit  of  confi- 
dence and  emulation  among  the  officers,  the  value 
of  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  estimate.  Every 
man  knew  that,  while  responsibility  rested  upon 
him  and  quiet  censure,  in  case  of  poor  results, 
would  surely  visit  him,  ample  and  quick  credit 
would  be  given  him  for  his  good  work.  He  knew 
that  the  success  of  his  efforts  meant  his  personal 
success  and  that  all  promotions  were  based  solely 
upon  merit. 

The  efficiency  of  the  individual  unit  of  the  com- 
mon labor  being  comparatively  low,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  employ  larger  gangs  than  is  usually  the 
case.  As  a  rule,  white  men  were  employed  as 
foremen  of  gangs,  although  in  some  cases  men  se- 

124 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

lected  from  the  ranks  of  the  laborers  gave  good 
service  in  such  capacities.  Close  supervision  was 
given  all  foremen  to  make  certain  that  a  proper 
spirit  was  exhibited  toward  the  laborers.  And  the 
latter,  especially  those  from  the  British  islands, 
had  such  an  innate  respect  for  authority,  that 
friction  and  clashes  seldom  took  place  and  were 
easily  settled. 

The  work  of  skilled  labor  was  largely  along  spe- 
cial lines.  Locomotives  and  trains  were  manned 
by  forces  picked  from  among  the  best  from  the 
United  States  and  governed  by  the  same  general 
regulations.  Steam-shovel  operators  and  men  of 
all  classes,  who  were  in  charge  of  the  many  ma- 
chines employed,  were  carefully  selected  for  their 
fitness.  Without  any  special  effort  made  by  their 
superior  officers,  they  soon  developed  a  spirit  of 
emulation  in  regard  to  the  amount  of  the  daily 
output  of  each  machine,  which  added  materially 
to  results.  Shop  and  field  mechanics,  whether 
carpenters,  plumbers,  steamfitters,  or  painters, 
once  the  organization  details  were  perfected,  set- 
tled down  upon  a  business  basis,  and  their  work 
moved  along  satisfactorily. 

During  the  two  years  while  the  gathering  and 
organization  of  the  vast  force  of  workers  were 
in  progress,  there  were  no  labor  disturbances  of 
a  serious  nature.  Without  the  announcement  of 
a  definite  rule,  the  *  ^  open  shop ' '  policy  prevailed, 

125 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

and  the  fitness  of  an  employee  for  liis  service  was 
the  only  standard  recognized.  Undoubtedly  the 
majority  of  the  skilled  laborers  were  affiliated  with 
organizations  in  the  United  States,  and  to  their 
credit  it  may  be  said  they  were  a  superior  class 
of  workers.  The  management  always  had  the  ac- 
tive cooperation  of  such  organizations  in  securing 
the  best  men. 

It  was  inevitable  that  among  such  a  host  of  em- 
ployees of  different  races,  classes,  and  such  varied 
lines  of  industries  there  should  be  some  who  came 
to  the  Isthmus  looking  for  individual  preferment 
rather  than  the  good  of  the  work.  The  fact  that 
it  was,  as  often  expressed,  a  *^ government  job'' 
had  created  in  the  minds  of  some  of  the  more 
thoughtless  the  idea  that  loose  business  methods 
would  prevail  and  that  full  efficiency  would  not  be 
demanded.  It  required  patient  endeavor  and  an 
absolutely  firm  line  of  action  to  eradicate  such 
mistaken  notions  and  to  harmonize  all  interests  as 
far  as  humanly  possible.  Complaints  there  were, 
some  justifiable,  many  not.  All  were  promptly 
and  diligently  considered  and  adjusted  for  the  ul- 
timate good  of  the  greatest  number.  The  force, 
assembled  with  comparative  haste  and  beginning 
a  new  life  under  unusual  and  unique  conditions, 
was  a  great  and  undigested  mass,  which  required 
time  for  assimilation  and  adjustment,  and  could 
only   be    made    an   effective   machine   by   disci- 

126 


ASSEMBLING  AND  MANAGING  THE  FORCE 

pline  and  careful  attention  to  details  of  organiza- 
tion. 

The  vast  majority  of  the  men  quickly  and  heart- 
ily accepted  the  situation  with  little  comment  and 
recognized  that  every  effort  was  being  made  that 
was  possible  for  their  welfare  and  comfort.  As 
'under  all  circumstances  and  situations,  the  good 
sense  and  intelligence  of  the  average  American 
could  be  depended  upon  to  adjust  himself  to 
proper  conditions  and  regulations. 

The  policy  in  handling  this  army  with  firm  and 
even  justice  to  all  alike,  of  maintaining  open 
house  at  headquarters  and  of  keeping  in  personal 
touch  everywhere  with  men  and  conditions,  was  a 
success  that  cannot  be  controverted.  No  stronger 
evidence  of  this  can  be  given  than  the  universal 
and  sincere  regret  manifested  in  many  ways  when, 
early  in  1907,  it  became  known  that  a  change  in 
administration  was  at  hand.  Petitions  carrying 
the  names  of  nearly  every  one  of  the  white  em- 
ployees went  to  headquarters,  asking  that  such 
action  be  rescinded.  Delegations  representing  the 
common  labor  made  the  same  appeal.  And  the 
demonstration  of  regard  and  affection  which  hon- 
ored the  retiring  Chief  Engineer  on  the  evening 
of  his  departure  still  stands  as  the  greatest  peace- 
ful function  on  the  Isthmus  since  the  American 
occupation. 

From  a  state  of  unrest,  uncertainty  and  pessi- 
127 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

mism,  which  prevailed  among  the  few  employees 
on  the  Isthmus  early  in  1905,  the  entire  large  force 
in  a  year  completely  changed  its  attitude  and  ex- 
hibited a  spirit  of  hope  and  loyalty,  which  could 
only  produce  one  result.  This  change  came  not 
only  from  the  improved  living  and  sanitary  con- 
ditions, but  also  from  the  workings  of  a  proper 
organization  and  the  fact  that  monthly,  daily  and 
hourly  every  man  of  intelligence  could  see  dis- 
tinct progress  was  being  made  toward  a  definite, 
comprehensive  and  successful  conclusion  of  the 
great  project. 

The  civil  engineers,  whether  employed  directly 
on  preparatory  work,  actual  construction  or  field 
surveys  miles  distant  in  the  tropical  jungles,  car- 
ried their  share  of  the  burden,  as  engineers  al- 
ways do,  with  vigor  and  skill.  Much  of  the  credit 
of  the  satisfactory  solution  of  intricate  details 
of  plans  and  their  execution  belongs  to  them.  As 
a  whole,  the  organization  was  well  fitted  to  carry 
on  the  vast  work.  During  the  latter  years  some 
changes  were  made  as  found  desirable  by  the 
progress  and  practical  completion  of  some  parts 
of  the  work  or  as  opportunities  presented  to  sim- 
plify methods.  But  no  fundamental  innovations 
were  introduced  and,  in  the  light  of  time  and  expe- 
rience, it  is  believed  that  it  was  eminently  well 
adapted  to  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  created. 


CONSTEUCTION  PERIOD:  MARCH,  1907,  TO 
APRIL,  1914 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

The  period  prior  to  March,  1907,  has  been  des- 
ignated as  the  preparatory  period,  the  period  of 
organization  and  plant  preparation. 

Engineers  fully  appreciate  the  far-reaching  ef- 
fects of  a  mistake  made  during  the  preparatory 
period.  A  mistake,  then,  as  to  a  general  principle 
or  as  to  the  proper  relation  between  size  of  plant 
and  work  to  be  done,  taking  into  consideration 
the  element  of  time,  is  basic  and  can  never  be 
fully  overcome. 

The  preparatory  period,  in  so  far  as  the  excava- 
tion plant  and  the  shops  incident  to  its  mainte- 
nance were  concerned,  was  completed  by  March, 
1907.  Of  course  experience  caused  many  addi- 
tions to  this  plant  and  many  changes  in  the  meth- 
od of  its  operation.  The  original  conception,  how- 
ever, was  broad  enough  to  permit  of  such  changes 
without  serious  disarrangement. 

In  the  great  majority  of  undertakings  with 
which  the  public  is  familiar,  living  arrangements 
already  exist  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  work. 
At  Panama,  however,  it  was  necessary  to  create 
all  these  facilities,  such  as  houses,  water  supplies, 
sewerage  systems,  hotels,  eating-houses,  etc.  The 

131 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

necessary  structures  were  materially  different 
from  those  in  an  ordinary  mining  camp. 

It  was  necessary  to  fight- and  eliminate  disease, 
and  the  hygienic  surroundings  had  to  be  as  nearly 
perfect  as  man  could  make  them.  This  phase  re- 
quired the  cooperation  of  the  Engineering  and 
Sanitary  departments.  The  success  of  the  entire 
undertaking  depended  largely  upon  the  health, 
happiness  and  contentment  of  a  large  force  of 
Americans  unaccustomed  to  a  tropical  climate. 

No  basic  changes  were  made  in  the  system  of 
housing,  feeding,  and  caring  for  the  force  during 
the  construction  period,  other  than  the  enlarge- 
ments and  improvements  that  experience  indicat- 
ed as  necessary. 

Before  commencing  the  history  of  the  construc- 
tion period  of  the  Canal,  a  short  description  will 
be  made  of  the  adopted  project,  the  changes  in 
such  project  during  the  construction  period  and 
the  discussions  that  accompanied  such  changes, 
together  with  an  outline  of  the  designs  made  dur- 
ing such  period. 

ADOPTED    PROJECT    AS    EECOMMENDED    BY    MINORITY 

OF    BOARD    OF    INTERNATIONAL    CONSULTING 

ENGINEERS 

The  adopted  project  contemplated  a  lift-lock 
canal  with  a  summit  level  85  feet  above  sea-level, 
extending  from  Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel  and  an 
intermediate  level  from  Pedro  Miguel  to  La  Boca, 

132 


THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

55  feet  above  sea,  with  other  parts  of  canal  at 
sea-level.  Ships  were  to  be  passed  to  and  from 
the  various  levels  of  the  Canal  by  means  of  a 
double  flight  of  three  locks  at  Gatun,  a  double 
lock  at  Pedro  Miguel,  and  a  double  flight  of  two 
locks  at  Sosa  Hill,  La  Boca. 

The  project  provided  a  channel  500  feet  wide 
and  41  feet  deep,  from  deep  water  in  the  Atlantic 
to  Gatun.  In  the  summit  level  section  extending 
from  Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel,  a  distance  of  30 
miles,  a  least  width  of  1,000  feet  with  a  depth  of 
45  feet  was  provided  in  the  channel  for  a  distance . 
of  about  15^  miles  from  Gatun  south.  As  the 
excavation  in  Gatun  Lake  increased,  in  obtaining 
a  depth  of  45  feet,  the  channel  width  was  de- 
creased, first  to  800  feet  for  a  distance  of  about  4 
miles,  then  to  500  feet  for  a  distance  of  about  3| 
miles,  and  to  300  feet  for  a  distance  of  about  IJ 
miles.  Through  the  Continental  Divide  from 
Obispo  to  Pedro  Miguel,  popularly  known  as  the 
Culebra  Cut,  a  channel  width  of  200  feet  was  con- 
templated. 

On  the  Pacific  side  from  Pedro  Miguel  to  a 
short  distance  beyond  Miraflores  the  channel  was 
to  be  500  feet  wide,  which  channel  was  to  rapidly 
increase  in  width  until  the  terminal  locks  on  that 
coast  were  reached  at  Sosa  Hill,  La  Boca. 

The  channel  through  that  part  of  the  summit 
level  contained  in  the  Gatun  Lake  followed  quite 

133 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

closely  the  Chagres  River  to  Obispo.  It  then  left 
the  valley  of  the  Chagres  and  crossed  the  Conti- 
nental Divide  to  Pedro  Miguel  by  the  route  that 
would  produce  a  satisfactory  navigable  channel 
with  the  least  amount  of  excavation. 

The  summit  level  was  to  be  created  by  an 
earthen  dam  not  only  across  the  Chagres  River, 
but  across  the  Chagres  Valley  at  Gatun.  The 
crest  of  this  dam  was  to  be  50  feet  higher  than  the 
level  of  the  lake  that  it  created.  Regulating  works 
were  provided  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the 
elevation  of  this  lake.  The  area  of  the  lake  at 
normal  level  created  by  this  dam  was  about  164 
square  miles.  On  the  Pacific  side  dams  were  to 
be  constructed  across  the  Rio  Grande  Valley  from 
the  locks  at  Sosa  Hill  to  the  hills  to  the  west. 
Sosa  Hill  or  Ancon  Hill  was  to  be  joined  by  a 
dam  to  the  high  ground  near  Corozal,  thus  creat- 
ing a  terminal  lake  of  7J  square  miles  in  area  on 
that  side. 

A  harbor  at  Colon  was  to  be  created  by  a  break- 
water extending  from  Colon  Point  to  deep  water 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Canal  entrance.  On  the 
west  side  of  the  channel,  a  breakwater  was  to  be 
constructed  extending  from  deep  water  in  the  At- 
lantic entirely  across  Limon  Bay  to  the  shore  near 
Mindi,  approximately  parallel  to  the  Canal. 

The  locks  were  to  be  900  feet  long,  90  feet  wide, 
and  to  provide  a  navigable  depth  of  40  feet. 

134 


THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

The  Secretary  of  War,  in  transmitting  the  re- 
port and  recommendation  of  the  minority  of  the 
Board  of  Consulting  Engineers,  as  to  type  of  ca- 
nal across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  recommended 
the  adoption  of  plans  proposed,  except  as  far  as 
they  related  to  the  location  of  the  locks  at  Sosa 
Hill,  La  Boca.  In  his  letter  transmitting  this 
project  to  the  President,  he  stated: 

The  great  objection  to  the  locks  at  Sosa  Hill  is 
the  possibility  of  their  destruction  by  the  fire  from 
an  enemy's  ships.  If,  as  has  been  suggested  to 
me  by  officers  of  this  Department  entitled  to  speak 
with  authority  on  military  subjects,  these  locks 
may  be  located  against  and  behind  Sosa  Hill  in 
such  a  way  as  to  use  the  hill  as  a  protection 
against  such  fire,  then  economy  would  lead  to  re- 
tention of  this  lake.  The  lake  would  be  useful  to 
commerce  as  a  means  for  relieving  any  possible 
congestion  in  the  Canal  should  the  traffic  be  very 
great,  and  would  give,  in  case  of  need,  a  place  for 
concentrating  or  sheltering  the  fleet.  If,  however, 
Sosa  Hill  will  not  afford  a  site  with  such  protec- 
tion, then  it  seems  to  me  wiser  to  place  the  locks 
at  Miraflores. 

The  International  Board  of  Consulting  Engi- 
neers consisted  of  thirteen  members — eight  Amer- 
icans and  five  foreigners.  Five  of  the  eight  Amer- 
icans voted  for,  and  submitted  a  minority  report 
recommending,  the  lift-lock  type  of  canal,  and 
all  of  the  foreigners  voted  against  such  tjipe  and 

135 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

in  favor  of  a  sea-level  canal  wMcli  was  recom- 
mended in  the  report  of  the  board  as  a  whole. 

There  had  not  been  constructed  and  operated 
in  any  of  the  foreign  countries  represented  by 
members  of  this  board  a  canal  for  the  passage  of 
large  ships  with  as  high  lift-locks  as  those  in  the 
St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal  which  connects  Lake  Su- 
perior with  the  St.  Mary's  Eiver.  No  European 
canals  had  the  commerce  to  justify  the  construc- 
tion of  such  effective  aids  to  the  safe  passage  of 
ships  through  locks  as  had  been  built  in  America 
at  that  canal.  Most  prominent  among  said  aids 
were  long  approach  walls  at  both  ends  of  locks, 
so  located  as  to  aid  ships  in  entering  the  locks. 
46,015,016  tons  of  commerce  had  been  passed 
through  the  canals  at  Sault  Ste.  Marie  the  year 
the  report  was  made — ^more  water-borne  commerce 
than  enters  London  and  New  York  combined. 

The  largest  lock  in  this  canal  had  then  been  in 
service  twenty  years  and  no  serious  accident  had 
actually  happened,  although  on  two  occasions  such 
accidents  had  been  narrowly  averted.  This  lock 
was  100  feet  wide,  800  feet  long,  and  had  a  lift 
of  18  feet;  practically  in  the  same  class  with  the 
locks  recommended  in  the  project  referred  to 
above. 

There  is  no  profession  in  which  experience  is  a 
greater  factor  than  in  that  of  the  engineer,  espe- 
cially as  to  the  design  of  works  affecting  navi- 

136 


THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

gation;  the  adaptability  of  sucli  works  to  the 
needs  of  the  navigator;  the  chances  of  accident, 
and  the  necessary  appliances  to  reduce  such 
chances  to  a  minimum  are  questions  that  expe- 
rience largely  determines.  It  is  probable  that 
such  considerations  as  the  above  were  largely  the 
reasons  that  practically  aligned  the  American  and 
foreign  engineers  on  different  sides  when  the 
type  of  canal  was  being  investigated.  The  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  the  President  of  the  United  States,  all  rec- 
ommended to  Congress  the  adoption  of  the  proj- 
ect recommended  by  the  minority  of  the  board. 

After  the  submission  of  this  project  and  prior 
to  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  a  canal  project  by 
Congress,  efforts  were  made  by  the  then  Chief  En- 
gineer of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  to  find 
a  location  for  the  three  locks  on  the  Pacific  side 
of  the  Isthmus  at  a  place  about  a  mile  south  of 
Miraflores,  thus  removing  the  military  objections 
raised  by  the  Secretary  of  War  as  to  the  loca- 
tion of  locks  at  the  Pacific  terminal.  It  was 
thought  that  a  suitable  foundation  had  been  lo- 
cated and  plans  were  proposed  for  the  three  locks 
in  flight;  but  before  these  plans  were  submitted, 
additional  borings  indicated  that  the  foundation 
was  unsuitable  for  the  needed  structures.  There 
was  not  time  to  permanently  settle  the  question  of 
lock  location,  and  the  need  of  a  decision  as  to 

137 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

type  of  canal  was  urgent  and  Congress  approved 
the  lock-canal  project  as  submitted,  with  two  of 
the  locks  on  the  Pacific  side  at  La  Boca  along 
the  edge  of  Sosa  Hill,  and  one  at  Pedro  Miguel. 

The  words  la  hoca,  in  Spanish,  mean  ^Hhe 
mouth,''  and  in  Spanish-speaking  countries  that 
name  is  quite  generally  given  to  towns  near  the 
mouths  of  streams.  At  the  suggestion  of  the  Pe- 
ruvian Minister  at  Panama,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  changed  the  name  of  the  Pacific 
terminal  of  the  Canal  to  Balboa,  a  fitting  recog- 
nition and  monument  to  the  discoverer  of  the  Pa- 
cific Ocean. 


CHAPTER  IX 
CHANGES  IN  THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

The  exposed  position  of  the  proposed  lock  at 
the  Pacific  entrance  in  so  far  as  ship-fire  from 
an  enemy's  fleet  was  concerned,  in  addition  to 
foundation  troubles  in  the  construction  of  the 
necessary  dams,  especially  the  dam  from  Sosa 
Hill  to  near  the  mouth  of  San  Juan  River,  caused 
investigations  to  be  continued  with  a  view  to  mov- 
ing the  locks  in  question  inland  to  a  position  where 
the  natural  hills  would  protect  them  from  hostile 
gun-fire. 

The  advantages  of  a  commodious  lake  at  the 
Pacific  terminus  were  many  from  a  navigation 
and  commercial  standpoint,  but  the  military  fea- 
tures were  considered  paramount.  The  investiga- 
tions which  consisted  principally  in  making  bor- 
ings in  search  of  suitable  foundation  material 
were  commenced  at  the  old  French  lock  location, 
at  Miraflores,  and  continued  south.  These  borings 
soon  established  the  fact  that  suitable  founda- 
tions existed  at  Miraflores  for  at  least  two  locks. 
Work  was  proceeding,  building  the  dams  connect- 
ing Sosa  Hill  with  the  highlands  on  either  side 
and  starting  the  excavation  for  the  Sosa  Hill 
Locks,  so  if  a  change  were  to  be  made  it  was  nec- 

139 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

essary  that  the  decision  should  be  arrived  at 
quickly  so  as  to  stop  expense  on  a  project  that 
might  be  discarded.  When  the  question  was 
brought  before  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 
for  recommendation,  it  was  not  known  that  suit- 
able foundation  existed  at  Miraflores  for  three 
locks  and  it  was  thought  and  stated  by  those  con- 
ducting the  explorations  that  there  was  not  a  suit- 
able foundation  for  three  locks  at  this  site,  so  two 
locks  were  recommended  at  Miraflores  and  one 
at  Pedro  Miguel,  which  plan  was  approved  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States. 

It  was  thought  by  some  of  the  engineers  con- 
nected with  the  Canal  that  there  would  be  a  great 
advantage  in  having  the  three  locks  in  one  flight 
at  Miraflores,  making  the  two  ends  of  the  Canal 
symmetrical.  Investigations  were  therefore  con^ 
tinned  and  soon  established  the  fact  that  the  three 
locks  could  advantageously  be  built  at  Miraflores 
on  a  rock  foundation,  thus  making  it  practicable 
to  carry  out  a  little  further  up  the  valley  essen- 
tially the  same  plan  that  had  been  studied  in  1906 
and  abandoned  because  suitable  foundations  had 
not  been  located. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  suitable  foun- 
dation existed  near  Miraflores  for  a  duplicate 
flight  of  three  locks,  comparative  estimates  were 
made  for  that  construction  and  for  the  locks  sep- 
arated— one  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  two  at  Mira- 

140 


CHANGES  IN  THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

flores.  These  estimates  showed  that  the  three 
locks  on  the  Pacific  side  could  be  built  in  flight  in 
one  structure  for  about  $4,000,000  less  than  if  sep- 
arated. This  saving  resulted  largely  from  the 
following  facts : 

First,  that  only  one  set  of  guide  and  flare  walls 
aggregating  a  length  of  about  four  thousand  feet 
would  be  needed  if  the  locks  were  in  one  struc- 
ture, while  two  sets  of  such  walls  would  be  nec- 
essary if  the  structures  were  separated  as 
stated. 

Second,  that  only  twenty  lock  gates  and  thirty- 
three  sets  of  gate  valves  were  necessary  if  all 
locks  were  together,  while  twenty-six  gates  and 
fifty-one  sets  of  valves  would  be  needed  if  the 
locks  were  separated.  The  six  extra  sets  of  gates 
would  also  require  a  material  increase  in  length 
of  lock  walls  to  accommodate  them. 

Third,  the  smaller  number  of  expensive  ma- 
chines for  operating  the  gates  and  valves. 

Fourth,  only  one  emergency  dam  would  be 
needed  in  the  first  case,  and  two  in  the  second. 

The  estimates  also  showed  that  the  operating 
and  maintenance  cost  would  be  about  $250,000  a 
year  less  for  the  three  locks  in  flight. 

The  advantages  and  disadvantages  to  naviga- 
tion afforded  by  each  of  the  propositions  were  dis- 
cussed. One  line  of  thought  led  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  navigation  interests  and  the  water-supply 

141 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

question  would  be  best  met  if  all  the  locks  of  the 
Panama  Canal  were  separated  by  material  dis- 
tances, and  that  where  this  could  not  be  attained 
it  should  be  approximated  as  closely  as  possi- 
ble, and  that  not  more  than  two  locks  should  be 
built  together  if  it  could  be  avoided;  it  being 
thought  in  the  beginning  that  the  saving  of  water 
due  to  the  use  of  intermediate  gates  could  not  be 
effected  in  a  flight  of  three  locks. 

These  intermediate  gates  divide  the  1,000-foot 
lock  chamber  into  two  smaller  chambers  of 
lengths  sufficient  to  accommodate  to  the  best  ad- 
vantage ships  of  commerce  not  exceeding  550  feet 
in  length.  Ships  of  this  class  constitute  over  95 
per  cent,  of  the  world  ^s  shipping  which  may  rea- 
sonably be  expected  to  use  the  Canal. 

It  was  also  pointed  out  that  a  ship  breaking 
through  the  upper  gates  in  a  flight  of  locks  would 
be  more  surely  and  completely  wrecked  than  if  it 
broke  the  upper  gate  of  a  lock  where  only  one  lift 
existed.  General  H.  L.  Abbott  proved  that,  if 
the  boats  going  from  Colon  to  Panama  were  al- 
ways passed  through  the  same  flight  of  locks — the 
west  side,  for  instance — and  those  going  the  op- 
posite direction  through  the  east  flight,  that  the 
same  saving  of  water  could  be  accomplished  by 
the  use  of  intermediate  gates  in  a  flight  of  three 
locks  as  could  be  if  the  locks  were  separated — 
without  any  cross-filling  devices — which  devices 

142 


CHANGES  IN  THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

are  of  doubtful  utility  when  the  locks  are  used  to 
maximum  capacity. 

The  advocates  of  the  three-lock  design  contend- 
ed that  it  would  probably  make  very  little  differ- 
ence to  a  ship  whether  it  plunged  down  one  fall 
of  thirty  feet,  or  three ;  that  it  would  be  wrecked 
anyway;  and  that  the  damage  to  shipping  would, 
in  the  three-lock  design,  be  largely  confined  to  the 
ship  actually  breaking  the  lock  gates;  while  if 
the  locks  were  separated,  many  other  ships  might 
be  involved  in  the  disaster  on  account  of  quickly 
draining  the  levels  between  locks  and  grounding 
the  ships  in  such  levels. 

It  was  pointed  out  in  the  case  of  the  flight  of 
locks  at  Gatun  that  the  upper  miter-sill,  which 
is  about  twenty-five  feet  above  the  general  lake 
bottom  in  that  vicinity,  would  limit  the  available 
depth  in  Gatun  Lake,  with  the  water  flowing 
through  the  locks,  to  about  thirty-one  or  thirty- 
two  feet,  and  that,  as  the  lake  fell  there  would  be 
no  unusual  difficulty  in  stopping  the  flow  before 
the  largest  draft  vessel  would  ground  in  the  an- 
chorage space  south  of  the  locks.  That  is,  should 
such  a  catastrophe  happen,  the  damage  to  ship- 
ping would  be  limited  to  the  ship  breaking  the 
summit  level. 

It  was  also  pointed  out  that  should  such  an  ac- 
cident happen  the  damage  to  the  Canal  would  be 
practically  limited  to  the  wreckage  of  the  lock 

143 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

gates  involved  in  tlie  collision.  The  flow  of  about 
100,000  cubic  feet  per  second,  which  might  result 
from  breaking  the  summit  level  could  not  damage 
the  masonry  of  the  lock  walls  or  floors  and  there 
was  nothing  below  the  locks  to  be  damaged  ex- 
cept  the  sea-level  section  of  the  Canal.  This '  sec- 
tion is  500  feet  wide  and  41  feet  deep  and  would 
carry  100,000  cubic  feet  with  a  mean  velocity  of 
about  5  feet  per  second,  or  less  than  4  miles  per 
hour.  In  that  part  of  channel  immediately  below 
the  locks  where  the  guide  wall  divides  it,  the  ve- 
locity should  not  exceed  7  miles  per  hour.  To 
have  no  essential  structures  below  the  locks  lead- 
ing to  the  summit  level  of  a  canal,  which  in  this 
case  was  a  reservoir  164  square  miles  in  area,  was 
considered  a  material  advantage. 

It  was  also  pointed  out  that  should  a  lock  gate 
be  carried  away  at  Pedro  Miguel,  there  would  de- 
velop  almost  immediately  in  the  section  through 
the  Culebra  Cut,  which  was  then  planned  with  a 
width  of  200  feet,  a  current  velocity  of  about  10 
miles  an  hour  which  would  imperil  all  vessels  in 
such  cut  and  would  fill  to  overflowing  in  about 
thirty  minutes  the  small  lake  between  Pedro  Mi- 
guel and  the  two  locks  at  Miraflores.  This  might 
result  in  serious  injury  to  the  earthen  dams  and 
fills  at  Miraflores  unless  the  spillway  in  the  dam 
at  that  place  was  surely  operated  in  a  very  short 
space  of  time. 

144 


CHANGES  IN  THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 

It  was  pointed  out  that,  if  three  locks  were 
placed  at  Miraflores,  the  size  and  depth  of  the 
lake  would  be  so  increased  over  that  in  the  two- 
lock  project  that,  should  a  lock  gate  be  carried 
away  at  Miraflores,  the  lake  would  fall  so  slowly 
that  all  ships  in  the  Culebra  Cut  would  pi^obably 
have  time  to  safely  pass  into  either  Gatun  or 
Miraflores  lakes  before  currents  could  be  devel- 
oped in  that  cut  destructive  to  shipping. 

The  congestion  and  consequent  difficulties  to 
navigation  brought  about  by  providing  a  lock  at 
the  end  of  a  long  narrow  channel  such  as  the  Cu- 
lebra Cut,  due  to  the  fact  that  ships  accumulate 
and  pass  each  other  at  locks,  was  pointed  out.  It 
was  also  pointed  out  that  large  ships  could  not 
pass  each  other  in  a  200-foot  channel  and  that  in 
order  to  attain  the  maximum  number  of  lockages 
per  day,  it  might  be  necessary  to  dispatch  ships 
through  the  Cut  in  fleets  and  that  lakes  at  both 
ends  of  the  summit  level  would  facilitate  this. 

The  advantage  of  such  lakes  was  still  further 
emphasized  by  the  fact  that  dense  fogs  are  fre- 
quent in  the  Culebra  Cut  during  the  year,  espe- 
cially in  the  rainy  season.  These  fogs  rise  from 
eight  to  ten  p.  m.  and  disappear  about  sunrise. 
The  records  showed  that  navigation  would  expe- 
rience practically  no  difficulty  in  the  sea-level 
parts  of  the  Canal  on  account  of  fogs. 

It  was  pointed  out  that  the  ability  to  pass  ships 
.145 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

to  the  summit  level  and  have  there  a  commodious 
harborage,  where  they  could  await  the  disappear- 
ance of  the  fog,  would  be  a  material  advantage. 

It  was  also  pointed  out  that  the  greatest  chance 
of  accident  in  passing  a  ship  through  a  lock  was 
in  entering  the  lock  from  the  pool  level  above, 
as  evidenced  by  the  construction  of  duplicate  lock 
gates  at  both  ends  of  a  lock  next  the  summit  or 
other  levels,  and  by  the  construction  and  mainte- 
nance of  expensive  devices  to  stop  the  flow  of  wa- 
ter through  a  lock  so  situated,  should  its  gates  be 
carried  away.  Such  entrance  would  take  place 
only  once  if  the  three  locks  were  in  flight  in  one 
structure,  and  would  take  place  two  or  three  times 
if  the  locks  were  built  at  two  or  three  sites. 

A  board  of  seven  consulting  engineers  reported 
confidentially  to  the  President  that  the  better  plan 
would  be  to  build  three  locks  at  Miraflores.  The 
matter  was  never  passed  upon  by  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission.  An  extended  and  bitter  pub- 
lic discussion  was  then  being  carried  on  in  the 
papers  of  the  United  States  concerning  the  type 
of  the  canal.  Changes  in  the  adopted  project 
could  be  utilized,  it  was  thought,  by  the  advocates 
of  the  sea-level  plan  in  their  arguments.  Changes 
in  plans  were  classed  as  admissions  of  weakness 
in  the  lock-type  canal. 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  in  this  connection,  that 
the  Annual  Report  of  the  Panama  Canal,  1914, 

146. 


CHANGES  IN  THE  ADOPTED  PROJECT 


shows  that  the  three  locks  on  the  Atlantic  side  of 
the  Canal  cost  $2,130,000  less  than  the  three  locks 
on  the  Pacific  side  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
the  sand,  stone  and  cement  in  a  cubic  yard  of  con- 
crete in  the  Atlantic  locks  cost  $2.01  more  than 


ISTHMIAN  CA» 

PACIFIC   DIVISION 


Qruces,. 


DIAGRAM    1 

in  a  cubic  yard  of  concrete  in  the  Pacific  locks. 
The  decision  afterwards  to  widen  the  Culebra 
Cut  to  300  feet  will  reduce  the  current  in  that 
cut  to  6^  miles  an  hour  in  case  such  an  accident 
as  that  described  above  should  happen.  The  many 
devices  adopted  to  prevent  accident  to  the  lock 
gates,  of  course,  make  it  very  improbable  that  any 

147 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

such  accident  will  occur,  and  the  entrance  to  Pe- 
dro Miguel  Lock  can  be  still  further  widened, 
and  thus  minimize  the  disadvantage  of  having  a 
lock  at  the  end  of  a  long  narrow  section  of  a  canal. 

The  change  of  lock  location  on  the  Pacific  side 
was  the  only  change  in  location  of  the  essential 
parts  of  the  Panama  Canal  excepting  the  follow- 
ing changes  in  channel  location:  first,  from  the 
Pacific  terminal  to  the  south  side  of  the  group  of 
islands  about  three  or  four  miles  ofP  shore;  sec- 
ond, the  extension  of  the  sea-level  section  to  Mira- 
flores,  which  route  followed  quite  closely  that  fol- 
lowed by  the  French  in  their  last  plan. 

The  change  in  location  of  the  channel  leading 
fronci  the  Pacific  terminal  to  deep  water  in  the 
Pacific,  placing  the  same  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Islands,  was  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  reduc- 
ing the  cost  of  maintenance,  experience  having 
shown  that  the  currents  in  Panama  Bay  caused 
a  movement  of  fine  silt  along  the  shore  to  the 
westward.  By  changing  the  channel  and  build- 
ing a  causeway  on  the  east  side  of  it  from  the 
shore  to  the  Islands,  this  channel  silting  would  be 
stopped,  and  furthermore  this  causeway  consti- 
tuted a  line  of  communication  from  the  shore  to 
the  sea-coast  fortifications  on  the  Island  that 
could  be  protected  by  guns  on  the  shore  on  that 
side  of  the  Canal  that  would  be  least  subject  to 
surprise  by  a  raiding  force. 

148 


CHAPTER  X 

CHANGES  IN  DIMENSION  OF  PARTS  OF  CANAL 

The  planned  dimensions  of  locks  were  first  in- 
creased so  as  to  provide  for  a  width  of  100  feet 
and  usable  length  of  1,000  feet ;  and  were  finally 
changed  so  as  to  provide  a  width  of  110  feet  and 
length  of  1,000  feet  with  a  fresh-water  depth  over 
sill  that  would  allow  the  passage  of  a  ship  that 
drew  40  feet  in  salt  water.  The  decision  to  make 
the  first  change  was  based  on  the  ordinary  pro- 
portions of  merchant  vessels  not  requiring  a 
greater  length  than  1,000  feet,  i.  e.,  a  merchant 
ship  1,000  feet  long  would  not,  in  ordinary  prac- 
tice, have  a  beam  width  as  great  as  a  100-feet. 
Naval  vessels,  however,  are  built  on  different 
lines,  and  the  requirements  of  law  that  the  Canal 
should  be  so  built  as  to  reasonably  meet  the  de- 
mands of  the  future,  not  only  as  to  merchant  ves- 
sels but  as  to  battleships,  was  referred  to  the 
General  Board  of  the  Navy  for  recommendation 
especially  as  to  naval  needs.  This  board  finally 
recommended  a  width  of  110  feet  as  one  comply- 
ing with  the  law  in  so  far  as  naval  needs  were 
concerned;  which  width  was  adopted.  It  is  un- 
derstood that  some  members  of  the  naval  board 

149 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

advocated  a  width  of  120  feet.  The  locks  in  the 
new  Kiel  Canal  in  Germany  have  a  width  of  147 
feet.  These  locks,  however,  are  of  low  lift  and  the 
solution  of  the  gate  problem  is  much  easier  than 
for  locks  with  relatively  high  lifts.  The  probabil- 
ity of  the  width  of  battleships  being  largely  in- 
creased in  the  near  future  in  an  effort  to  meet 
by  extra  compartments  around  the  hull  the  at- 
tacks of  submarines,  was  considered  in  determin- 
ing the  dimensions  of  locks  for  the  Panama  Canal. 

In  designing  the  locks  adjoining  the  summit 
level  the  upper  miter-sill  was  placed  three  feet 
lower  than  had  been  originally  contemplated.  By 
so  placing  the  miter-sills,  the  storage  in  the  lake 
could  in  the  future  be  increased  three  feet  at  the 
cost  of  digging  three  feet  out  of  the  channels  in 
the  summit  level. 

The  width  of  lock  had  also  direct  bearing  upon 
the  water  supply  of  the  Panama  Canal ;  the  wider 
the  lock,  the  greater  demand  on  the  water  supply. 
It  was  calculated  at  the  time  of  the  discussion  that 
in  the  driest  of  years  the  Chagres  Eiver,  with  the 
storage  facilities  provided  in  the  project,  would 
furnish  only  enough  water  for  the  maximum  num- 
ber of  lockages  mechanically  practicable  through 
a  110-foot  lock  of  the  length  decided  upon.  Miter- 
ing  gates  for  locks  of  the  lift  of  those  at  Panama 
and  a  width  of  120  feet  could  be  easily  built  and 
operated.    A  different  type,  a  rolling  gate,  was 

150 


CHANGES  IN  DIMENSION  OF  PARTS 

adopted  for  the  Kiel  Canal,  one  maneuvered  on  a 
track  across  the  lock  chamber. 

The  engineering  problems  of  the  Panama  Canal 
for  the  future  will  be  met  by  the  engineer  of  the 
future.  Larger  locks  can  be  built  and  the  water 
supply  can  be  increased  within  limits. 

The  design  for  locks  in  the  report  of  the  minor- 
ity was  of  necessity  in  outline  only. 

CHANGE  OF  WIDTH  IN  CULEBRA  CUT 

The  deep  excavation  across  the  Continental  Di- 
vide from  Obispo  to  Pedro  Miguel  is  ordinarily 
called  the  Culebra  Cut.  The  adopted  bottom 
width  of  this  cut  was  200  feet  and  as  actually 
built,  it  has  a  least  width  of  300  feet.  This  was 
the  most  extensive  and  expensive  change  in  the 
Canal ;  it  makes  a  more  commodious  waterway ;  a 
sufficient  width  possibly  for  large  ships  to  pass  if 
one  of  them  comes  to  a  stop  and  is  moored.  The 
ability  of  ships  to  pass  each  other  in  this  cut,  how- 
ever, can  only  be  determined  by  actual  trial. 
What  effect,  if  any,  this  increased  width  has  had 
in  increasing  the  slides  that  are  accompanied  by 
a  lifting  of  the  bottom  is  a  mooted  question. 

CHANGES   IN   THE   SECTION   OF   GATUN   DAM 

The  section  proposed  for  Gatun  Dam  in  the 
adopted  project  is  shown  in  Diagram  2. 

151 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Diagram  3  shows  the  first  approved  change  in 
this  plan. 

This  dam  was  the  controlling  feature  in  the 


l*Biy  ^W~J}P^  -^8t^»88) 


'  jss^-^^ y.:  ^♦">N^fif»^/y> 


CATUN  DAM 

SECTION  PROPOSED  BY 

INTERNATIONAL  BOARD 

*coJ«. 

o       w«      too'    »oe     «ierf   Kj> 

i«oa 


DIAGRAM  2 


project ;  it  created  the  summit  level,  and  the  lake 
formed  by  it  constituted  about  thirty-two  miles 
of  the  route  to  be  navigated  across  the  conti- 


j^^ 


Mi/uiasA  itviT' 
^ahM»pi)in«ocrm« 


CATUN  DAM 
BCCTION  APPROVED  SEPT.  30.1907. 

Scale: 
»        <»■      nttca-      m^    tat 


DIAGRAM   3 


nent.  It  impounded  and  constituted  a  great  con- 
trolling reservoir  for  the  flood- waters  of  the  Cha- 
gres.    It  also  acted  as  an  efficient  storage  reser- 

152 


CHANGES  IN  DIMENSION  OF  PARTS 

voir  for  water  needed  in  the  dry  season ;  the  low- 
water  flow  of  the  Chagres  Eiver  alone  not  being 
sufficient  for  the  operation  of  a  lift-lock  canal. 

Gatun  was  practically  the  only  place  at  which 
a  dam  conld  be  built  so  well  fulfilling  all  of  the 
functions  deemed  necessary  in  the  solution  of  the 
general  problem.  The  feasibility  of  the  construc- 
tion of  this  dam  was  questioned  by  many  engi- 
neers and  the  majority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting 
Engineers  were  of  the  opinion  that  ^  ^  no  such  vast 
and  doubtful  experiment  should  be  indulged  in." 

The  principal  fear  of  this  majority  was  based 
on  the  supposed  probability  of  seepage  or  perco- 
lation in  dangerous  quantities  through  the  mate- 
rial underlying  the  dam.  The  borings  had  de- 
veloped the  existence  under  the  site  of  the  Gatun 
Dam  of  two  geological  gorges  the  rock  bottoms  of 
which  were  from  200  to  250  feet  below  sea-level. 
The  studies  of  the  geologists  led  them  to  the  con- 
clusion that  these  gorges  were  former  beds  of  the 
Chagres  or  its  tributaries  that  had  subsided  some 
300  feet  in  some  former  adjustment  of  the  earth's 
crust  at  this  place,  and  that  these  gorges  or  val- 
leys had  afterwards  been  filled  with  a  sea  deposit 
of  fine  clay  with  some  sand.  Concerning  the  de- 
sign of  the  dam  at  Gatun,  the  minority  of  the 
board  stated: 

It  was  thought  best  to  provide  a  dam  which 
could  not  be  destroyed  by  any  of  the  forces  of 

153 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

nature,  and  wliich  could  only  be  destroyed  by  mak- 
ing excavations  which  would  require  a  large  force 
working  for  a  long  time. 


Practically  no  experience  as  to  the  bearing  ca- 
pacity of  material  similar  to  that  under  the  Gatun 
Dam  was  available  at  the  time  the  plan  was  made 
and  the  adoption  of  a  section  with  a  1  on  3  slope 
as  shown  on  the  lake  face  of  the  dam  presupposed 
that  the  material  under  the  dam  would  safely 
carry  such  a  load.  In  fact,  the  bearing  capacity 
of  the  material  under  the  dam  seems  not  to  have 
been  seriously  questioned  by  the  minority  of  the 
board  in  its  plans,  or  by  the  majority  in  its  crit- 
icisms. 

As  soon  as  construction  commenced  on  the  pro- 
posed dams  on  the  Pacific  side  and  at  other  points 
on  the  Isthmus  where  loads  were  placed  on  mate- 
rial similar  to  that  under  the  proposed  dam  at 
Gatun,  a  thought  soon  grew  into  a  conviction  that 
it  was  not  practicable  to  build  a  slope  of  1  ver- 
tical on  3  horizontal  by  the  hydraulic  method,  of 
material  such  as  that  available  for  building  the 
Gatun  Dam.  This  thought  found  expression  in 
proposing  a  rock  fill  about  50  feet  high  along  the 
foot  of  the  south  slope  of  the  dam  as  originally 
proposed.  The  top  of  this  ridge  was  to  be  60  feet 
above  sea-level.  With  this  built  a  slope  of  1  ver- 
tical to  5  horizontal  could  then  be  adopted  until 

154 


CHANGES  IN  DIMENSION  OF  PARTS 

the  dam  was  higher  than  the  level  of  the  lake.  It 
was  then  thought  that  such  a  slope  could  be  con- 
structed with  the  available  material  by  the  hy- 
draulic method. 

Very  soon  after  this  conclusion  was  tentatively 
accepted,  a  further  thought  began  to  impress  it- 
self on  those  charged  with  the  execution  of  the 
work  and  that  was  the  insufficiency  of  the  bearing 
capacity  of  the  foundation  of  the  dam  for  the 
loads  resulting  from  the  rock  fill  and  the  south  face 
of  the  dam  itself.  Experience  at  other  places  in- 
dicated that  when  loads  became  excessive  on  such 
material  a  violent  vertical  movement  ensued,  in 
some  instances  the  drop  being  as  much  as  twenty 
feet,  accompanied  by  a  bulging-up  of  the  ground 
on  either  side.  In  making  a  fill  about  80  feet  high 
across  a  flat  near  Gatun,  while  rebuilding  the  Pan^ 
ama  Eailroad,  many  such  subsidences  occurred. 
It  was  attempted  to  make  this  fill  from  trestles, 
allowing  the  dumped  material  to  take  its  natural 
slope.  One  trestle  was  built  and  filled  and  an- 
other trestle  built  on  the  fill  and  material  dumped 
from  that.  Vertical  drops  of  from  15  to  20  feet 
at  the  crest  were  frequent  and  the  ground  bulged 
or  lifted  500  or  600  feet  away.  It  was  found  nec- 
essary to  construct  a  slope  of  about  1  vertical  to  7 
horizontal  on  the  west  side  of  this  fill  before  its 
final  elevation  was  reached.  The  material  on 
which  this  fill  was  made  was  similar  to  that  found 

155 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

tinder  part  of  the  Gatun  Dam.  The  only  practical 
way  to  prevent  similar  occurrences  was  to  load 
down  the  material  contiguous  to  the  fill  so  as  to 
counterbalance  the  higher  part  of  the  fill.  This 
simply  meant  widening  the  base  of  any  fill  on 
such  material  and  making  the  slopes  flatter.  The 
two  above  considerations  led  to  changing  the  dam 
section  from  the  adopted  project  to  that  shown 
in  Diagram  3.  The  change  was  authorized  in  Sep- 
tember, 1907.  For  comparison,  Diagrams  2  and  3 
show  the  difference  between  the  dam  section  as 
recommended  by  the  minority  of  the  International 
Board  and  that  resulting  from  the  changes  re- 
ferred to  above. 

Those  parts  of  the  dam  foundation  lying  over 
the  deep  geological  gorges  referred  to  above 
proved  quite  unstable  when  the  actual  construc- 
tion of  the  dam  started.  When  a  pile  trestle  was 
driven  on  the  30-foot  contour  on  the  north  face 
of  the  dam  where  it  crossed  the  eastern  gorge, 
piles  when  placed  in  the  pile-driver  would  sink 
of  their  own  weight  from  10  to  15  feet  in  the  un- 
derlying material,  indicating  a  softer  foundation 
than  had  ever  supported  a  dam  of  the  height  of 
that  proposed  at  Gatun.  It  was  of  course  appre- 
ciated that  if  the  base  were  wide  enough  to  make 
sufficiently  flat  slopes,  a  dam  as  high  as  that  at 
Gatun  could  be  built  on  almost  any  kind  of  mate- 
rial. 

156 


CHANGES  IN  DIMENSION  OF  PARTS 

The  softness  of  the  foundation  led  to  the  con- 
sideration of  two  other  important  features  of  the 
dam — its  height  and  the  slopes  on  both  faces.  The 
dam  as  originally  planned  was  to  be  50  feet  above 
the  level  of  Gatun  Lake.  Twenty  feet  free  board 
would  ordinarily  be  considered  ample  for  an 
earthen  dam  such  as  this,  with  a  spillway  having 
the  relative  discharging  capacity  of  that  proposed 
at  Gatun.  The  extra  30  feet  was  proposed  so  as 
to  increase  the  labor  necessary  should  an  enemy 
try  to  dig  a  trench  through  the  top  of  the  dam 
deep  enough  to  form  an  initial  outlet  from  the 
lake.  A  desire  to  satisfy  a  public  apprehension  of 
some  imagined  danger  was  also  a  factor  in  the 
design.  As  stated  before,  at  that  time  no  expe- 
rience was  available  as  to  the  actual  bearing  ca- 
pacity of  the  particular  soil  under  the  dam,  and 
a  sandy  loam  such  as  the  preliminary  borings 
seemed  to  indicate  would  ordinarily  safely  carry 
the  load  contemplated.  But  later  investigations 
proved  that  the  percentage  of  sand  in  much  of 
this  material  was  very  small.  Experience  proved 
its  instability  and  that  it  would  be  a  distinct  dis- 
advantage to  add  the  load  necessary  in  building 
the  last  30  feet  of  the  height  proposed  for  the 
dam.  The  section  was  therefore  changed,  limiting 
the  height  of  the  dam  to  about  20  feet  above  nor- 
mal lake  level  and  the  dam  was  so  built. 

The  yielding  nature  of  the  material  in  the  f  oun- 
157 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

dation  caused  a  reconsideration  of  all  the  slopes 
on  the  two  faces  of  the  dam.  It  was  thought  by 
some  that  there  should  only  be  one  slope  on  a 
face  of  a  dam  built  on  such  yielding  material  and 
that  the  slope  on  the  two  faces  should  be  the  same 
— the  idea  being  that  the  increase  in  the  load  from 
the  foot  of  the  slope  to  the  top  of  the  dam  should 
be  uniform,  with  no  such  sudden  changes  of  load- 
ing as  would  result  from  adopting  several  slopes 
on  the  face  of  the  dam.  The  dam  having  been 
commenced  it  was  impracticable  to  carry  out  this 
idea  completely,  but  it  was  approximated  as  near- 
ly as  could  be. 

Diagram  2  shows  the  section  of  dam  in  project 
as  originally  adopted. 

Diagram  4  shows  the  section  as  actually  built. 

Diagram  2  presupposed  that  the  foundation 
would  safely  carry  the  load  due  to  the  steep  slope 
on  the  lake  face  and  that  the  material  that  would 
support  such  a  load  could  be  placed  in  the  dam 
on  a  slope  of  one  vertical  to  three  horizontal. 
Had  the  information  afterwards  obtained  from 
actual  experience  been  available,  it  is  quite  certain 
that  the  original  design  would  have  followed  quite 
closely  that  shown  in  Diagram  4. 

Engineers  have  often  remarked  that  the  slopes 
of  the  Gatun  Dam  were  flatter  than  necessary, 
that  its  unusual  dimensions  were  adopted  to  stop 
an  unreasonable  popular  impression  as  to  the  in- 

158 


CHANGES  IN  DIMENSION  OF  PARTS 

security  of  a  dam  built  across  the  lower  valley  of 
the  Chagres.  It  is  thought,  however,  when  they 
read  of  the  slides  and  of  other  difficulties  of  con- 
struction to  be  described  later,  that  they  will  con- 
clude that  the  adopted  slopes  were  necessary  in 


three  fxt  thick  msliny  »,»*»-  5 
foot  /oyer  grac/"*g  frotv  ontman^^ 

'^'/•""'^Ytzr'"'"  I""' 


p;;?t°i!is.'^N?^ 


ICAL  8&CTI0N 


catundAt 

SECTION  ADOPTED 
FOR  105  TT.  HEIGHT 


DIAGRAM  4 

obtaining  that  factor  of  safety  that  should  be 
given  to  a  dam  which  constitutes  the  keystone  of 
a  project  that  has  cost  about  $375,000,000,  and 
which  will  ultimately  be  one  of  the  most  valuable 
assets,  both  from  a  military  and  commercial  stand- 
point, that  the  United  States  possesses. 


CHANGES  IN  PLANS  FOE  COLON  HAEBOR 

Here  again  the  military  idea  predominated  to 
some  extent.  The  advantage  of  a  commodious 
harbor  with  sufficient  anchorage  in  deep  water 
for  a  large  fleet  of  naval  vessels  was  an  impor- 

159 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

tant  desideratum,  which  could  best  be  accom- 
plished by  a  long  breakwater  leading  from  the 
shore  and  giving  protection  to  a  considerable  area 
of  deep  water.  In  carrying  out  this  idea  the  west 
breakwater,  two  miles  long,  starting  from  Toro 
Point,  was  proposed  and  built. 

The  destructive  storms  at  Colon,  the  **  north- 
ers,'' come  from  the  north  or  slightly  west  of 
north,  and  the  west  breakwater  as  built  affords  a 
protected  anchorage  during  such  a  storm.  The 
trade  winds,  which  blow  continuously  during  the 
dry  season,  which  inclu4es  December,  January, 
February  and  March,  come  from  the  northeast, 
and  the  west  breakwater  gives  no  protection  from 
such  winds.  These  winds,  however,  are  not  de- 
structive to  shipping,  but  do  create  at  times 
a  sufficiently  rough  sea  to  inconvenience  the  com- 
merce of  Colon  Harbor.  It  was  first  decided  to 
build  the  west  breakwater  and  await  develop- 
ments. 

It  was  soon  established  that  the  channel  in  Li- 
mon  Bay  was  filled  with  silt  to  the  extent  of  more 
than  2,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material  a  year,  and 
that  this  silting  was  due  to  the  currents  created 
in  the  bay  by  the  trade  winds  and  the  stirring-up 
of  the  soft  bottom  of  the  bay  by  the  waves.  In 
consideration  of  these  facts  and  of  the  further 
fact  that  the  protection  of  a  fleet  in  Colon  Harbor 
from  submarine  attacks  would  be  facilitated  if 

160 


CHANGES  IN  DIMENSION  OF  PARTS 

the  entrance  to  tlie  harbor  were  made  as  narrow 
as  possible,  it  was  decided  to  construct  the  east 
breakwater  as  shown.  At  present  this  breakwater 
is  not  connected  with  the  shore,  but  it  can  be  eas- 
ily so  connected  and  thus  bar  the  passage  of  any- 
kind  of  craft  into  the  harbor  by  any  route  except 
the  prepared  opening  between  the  sea  ends  of  the 
two  breakwaters. 


CHAPTER  XI 

DESIGNS  FOR  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS  AND  LOCKS 

PACIFIC   TERMINAL:     DRY   DOCKS,   SHOPS,   ETC. 

No  specific  estimate  or  plan  for  dry  docks, 
shops,  etc.,  that  would  be  necessary  in  any  com- 
prehensive operating  plan  for  the  Canal  was  in- 
cluded in  the  adopted  project.  Of  course,  the  cost 
of  all  shop  and  other  appliances  necessary  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  estimated  work  would  be  in- 
cluded in  the  estimates  in  question. 

As  the  work  progressed,  the  question  of  an  op- 
erating plan  for  a  completed  Canal  was  studied 
and  it  was  finally  decided  that  the  United  States 
would  control  practically  every  activity  connected 
with  the  operation  of  the  Canal — that  it  would 
furnish  fuel,  water,  ship  supplies,  wharfs,  dry 
docks,  etc.  The  appliances  necessary  for  many 
of  these  operations  were  of  necessity  built  in  con- 
nection with  supplying  and  housing  the  construc- 
tion forces. 

The  extent  of  permanent  shops  and  dry  dock 
facilities,  however,  were  determined  by  many  con- 
siderations; prominently  among  them  were  the 
possible  repair  needs  of  the  Navy.    The  advisa- 

162 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

bility  of  being  able  to  effect  any  repair  that  might 
be  desired  in  the  case  of  a  merchant  ship  would, 
of  course  depend  on  the  probable  amount  of  such 
business  and  whether  it  would  justify  the  neces- 
sary plant  expenditure.  The  question  was  finally 
determined  by  the  prospective,  or  rather  possible, 
needs  of  the  Navy.  The  dry  docks  and  shops 
were  so  planned  as  to  furnish  the  appliances  for 
such  war  repairs  as  might  be  necessary  to  a  battle- 
fleet;  the  mechanical  force  kept  in  the  shops  to 
depend  upon  the  amount  of  work  that  came  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  events. 

The  Panama  Canal  is  of  great  strategic  value  to 
the  United  States  from  a  military  standpoint,  but 
like  all  points  or  lines  with  such  a  value,  it  is 
liable  to  be  the  scene  of  conflict  in  case  of  war, 
and  both  ends  of  the  Canal  are  likely  to  become, 
in  such  a  contingency,  more  or  less  naval  bases. 

While  there  are  other  sites  from  a  purely  naval 
standpoint  that  may  have  a  better  location,  stra- 
tegically, one  great  consideration  is  that  a  land 
force  sufficient  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the 
locks  and  other  appurtenances  of  the  Canal  must 
be  kept  on  the  Isthmus  and  would  at  the  same  time 
be  a  protection  for  a  naval  base.  The  value  of  a 
naval  base,  among  other  things,  depends  largely 
on  the  chance  of  its  being  captured  by  a  land 
force  during  war.  The  question  of  constructing 
commodious  dry  docks  on  the  Atlantic  side  was 

163 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

considered,  the  decision  being  not  to  do  so  at  the 
present  time.  The  dry  docks  at  Balboa  provide 
for  docking  ships  of  as  large  dimensions  as  can 
pass  through  the  Canal. 

FOETIFICATIONS 

The  original  project  made  no  provision  in  its  es- 
timate for  fortifications.  In  order  to  enable  the 
United  States  to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  the 
Canal — a  duty  placed  on  it  by  the  Hay-Pauncef  ote 
treaty — Congress  authorized  seacoast  fortifica- 
tions at  both  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  entrances. 
Any  uses  of  this  Canal,  when  the  United  States 
is  at  war,  that  tend  to  its  military  advantage  in- 
creases the  ability  of  that  country  to  defend  the 
neutrality  of  the  Canal  and  is  consequently  jus- 
tifiable under  the  treaty.  These  fortifications  are 
modern  and  will  be  effective  if  ever  needed. 

In  addition  to  the  seacoast  fortifications  provi- 
sion has  been  made  for  defending  the  more  vul- 
nerable parts  of  the  Canal  from  raids  that  might 
occur  just  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war. 

The  entire  Canal  Zone  has  been  declared  a  mili- 
tary reservation  and  all  private  titles  to  land 
have  been  or  will  be  extinguished. 

DESIGN 

The  general  design  was  of  course  comprised  in 
the  adopted  project. 

164 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

The  only  design  required  in  making  a  cut  of 
certain  bottom  width  and  depth  is  a  determina- 
tion of  the  side  slopes,  benches,  etc.,  considered 
necessary  to  secure  stability.  This,  except  in 
hard  rock,  amounts  to  laying  down  on  paper  the 
slopes  that  one 's  experience  and  study  would  lead 


CULEBRACUT 

■          77-^' 

1 

-\ 

\ 

J 

/ 

i 

TV   '  " -i' 

DIAGRAM   5 

him  to  assume  that  the  material  in  question  would 
require  in  order  not  to  slide. 

The  slopes  shown  in  Diagram  5  are  those  that 
the  consulting  engineers  considered  necessary  for 
stability  in  the  cut  through  the  Continental  Di- 
vide. It  is  evident  from  these  sections  and  from 
the  absence  of  criticism  concerning  them,  that  the 
International  Board  of  Engineers  anticipated  no 
material  difficulty  in  making  and  maintaining  a 
cut  through  the  Continental  Divide  at  Culebra. 
It  is  also  a  noteworthy  coincidence  that  the  crit- 
ics of  the  sea-level  project  failed  to  point  out  the 
one  thing  that  proved,  more  than  anything  else, 

165 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  impracticability  of  the  sea-level  plan,  namely, 
the  inability  to  maintain,  within  any  reasonable 
limits  of  time  and  expense,  the  sides  of  a  cut 
through  the  Continental  Divide  with  its  bottom 
45  feet  below  sea-level. 

The  angle  of  repose  of  the  material  in  question 
was  dependent  on  conditions  of  which  the  engi- 
neer was  uninformed,  and  which  could  be  known 
only  by  making  the  excavation  itself.  This  ma- 
terial has  or  will  ultimately  make  its  own  design 
as  to  slopes.  The  designing  work  of  the  Canal 
was  therefore  essentially  confined  to  the  locks, 
dams,  regulating  works,  dry  docks,  shops  and 
breakwaters. 

DESIGN  OF  LOCKS 

During  the  preparatory  period  a  general  de- 
sign for  the  locks  of  the  Panama  Canal  had  been 
worked  out,  many  features  of  which  design  were 
never  changed.  The  lock  gates  remained  essen- 
tially the  same,  as  well  as  the  general  thought 
governing  the  filling  and  emptying  system;  the 
only  radical  change  in  the  latter  being  the  adop- 
tion of  a  single  culvert  in  the  middle  wall,  in- 
stead of  two  as  originally  proposed.  This  single 
culvert  is  connected  by  lateral  culverts  with  the 
lock  chamber  on  each  side,  and  the  flow  of  water 
through  each  lateral  is  controlled  by  a  cylindrical 
valve. 

166 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

During  this  period  a  study  was  made  of  the  reg- 
ulating works  for  the  spillways.  Vertical  ris- 
ing sluice  gates  of  the  Stoney  type,  bearing 
against  trains  of  rollers,  were  decided  upon  and 
a  detailed  study  completed  to  determine  the  most 
economical  dimensions  of  the  gates  and  piers, 
which  dimensions  were  not  changed  when  the  final 
design  and  plans  were  made. 

The  dimensions  of  the  lock  chambers  having 
been  determined,  the  design  in  all  locks  is  prac- 
tically confined 
First,  to  so  proportioning  the  walls  as  to  make 

them  stable  under  all  possible  conditions; 
Second,  to  devising  a  means  of  filling  and  emp- 
tying the  lock  chambers ; 
Third,  to  designing  the  lock  gates ; 
Fourth,  to   designing  such   appurtenances   as 
will  facilitate  and  make  safe  the  entrance  of 
ships  into  the  locks,  their  passage  through 
and  departure  from  such  locks. 
Fifth,  to  designing  the  machinery  for  operating 

the  locks. 
Assuming  an  unyielding  foundation  with  no  up- 
ward water  pressure  or  one  definitely  known,  the 
design  of  lock  walls  is  simple,  but  the  character 
of  the  foundation  material  under  locks  may  radi- 
cally vary  the  design.  At  Gatun,  especially,  the 
foundation  material  was  the  subject  of  much  dis- 
cussion and  criticism  in  the  newspapers.     The 

167 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

earlier  borings  were  misleading,  or  at  least  were 
so  recorded  as  to  form  the  basis  for  criticism. 
The  following  figure  shows  the  rock  strata  at 
Gatun  as  finally  determined.  In  the  earlier  bor- 
ings when  the  rock  was  not  hard  enough  or  was 
so  constituted  that  the  diamond  drill  machine 
would  not  cut  out  a  cylindrical  sample,  it  was 
chopped  into  small  pieces  and  washed  out  by  the 
drilling  process,  and  such  material  was  classified 
as  chopped  clay,  sand  and  gravel.  Later  inves- 
tigations proved  all  material  so  classified  to  be 
some  form  of  rock  capable  of  sustaining  any  load 
that  would  be  placed  on  it.  Holes  were  drilled 
through  the  rock,  preserving  core  samples  where 
the  same  could  be  made,  to  a  depth  of  50  feet  be- 
low the  foundation  of  the  various  parts  of  the 
locks.  Shafts  or  test  pits  were  excavated  into 
the  material  that  would  not  core.  These  pits 
were  large  enough  for  men  to  enter  and  of  such 
size  as  to  facilitate  a  careful  inspection  and  test 
of  the  material  in  place  by  engineers  and  others. 
These  investigations,  supplemented  by  test  loads 
on  the  various  classes  of  material,  clearly  estab- 
lished the  fact  that  the  foundation  materials  at 
Gatun,  as  well  as  those  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Mira- 
flores,  were  all  properly  classible  as  rock  and 
would  safely  bear  the  expected  loads,  provided 
such  foundations  were  properly  prepared. 
At  Gatun,  however,  the  question  of  lake  pres- 
168 


DESIGNS:   PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

sure  being  transmitted  under  the  floors  of  the 
locks,  and  the  methods  of  resisting  such  pressure 
should  it  be  transmitted,  were  subjects  of  much 
discussion  and  investigation. 

It  was  assumed  that,  at  the  time  the  subsidence 
occurred  that  lowered  the  old  gorges  of  the 
Chagres  Eiver  in  the  vicinity  of  Gatun  about  300 
feet,  all  the  surrounding  country  was  similarly 
lowered.  The  geologists  also  found  evidences  that 
an  uplift  of  10  feet  or  more  had  taken  place  in 
the  same  locality  at  a  later  date.  It  was  con- 
cluded by  some  that  these  motions  could  not  occur 
without  creating  many  minute  fissures  in  the  rock 
and  that  such  fissures  probably  extended  to  great 
depths,  and  that,  consequently,  lake  pressure  un- 
der the  lock  floors  at  Gatun  should  be  expected. 
To  make  provision  against  such  pressure  would 
be  quite  expensive,  and  a  thorough  investigation 
of  the  situation  was  made  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
ciding whether  or  not  the  floor,  of  a  portion  at 
least  of  the  lock  next  to  the  lake,  should  be  so 
built  as  to  stand  the  lake  pressure. 

As  previously  stated,  holes  were  drilled  through 
the  underlying  material  to  a  depth  of  about  50  feet 
below  the  level  of  the  masonry  of  the  locks.  Water^ 
of  course,  rose  in  all  of  these  holes  to  the  same 
level  as  that  of  the  ground  water  in  the  adjacent 
country.  Lowering  the  water  surface  in  one  of 
these  holes  by  pumping  and  observing  how  quickly 

169 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  water  in  other  holes  was  lowered  and  the  dis- 
tance to  holes  that  had  their  water  level  affected, 
formed  a  basis  for  an  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not 
there  existed  crevices  in  the  rocks  through  which 
water  could  pass  to  an  extent  sufficient  to  create 
and  maintain  pressure.  It  was  proven  that,  in 
pumping  out  a  hole,  the  water  level  in  a  hole  two 
thousand  feet  away  was  affected.  A  test  pit  was 
finally  dug  outside  the  lock  area  down  into  the 
material  that  was  thought  to  be  most  water  bear- 
ing and  the  effect  of  pumping  out  this  pit  on  the 
water  level  in  other  holes  was  observed  and  re- 
corded. 

The  rock  formation  in  Spillway  Hill  is  the  same 
as  that  under  the  Gatun  Locks  but  a  different  line 
of  investigation  was  pursued  there.  The  conclu- 
sions indicated  were  considered  applicable  at  both 
places.  Some  of  the  drill  holes  in  the  foundation 
for  the  Gatun  Lock  as  well  as  some  in  Spillway 
Hill  encountered  water  under  such  pressure  as  to 
cause  a  slight  artesian  flow  through  such  holes. 
This  water  under  pressure  was  first  encountered 
sometimes  as  much  as  40  or  50  feet  below  sea- 
level. 

A  shaft  was  sunk  in  the  rock  on  Spillway  Hill 
from  about  40  feet  above  sea-level  to  30  feet  below 
sea-level,  the  object  being  to  observe  the  character 
of  the  rock,  the  crevices  in  it,  and  the  pumping 
capacity  needed  in  keeping  the  water  out.    It  was 

170 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

noted  in  pumping  out  tliis  shaft  when  it  was  near- 
ing  completion,  that  the  artesian  flow  in  a  drill 
hole  600  feet  away  stopped  and  commenced  again 
when  the  shaft  was  allowed  to  fill  with  water  to 
the  natural  ground  water-level. 

It  was  then  decided  to  determine  the  extent  of 
the  connection  between  this  shaft  and  the  drill 
hole.  The  records  showed  that  artesian  water  was 
first  encountered  in  this  hole  at  50  feet  below 
sea-level.  A  pipe  connection  was  made  from  the 
water-supply  system  in  Gatun  to  the  shaft,  and 
the  shaft  filled  with  water.  The  casing  in  the  drill 
hole  was  connected  with  a  glass  tube,  so  that  if 
the  pressure  in  the  hole  was  increased  as  the  shaft 
was  filled,  the  consequent  increase  of  head  could 
be  measured.  When  the  water  in  the  shaft  reached 
30  feet  above  sea,  that  in  the  glass  tube  had  risen 
16  feet. 

Water  at  this  time  was  oozing  through  the  small 
crevices  in  the  rock  everywhere.  These  experi- 
ments showed  conclusively  that  water  pressure 
could  be  transmitted  through  the  material  in  Spill- 
way Hill  and  under  the  locks  at  Gatun. 

The  floors  of  the  upper  locks  at  Gatun  for  about 
600  feet  of  their  length  next  to  the  lake  were  so 
designed  as  to  stand  lake  pressure,  and  for  the 
remaining  length  of  locks  provision  was  made  for 
carrying  the  seep  water  into  drains  behind  the 
'lock  walls  so  as  to  prevent  any  pressure  under 

171 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

that  part  of  the  floor,  and  the  design  was  made 
under  that  assumption.  The  floor  of  the  lower 
lock  being  more  than  forty  feet  below  sea-level, 
it  was  considered  necessary  to  protect  it  by  weep 
holes  when  the  lock  was  pumped  out. 

In  addition  to  the  strong  floor  in  the  upper  end 
of  Gatun  lock  a  concrete  cut-off  wall  from  12  to 
18  feet  deep  was  built  in  a  trench  excavated  in 
the  rock  around  three  sides  of  this  foundation. 
It  was  thought  by  some  that  this  wall  would  pre- 
vent water  from  getting  under  this  floor. 

In  order  to  know  whether  there  would  be  pres- 
sure under  this  floor  when  the  Gatun  Lake  was 
formed,  a  telltale  system  was  provided  under  the 
floor.  Small  grooves  or  trenches  were  dug  in  the 
underlying  rock  and  porous  tiles  of  small  diameter 
were  placed  in  them.  These  tile  drains  were  con- 
nected with  iron  pipes  that  were  extended  verti- 
cally to  the  top  of  the  lock  walls  and  encased  in 
the  concrete  of  such  walls.  If  pressure  were  de- 
veloped under  the  lock  floor,  the  head  of  water 
would  be  shown  in  the  vertical  pipes  leading  to  top 
of  wall.  The  observations,  taken  as  the  lake  was 
forming,  indicated  that  the  pressure  under  the 
lock  floor  varied  with  the  elevation  of  the  lake 
and  that  the  strong  floor  was  necessary. 


172 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

WALLS 

The  side  walls  of  the  upper  lock  at  Gatnn  are 
wider  and  stronger  than  the  walls  of  any  of  the 
other  locks  on  the  Canal.  They  were  designed  on 
the  assumption  that  in  the  back-fill  of  the  walls, 
which  back-fill  is  part  of  the  Gatun  Dam,  the 
ground  water  might  be  at  the  approximate  level 
of  Gatun  Lake  and  thus  give  rise  to  full  water 
pressure  against  the  walls.  At  all  other  places 
the  back-fill  was  of  coarse  material  through  which 
water  could  easily  percolate  and  thus  insure  that 
the  ground-water  level  would  be  but  slightly 
higher  than  the  water  level  of  the  channel  below 
the  locks. 

A  cut-off  wall  of  concrete,  founded  on  rock,  was 
built  to  extend  from  the  lock  wall  about  105  feet 
into  the  Gatun  Dam.  This  wall  was  to  make  diffi- 
cult the  passage  of  water  from  the  lake  along 
the  surface  of  the  back  of  the  lock  walls. 

The  ground  for  about  200  feet  on  each  side  of 
the  completed  locks  slopes  gently  away  from  the 
walls  to  carry  away  the  rainfall.  The  top  surface 
of  concrete  walls,  machinery  rooms,  etc.,  aggregate 
several  acres,  and  on  account  of  the  heavy  rain- 
fall which  is  common  to  Panama  it  was  necessary 
to  provide  means  for  rapidly  disposing  of  the 
water  falling  on  these  flat  surfaces,  and  large 
drainage  culverts  were  constructed  about  15  feet 

173 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

below  the  ground  surface  and  running  the  entire 
length  of  all  walls,  to  which  water  falling  on  con- 
crete surfaces  was  conducted  by  numerous  small 
drains. 

This  drainage  culvert  formed  the  lower  portion 
of  a  reenf  orced  concrete  structure,  the  top  portion 
of  which  was  an  operating  tunnel  5  feet  wide  by  7 
feet  high,  connecting  by  means  of  branch  tunnels 
or  openings  with  all  the  machinery  chambers  con- 
taining the  machines  for  operating  the  lock  gates, 
valves  and  other  parts  of  operating  equipment. 
In  the  thick  floor  between  the  drainage  culvert  and 
operating  tunnel  was  located  the  extensive  wiring 
system  necessary  for  the  electrical  operation,  by 
remote  control  in  the  operating  house,  of  all  the 
lock  machinery.  On  the  top  of  the  operating  tun- 
nel was  placed  the  return  track  for  the  electric 
towing  locomotives.  This  track  is  used  by  the 
locomotives  only  to  return  to  the  proper  end  of 
the  lock  after  having  towed  a  ship  through  the 
locks.  It  is  equipped  with  racks  only  on  the  in- 
clines, whereas  the  towing  track  located  close  to 
the  edge  of  the  lock  walls  has  a  rack  for  its  entire 
length.  This  rack  is  necessary  in  order  to  obtain 
sufficient  pulling  force  on  the  tow  lines.  It  is 
engaged  by  a  pinion  on  the  towing  locomotive  and, 
by  this  arrangement,  a  40,000-pound  pull  can  be 
exerted. 

The  walls  of  the  locks  proper  were  designed  and 
174 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

constructed  under  assumptions  of  severe  lateral 
pressure  and  with  conservative  factors  of  safety, 
as  their  stability  was  of  vital  importance  to  con- 
tinuous operation  of  the  Canal.  The  center  ap- 
proach walls  and  flare  walls,  however,  were  merely 
aids  to  navigation,  and  various  types  were  used 
as  best  suited  the  local  conditions;  for  econom- 
ical reasons,  reenforced  concrete  walls  were  per- 
mitted under  some  conditions  except  where  ex- 
posed to  salt  water. 

The  south  center  approach  walls  of  the  Pedro 
Miguel  and  Miraflores  locks  were  of  massive  con- 
crete, stepped  on  the  back  so  that  the  back-filled 
space  was  V-shaped.  The  north  center  approach 
walls  of  these  locks  were  of  cellular  reenforced 
concrete  construction,  the  wall  for  Miraflores 
Locks  resting  on  reenforced  concrete  cylinders, 
sunk  to  rock  and  filled  with  concrete,  whereas  the 
wall  at  Pedro  Miguel  rested  directly  on  the  rock 
three  feet  below  the  bottom  level  of  the  Culebra 
Cut. 

Part  of  the  flare  walls  at  these  locks  were  of 
massive  gravity  type  and  part  of  reenforced  con- 
crete, the  latter  consisting  of  a  vertical  slab  from 
27  inches  thick  at  the  bottom  to  15  inches  at  the 
top,  tied  at  intervals  of  15  feet,  to  reenforced 
concrete  buttresses  which,  in  turn,  were  tied  to  a 
bottom  slab  to  hold  the  earth  which  gave  the  wall 
stability.    The  south  flare  walls  at  Miraflores  were 

175 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

of  massive  concrete  because  of  their  exposure  to 
sea  water. 

At  the  Gatun  Locks  the  foundation  difficulties 
for  the  approach  and  flare  walls  were  numerous. 
A  description  of  the  difficulties  met  with  in  the 
construction  of  the  north  approach  will  be  given 
further  on. 

The  rock  under  the  south  approach  wall  dips 
rapidly  down  and  for  several  hundred  feet  of  the 
outer  end  of  the  wall  is  from  10  to  100  feet  below 
the  desired  elevation  of  the  bottom  of  the  wall, 
and  the  natural  ground  surface  about  30  feet  be- 
low. The  material  overlying  the  rock  was  too  soft 
to  support  piles,  with  the  exception  of  a  stratum 
of  clay  about  10  feet  thick  and  30  feet  below  the 
ground  surface.  To  give  piles  the  necessary 
frictional  resistance,  a  30-foot  hill,  100  feet  wide, 
was  made  along  the  axis  of  the  wall  and,  after 
some  time  had  elapsed,  reenforced  concrete  piles 
were  driven  through  this  fill  and  to  several  feet 
penetration  in  the  hard  stratum  previously  men- 
tioned. On  these  piles  was  constructed  a  thick 
reenforced  concrete  slab  upon  which  was  built  a, 
cellular  reenforced  concrete  wall  which,  to  relieve 
the  weight  on  the  foundation,  was  not  filled  with 
earth  as  were  similar  walls  of  the  Pedro  Miguel 
and  Miraflores  locks. 

Soon  after  the  construction  of  this  wall  was  be- 
gun it  was  noted  that  settlement  was  occurring. 

176 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

This  settlement  continued  thronglioiit  the  time  of 
its  constrnction  and  until  the  Gatun  Lake  had  been 
filled.  The  total  settlement  was  over  two  feet  and 
the  top  slabs  and  tracks  were  omitted  until  the 
settlement  ceased.  The  wall  was  designed  with 
three  longitudinal  rows  of  cells  to  give  it  stiffness 
against  the  impact  of  ships,  and  this  proved  for- 
tunate as,  at  one  period,  the  wall  was  settling  un- 
evenly and  tending  to  tip  over.  To  correct  this 
tendency  one  outside  row  of  cells  was  filled  with 
water  with  the  hope  that  this  added  weight  would 
balance  the  pressure  which  was  causing  the  un- 
equal settlement,  and  this  proved  actually  to  be 
the  case. 

The  general  design  of  the  north  approach  wall 
is  shown  in  the  accompanying  illustration.  Figure 
1.  This  was  devised  at  a  later  date,  and  a  simi- 
lar design  for  the  south  wall  would  have  been 
preferable.  The  open  spaces  between  the  piers 
permit  a  free  flow  of  water  when  a  ship  docks 
alongside  the  wall,  and  eliminates  the  swinging  of 
the  vessel,  due  to  the  inability  of  the  water  to  so 
quickly  flow  from  between  the  vertical  wall  sur- 
face and  the  side  of  the  ship  as  to  prevent  the 
creation  of  a  head  with  its  consequential  pressure 
tending  to  force  the  vessel  away  from  the  wall. 
A  wall  of  this  design  costs  no  more  than  the  cellu- 
lar type  and  has  the  advantage  of  being  founded 
on  rock  and  can  be  built  in  less  time. 

177 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

» 

DEVICES   FOR  FILLING  AND   EMPTYING  LOCKS 

From  the  standpoint  of  speed  of  passage  of 
ships  from  ocean  to  ocean  through  the  Canal,  the 
shorter  the  time  in  which  locks  can  be  filled  and 
emptied  the  better,  but  larger  culverts  and  pas- 
sage-ways for  the  water  means  greater  expense, 
and  the  relative  tranquillity  of  the  water  in  the 
lock  chamber  during  the  operation  of  filling  has  a 
direct  bearing  on  the  safe  handling  of  the  ship 
during  such  operations,  i.  e.,  the  water  should  not 
be  allowed  to  enter  the  lock  at  such  a  rate  as  to 
create  currents  and  eddies  that  would  endanger 
or  interfere  with  the  handling  of  the  ship. 

In  order  to  fill  a  large  lock  as  quickly  as  practi- 
cable and  keep  the  water  relatively  smooth  during 
the  operation,  water  should  enter  through  as  many 
openings  as  practicable,  well  distributed  over  the 
entire  floor.  This  was  accomplished  in  the  Panama 
Canal  locks  by  constructing  under  the  floor,  run- 
ning directly  across  the  lock,  culverts  about  6^  by 
8  feet  in  diameters  with  five  circular  holes  in  the 
top  of  the  culvert  18  feet  apart.  These  lateral 
culverts  were  about  36  feet  apart  and  were  con- 
nected with  large  longitudinal  culverts  18  feet  in 
diameter,  built  in  the  lock  walls.  The  design  con- 
templated the  passage  of  water  both  into  and  out 
of  the  lock  chambers  through  the  same  openings. 
The  longitudinal  culverts  were  in  communication 

178 


Fig.  1. — North  Guide  Wall,  Gatun  Locks. 


Fig.  2. — Dam  Construction  Through  Gatun  Village. 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

with  the  lake  or  a  higher  lock  level  when  the  locks 
were  being  filled,  the  downstream  end  of  such  cul- 
vert being  closed.  These  connections  were  re- 
versed when  the  locks  were  emptied.  The  flow  of 
water  in  the  main  culverts  is  controlled  by  rising 
stem  gate  valves  of  the  Stoney  type,  bearing 
against  a  train  of  free  rollers  which  transmit  the 
water  pressure  to  the  masonry.  A  single  valve, 
rectangular  in  shape,  for  this  culvert  would  have 
been  approximately  19  feet  high  by  21  feet  wide 
and  at  times  would  be  subjected  to  over  60  feet 
head  of  water.  While  unprecedented  in  size,  there 
is  no  reason  why  such  valves  could  not  be  satis- 
factorily built  and  installed,  but  taking  everything 
into  consideration  it  was  decided  to  divide  the 
main  culverts  at  the  valve  chambers  by  a  central 
pier  into  two  culverts  controlled  by  valves  10  feet 
by  18  feet  in  size.  There  was  nothing  new  or  novel 
about  these  valves,  except  the  sealing  device  on 
the  sides  to  make  them  watertight.  This  seal  con- 
sisted of  a  curved  bronze  spring  with  bronze  point 
kept  in  contact  with  the  wall  plate  by  the  tension 
in  the  spring  and  the  pressure  of  the  water.  These 
valves,  when  tested  for  watertightness,  proved 
very  efficient. 

It  was  desired  that  the  center  wall  culvert 
should  serve  the  lock  on  each  side  of  it  and  permit 
water  to  be  passed  from  one  lock  to  its  twin  by 
cross-filling  and  therefore,  in  addition  to  the  main, 

179 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

rising  stem  valves,  each  small  lateral  culvert 
wliich  passed  under  the  lock  floor  was  controlled 
by  a  cylindrical  valve.  The  cross-filling  feature 
was  desired  in  order  to  make  possible  a  consider- 
able saving  of  water  during  lockages,  should  such 
saving  ever  become  necessary. 

APPLIANCES    FOR   PREVENTION    OF    ACCIDENTS 
WHILE   SHIPS   ARE   PASSING   THROUGH   LOCKS 

This  subject  received  thorough  study  in  the 
United  States  at  the  St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal, 
Michigan;  also  previously  at  the  same  canal,  for 
several  years  before  the  commencement  of  the 
building  of  the  Panama  Canal,  it  was  supple- 
mented by  a  study  of  the  most  practicable  method 
of  stopping  the  flow  of  water  through  a  lock  should 
its  gates  be  carried  away  through  collision  with 
ship  or  otherwise.  The  final  conclusion  at  St. 
Mary's  Falls  Canal  was  that  the  passage  of  ships 
would  be  reasonably  safe  if  duplicate  gates  were 
built  at  each  end  of  the  lock — thus  providing  for 
a  good  gate  in  position  in  case  its  duplicate  was 
damaged — and  that  the  flow  of  water  through  the 
lock  could  be  most  surely  stopped  by  an  emer- 
gency dam  of  the  swing  bridge  type,  that  is,  by 
use  of  a  bridge  that  could  be  swung  over  the 
opening  and  which  carried  the  parts  of  a  movable 
dam  that  could  be  lowered  into  position  by  power 
on  the  bridge  and  thus  stop  the  flow. 

180 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

It  was  considered  safe  to  allow  boats  to  enter 
and  leave  the  St.  Mary's  Falls  Lock  under  their 
own  steam.  It  was  assumed  that  lockmen  would 
be  ready  at  all  times  to  drop  a  line  over  a  snub- 
bing post  and  thus  assist  in  handling  the  boat. 

The  results  of  the  studies  at  the  **Soo"  Lock 
were  adopted  at  Panama  in  so  far  as  the  duplicate 
gates  and  emergency  dam  were  concerned.  This 
type  of  emergency  dam  was  a  development  from 
one  originally  built  at  the  Weitzell  Lock,  St. 
Mary's  Falls  Canal,  improved  in  a  structure  on 
similar  lines  at  the  Canadian  lock  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river.  The  only  difference,  in  general 
thought,  between  the  emergency  dam  at  Panama 
and  that  at  the  Canadian  lock  was  the  system  of 
curtains  that  shut  off  the  flow  of  water.  In  the 
former,  when  the  swinging  girders  had  been  low- 
ered in  position,  a  section  of  curtain  was  run  down 
on  each  set  of  girders,  shutting  off  the  water  for 
the  same  vertical  height  all  the  way  across  the 
opening,  then  another  section  was  run  down  all 
the  way  across.  See  Figure  3.  At  the  Canadian 
lock  a  curtain  was  run  down  from  top  to  bottom 
of  a  set  of  girders  at  one  operation.  This  causes 
the  difficulties  of  stopping  the  flow  to  increase  as 
the  operation  proceeds,  whereas  the  opposite  will 
be  the  case  with  the  dams  at  Panama.  While 
the  emergency  dams  for  Panama  locks  were  be- 
ing designed  an  accident  occurred  at  the  Cana- 

181 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

dian  lock  in  question  that  opened  a  route  for 
Lake  Superior  water  through  the  lock.  This  was 
the  first  and  only  opportunity  to  test  the  dam  un- 
der the  conditions  for  which  it  was  designed.  The 
closure  was  finally  made  utilizing  the  dam.  The 
difficulties  encountered  and  the  weak  points  de- 
veloped during  this  operation  were  of  much  value 
in  perfecting  the  design  of  the  dams  for  Panama. 

In  addition  to  the  above  safety  devices,  fender 
chains  are  provided,  i.  e.,  a  chain  that  is  stretched 
across  the  lock  entrance  above  water  while  the 
boat  is  approaching  the  gate  protected  by  such 
chain.  This  chain  can  be  lowered  below  the  bot- 
tom of  the  lock  entrance  into  a  recess  or  groove, 
and  is  connected  with  a  system  of  hydraulic  cylin- 
ders in  such  a  way  that  it  requires  a  very  strong 
force  to  cause  the  chain  to  play  out.  A  10,000-ton 
ship  moving  at  5  miles  per  hour,  with  power  shut 
off,  could  be  stopped  by  this  chain  within  a  dis- 
tance of  about  70  feet. 

The  decision  was  also  reached  not  to  permit 
ships  to  pass  through  the  locks  under  their  own 
'steam.  Inability  to  surely  stop  a  ship  before  it 
reaches  a  certain  point,  together  with  the  giving 
of  wrong  signals  or  the  misunderstanding  of  sig- 
nals, have  in  the  past  been  the  principal  causes  of 
collisions  with  lock  gates. 

A  system  of  electrically  operated  towing  loco- 
motives were  therefore  designed.    These  locomo- 

182 


Fig.  3. — Views  of  Emergency  Dam  at  Gatun  in  Operation. 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

tives  will  control  the  movement  of  vessels  from 
the  time  they  land  alongside  the  approach  walls 
of  the  locks  until  the  passage  through  the  locks  is 
complete. 

LOCK   GATES 

The  lock  gates  are  of  the  mitering  type,  and 
built  of  steel  in  the  form  of  girders.  A  gate  of  the 
arched  type  which  was  of  course  found  much 
lighter  than  the  girder  type  was  studied,  but  was 
discarded  on  account  of  the  excessive  depth  of 
recess  required,  which  in  the  wall  separating  the 
lock  chambers  could  not  be  provided,  except  by 
materially  increasing  the  thickness  of  such  wall 
for  its  entire  length,  at  great  expense.  The  leaves 
in  the  largest  gates  on  the  Canal  weigh  more  than 
six  hundred  tons  and  it  is  an  impressive  sight  to 
see  two  such  huge  structures  swinging  leisurely 
across  the  lock  chamber  and  meeting  gently  in  the 
center  and  there  making  closures  from  top  to  bot- 
tom that  hardly  allow  the  passage  of  a  drop  of 
water,  not  only  where  the  leaves  meet  each  other 
but  also  where  they  abut  against  the  walls. 


SPILLWAY 

The  control  of  the  level  of  Gatun  Lake  in  such 
a  way  as  to  absolutely  insure  that  its  waters  will 
never  overflow  the  locks  and  thus  endanger  the 

183 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Canal,  and  the  control  of  Miraflores  Lake  so  that 
its  water  can  never  overflow  the  locks  at  that  place 
■under  the  assumption  that  the  summit  level  at 
Pedro  Miguel  is  broken,  were  interesting  problems, 
for  the  designing  engineers.  Fortunately  the  com- 
plete discharge  records  of  the  Chagres  River  kept 
for  many  years  by  the  French  canal  companies 
and  continued  by  the  United  States,  furnished 
more  accurate  data  as  to  the  hydraulics  of  that 
stream  than  is  known  about  almost  any  stream  in 
the  United  States.  If  the  amount  of  water  to  be 
discharged  is  known  the  size  of  the  openings 
necessary  can  be  accurately  calculated.  The  rain- 
fall on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  is  extremely  heavy, 
ranging  from  100  to  140  inches  per  year  within 
the  watershed  of  the  Chagres.  Excessive  amounts 
of  waterfall  at  times  within  a  few  hours,  the  maxi- 
mum records  being  about  3  inches  an  hour  at 
Colon  and  Gatun.  Fortunately  for  the  flood  situa- 
tion such  rainfalls  are  confined  generally  to  small 
areas,  the  rains  in  general  being  heavy  showers 
over  small  areas  indiscriminately  located.  While 
long  records  were  available  as  to  the  flood  dis- 
charge of  the  Chagres,  the  chance  of  an  unusual 
combination  of  these  heavy  rainfalls,  involving  an 
extensive  area,  which  might  occur  only  once  in  a 
century,  received  consideration  in  the  design  of 
the  spillways,  especially  that  at  Gatun,  at  which 
place  the  surplus  waters  of  the  entire  watershed 

184 


Fig.  4. — The  Opening  of  the  First  Gate,  Gatun  Spillway. 


Fig.  5. — Gatun  Spillway  with  Seven  Gates  Open. 


DESIGNS:  PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

of  the  Chagres  Eiver  must  find  an  outlet  to  the 
sea.  It  is  always  good  engineering  practice  to 
lean  strongly  toward  the  safe  side  in  designing  a 
spillway,  because  its  failure  to  meet  any  possible 
condition  might  be  fatal. 

The  reservoir  capacity  of  the  Gatun  Lake 
within  the  allowed  limiting  variations  of  levels  is 
itself  a  large  factor  of  safety.  The  tops  of  the 
lock  walls  are  five  feet  above  the  maximum  service 
elevation  of  this  lake.  The  maximum  known  dis- 
charge of  the  Chagres  Eiver  for  a  period  of  33 
hours  is  137,000  cubic  feet  per  second.  Assuming 
that  this  maximum  flow  continued  and  that  no 
water  was  passing  out  of  the  lake  through  the 
spillway  or  through  the  locks,  about  47  hours 
would  elapse  before  the  lake  reached  the  top  of 
the  lock  walls.  The  discharge  capacity  of  the 
Gatun  Spillway  at  the  beginning  of  such  a  flood 
would  be  154,000  cubic  feet  per  second,  which  could 
be  augmented  by  a  discharge  of  40,000  second  feet 
through  the  locks  at  Gatun  and  Pedro  Miguel, 
making  a  total  of  194,000  second  feet.  At  the 
extreme  danger  stage,  just  as  the  lake  reached  the 
top  of  the  lock  walls,  the  combined  discharge  of 
the  spillway  and  the  lock  culverts  would  be  about 
262,000  cubic  feet  per  second.  It  is  therefore  seen 
that  the  combination  of  reservoir  value  of  the  lake 
with  the  outflow  capacity  of  spillway  and  culverts 
gives  a  factor  of  safety  that  will  provide  for  the 

185 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

century  flood  and  for  marked  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  operating  force. 

In  order  to  provide  a  discharge  capacity  ful- 
filling the  above  conditions,  the  upper  16  feet  of 
the  spillway  dam  was  made  movable.  A  fixed 
dam  was  built  to  a  height  of  16  feet  below  normal 
lake  level ;  on  this  fixed  portion  piers  45  feet  apart 
were  constructed.  In  the  spaces  between  piers 
movable  gates  of  the  Stoney  type  are  operated. 
These  gates  are  raised  and  lowered  vertically  ou 
trains  of  live  rollers  in  grooves  in  'the  piers.  With 
this  arrangement  it  will  be  seen  that  when  the 
spillway  gates  are  opened  the  flow  of  water  will 
be  immediately  actuated  by  a  head  of  16  feet. 
There  are  fourteen  such  gates.  Figures  4  and  5 
show  the  operation  of  the  Gatun  Spillway  in  its 
first  official  try-out.  Only  seven  of  the  fourteen 
gates  are  open.  The  spillway  at  Miraflores  is 
similar  in  design  but  has  only  half  as  many  gates. 

In  the  design  of  all  the  parts  of  the  Panama 
Canal  a  generous  factor  of  safety  was  allowed. 
It  was  felt  that  the  resultant  structures  were  not 
for  a  day  or  a  generation,  but  that  the  completed 
Canal  would  be  the  embodiment  of  a  great  con- 
ception of  our  country  to  connect  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  for  the  benefit  of  the  commerce  of  the 
world;  the  neutrality  of  which  she  was  to  main- 
tain. 

"When  practicable,  all  designs  were  based  on 
186 


DESIGNS:   PERMANENT  BUILDINGS,  LOCKS 

successful  precedents.  There  were  no  precedents, 
however,  for  many  features  of  the  lock  designs, 
especially  some  of  the  operating  machinery  and 
other  appurtenances  necessary  for  the  safe  pas- 
sage of  ships. 


CHAPTER  XII 

CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

A  canal  of  the  dimensions  of  that  just  completed 
across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  could  not  have  been 
built  in  any  reasonable  time  without  the  mechan- 
ical appliances  that  this  age  has  developed.  Dry 
excavation  at  the  rate  of  50,000  cubic  yards  of 
material  a  day  and  placing  concrete  at  the  average 
rate  of  3,000  cubic  yards  a  day  with  one  plant, 
would  have  been  looked  upon  as  impracticable  by 
the  engineer  of  twenty  years  ago  and  are  astound- 
ing accomplishments  to  many  engineers  of  today. 
These  rates  of  work,  however,  were  necessary  in 
completing  the  Canal  within  the  time  fixed  in  the 
original  project. 

The  most  important  stage  in  any  great  under- 
taking is  the  preparatory  stage.  During  this  stage 
a  proper  conception  must  be  formed  as  to  relation 
of  plant  to  work  to  be  done,  and  as  to  the  relation 
of  plant  to  those  appurtenances  necessary  in  keep- 
ing it  working  at  maximum  efficiency.  Any  failure 
during  this  period  as  to  design  of  appliances  com- 
mensurate with  the  size  of  the  undertaking  is  a 
basic  mistake  and  can  never  be  fully  corrected. 

Efficient  transportation  in  some  form  or  other 
188 


CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

is  nearly  always  the  key  to  success  in  construction. 
It  matters  not  whether  it  be  hauling  dirt  and  rock 
from  steam-shovels  to  dumps,  or  hauling  material 
from  storage  to  concrete  mixers,  or  concrete  from 
mixers  to  forms. 

The  work  in  the  spring  of  1907  can  be  truly  said 
to  have  just  passed  through  the  preparatory 
period,  at  least  so  far  as  the  dredging  and  dry 
excavation  necessary  in  building  the  Canal  were 
concerned.  It  was  not  until  the  fall  of  1906  that 
Congress  had  finally  decided  the  type  of  canal, 
and  the  plan  of  construction  for  the  locks  and 
dams  needed  in  the  type  selected  had  not  passed 
through  the  preparatory  period,  although  much 
thought  had  been  devoted  to  that  plan.  The  gen- 
eral questions  that  concerned  the  source  of  supply 
of  stone  and  sand  needed  for  concrete  and  the 
methods  of  transporting  same  to  the  site  of  the 
work  had  been  decided. 

The  fact  that  the  Canal  was  completed  in  the 
time  specified,  although  the  quantities  involved 
largely  exceeded  those  contemplated,  stands  out 
as  strong  proof  that  those  responsible  for  the 
preparatory  period  conceived  the  needs  of  the 
problem  in  a  broad,  comprehensive  manner.  Of 
course  many  improvements  were  made,  but  such 
improvements  were  practicable  without  any  basic 
change  in  the  original  conception. 


189 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 
COLON   BEEAKWATER 

The  final  plans  for  Colon  Harbor  were  deter- 
mined March.  10,  1910,  and  the  construction  of  the 
west  breakwater  immediately  commenced.  This 
breakwater  started  from  Toro  Point  and  extended 
11,526  feet  in  a  direction  a  little  north  of  east. 
No  rail  connection  existed  between  the  Panama 
Eailroad  and  Toro  Point.  A  survey  was  made 
for  a  line  from  Gatun,  which  indicated  that  its 
construction  would  be  difficult  and  expensive. 
Furthermore  its  connection  with  the  Panama  Eail- 
road would  be  broken  when  rail  connection  with 
the  Gatun  Dam  was  broken,  Toro  Point  being  on 
the  west  side  of  the  Canal.  This  survey  was  made 
in  connection  with  studies  as  to  the  best  source 
of  supply  of  stone  for  breakwater  construction. 
These  studies  showed  that  there  existed  at  Toro 
Point  a  rock  that  would  be  acceptable  for  the  core 
or  hearting  of  the  breakwater  and  that  since  the 
heavy  rock  required  for  armor  must  be  delivered 
by  water,  that  the  best  and  most  available  source 
of  supply  for  such  stone  was  Porto  Bello.  Stone 
could  be  easily  quarried  there  in  pieces  weighing 
from  twelve  to  fifteen  tons. 

The  general  plan  of  construction  followed  was 
to  drive  a  double-track  trestle  from  Toro  Point 
out  into  the  Caribbean  Sea  along  the  axis  of  the 
breakwater ;  to  open  a  quarry  at  Toro  Point ;  load 

190 


CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

cars  there  with  steam-shovels,  and  dump  stone 
from  the  trestle  to  a  height  necessary  to  make  the 
trestle  steady  in  a  moderate  sea,  and  to  follow  this 
operation  by  raising  the  fill  above  water  with 
large  rock  from  Porto  Bello.  Derrick  boats  work- 
ing nnder  the  lee  of  this  rock  ridge  were  to  com- 
plete the  section  of  the  breakwater  with  stone 
weighing  from  twelve  to  fifteen  tons.  This  stone 
came  from  Porto  Bello  and  was  delivered  along- 
side the  derrick  boats  in  barges. 

The  thought  was  that  the  placing  of  the  heavy 
stone  should  follow  the  trestle  driving  as  closely 
as  practicable  so  as  to  minimize  the  damage 
should  a  severe  *' norther''  occur  while  the  break- 
water was  being  constructed.  The  Porto  Bello 
rock,  first  placed,  forming  a  ridge  above  water 
on  the  sea  face  of  the  breakwater,  was  transported 
in  barges  to  a  small  harbor  constructed  at  Toro 
Point ;  it  was  then  loaded  on  flat-cars,  run  out  on 
the  trestles  and  plowed  off  in  position  by  a  Lid- 
gerwood  unloader.  The  sight  of  these  big  stones 
splashing  into  the  sea  was  an  impressive  one. 
This  ridge  only  gave  protection  during  a  moder- 
ate sea  and  derrick  boats  were  often  unable  to 
work. 

The  west  breakwater  was  successfully  built  in 
the  manner  described  for  less  than  the  estimate. 
See  Figure  6. 

The  east  breakwater  was  not  commenced  until 
191 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

1914.  It  being  on  the  east  side  of  the  Canal  and 
a  rail  connection  from  Mount  Hope  to  Magarita 
Point  having  already  been  made  in  connection 
with  the  construction  of  fortifications,  it  was  de- 
cided to  obtain  all  the  stone  for  this  breakwater 
on  the  Isthmus  and  transport  it  to  the  breakwater 
by  rail;  a  double-tracked  trestle  being  utilized  in 
its  construction  as  was  done  in  the  west  break- 
water. The  heavy  armor  rock  was  to  be  obtained 
from  near  Sosa  Hill,  Balboa.  A  severe  *  *  norther ' ' 
visited  Limon  Bay,  Colon,  February  8  to  10,  1915, 
and  destroyed  4,700  feet  of  trestle  on  the  east 
breakwater. 


SEA-LEVEL  SECTION,  COLON  TO  GATUN 

Both  steam-shovels  and  dredges  were  utilized 
in  excavating  this  part  of  the  Canal;  steam- 
shovels  in  making  the  channel  through  the  Mindi 
Hills,  and  the  dredges  in  the  remainder. 

In  making  the  cut  through  Mindi  Hills  it  was 
first  decided  to  complete  the  excavation  to  sea- 
level  with  steam-shovels,  drill  and  blast  the  under- 
lying material  and  remove  it  by  dredges.  But  as 
the  work  progressed  it  became  apparent  that  the 
rock  excavation  in  this  section  of  the  Canal,  other 
than  that  at  Mindi,  would  completely  occupy  that 
part  of  the  dredging  plant  capable  of  rock  ex- 
cavation.   The  records  showed  very  little  differ- 

192 


Fig.  6. — Toro  Poixt  Breakwater.  Looking  Towards  Water  End, 
July  12.   1913. 


Fig.  7. — A  Dredge  Grounded  Fifty-five  Feet  Below  Sea-Level, 
Gatun  Locks. 


CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

ence  as  to  cost  by  the  dry  and  wet  methods  of 
excavation,  considering  the  dredges  available  for 
the  work.  The  ladder  dredges  engaged  were  bnilt 
during  the  French  regime  and  had  small  buckets — 
good  machines  for  their  day.  The  dipper  dredges 
were  modern;  the  type,  however,  is  not  the  best 
for  such  deep  digging.  The  stone  from  this  ex- 
cavation, if  dug  by  steam-shovels,  could  be  ad- 
vantageously used  in  building  the  toes  of  Gatun 
Dam.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  install  a  pump- 
ing plant  and  complete  the  rock  excavation  to  a 
depth  of  41  feet  below  sea-level  by  steam-shovels. 
The  cost  of  this  excavation  was  66.8  cents  per 
cubic  yard.  This  included  pumping,  cost  of  extra 
engines  in  pushing  the  trains  up  to  the  country 
level,  and  all  other  costs,  except  dumping  the  cars 
on  the  dam. 

No  untoward  circumstances  —  not  counting 
slides — occurred  in  the  making  of  this  excavation, 
except  that  the  Chagres  River  forced  its  way,  dur- 
ing a  flood,  through  the  spillway  cut,  while  the 
latter  was  being  excavated.  The  greater  part  of 
its  flood  discharge  passed  down  the  old  French 
canal  and  overflowed  the  surrounding  country  in 
places.  This  resulted  in  flooding  the  Mindi  ex- 
cavation and  in  submerging  some  of  the  shovels 
to  a  depth  of  40  feet,  the  bottom  of  the  cut  being 
at  that  time  40  feet  below  sea-level  in  places.  The 
entire  excavated  space  being  filled  with  water,  an 

193 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

entrance  channel  was  made  into  it  and  a  pipe  line 
suction  dredge  sent  in  to  remove  the  soft  material 
that  had  been  sliding  into  the  cut  for  some  dis- 
tance back  from  the  canal  line.  More  powerful 
pumps  were  installed,  the  entire  space  unwatered, 
the  steam-shovels  cleaned  up  and  greased,  and  the 
excavation  continued. 

The  same  flood,  which  lasted  for  some  time,  in- 
terfered most  seriously  with  towing  rock  and  sand 
to  Gatun  via  the  old  French  canal.  The  current 
was  so  swift  that  the  tug  boats  could  not  stem  it 
with  a  tow.  In  order  to  deliver  their  tows,  the 
tugs  would  run  ahead  for  a  thousand  or  more  feet, 
make  fast  to  a  tree  and,  with  their  towing  ma- 
chines, pull  the  barges  up,  and  then  repeat  the 
operation.  Fortunately,  the  storage  piles  were 
able  to  supply  the  deficiency  during  this  period. 


DREDGING  SEA-LEVEL  SECTION 

Four  distinct  classes  of  dredges  were  used  on 
this  work.  The  sea-going  suction  dredge  handled 
the  material  in  Limon  Bay,  which  was  so  soft  that 
dredges  could  suck  it  in  without  any  previous 
mechanical  agitation.  The  pipe-line  suction 
dredge  handled  the  next  harder  grade  of  material, 
including  all  not  classible  as  rock.  These  dredges 
were  equipped  with  a  steam-driven  mechanical 
cutter  operating  just  in  front  of  the  suction  pipe. 

194 


CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

The  cutter  tore  up  the  material  so  that  it  would 
be  sucked  into  the  pipe  and  be  driven  out  by  the 
pumps.  The  ladder  and  dipper  dredges  handled 
the  rock  which  was  previously  disrupted  by  dyna- 
mite. Several  of  the  old  ladder  dredges  owned 
by  the  French  Company  were  utilized  on  this  work 
advantageously,  notwithstanding  that  they  were 
twenty  years  old.  The  pipe-line  dredges  could 
deliver  material  through  their  discharge  pipes  td 
points  from  a  half  to  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
away,  and  the  discharge  from  these  dredges  was 
so  directed  as  to  fill  as  many  of  the  swampy  places 
as  practicable,  thus  enabling  the  Sanitary  Depart- 
ment to  construct  drainage  ditches  and  destroy 
breeding-places  for  mosquitoes. 

In  connection  with  these  dredging  operations 
39,032,400  cubic  yards  of  material,  rock  and  dirt, 
were  removed,  at  a  cost  of  23J  cents.  This  cost 
included  all  plant  charge  and  overhead  expense. 
The  drilling  and  blasting  for  the  greater  part  of 
the  rock  below  sea-level  was  done  from  the  ground 
surface,  which  was  above  sea-level:  that  is,  holes 
were  drilled,  loaded  and  fired,  disrupting  the  rock 
to  a  depth  of  42  feet  below  sea-level,  working  on 
the  natural  ground,  before  the  dredges  commenced 
work.  This  made  the  blasting  costs  light.  The 
rock  encountered  was  soft. 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

CONSTEUCTION    OF    LOCKS    AND    DAMS — GATUN    LOCKS 

In  1906  a  decision  had  been  reached  to  obtain 
from  Porto  Bello,  a  point  on  the  Caribbean  Coast 
twenty  miles  east  of  Colon,  the  crushed  stone  for 
the  concrete  in  the  Gatun  Locks,  and  the  erection 
of  quarters  there  had  commenced  in  the  spring  of 
1907,  and  advertisements  were  out  calling  for  bids 
for  a  rock-crushing  plant.  It  had  also  been  de- 
cided to  obtain  the  sand  needed  at  Gatun  from 
some  point  on  the  Caribbean  shore,  possibly  at 
Nombre  de  Dios,  a  place  about  twenty  miles  east 
of  Porto  Bello. 

In  searching  for  suitable  sand  on  the  Atlantic 
Coast  some  of  the  field  parties  penetrated  the 
country  occupied  by  the  San  Bias  Indians,  about 
ninety  miles  east  of  Colon.  These  Indians  lived 
on  small  coral  islands,  cultivating  land  on  the 
main  shore.  They  did  not  look  with  favor  upon 
the  visits  that  the  white  man  was  making  in 
search  of  sand  in  their  territory:  they  suspected 
that  the  search  was  for  gold  and  not  for  sand. 

These  investigations  soon  developed  a  supply  of 
suitable  sand  and  a  party  of  higher  officials  made 
a  visit  to  the  Indian  country  with  a  view  to  mak- 
ing arrangements  for  procuring  sand.  The  tug 
on  which  this  party  came  was  a  strange  sight  to 
the  Indians.  As  soon  as  the  island  on  which  the 
Chief  lived  came  into  plain  view  one  could  see, 

196 


CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

looking  through  a  glass,  all  of  the  women  seeking 
a  hiding-place,  as  seems  to  be  the  custom  in  that 
country  when  strange  men  appear. 

As  this  tug  drew  near  the  island  a  naked  Indian 
boy  about  ten  or  eleven  years  old  was  noticed  in 
a  small  dugout  pulling  frantically  for  the  shore : 
his  fear  and  his  efforts  were  so  appealing  that  the 
tug  was  stopped  in  order  to  give  him  time  to 
safely  reach  land  without  crowding  him  too  much 
with  the  tug.  These  Indians  are  efficient  sailors 
and  learn  to  handle  a  boat  when  very  young. 

When  the  inspection  party  reached  the  island 
on  which  the  Chief  lived  they  ascertained  that  he 
was  not  at  home  but  that  he  would  be  at  home  in 
the  afternoon  and  that  if  the  party  returned  it 
could  then  find  out  whether  or  not  he  would  re- 
ceive them. 

In  the  meantime  an  inspection  was  made  of  the 
deposits  of  sand  and  of  the  country  generally 
thereabout,  and  at  the  appointed  time  the  inspec- 
tion party  proceeded  to  the  island  on  which  the 
Chief  lived.  In  the  meantime  a  great  many  In- 
dians had  come  to  this  island  from  the  surround- 
ing islands.  The  contemplated  visit  had  probably 
excited  the  Indian  community  more  than  it  had 
been  excited  for  a  long  time. 

When  the  party  landed  on  the  island  it  was  led 
through  a  labyrinth  of  Indian  dwellings  and  fin- 
ally conducted  into  the  Chief's  quarters.    This  old 

197 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Chief — about  seventy  years  of  age — was  seated 
■upon  a  block  of  timber  and  he  motioned  the  visit- 
ors to  a  seat  on  the  sand  at  his  feet — the  floor  of 
the  house  being  sand.  An  air  of  solemnity  sur- 
rounded the  whole  proceeding. 

This  Chief  was  told  of  the  intention  of  the 
United  States  Government  to  connect  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  oceans  by  a  canal  so  that  boats  could 
cross  in  a  short  time ;  he  was  told  how  this  would 
improve  the  trade  of  the  Indians;  and  how  it 
would  increase  the  price  of  his  cocoanuts  and  his 
ivory  nuts.  The  old  Chief  listened  to  the  story 
and  after  it  was  finished,  stated  that  God  had 
given  the  Indians  that  country,  the  land  and  wa- 
ter, and  the  sand  that  was  under  the  water,  and 
that  which  God  had  given  the  Indians  they  would 
neither  sell  nor  give  to  the  white  man ;  and,  after 
another  attempt  was  made  to  present  further  ar- 
guments, with  a  wave  of  his  hand,  he  said : 
'^ There  is  no  need  to  talk  further.'' 

The  Chief  was  informed  that  permission  could 
be  obtained  from  the  Eepublic  of  Panama  to  get 
this  sand  and  that  it  could  be  taken,  but  that  the 
United  States  preferred  to  pay  for  it  and  would 
pay  for  all  of  the  sand  procured  from  their  terri- 
tory if  suitable  arrangements  could  be  made.  The 
Chief  replied  that  he  owed  no  allegiance  to  the 
Eepublic  of  Panama  and  would  not  permit  ,the 
United  States  to  take  the  sand. 

198 


CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

From  this  interview  it  was  evident  that  sand 
could  not  be  procured  from  the  San  Bias  Indian 
country  without  bloodshed.  In  addition,  it  seemed 
a  pity  to  disturb  a  life  that  was  so  unique  and 
strong,  in  an  Indian  way  at  least. 

Permission  was  asked  to  anchor  for  the  night, 
which  was  granted  on  condition  that  the  party 
leave  early  next  morning  and  never  return. 

The  discipline  of  these  people,  the  power  of  the 
Chief,  and  the  respect  of  the  tribe  for  him,  as 
shown  during  this  visit,  were  remarkable. 

The  physical  condition  and  strength  of  these 
island  Indians  attracted  one's  attention  imme- 
diately, and  the  reason  for  it  in  this  tropical 
country  was  sought.  Investigations  showed  that 
there  was  no  fresh  water  on  the  little  coral  islands 
where  the  Indians  lived  and,  consequently,  no 
breeding-places  for  malarial  or  yellow-fever  mos- 
quitoes, such  mosquitoes  never  breeding  in  sea 
water.  This,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  the  ma- 
larial mosquito  does  not  bite  or  feed  in  the  day- 
time, when  the  Indians  were  on  the  main  land 
looking  after  their  banana  and  cocoanut  planta- 
tions, largely  furnishes  the  reason  why  these  par- 
ticular Indians  were  not  cursed  with  the  two  worst 
tropical  diseases — yellow  fever  and  malaria. 

It  was  known  that  it  would  be  expensive  to  ob- 
tain stone  from  Porto  Bello  and  sand  from  Nom- 
bre  de  Dios,  as  previously  mentioned,  because  it 

199 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

would  primarily  involve  the  construction  of  a 
staunch  and  consequently  expensive  sea-going 
transportation  plant  capable  of  delivering  more 
than  an  average  of  3,000  cubic  yards  of  crushed 
stone  and  1,500  cubic  yards  of  sand  a  day  across 
a  portion  of  the  Caribbean  Sea.  It  was  also 
known  that  considerable  expense  would  be  in- 
curred in  deepening  the  old  French  canal  from 
Cristobal  to  Gatun  and  that  it  would  be  necessary 
to  make  provision  for  storing  large  quantities  of 
sand  and  stone  so  as  to  insure  no  delay  in  the  con- 
crete work  on  account  of  quarry  breakdowns  or 
rough  weather  on  the  Caribbean.  In  order  to 
fully  meet  these  requirements  provision  was  made 
for  storing  200,000  cubic  yards  of  stone  and 
100,000  cubic  yards  of  sand.  About  $800,000  was 
spent  on  the  sea  transportation  plant,  dredging 
the  channel  from  Cristobal  to  Gatun  and  on  the 
unloading  plant  designed  especially  for  accom- 
plishing the  needed  storage,  all  of  which  was 
absorbed  in  the  cost  of  sand  and  stone.  When 
these  materials  were  delivered  they  were  still 
1,700  feet  away  and  60  feet  below  the  site  of  the 
concrete  mixing  plant,  which  of  course  involved 
extra  plant  and  extra  expense  in  mixing  the  con- 
crete. 

The  above  considerations  coupled  with  the  fact 
that  the  Porto  Bello  stone  was  exceedingly  refrac- 
tory, and  that  the  rainfall  there  was  excessive, 

200 


CONSTRUCTION  FROM  COLON  TO  GATUN 

being  237  inches  the  first  year  of  operations  there, 
whereas  it  was  only  70  inches  at  Panama,  and  of 
the  further  fact  that  the  Nombre  de  Dios  sand 
was  mixed  with  mud  and  had  to  be  handled  with  a 
suction  dredge  in  order  that  the  pumping  might 
wash  it,  were  the  causes  of  the  excessive  cost  of 
sand  and  stone  and  consequently  of  the  concrete 
for  the  Gatun  Locks  as  compared  with  that  of  the 
locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores.  This  extra 
cost  has  been  criticized  by  some,  and  the  question 
was  often  asked  why  this  sand  and  stone  was  not 
obtained  from  the  same  source  as  that  for  the 
locks  on  the  Pacific  side,  hauling  that  needed  for 
Gatun  by  rail  across  the  Isthmus  at  a  considerable 
saving  in  cost.  The  source  of  supply  of  sand  and 
stone  for  Gatun  was  decided  upon  during  the  pre- 
paratory period  and  was  an  element  in  the  general 
problem  of  transporting  material  to  and  from 
other  parts  of  the  Canal  and  of  freight  across  the 
Isthmus  by  the  Panama  Railroad.  An  obligation 
existed  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  do  a 
general  freight  and  passenger  business  with  this 
railroad. 

It  was  recognized  that  the  stone  at  Gatun  would 
cost  more  than  that  quarried  at  a  hill  near  the 
sites  of  the  locks  on  the  Pacific,  but  it  was  de- 
cided that  the  increased  cost  would  be  at  least 
offset  by  the  increased  transportation  facilities, 
thus  accorded  the  other  parts  of  the  Canal,  in 

201 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

addition  to  the  advantage  of  not  having  the  work 
at  Gatun  hampered  by  an  uncertain  supply  of  ma- 
terial. Furthermore  it  was  expected  that  the  par- 
tial formation  of  Gatun  Lake  would  drown  out  the 
old  line  of  the  Panama  Eailroad  before  concreting 
in  the  locks  was  finished,  which  of  course  would 
throw  all  the  traffic  on  the  relocated  line,  which 
line  at  that  time  was  not  planned  as  a  freight  car- 
rying road,  a  much  cheaper  line  than  that  after- 
wards determined  upon  and  built.  The  cost  of  the 
stone  and  sand  in  the  stock  pile  at  Gatun,  all 
plant  cost  absorbed,  was :  Stone  $2.44  per  cubic 
yard;  sand,  $1.95  per  cubic  yard. 

In  order  to  relieve  the  Panama  Railroad  still 
further,  it  was  decided  as  a  part  of  the  plan  for 
transportation  of  concrete  materials  to '  Gatun, 
that  the  cement  be  shipped  by  water  from  Cristo- 
bal to  Gatun.  This  involved  the  absorption  of  the 
cost  of  the  barges  and  boats  necessary  to  this 
service,  in  the  cost  of  the  cement  for  Gatun.  The 
operating  cost  of  this  plant  was  about  the  same 
as  the  railroad  charge  for  the  cement  to  other 
parts  of  the  Isthmus. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK  AT  GATUN 

EXCAVATION   OF   LOCK   SITE 

This  excavation  comprised  the  removal  of 
4,660,455  cubic  yards  of  material  by  steam-shovel ; 
1,756,917  by  dredges.  In  preparing  the  founda- 
tion after  the  general  excavation  had  been  com- 
pleted 228,376  cubic  yards  were  removed  by  crane 
and  by  hand.  There  was  nothing  unusual  in  any 
of  this  excavation  until  the  lower  end  of  the  lower 
lock  was  reached.  On  the  east  side  of  this  lock  the 
rock  dipped  rapidly  to  the  northeast  and  at  the 
lower  end  of  the  lock  proper  was  found  at  66  feet 
below  sea-level  and  overlaid  with  the  softest  of 
mud.  On  the  west  side  of  the  locks  the  rock  com- 
menced to  dip  rapidly  to  the  north  near  the  cais- 
son sill,  imposing  many  difficulties  in  making  the 
excavation  for  the  flare  and  guide  walls.  The  en- 
gineering difficulties  connected  with  the  flare  and 
guide  wall  excavation  will  be  treated  separately. 

STEAM-SHOVEL  EXCAVATION 

During  the  last  week  in  September,  1906,  one 
steam-shovel  commenced  excavation  at  the  lock 

203 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

site;  other  shovels  were  added  as  fast  as  they 
could  be  advantageously  cut  in.  By  July,  1907, 
the  excavation  had  sufficiently  advanced  to  install 
a  satisfactory  track  system.  After  that  the  work 
followed  ordinary  lines  of  development.  The 
problem  was  to  complete  the  excavation  to  the 
foundation  level  of  the  upper  locks  as  soon  as 
practicable,  so  that  concrete  work  could  be  com- 
menced in  that  lock ;  excavation  to  be  continued  at 
a  rate  that  would  enable  the  concrete  force  to 
spread  into  the  middle  lock  before  it  was  cramped 
in  the  upper  lock.  In  order  that  the  wall  founda- 
tions could  be  prepared  in  advance  and  the 
trenches  for  the  lateral  culverts  excavated  in  time, 
it  was  necessary  for  the  lock  excavation  to  pro- 
ceed with  celerity  and  certainty.  The  success  of 
a  great  construction  job  like  the  Gatun  Locks  de- 
pends upon  an  orderly  procedure  t)f  the  various 
parts.  No  part  must  be  allowed  to  delay  another 
part  if  it  be  practicable  to  avoid  such  delay. 

The  average  output  per  day  per  shovel  for  the 
entire  year  ending  June  30,  1908,  was  1,142  cubic 
yards,  and  the  corresponding  average  for  1909 
was  1,101  cubic  yards,  showing  that  the  machine 
worked  with  regularity.  The  requirements  placed 
upon  the  excavation  force  were  met  and  the  con- 
creting was  not  delayed  until  the  lower  end  of  the 
last  lock  was  reached,  when  the  entire  plan  of 
excavation  had  to  be  changed  on  account  of  the 

204 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

fact  that  the  material  overlying  the  rock  was  too 
soft  to  hold  up  a  steam- shovel.  The  uniform  rate 
at  which  concrete  was  placed  is  the  most  lucid 
proof  of  this  statement.  The  material  from  the 
lock  excavation  was  utilized  in  building  the  toes 
of  the  Gatun  Dam  and  in  making  fills  in  the  recon- 
struction of  the  Panama  Railroad. 

The  average  cost  of  the  excavation  for  Gatun 
Locks  was  67.8  cents  per  cubic  yard.  The  space 
was  contracted,  especially  in  the  middle  and  lower 
locks,  and  hauling  excavated  material  from  a 
depth  of  45  feet  below  sea-level  to  the  general 
track  level,  utilized  in  disposing  of  this  material, 
was  very  expensive. 

Notwithstanding  these  difficulties  all  of  the  ex- 
cavation for  the  locks  proper,  including  the  cais- 
son sill  of  lower  lock,  was  done  by  steam-shovel. 
In  accomplishing  this  for  the  last  400  feet  of  the 
east  wall,  a  depth  of  66  feet  below  sea-level  was 
reached,  in  spite  of  a  succession  of  slides,  that 
at  times  turned  over  steam-shovels,  and  on  more 
than  one  occasion,  covered  up  workmen.  The  fact 
that  the  rock  dipped  both  east  and  north  enabled 
the  shovel  and  the  loading  track  to  be  kept  on 
rock. 

This  material  sometimes  assumed  slopes  as  flat 
as  one  vertical  on  thirteen  horizontal.  No  one  ex- 
pected on  returning  to  work  in  the  morning  to  find 
things  as  they  were  left  the  evening  before.    The 

205 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

force,  however,  were  never  discouraged  and  felt 
determined  to  conquer  the  situation  in  time  so 
as  not  to  interfere  with  building  the  lock 
walls. 

The  experience  in  this  part  of  the  excavation 
proved  that  it  would  be  impracticable  to  make 
the  excavation  for  the  flare  and  guide  walls  by 
steam-shovel.  The  rock  was  so  low  that  initial 
tracks  for  shovel  and  trains  could  not  be  placed 
on  it.  It  was'  then  decided  to  complete  the  lock 
walls  to  the  caisson  sill,  build  reenf  orced  concrete 
dams  between  such  walls  to  hold  back  the  sea  from 
the  lock  chambers,  in  order  that  the  installation  of 
lock  gates  and  machinery  might  proceed,  and  to 
complete  the  excavation  by  dredges. 

In  making  this  excavation  a  sound  log  was 
found  56  feet  below  sea-level  and  about  65  feet 
below  the  surface  of  the  ground.  Its  envelope  of 
soft,  impervious  blue  clay  had  evidently  prevented 
any  circulation  of  water  and  thus  prevented  its 
being  petrified  or  destroyed  by  chemical  agencies. 
It  was  a  hard,  heavy,  beautiful  wood  capable  of 
receiving  a  high  polish.  Canes  and  cribbage 
boards  made  from  it  are  among  the  most  cher- 
ished mementos  of  many  of  the  employees  of  the 
old  Atlantic  Division.  This  log  may  have  been 
thrown  into  the  position  where  found,  during  the 
geological  disturbance  that  lowered  the  old  chan- 
nels of  the  Chagres  Eiver  previously  referred  to ; 

206 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

tlie  overlying  material  being  a  sea  deposit  of  the 
finer  clays  delivered  by  the  Chagres  River  into 
the  area  of  sea  that  extended  up  the  Chagres  Val- 
ley after  the  subsidence.  There  were  evidences 
of  this  subsidence  brought  to  light  in  the  excava- 
tion for  the  Gatun  Locks. 

Below  the  soft  blue  mud  was  found  the  same 
kind  of  red  clay  that  formed  the  tops  of  the  small 
hills  around  Gatun.  A  few  feet  beneath  this  clay 
the  same  class  of  rock  was  encountered.  The  line 
of  demarcation  between  the  original  hilltops  and 
the  sea  deposit  on  them  was  very  clear;  the  sea 
deposit  being  dark  blue  mud  filled  with  shells.  The 
old  natural  surface  of  the  ground  h^d  the  same 
broken,  uneven  appearance  that  characterizes  the 
surrounding  country.  This  unevenness  made  the 
construction  very  difficult,  unexpected  depressions 
being  encountered  frequently — depressions  not 
fully  developed  by  the  borings. 

The  channel  excavation  from  Limon  Bay  to 
Gatun  was  stopped  1,000  feet  south  of  the  site 
of  the  flare  and  guide  walls  and  the  undisturbed 
earth  left  as  a  barrier  or  dam  to  hold  the  sea  out 
of  the  deep  excavation  to  be  made  for  the  walls. 
As  soon  as  the  lock  walls  were  completed,  as 
stated  before,  and  the  reenforced  concrete  dams 
across  the  sea  end  of  them  built,  dredges  cut  a 
channel  through  this  barrier  wide  enough  for 
their  entrance,  allowing  the  sea  water  to  come 

207 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

against  the  temporary  dams  at  the  south  end  of 
the  locks. 

Dredges  then  commenced  to.  excavate  the 
space  in  which  the  flare  and  guide  walls  were  to 
be  built.  These  dredges  were  of  the  pipe-line 
suction  type  and  could  discharge  the  excavated 
material  through  the  pipe,  as  shown,  to  dis- 
tances of  a  half-mile  or  more,  but  they  could  only 
dig  to  a  depth  of  41  feet  below  sea,  while  it  was 
necessary  to  excavate  to  a  depth  of  70  feet  below 
sea  in  order  to  uncover  the  rock  under  the  east 
flare  wall. 

The  borings  indicated  that,  while  it  was  70 
feet  below  sea-level  to  rock  under  a  part  of  the 
flare  walls,  a  hundred  or  more  feet  back  of  these 
walls  the  rock  was  at  about  40  feet  below  sea  and 
could  be  uncovered  by  the  dredges  floating  at  sea- 
level. 

Experience  in  digging  the  sea-level  section  of 
the  Canal  between  Gatun  and  the  sea,  had  estab- 
lished the  fact  that  where  the  ground  was  not 
more  than  six  to  ten  feet  above  the  sea  the  sides 
of  a  cut  50  feet  deep  would  not  slide  if  the  sea 
water  followed  the  dredges  in  making  the  cut. 

The  plan  of  excavation,  therefore,  contemplated 
uncovering  the  rock  behind  both  the  flare  walls 
without  lowering  the  water  level ;  then  to  drive  a 
trestle  into  this  rock,  using  shod  piles,  and  from 
such  trestle  make  a  rock  fill,  dumping  the  rock 

208 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

through  the  water.  These  rock  fills  resting  on  the 
rock  bottom  were  expected  to  act  as  retaining 
walls  and  to  hold  the  mud  out  of  the  excavation 
when  the  water  surface  was  afterwards  lowered 
and  the  excavation  continued. 

After  this  was  accomplished,  an  earthen  dam 
was  built  across  the  entrance  cut  in  the  barrier 
made  by  the  dredges,  shutting  off  their  connection 
with  the  sea.  A  suction  dredge  in  operation 
pumps  six  or  seven  times  as  much  water  as  it 
does  solid  material.  Being  disconnected  from  the 
sea  the  operation  of  these  dredges  lowered  the 
water  surface  in  the  space  where  the  walls  in 
question  were  to  be  built.  The  dredges  floating 
at  a  lower  elevation  could  uncover  the  rock  at 
greater  depths :  as  this  process  continued  the  rock 
fills  referred  to  above  were  widened.  In  this  way 
the  dredges  uncovered  rock  70  feet  below  sea  un- 
der the  flare  walls  and  the  rock  dams  kept  the  mud 
out.  A  water  supply  for  the  dredges  was  pumped 
into  the  dredged  space  when  needed. 

This  process  could  not  be  followed  in  building 
that  part  of  the  guide  wall  north  of  the  flare  walls 
on  account  of  the  extreme  depth  of  the  rock  below 
sea-level.  In  lowering  the  water  level  many  slides 
came  into  the  excavation  north  of  the  flare  walls 
and  were  pumped  out  by  the  dredges,  the  water 
being  held  at  constant  level  during  such  process. 
After  the  excavation  had  all  been  made  to  grade, 

209 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  water  surface  being  at  thirty-two  feet  below 
sea-level,  the  entire  space  was  filled  with  water  to 
sea-level,  an  opening  made  in  the  barrier,  and  all 
but  one  of  the  dredges  were  then  taken  out  to  be 
used  at  other  places  where  needed.  The  opening 
in  the  barrier  was  again  closed  and  the  dredge 
left  within  the  inclosure  finally  pumped  all  the 
remaining  water  and  earth  brought  in  by  slides 
out  of  the  excavated  space.  This  dredge  ulti- 
mately was  grounded  55  feet  below  sea-level, 
where  it  remained  until  the  work  was  finished. 
See  Figure  7. 

After  all  the  masonry  was  finished  and  the  sea 
gates  of  the  locks  completed  ready  to  take  the 
pressure  of  the  water  and  keep  it  out  of  the  lock 
chambers  while  the  gates  and  valves  were  in- 
stalled, the  reenforced  concrete  dams  at  the  ends 
of  the  locks  were  removed  and  the  space  excavated 
for  the  guide  walls  was  filled  by  dredges  pumping 
water  from  the  sea-level  section  of  the  Canal.  The 
sea  gates  were  thus  gradually  subjected  to  a  full 
head  of  water.  See  Figure  8.  The  grounded 
dredge  was  thus  floated  and  commenced  to  cut 
away  the  barrier  between  the  Gatun  Locks  and 
the  sea.  Other  dredges  worked  on  the  same  bar- 
rier from  the  sea  toward  the  locks,  thus  complet- 
ing the  Canal  from  Gatun  to  the  ocean. 

Figure  9  shows  one  slide  that  came  into  this 
space  and  covered  a  large  part  of  the  guide-wall 

210 


Fig.  8. — Sea  Gates,  Gatun  Locks,  Under  Pressure  for  the  First 

Time. 


Fig.   9. — Slide   into   Space   Excavated   for   North   Guide   Wall, 
Gatun  Locks. 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

foundation  with  mud  from  6  to  18  feet  deep  while 
the  process  of  driving  piles  was  proceeding.  This 
happened  two  months  after  the  space  had  been 
pumped  out  and  in  the  middle  of  the  dry  season. 
The  sliding  material  finally  came  to  rest  with 
slopes  as  flat  as  one  vertical  on  twenty  horizontal. 
This  slide  wrecked  two  pile-drivers  and  caused  a 
serious  delay  to  the  work.  The  mud  brought  in 
by  this  slide  was  sluiced  into  a  hole  in  front  of 
the  grounded  dredge;  water  sufficient  for  the 
operation  of  the  dredge  being  pumped  into  the 
excavated  space,  and  the  dredge  put  in  operation, 
sending  this  mud  through  its  pipe  line  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  to  the  east  of  the  scene  of  trouble.  It 
was  an  odd  sight,  one  probably  never  ^een  before 
■ — a  20-inch  suction  dredge  on  the  ground  55  feet 
below  the  level  of  the  sea  and  doing  useful  excava- 
tion. This  dredge  kept  the  excavated  space  un- 
watered  until  a  less  expensive  pumping  plant 
could  be  installed. 

The  excavation  for  the  flare  and  guide  walls  of 
the  Gatun  Locks  was  the  most  difficult  task  in  con- 
nection with  the  building  of  the  Gatun  Locks,  if 
not  of  the  entire  Canal.  An  open  cut  over  70  feet 
below  sea-level  in  soft  mud  is  difficult  to  make 
and  even  more  difficult  to  maintain.  Had  the  rock 
foundation  for  these  walls  been  at  a  suitable 
elevation  and  the  banks  reasonably  stable,  the 
masonry  of  the  locks  could  have  been  completed 

211 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

about  ten  months  sooner  and  the  cost  of  concrete 
materially  reduced.  Concrete  operations  were 
practically  stopped  for  ten  months. 

The  rock  surface  under  the  Gatun  Locks  was 
very  uneven,  its  elevation  varying  as  much  as  30 
feet  within  a  horizontal  distance  of  50  feet.  These 
depressions  were  evidently  small  valleys  that 
existed  in  this  section  before  the  300-foot  sub- 
mergence referred  to  in  connection  with  the  sub- 
merged old  Chagres  River  gorges.  Evidently  the 
surface  flow  of  the  streams  excavated  these  val- 
leys to  rock  before  the  submergence,  and  after 
the  submergence  they  were  filled  entirely  with  a 
sea  ooze. 

Slides  down  these  various  submerged  valleys 
into  the  north  end  of  the  Gatun  Locks  and  into  the 
excavated  space  for  the  flare  walls  and  guide  walls 
during  construction  constituted  a  most  serious 
bar  to  rapid  and  cheap  prosecution  of  work. 
Slides  at  times  would  flow  around  the  end  of  the 
work  and  into  the  lock  chamber  for  half  its  length. 

PLACING  CONCEETE;  GATUN  LOCKS 

The  main  construction  plant  finally  decided 
upon  for  Gatun  consisted  of  four  traveling  duplex 
cableways  for  placing  concrete  at  any  place  where 
needed  in  the  construction  of  the  locks. 

There  were  two  cableways  spanning  the  lock 
212 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

site  and  connecting  each,  pair  of  towers,  the  towers 
being  equipped  with  railroad  trucks  on  tracks  so 
as  to  permit  their  being  moved  up  or  down  the 
lock  site  for  a  distance  of  nearly  a  mile.  Eight 
two-cubic-yard  concrete  mixers  supplied  the  con- 
crete. All  of  these  mixers  were  in  one  building, 
four  facing  the  east  and  four  the  west  to  facilitate 
the  delivery  of  the  buckets  of  mixed  concrete  to 
the  cableways  by  an  electric  road  which  ran  north 
and  south  under  the  west  end  of  the  cableways. 
The  ordinary  mine  type  of  electric  locomotive  was 
used.  The  material  in  proper  proportions  and 
amounts  for  two  yards  of  concrete  was  brought 
from  storage  and  delivered  into  the  mixers  by  an 
automatic  electric  road.  There  were  a  maximum 
of  forty-two  cars  on  this  road  and  each  car  made 
three  trips  an  hour.  More  than  a  million  tons 
of  material  were  handled  by  this  automatic  road 
in  one  year.  Its  cars,  without  operators,  moved 
around  with  absolute  regularity  and  constituted 
one  of  the  most  insistent  accelerators  on  the  job. 
It  was  up  to  the  mixing  force  to  mix  the  material 
that  they  brought  and  to  the  transporting  force  on 
the  other  electric  railway  to  haul  it  from  the  mix- 
ers, and  to  the  cableways  to  dispose  of  it. 

In  addition  to  the  main  or  principal  construc- 
tion plant  at  Gatun  a  mixer  plant  of  two  two- 
cubic-yard  mixers,  steam-driven,  was  erected  at 
the  south  end  of  the  lock.     This  plant  had  over- 

213 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

head  storage  in  bins  for  rock  and  sand,  wMch 
materials  were  brought  by  regular  railroad  equip- 
ment from  the  main  storage  piles  and  dumped 
into  the  bins.  The  concrete  was  hauled  in  side 
dumping  cars  from  the  mixers  to  its  destination 
by  narrow-gauge  steam  equipment. 

It  was  known  in  the  beginning  that  the  south 
guide  wall  and  flare  walls  of  the  Gatun  Lock  could 
not  be  constructed  by  the  cableways  of  the  main 
construction  plant,  and  this  auxiliary  steam  plant 
was  erected  primarily  for  the  construction  of  such 
walls:  its  use,  however,  spread  far  beyond  this. 
With  it  was  constructed  practically  all  the  floors 
of  the  Gatun  Locks,  dumping  concrete  directly 
from  the  cars.  This  proved  a  very  efficient  and 
economical  way  of  placing  concrete,  and  through 
its  use  the  floors  could  be  prepared  in  advance 
of  the  construction  of  the  lock  walls,  thus  provid- 
ing tracks  for  the  wall  forms  and  facilitating  in 
many  ways  the  construction  of  the  lock  walls. 
Not  only  the  floors  of  the  locks  were  placed  in  this 
way  but  the  foundation  of  the  lock  walls  them- 
selves to  the  level  of  the  floors.  This  part  of  the 
wall  foundation  included  enough  of  the  bottom  of 
the  curve  of  the  18-foot  culvert  to  provide  space 
for  the  track  therein  on  which  rested  trucks  for 
supporting  and  carrying  forms  for  the  construc- 
tion of  the  remainder  of  these  culverts.  These 
forms  could  be  slightly  collapsed  on  the  trucks 

214 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

and  moved  from  monolith  to  monolith  with  great 
ease. 

There  were  more  than  two  million  cubic  yards 
of  concrete  in  the  Gatun  Locks.  No  structure  in 
the  world  contains  as  large  an  amount  of  such 
material.  At  the  time  the  construction  of  these 
locks  was  contemplated  about  1,700  cubic  yards  of 
concrete  per  day,  for  short  periods,  constituted 
the  world's  record.  In  order  to  complete  the 
locks  in  question  within  the  contemplated  time  it 
would  be  necessary  to  practically  double  this  rate 
of  placing  concrete.  This  meant  increasing  the 
number  of  concrete  plants  or  increasing  the  capac- 
ity of  a  central  plant  beyond  anything  attempted 
before. 

The  decision  to  obtain  the  crushed  rock  from 
Porto  Bello  and  the  sand  from  Nombre  de  Dios, 
20  and  40  miles,  respectively,  from  Colon  down 
the  Caribbean  Coast,  and  to  transport  same  in 
barges  across  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  up  the  old 
French  canal  to  the  vicinity  of  Gatun,  largely 
determined  many  features  of  the  plant.  The 
Caribbean  Sea  was  noted  for  storms  during  which 
navigation  would  be  impracticable  and  dangerous. 
The  desire  to  eliminate  all  chance  of  shortage  of 
material,  caused  the  construction  plant  to  provide 
for  large  storage — about  200,000  cubic  yards  of 
stone  and  100,000  cubic  yards  of  sand.  This  ma- 
terial, when  delivered  as  closely  as  practicable  to 

215 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  Gatun  Lock  site,  was  still  1,700  feet  away  and 
60  feet  below  a  centrally  located  mixer  plant.  To 
transport  these  materials  from  the  storage  piles 
to  the  mixer  involved  quite  an  expensive  addition 
to  the  plant,  one  not  ordinarily  necessary. 

The  preliminary  plans  for  the  lock  construction 
plant  at  Gatun,  studied  prior  to  1907,  contem- 
plated unloading  the  sand  and  stone  and  placing 
concrete  by  cableways.  While  the  general  thought 
in  this  layout  was  retained,  duplex  cableways  for 
placing  concrete,  were  substituted  for  single  ones, 
thus  doubling  the  capacity  of  this  part  of  the 
plant.  An  automatic  electric  road  was  substituted 
for  a  cable  road  as  a  means  of  transporting  sand 
and  stone  from  the  storage  piles  to  the  concrete 
mixers. 

The  advisability  of  using  cableways  for  building 
the  locks  was  questioned  by  many.  Their  disad- 
vantages in  placing  concrete  in  contracted  places 
were  known.  It  was  thought,  however,  that  build- 
ing lock  walls,  the  bases  of  which  were  from  50 
to  60  feet  wide,  would  not  be  working  in  contracted 
spaces.  The  width  of  base  of  lock  wall  was  about 
the  same  as  the  width  of  lock  chamber  in  the 
majority  of  such  structures  in  the  rivers  of  the 
United  States.  The  advantages  of  covering  the 
entire  space  in  which  a  structure  is  to  be  erected 
with  overhead  lines  of  delivery  for  any  class  of 
material,  are  many.    The  men  referred  to  this  ad- 

216 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

vantage  as  one  that  gave  them  a  **sky  hook''  over 
all  the  work.  An  overhead  system  keeps  the  space 
in  which  the  work  is  being  carried  on  relatively 
free  of  all  plant,  except  forms.  It  facilitates  the 
delivery  in  the  work  of  all  material,  whether  it  be 
lumber  for  forms,  mixed  concrete,  necessary  iron, 
etc.  Material  trains  in  this  case  ran  on  tracks 
outside  the  excavation  on  the  inside  of  the  cable- 
way  towers,  from  which  position  material  was 
taken  directly  from  the  cars  and  placed  in  posi- 
tion in  the  locks. 

The  decision  of  the  question  as  to  type  of 
plant  where  such  a  great  undertaking  is  involved 
requires  much  thought,  because  its  failure  to  meet 
expectations  means  that  the  entire  construction  is 
materially  delayed.  A  serious  mistake  in  plant 
layout  can  never  be  fully  rectified. 

In  the  solution  of  this  problem  those  in  charge 
of  the  construction  of  the  locks  on  the  Atlantic 
side  reached  different  conclusions  from  those  in 
charge  of  the  construction  of  the  locks  on  the 
Pacific  side.  Of  course  the  topographic  conditions 
were  different;  consequently,  methods  of  doing 
the  work  were  different.  That  the  plants  on  both 
sides  were  the  results  of  careful  study  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  the  cost  of  taking  material  from 
storage,  mixing  it  into  concrete,  and  building  the 
lock  walls,  shows  very  little  variation  as  between 
Gratun,  Pedro  Miguel,  and  Miraflores. 

217 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Prior  to  1907  no  thoughts  had  materialized  into 
plans  for  forms  for  concrete  at  Gatnn.  All  en- 
gineers know  that  no  single  thing  influences  the 
rate  of  concrete  work  as  much  as  forms.  The 
mixing  and  placing  forces  are  always  calling  for 
a  place  to  put  concrete.  To  design  a  system  of 
forms  and  complete  the  plans  for  the  construction 
plant  was,  therefore,  one  of  the  first  duties  of  the 
organization  of  1907. 

It  was  decided  primarily  to  build  the  lock  walls 
in  monoliths  36  feet  long,  i.  e.,  to  complete  the  wall 
for  that  length  from  bottom  to  top  and  design 
forms  that  would  box  in  that  length  of  wall.  This 
decision  led  to  the  adoption  of  duplex  instead  of 
single  cable  ways.  A  tower  carrying  two  cable- 
ways  eighteen  feet  apart  could  be  so  placed  with 
respect  to  a  form  36  feet  long  that  any  concrete 
delivered  would  not  be  more  than  9  feet  from  its 
final  destination.  And  it  was  thought  that  by 
using  wet  concrete  it  would  flow  to  place  and  that 
no  rehandling  would  be  necessary  and  that  a 
monolith  in  each  wall  could  be  built  with  the  cable- 
way  towers  in  one  position.  No  such  massive 
walls  of  concrete  had  been  built  as  those  designed 
for  the  locks  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  the  forms 
at  Gatun  met  this  unusual  and  exacting  condition 
in  a  new  way.  Of  course  the  type  of  construction 
plant  was  also  a  material  factor  in  the  design  of 
forms. 

218 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

The  wall  form  adopted  was  a  steel  box  that 
could  be  knocked  down  and  set  up  easily.  See 
Figure  10.  The  front  of  the  box  was  a  steel  plate 
80  feet  high  and  36  feet  long,  permanently  sup- 
ported by  and  transported  on  a  steel  tower  that 
traveled  on  tracks  on  the  floor  of  the  locks  parallel 
to  the  walls.  The  sides  and  back  of  this  form  were 
made  of  steel  pieces  six  feet  high  and,  when  in 
position,  were  connected  by  bolts  fo  each  other 
and  to  the  front  piece.  The  sides  were  handled 
by  booms  on  the  form  tower  and  the  back  pieces 
by  the  cableway.  Two  such  forms  were  provided 
for  each  cableway,  with  one  form  in  reserve. 
These  forms  could  be  dismantled,  moved  and  set 
up  in  two  days  and  would  contain  about  3,500  cubic 
yards  of  concrete.  It  required  about  a  week  for 
the  cableway  to  fill  one  of  these  forms.  Two 
forms,  therefore,  kept  a  cableway  occupied.  It 
was  recognized  that  if  the  foundations  could  be 
prepared  ahead  and  the  lock  floors  laid  in  ad- 
vance, the  building  of  the  walls  with  these  forms 
would  be  a  continuous  process. 

Collapsible  forms  were  provided  for  all  the  cul- 
verts and  openings  that  were  repeated,  such  as 
the  circular  holes  through  the  floors  into  the  cul- 
verts. All  the  large  culvert  forms  were  on  trucks 
which  could  be  collapsed  and  moved.  See  Figure 
11. 

The  form  system,  with  some  minor  changes, 
219 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

proved  very  efficacious.    In  fact,  the  entire  con- 
struction plant  came  up  to  expectations. 


MOVEMENT    OF    MATEEIALS 

The  point  of  delivery  of  materials  enforced  by 
the  source  of  supply  made  the  problem  of  trans- 
porting this  material  from  storage  to  mixer  an 
expensive  one.  This  was  accomplished  by  devis- 
ing an  automatic  electric  railroad.  Each  car  car- 
ried the  materials  for  two  yards  of  concrete:  its 
cycle  was  under  the  cement  shed,  where  it  re- 
ceived its  charge  of  cement;  then  under  the  sand 
pile  where  a  compartment  was  filled  with  sand; 
then  under  the  stone  pile  where  a  compartment 
was  filled  with  stone.  The  cars  ran  under  all  ma- 
terial and  were  loaded  by  gravity.  After  being 
loaded  each  car  was  started  and  ran  automatically 
to  a  point  over  the  mixers  where  it  was  stopped, 
dumped  and  started  on  a  new  cycle  by  a  workman. 
There  were  no  operators  on  the  cars ;  their  speed 
was  only  four  miles  per  hour  and  they  were 
stopped  and  started  by  men  under  the  cement 
shed  and  under  the  sand  and  stone  piles. 

As  soon  as  the  material  was  mixed  into  concrete 
it  was  dumped  from  the  mixer  into  buckets  hold- 
in  the  entire  batch,  two  cubic  yards.  These 
buckets  rested  on  flat-cars  which  were  hauled  by 
the  electric  railroad  under  the  cable  ways.     The 

220 


V 


GATUN  EXCAVATION  AND  CONCRETE  WORK 

buckets  were  then  taken  up  by  the  cableways,  run 
out  to  the  point  where  the  concrete  was  needed, 
lowered  and  dumped,  and  the  cycle  repeated. 

It  was  recognized  in  the  design  of  the  plant  that 
in  order  to  obtain  speed  and  keep  all  parts  of  the 
construction  going  at  its  full  capacity,  every  oper- 
ation connected  with  the  erection,  moving  and 
reerection  of  forms  must  be  facilitated  in  every 
way.  It  was  also  recognized  that  the  capacity  of 
the  smaller  elements  of  the  plant  should  be 
greater  than  that  of  the  more  important  units, 
such  as  the  duplex  cableways,  so  as  to  be  sure  to 
meet  the  peak  capacity  of  such  units.  This  prin- 
ciple was  followed  in  designing  the  various  forms ; 
it  was  followed  in  the  mixer  building  by  having 
two  two-cubic-yard  mixers  always  in  reserve  and 
kept  in  perfect  repair  so  that  they  could  imme- 
diately take  the  place  of  other  mixers  while  the 
latter  were  being  repaired. 

The  operation  of  such  an  extensive  plant,  many 
parts  of  which  involved  novel  features,  was  natur- 
ally accompanied  by  many  troubles  in  the  begin- 
ning. These  troubles,  however,  were  of  relatively 
short  duration,  and  in  a  few  months  the  plant  was 
working  with  marked  regularity. 

From  June,  1910,  to  June,  1911,  950,000  cubic 
yards  of  concrete  were  placed,  constituting  an 
average  of  about  3,000  cubic  yards  per  working 
day.     The  plant  was  operated  for  twelve  hours 

221 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

per  day  during  the  greater  part  of  the  work,  thus 
taking  advantage  of  all  the  daylight  in  that  tropi- 
cal country. 

The  interest  that  the  entire  force  took  in  the 
operation  of  this  plant  and  their  enthusiasm  when 
it  fully  reached  the  expectation  of  the  designers 
was  marked.'  It  not  only  extended  to  the  entire 
working  force  but  also  to  their  families.  The 
Division  Engineer,  in  walking  to  his  office  in  the 
morning,  would  be  accosted  by  the  children  in 
Gatun  who  would  proudly  inform  him  of  the  num- 
ber of  cubic  yards  of  concrete  that  had  been  placed 
in  the  locks  the  day  before. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

The  Gatun  Dam  has  covered  with  rock  and 
earth  to  a  depth  of  one  hundred  feet  the  site  of 
the  old  village  of  Gatun.  This  village,  thus  erased 
from  the  map,  was  located  between  the  Chagres 
Eiver  and  the  old  French  canal.  It  had  the  ap- 
pearance of  having  been  there  forever  and  of  in- 
tending to  remain  there  forever.  It  was  ideally 
located  for  the  transportation  needs  of  its  in- 
habitants; having  streams  on  both  sides  of  it 
which  provided  mooring  places  for  the  cayuco  or 
*^ dugout,''  the  only  means  of  travel  and  trans- 
portation for  the  villagers  along  the  waterways  in 
the  Republic  of  Panama.  This  village  had  easy 
water  connections  with  the  valleys  of  the  Chagres, 
Trinidad,  and  Gatun  rivers  to  the  south,  and  with 
Colon  and  Cristobal  to  the  north. 

The  great  buccaneer,  Morgan,  afterwards  Gov- 
ernor-General of  Jamaica,  passed  through  this 
place  in  1671,  on  his  way  to  capture  old  Panama. 
The  same  route  was  followed  by  the  **  Forty- 
niners  ' '  on  their  way  to  the  gold  fields  of  Califor- 
nia.    In   fact,  prior  to   the   completion   of  the 

223 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Panama  Railroad,  in  1855,  this  village  was  in  the 
direct  line  of  many  expeditionary  forces  traveling 
from  our  Atlantic  to  our  Pacific  shores,  including 
one  made  by  Lieutenant  V.  S.  Grant.  Two  old 
cannons  were  found  that  had  been  placed  in  a 
position  to  defend  this  reach  of  river. 

Its  inhabitants  could  see  no  reason  for  disturb- 
ing such  an  ideally  located  settlement,  nor  could 
they  see  why  its  site  should  be  utilized  for  the 
construction  of  a  dam,  and  were  consequently 
loath  to  move  their  belongings  to  a  new  site  se- 
lected along  the  Panama  Railroad  east  of  Gatun. 
After  their  property  had  been  purchased  and 
they  had  been  assigned  lots  in  the  new  village  and 
offered  cars  on  which  to  load  the  material  com- 
posing their  houses  they  still  would  not  move. 
They  did  not  believe  in  the  stories  told  as  to  the 
intentions  of  the  Americans,  and  stated  that  the 
French  had  told  them  thirty  years  before  of  im- 
possible things  that  would  happen  in  the  shape  of 
great  locks  and  dams,  and  lakes  that  would  sub- 
merge their  little  homes  along  the  streams.  It 
was  not  until  the  United  States  commenced  to 
actually  dump  material  in  the  toes  of  the  Gatun 
Dam,  as  shown  in  Figure  2,  which  material  even 
rolled  into  and  under  the  houses,  that  they  finally 
realized  the  necessity  of  moving. 

The  Chagres  Valley  was  divided  into  two  parts 
where  it  is  crossed  by  the  Gatun  Dam.      These 

224 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

parts  were  separated  by  a  hill  more  than  one  hun- 
dred feet  high  through  which  the  spillway  channel 
was  excavated.  This  hill  and  that  part  of  the  dam 
site  to  the  west  of  it  was  heavily  wooded.  All  of 
such  woods  had  been  cleared  away  prior  to  the 
spring  of  1907,  but  no  other  work  had  been  done 
toward  the  building  of  the  dam. 

As  indicative  of  the  proximity  of  wild-animal 
life  to  the  habitations  along  the  streams  in 
Panama,  monkeys  chattered  in  protest  as  the  tim- 
ber was  cut  from  Spillway  Hill,  and  the  force  per- 
forming this  work  actually  killed  a  tiger  cat  with 
the  machetes  used  in  making  the  clearing. 

EXPEEIMENTS   AND    TESTS 

While  the  preliminary  explorations  concerning 
the  material  out  of  which  the  Gatun  Dam  was  to 
be  built,  and  that  on  which  it  was  to  rest,  had 
been  sufficient  to  warrant  those  members  of  the 
International  Board  of  Engineers  who  had  recom- 
mended a  lock  canal  to  conclude  that  it  was  prac- 
ticable to  build  a  stable  and  satisfactory  dam 
across  the  Chagres  Valley  at  Gatun,  it  was  decided 
to  continue  these  investigations,  both  as  an  extra 
precaution  and  as  a  matter  of  record.  The  con- 
struction of  the  dam,  however,  did  not  await  the 
completion  of  these  tests,  but  was  carried  on  on 
the  supposition  that  the  original  conclusions  were 

225 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

correct  and  in  accordance  with  the  then  approved 
plans. 

The  experiments  and  investigations  made  for 
the  purpose  of  testing  the  impermeability  of  the 
material  available  for  the  construction  of  the 
Gatun  Dam  consisted  in  building  a  short  length 
of  two  experimental  dams  of  one-twelfth  the  size 
of  that  proposed  for  the  Gatun  Dam.  These  ex- 
perimental dams  were  built  of  the  same  material 
that  was  to  be  used  in  the  Gatun  Dam  and  placed 
by  the  hydraulic  method  in  the  same  way  as  pro- 
posed for  the  Gatun  Dam. 

The  first  of  these  dams  was  built  by  pumping 
all  of  the  material  into  the  downstream  edge  of  the 
dam,  which  of  course  resulted  in  placing  the  finer, 
more  impermeable,  material  on  the  water-face  of 
the  dam. 

In  the  second  experimental  dam  the  material 
was  pumped  from  both  faces,  the  finer  material 
thus  being  segregated  in  the  center. 

Both  of  these  experimental  dams  were  sub- 
jected to  a  head  of  water  corresponding  to  the 
head  that  would  be  against  the  Gatun  Dam  proper. 

Seepage  tests  were  made,  from  which  the  con- 
clusion was  reached  that  a  dam  built  of  either 
type,  utilizing  the  material  available  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  Gatun  Dam,  would  be  relatively 
impermeable. 

Ease  of  construction  ordinarily  determines 
226 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

wlietlier  all  of  sucli  material  shall  be  delivered  at 
one  face  of  the  dam  or  at  both  faces.  It  was 
necessary  in  this  instance  to  build  ridges  of  dry 
material  to  hold  the  hydraulic  material  in  place 
during  consolidation.  In  consequence  of  this  and 
of  the  necessity  of  building  up  these  ridges  as  the 
dam  grew,  hydraulic  material  was  delivered  on 
both  faces  of  the  dam. 

Tests  of  the  material  underlying  the  Gatun  Dam 
were  made  both  by  borings  and  by  test  pits.  Wash 
drill  borings  were  made  in  all  of  the  dam  founda- 
tion, except  Spillway  Hill.  In  these  borings  a  hole 
would  be  washed  down  a  certain  number  of  feet 
and  then  a  sample  taken  of  the  material.  This 
sample  would  be  obtained  by  driving  an  open  pipe 
into  the  material,  such  pipe  hanging  free  within 
the  casing  surrounding  the  hole.  The  pipe  would 
be  filled  with  material  to  the  depth  that  it  was 
driven.  The  hole  would  then  be  washed  four  or 
five  feet  deeper  and  another  drive  sample  taken, 
etc.  All  of  these  samples  were  labeled  and  stored 
away.  The  holes  were  located  generally  over  the 
entire  dam  site.  A  test  pit  was  then  sunk  in  the 
east  half  of  dam  to  a  depth  of  eighty  feet  below 
sea-level.  The  amount  of  pumping  necessary  to 
keep  this  pit  dry  was  a  direct  measure  of  the 
watertightness  of  the  material.  By  comparing  the 
material  actually  encountered  at  the  various 
depths  in  this  pit  with  the  drive  samples  at  the 

227 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

same  depths,  obtained  in  the  many  holes,  an  accu- 
rate conclusion  could  be  drawn  as  to  the  character 
of  the  material  generally  existing  under  the  dam. 

From  these  tests  the  conclusion  was  drawn  that 
the  material  underlying  the  Gatun  Dam  was  rela- 
tively impermeable.  The  work  of  building  the 
dam  was  continued  during  the  time  of  these  tests 
in  accordance  with  an  approved  plan. 

Coincident  with  the  tests,  careful  examinations 
were  made  of  all  the  saddles  or  low  places  in  the 
ridges  surrounding  Gatun  Lake  that  approxi- 
mated the  same  height  as  the  lake  level.  Holes 
were  drilled  in  all  of  these  saddles  in  order  to 
determine  the  character  of  the  material,  its  water- 
tightness  and  general  suitability  to  form  a  por- 
tion of  the  rim  of  the  lake.  An  accurate  contour 
survey  of  the  lake  bed  had  been  made  in  the  begin- 
ning, the  contours  extending  to  fifteen  feet  above 
the  proposed  lake  level. 

In  April,  1907,  one  steam-shovel  commenced 
grading  for  a  pilot  or  preliminary  track  along  the 
axis  of  the  spillway  cut.  This  shovel  was  trans- 
ferred to  the  site  by  a  barge.  In  June  work  was 
commenced  driving  a  trestle  along  the  30-foot  con- 
tour on  the  north  face  of  the  dam. 

An  examination  of  Diagram  6  will  show  that 
the  waters  of  the  Chagres  at  this  time  were  pass- 
ing the  site  of  the  Gatun  Dam  through  three  chan- 
nels; the  old  bed  of  the  Chagres  Eiver,  the  old 

228 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

French  canal,  and  tlie  west  diversion  channel  dug 
by  the  French  west  of  Spillway  Hill  to  divert  the 
Chagres  from  the  then  proposed  canal.  These 
channels  are  shown  by  dotted  lines  in  the  figure. 
The  Gatun  Dam  is  8,200  feet  long  and  is  made 
up  of  three  parts — an  earthen  dam,  connecting 
the  locks  with  Spillway  Hill ;  a  concrete  dam  with 


GATUN  DAM 

SPILLWAY  AND  LOCKS 


DIAGRAM  6 


regulation  works  across  the  channel  in  Spillway 
Hill,  and  an  earthen  dam  from  Spillway  Hill  to 
the  high  ground  bounding  the  west  side  of  the 
Chagres  Valley. 

The  plan  of  procedure  determined  upon  was, 
first  to  build  a  dam  across  the  Chagres  Eiver 
proper  and  one  across  the  old  French  canal,  thus 
diverting  all  the  flow  of  the  Chagres  into  the 
channel  west  of  Spillway  Hill.  These  operations 
would  remove  all  water  difficulties  from  that  half 

229 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

of  the  dam  east  of  Spillway  Hill  and  enable  work 
of  dam  construction  to  be  started  in  that  part. 
The  next  step  was  to  cut  a  channel  three  hundred 
feet  wide  through  Spillway  Hill  into  which  chan- 
nel, when  completed,  the  entire  flow  of  the  Cha- 
gres  was  to  be  diverted.  With  this  completed, 
the  west  half  of  the  dam  was  to  be  built.  After 
the  earthen  parts  of  the  dam  were  completed  the 
step  next  planned  was  to  build  a  dam  with  regula- 
tion works  across  the  south  end  of  the  spillway 
channel  passing  the  Chagres  through  temporary 
culverts  during  such  construction. 

No  serious  difficulties  were  encountered  in  build- 
ing the  dams  across  the  Chagres  channel  and  the 
old  French  canal.  The  river  had  an  outlet  through 
the  west  diversion  channel  while  this  work  was 
being  done  and  the  water  surface  of  the  Chagres 
was  not  materially  raised  while  the  dams  were 
being  built. 

In  forcing  the  Chagres  from  the  west  diversion 
channel  into  the  spillway  channel  many  difficulties 
were  encountered.  The  bottom  of  the  spillway 
channel  was  constructed  at  an  elevation  of  10 
feet  above  sea-level  and  the  bottom  of  the  west 
diversion  channel  was  about  20  feet  below  sea- 
level.  The  effect  of  the  tides  was  felt  in  the  Cha- 
gres Eiver  for  about  ten  miles  above  Gatun.  In 
order  to  force  the  river  through  the  channel  exca- 
vated for  the  spillway  it  was  necessary  to  bar  the 

230 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

passage  of  the  river  through  the  west  diversion. 
During  the  construction  of  the  dams  necessary  for 
accomplishing-  this,  the  river  would  have  no  outlet 
until  it  had  risen  ten  feet,  at  which  stage  it  would 
commence  to  flow  through  the  spillway  channel. 
Its  entire  discharge  could  not,  however,  be  thus 
accommodated  until  it  had  risen  14  feet. ' 

The  sides  and  bottom  of  the  west  diversion 
channel  were  mud  for  depths  of  about  200  feet, 
its  location  being  over  the  old  geological  gorge  to 
the  west  of  Spillway  Hill.  In  making  the  diver- 
sion in  question  it  was  decided  to  build  two  dams 
across  the  channel  simultaneously,  one  on  the  30- 
foot  contour  on  the  north  face  of  Gatun  Dam  and 
one  on  the  30-foot  contour  on  the  south  face. 

The  reason  for  attempting  to  build  the  two 
dams  at  once  was  the  hope  that  during  construc- 
tion the  head  of  water  that  would  result  from  the 
rising  river  would  be  divided  between  the  two 
dams;  that  is,  should  the  river  rise,  say,  6  feet, 
there  would  be  a  fall  of  3  feet  at  the  upper  dam 
and  3  feet  at  the  lower.  The  diversion  dams  were 
to  be  encompassed  by  the  main  dam  when  built. 

An  unlimited  amount  of  rock  spoil  from  the 
Culebra  Cut  was  available  for  the  construction  of 
these  diversion  dams. 

The  first  step  in  the  construction  was  to  drive 
trestles  across  the  stream  at  the  selected  location 
and  to  try  to  build  the  dams  by  dumping  rock  from 

231 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

the  trestles  directly  into  the  stream.  Eock  was 
at  first  dumped  next  to  the  banks  for  purposes  of 
protecting  the  same.  Then  the  fill  was  gradually 
worked  out  into  the  river.  As  soon  as  the  flow 
had  been  contracted  sufficiently  to  develop  a 
strong  current,  medium-size  stone  was  dumped 
for  the  full  length  of  the  trestle,  expecting  that 
the  current  would  distribute  such  stone  down- 
stream, forming  an  apron  below  the  dam.  After 
this  had  been  continued  for  some  time  an  attempt 
was  made  to  complete  the  dams  for  their  entire 
length  by  increasing  the  rate  of  dumping  stone. 
When  the  stream  had  been  contracted  until  the 
channels  through  the  dams  were  about  80  feet 
wide  and  6  feet  deep,  the  force  of  the  water  was 
such  that  all  stone  would  be  carried  downstream ; 
none  of  the  pieces  seemed  big  enough  to  stand  the 
current. 

The  original  plan  was  to  make  this  diversion  in 
the  dry  season,  but  the  excavation  in  the  spillway 
channel  had  been  delayed  for  a  month  or  more 
the  previous  wet  season,  on  account  of  the  Cha- 
gres  washing  the  barriers  away  during  a  flood 
and  occupying  the  incompleted  channel,  and  the 
diversion  could  not  be  attempted  until  the  latter 
part  of  April  when  the  rains  were  commencing, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  make  the  closure  quickly, 
otherwise  it  could  not  be  done  until  the  next  dry 
season.     It  was  therefore  decided  to  dump  car- 

232 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

loads  of  crooked  rails  into  the  river  above  the 
trestles,  the  piles  of  the  trestles  being  well  sup- 
ported by  the  stone  previously  dumped.  It  was 
thought  that  these  crooked  rails  would  form  an 
entanglement  that  would  stop  the  stone  on  the 
upstream  side  of  the  trestle  and  this  would  result 
in  either  closing  the  river  or  tearing  out  the  tres- 
tle. A  large  number  of  trainloads  of  rock  were 
gathered  together  so  that  the  process  of  dump- 
ing could  be  made  continuous  after  the  rails  were 
placed.  This  process  was  successful  and  resulted 
in  building  the  diversion  dams  above  water.  One 
of  the  trestles  cracked  and  moved  downstream  a 
few  inches,  but  not  enough  to  prevent  its  use  after 
minor  repairs  had  been  made. 

After  the  flow  of  the  river  was  completely 
stopped  these  two  dams  were  raised  to  the  top  of 
the  trestles  and  widened,  with  a  view  to  making 
them  secure,  and  the  Chagres  River  had  com- 
menced to  flow  through  the  spillway  channel.  Be- 
fore attempting  to  build  these  dams  levees  had 
been  built  across  the  valley  which,  with  the  dams, 
would  make  a  continuous  barrier. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  space  between 
these  two  diversion  dams  constituted  the  site  of 
the  Gatun  Dam  proper. 

In  order  that  this  site  should  be  free  from  wa- 
ter, 20-inch  pipes  were  laid  through  the  levee  that 
formed  an  extension  of  the  diversion  dam  on  the 

233 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

north  face,  the  object  being  to  drain  off  any  water 
that  seeped  through  the  dam  on  the  south  face. 

The  second  day  after  the  completion  of  the  two 
diversion  dams  a  settlement  occurred  in  this  levee 
that  mashed  the  drain  pipes  and  stopped  the  flow 
of  water  through  them.  When  the  space  between 
the  two  diversion  dams  was  partially  filled  with 
water  the  north  dam  moved  leisurely  downstream 
and  spread  itself  out  in  the  bottom  of  the  west 
diversion.  Piles  that  had  30-  or  40-feet  penetra- 
tion moved  downstream  vertically.  See  Figure 
12. 

Thus  one  of  the  dams  for  diverting  the  Chagres 
passed  away,  and  the  sudden  release  of  water 
caused  the  bank  against  which  the  other  dam 
abutted  to  slide  into  the  river.  This  slide  was 
of  such  an  extent  as  to  break  nearly  through  the 
levee  joining  the  dam,  a  lip  of  earth  about  3  feet 
wide  being  the  only  barrier  left  that  kept  the 
Chagres  from  resuming  her  old  course.  Trains 
were  immediately  run  out  onto  the  trestle  and  an 
attempt  made  to  rebuild  the  levee  through  this 
slide;  about  30,000  cubic  yards  of  rock  were 
dumped  into  the  area.  Immediately  after  the 
completion  of  this  fill  this  entire  body  of  rock  slid 
out  into  the  river  and  cracked  the  small  lip  of 
earth  yet  standing  as  a  barrier,  and  it  looked  as 
if  the  Chagres  Eiver  were  the  victor.  It  was 
thought  that  if  an  attempt  were  made  to  dump  any 

234 


Fig.  12. — Remains  of  the  North  Diversion  Dam,  Gatun  Dam. 


Fig.  13. — Slipping  of  the  South  Toe  of  Gatun  Dam,  Top  View, 
November  21,  1908. 


n 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

more  rock  into  this  sliding  area  it  might  precipi- 
tate a  slide  that  would  break  entirely  through  the 
levee  and  open  a  route  for  the  river.  The  rising 
river  had  formed,  at  this  time,  a  lake  with  an 
elevation  of  14  feet  above  sea. 

It  was  then  decided  to  utilize  two  suction 
dredges,  bought  for  the  purpose  of  building  the 
Gatun  Dam,  in  raising  the  lake  bed  just  above 
the  weak  place,  and  to  trust  that  nothing  would 
happen  while  this  was  being  done.  These  two 
dredges,  pumping  material  from  some  distance 
away,  gradually  filled  up  the  lake  bed  with  clay 
and  sand  until  an  island  about  three-fourths  of  an 
acre  in  area  was  formed  immediately  above  the 
threatened  place.  This  gave  a  factor  of  safety. 
Should  the  slide  break  farther  back  toward  the 
lake  there  would  still  be  ground  out  of  water  that 
would  bar  the  passage  of  the  Chagres  and  form 
a  footing  for  protective  operations. 

It  was  not  long  after  this  fill  was  made  before 
the  repairs  to  south  dam  were  completed  and 
the  north  diversion  dam  rebuilt  to  its  full  height. 
New  drainage  pipes  were  inserted  under  the  levee. 
The  Chagres  was  now  permanently  diverted  into 
the  spillway  channel  where  man's  control  over  her 
became  more  and  more  complete.  Now  her  wa- 
ters are  sent  to  the  sea  when  man  wills  and  in 
such  quantities  as  man  elects. 

This  diversion  eliminated  all  further  trouble 
235 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

with  the  Ghagres  in  so  far  as  the  construction  of 
the  earthen  parts  of  Gatun  Dam  were  concerned. 

The  first  operation  in  building  the  earthen  parts 
of  the  dam  was  to  drive  a  pile  trestle  along  the 
30-foot  contours  on  each  slope  of  the  dam  and 
then  to  dump  rock  from  cars  run  out  on  the  tres- 
tles. This  operation  was  continued  until  ridges 
were  formed  entirely  across  that  part  of  the  valley 
to  be  occupied  by  the  dam.  When  this  ridge 
reached  the  height  of  the  trestle  the  dumping 
track  was  thrown  onto  the  fill  and  the  rock  slopes 
shown  on  the  section  made  by  dumping  directly 
from  cars. 

Before,  and  while  this  was  being  done,  dredges 
were  at  work  cleaning  out  that  portion  of  the  beds 
of  the  streams  that  would  be  covered  by  the  dam. 
It  was  feared  that  there  were  layers  of  old  logs 
in  the  beds  of  the  streams  that  might  make  a  leak- 
age plane  under  the  dam.  All  the  stumps  on  the 
dam  site  were  blasted  and  removed  and  steam- 
shovels  were  set  to  work  removing  the  surface  of 
the  ground  to  a  depth  of  two  or  three  feet  between 
the  rock  ridges  or  toes.  The  object  of  this  last 
operation  was  to  remove  all  roots  and  vegetable 
matter  that  might  ultimately  form  a  porous  layer. 
When  these  operations  were  finished  a  cut  20  feet 
wide  and  about  10  feet  deep  along  the  axis  of  the 
dam  was  made  by  a  steam-shovel,  and  the  re- 
maining surface  for  400  feet  on  either  side  of  the 

236 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

axis  was  either  plowed  or  picked  so  that  a  good 
bond  or  watertight  connection  would  be  made 
between  the  material  placed  in  building  the  cen- 
tral part  of  the  dam  and  the  material  on  which  it 
rested.  The  central  or  watertight  part  of  the 
dam — that  part  between  the  rock  toes — ^was  com- 
posed of  a  mixture  of  sand  and  clay  and  was 
pumped  into  place  by  suction  dredges. 

The  rock  fill  on  the  south  side  of  the  east  half 
of  the  dam  was  to  be  carried  to  an  elevation  of  60 
feet  above  sea-level  before  placing  any  of  the 
hydraulic  fill,  except  in  the  stream  beds.  It  was 
with  difficulty  that  this  stone  fill  was  brought  to 
the  required  height,  especially  where  it  crossed 
the  bed  of  the  old  French  canal. 

Five  quite  serious  slides  were  encountered  at 
this  place,  the  effect  of  which  was  to  carry  the 
rock  toward  the  axis  of  the  dam.  See  Figure  13. 
This  resulted  in  a  decision  to  construct  a  bench  at 
an  elevation  of  25  feet  above  sea.  With  the  in- 
creased width  of  base  thus  provided  it  was  found 
practicable  to  carry  the  fill  to  proper  elevation. 
This  operation  accounts  for  the  unusual  shape  of 
the  rock  fill  shown  in  section  on  Diagram  4.  After 
this  toe  or  ridge  was  brought  to  full  height  on 
the  south  face  and  that  on  the  north  face  to  30 
feet  above  sea-level,  dredges  were  started  pump- 
ing material  into  the  dam  between  these  ridges. 

About  this  time  a  slide  occurred  in  the  Necaxa 
237 


n. 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Dam,  Mexico,  which  was  then  under  construction. 
The  reports  indicated  that  the  slide  was  caused 
by  fluid  pressure  in  the  center  of  the  dam,  the 
component  material  not  having  consolidated. 
This  pressure  shoved  out  the  toes  or  ridges  im- 
pounding the  soft  material.  In  consequence  of 
this  information  it  was  decided  to  increase  the 
section  of  the  dry  fill  forming  the  toes  of  the  Ga- 
tun  Dam  so  that  it  could  better  resist  pressure 
exerted  by  semi-fluid  material  in  the  center  of  the 
dam.  Diagram  4  shows  the  relative  amount  of  dry 
fill  and  hydraulic  fill,  determined  by  borings  made 
when  the  dam  was  nearing  completion. 

After  the  original  toes  were  constructed  the 
rate  of  placing  wet  and  dry  fill  thereafter  de- 
pended upon  the  relative  capacities  of  the  dredges 
and  the  railroad  transportation  equipment  avail- 
able for  dam  building. 

The  dry  fill  for  this  dam  was  obtained  from  sev- 
eral sources:  in  the  beginning  a  large  portion  of 
the  excavated  material  from  the  site  of  the  Gatun 
Locks  and  from  the  cut  at  Mindi  was  so  utilized ; 
in  addition  practically  all  of  the  material  removed 
in  excavating  the  spillway  channel  was  placed  in 
the  dam.  For  one  entire  year  practically  all  of 
the  dry  fill  placed  in  Gatun  Dam  was  waste  mate- 
rial hauled  from  the  Culebra  Cut,  After  the  old 
line  of  the  Panama  Eailroad  was  flooded  by  the 
rising   waters    of    Gatun    Lake,  a    quarry   was 

238 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

opened  on  the  west  end  of  the  dam  and  material 
excavated  solely  for  the  dam.  Kail  connection 
with  the  dam  was  then  difficult  and,  furthermore, 
the  single-tracked  relocated  line  of  the  Panama 
Eailroad  could  not  well  stand  an  extensive  addi- 
tion to  its  traffic. 

As  the  dam  increased  in  height  the  dry  fill  over- 
lapped the  wet  fill  and  compressed  it,  often  slid- 
ing out  into  it.  An  effort  was  made  to  keep  the 
dry  fill  10  to  15  feet  higher  than  the  wet  fill.  It 
was  thought  that  the  weight  of  this  material  with 
the  added  weight  of  trains  running  over  it  would 
either  compact  the  underlying  hydraulic  mate- 
rial or  force  it  to  the  center,  where  that  part  of 
it  that  would  not  consolidate  could  be  taken  off 
through  the  drain  pipes.  ^ 

The  pipe-line  suction  dredges  utilized  in  build- 
ing the  central  portion  of  the  dam  pumped  seven 
or  eight  times  as  much  water  as  they  did  solid 
material.  In  building  a  dam  in  this  manner  it  is 
necessary  to  make  provision  for  carrying  off  the 
surplus  water  after  it  has  deposited  its  burden 
of  solid  matter;  otherwise,  the  pond  or  lake  be- 
tween the  rock  ridges  would  fill  and  overflow. 

In  this  dam  the  surplus  water  was  drained  off 
through  20-inch  pipes,  entering  the  dam  gener- 
ally from  the  north  face  and  extending  to  that 
edge  of  the  pond  farthest  removed  from  the  lake 
face  of  the  dam.    These  pipes  entered  the  dam 

239 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

in  trendies  dug  into  or  down  to  tlie  rock.  An  el- 
bow was  placed  on  the  end  of  the  pipe  and  ver- 
tical lengths  of  2J  feet  were  added  as  the  dam 
increased  in  height.  A  drainage  system  of  this 
type  once  established  could  be  utilized  for  the 
entire  construction.  The  facility  of  adding  short 
lengths  to  the  vertical  part  of  the  pipe  gave  the 
builders  complete  control  as  to  depth  of  the  pond 
into  which  the  dredges  were  discharging.  If  the 
character  of  the  material  being  delivered  was  such 
as  to  make  it  desirable  to  retain  practically  all  of 
it  in  the  dam,  the  water  in  the  pond  would  be  in- 
creased in  depth.  If  the  material  contained  too 
large  a  proportion  of  unctuous  clay,  the  pond 
would  be  lowered  and  that  part  of  the  material 
wasted  which  would  not  consolidate  quickly. 

The  material  available  for  the  construction  of 
the  Gatun  Dam  contained  too  large  a  proportion 
of  clay  for  quick  or  proper  consolidation;  conse- 
quently a  large  proportion  of  it  was  wasted 
through  the  drain  pipes.  This  not  only  increased 
the  cost  but  added  many  construction  difficulties. 

A  remarkable  incident  occurred  in  connection 
with  the  drain  pipes  during  the  construction  of 
the  dam.  These  pipes  were  20  inches  in  diam- 
eter; the  entrance  to  them  was  protected  by  a 
screen  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  out  any  float- 
ing chunks  or  pieces  of  timber.  It  was  necessary 
occasionally  to  clean  these  screens.     On  one  oc- 

240 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

casion,  when  the  hydraulic  fill  had  reached  an 
elevation  of  30  feet  above  sea-level,  three  Jamaica 
negroes  were  cleaning  the  screens  and  in  doing 
so  had  removed  the  screen  from  one  of  the  pipes. 
One  of  the  Jamaicans  accidentally  fell  into  the 
pipe,  head  first;  the  other  two  canght  him  and 
tried  to  pull  him  out,  but  the  force  of  water  under 
a  30-foot  head  was  too  much  and  they  let  him  go. 
This  pipe  extended  down  vertically  for  about  30 
feet,  then  turned  at  a  right  angle  and  extended 
about  300  feet  horizontally  to  its  outlet  at  sea- 
level.  These  two  Jamaicans,  as  soon  as  they  had 
released  their  hold  on  the  man  in  the  pipe,  ran  at 
full  speed  to  the  outlet  of  the  pipe  and,  on  reach- 
ing there,  found  their  companion  out  of  the  water 
and  uninjured,  except  for  one  of  his  ears  which 
had  been  torn  slightly  in  making  the  turn  in  the 
20-inch  pipe. 

After  the  Chagres  River  was  under  control  no 
unexpected  circumstances  happened  in  connection 
with  the  construction  of  the  Gatun  Dam  until  its 
full  height  was  approximately  reached,  except  the 
slides  into  the  old  French  canal  during  the  con- 
struction of  the  rock  toe  on  the  south  face.  There 
were  of  course  many  local  slides  toward  the  cen- 
ter of  the  dam  involving  relatively  small  areas. 
These  slides  were  due  to  the  inability  of  the  hy- 
draulic fill  to  support  the  overlapping  dry  fill. 
On  many  occasions  these   slides  carried  loaded 

241 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

cars  with  them  into  the  wet  fill.  The  disarrange- 
ment of  tracks  on  account  of  local  settlement  and 
sjides  was  almost  a  daily  occurrence.  The  con- 
solidation of  the  wet  fill  in  this  manner  was  con- 
sidered a  necessary  step  in  the  dam  construction 
and  the  risks  taken  and  troubles  encountered  were 
considered  a  part  of  the  operations  incident  to 
the  proper  consolidation  of  the  dam. 

A  foreman  on  the  job,  however,  after  his  tracks 
and  cars  had  slid  into  the  hydraulic  fill,  forcing 
him  to  build  new  tracks  and  send  for  a  wrecker 
to  recover  his  cars,  could  not  appreciate  the  state- 
ment that  such  slides  were  a  necessary  part  of 
the  dam  construction  and  made  the  dam  more 
stable.    See  Figures  14,  15  and  16. 

UNEXPECTED   SLIDES   IN   THE   DAM 

When  that  part  of  the  dam  between  the  locks 
and  Spillway  Hill  was  nearing  its  final  height  a 
settlement  of  from  10  to  15  feet  occurred  at  the 
crest  of  the  dam  for  a  length  of  about  1,000  feet, 
the  slopes  on  both  sides  moving  out  and  lifting 
slightly.  This  was  the  first  slide  from  the  center 
of  the  dam  toward  its  edges. 

Observation  points  had  previously  been  estab- 
lished on  the  various  contours  of  both  faces  of 
the  dam  for  the  purpose  of  measuring  settlement 
or  any  lateral  motion.     During  this  slide  a  lat- 

242 


.- 

^■flf 

^ 

i^jjK 

i  i^^0% 

W 

P^fex^^^^^^^S 

W-  ju 

Fig.  14. — Slides  Into  Wet  Fill,  Gatun  Dam. 


Fig.  15. — Slides  Into  Hydraulic  Fill,  Gatun  Dam. 


'\f 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

eral  movement  of  over  15  feet  occurred  in  the 
center  of  the  moving  mass;  on  the  60-foot  con- 
tour north  face,  accompanied  an  uplift  of  about 
IJ  feet.  This  lateral  movement  extended  beyond 
the  30-foot  contour.  The  north  slope  of  the  dam 
was  being  built  at  that  time  with  a  slope  of  1  ver- 
tical to  16  horizontal  from  the  30-foot  to  the  60- 
foot  contour,  and  with  a  slope  of  1  vertical  to  8 
horizontal  from  the  60  to  the  90-foot  contours. 
The  extent  of  the  movement  in  this  case  caused 
those  in  charge  of  the  work  to  tentatively  con- 
clude that  it  had  its  origin  in,  or  at  least  in- 
volved, the  material  underlying  the  dam;  this 
opinion  was  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  there 
was  a  lateral  movement  of  more  than  5  feet  in 
a  portion  of  the  south  face  of  the  dam  under 
which  there  was  no  hydraulic  fill.  This  thought 
was  still  further  supported  by  the  fact  that  a 
pile  bridge,  entirely  outside  the  dam  crossing  the 
spillway  cut,  was  squeezed  until  its  length  was 
decreased  by  7  inches. 

Thorough  investigations  were  therefore  started 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  cause  of  this 
extensive  slide.  A  line  of  borings  was  made 
through  the  part  of  the  dam  involved  in  this  slide. 
The  holes  were  cased  throughout  with  2|-inch 
pipe  and  extended  down  to  the  underlying  rock. 
Drive  samples  of  the  material  encountered  in 
these  holes  were  taken  at  5-foot  intervals,  both 

243 


V 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

in  the  dam  and  under  it.  Tests  were  made,  at 
same  intervals,  of  the  compactness  or  bearing 
capacity  of  the  material  throughout  the  entire 
depth  of  hole.  An  open-ended  pipe,  hanging  free 
in  the  casing,  was  driven  into  the  material,  using 
a  100-foot  weight  falling  3  feet,  and  a  record  kept 
of  the  number  of  blows  necessary  to  drive  the 
pipe  a  certain  distance  into  the  underlying  ma- 
terial. The  dirt,  forced  up  in  the  pipe  was  exam- 
ined. All  samples  so  obtained  were  labeled  and 
stored.  In  this  way  the  character  and  bearing 
capacity  of  the  material  composing  the  various 
layers  of  the  dam  could  be  compared  with  the 
layers  of  material  underlying  the  dam  and  a  con- 
clusion reached  as  to  the  material  most  likely  to 
move  under  pressure.  A  compilation  of  these 
tests  showed  that  the  material  under  the  dam  was 
softer  than  that  which  composed  the  dam  after 
the  latter  had  had  a  reasonable  time  to  consoli- 
date. This  corroborated  further  the  thought  that 
this  extensive  slide  had  its  origin  in  the  founda- 
tion material  of  the  Gatun  Dam. 

In  the  construction  of  dams  on  soft  founda- 
tions, slides  occurring  about  the  time  the  loads 
are  at  a  maximum  are  of  unusual  value.  They 
show  the  loads  under  which  slides  can  be  expected 
under  similar  circumstances.  A  widening  of  the 
base  thereafter  gives  a  factor  of  safety,  concern- 
ing the  value  of  which  one  can  at  least  form  an 

244 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

opinion.  If  an  engineer  knows  just  when  a  struc- 
ture reaches  an  unstable  state,  he  knows  that  all 
additional  strengthening  makes  for  safety. 

After  this  slide  steps  were  immediately  taken 
to  flatten  the  slope  on  the  north  face  of  the  dam 
and  make  it  uniform  from  top  to  bottom. 

The  swamp  area  north  of  this  part  of  the  dam 
was  raised  so  as  to  counterbalance,  by  additional 
weight,  any  pressure  that  might  be  transmitted 
to  it,  and  the  slope  on  the  south  side  toward  the 
spillway  cut  was  flattened. 

These  changes  in  the  slopes  of  the  dam  made 
them  conform  to  the  section  shown  in  Diagram  4. 
No  further  sliding  occurred  in  this  part  of  the 
Gatun  Dam.  , 

In  that  portion  of  the  west  half  of  the  dam 
that  overlapped  some  low  ridges  jutting  from 
the  main  hills  out  into  the  dam,  a  steeper  slope 
was  adopted — a  slope  of  1  vertical  to  5  horizontal. 
See  Diagram  6.  It  was  thought  that  the  underly- 
ing material  would  certainly  carry  safely  the  load 
and  that  the  hydraulic  fill  itself  could  be  built 
to  that  slope  if  properly  supported  at  the  toes. 
This,  however,  did  not  prove  to  be  the  case,  and 
a  slide  did  occur  on  the  south  face  of  this  portion 
of  the  dam,  which  slide  was  accompanied  by  a 
bulging-up  of  the  lake  bottom  south  of  the  dam, 
which  indicated  movement  for  a  considerable  dis- 
tance in  undisturbed  material.    It  was  concluded 

245 


\r 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

that  this  slide  originated  in  the  clay  covering  of 
the  hillside  and  was  brought  about  by  the  in- 
creased load  placed  upon  it.  The  material  in  the 
flat  country  abutting  the  foot  of  this  hill  was  very 
soft  and,  consequently,  had  very  little  lateral  re- 
sistance. As  a  result  of  this  slide  the  slope  in 
this  part  of  the  dam  was  changed  from  1  vertical 
on  5  horizontal  to  1  vertical  on  8  horizontal  and, 
in  addition,  the  ground  south  of  the  dam  on  that 
face  was  raised  by  means  of  suction  dredges  so 
as  to  counterbalance  the  pressure  from  the  hill- 
side above.  The  slope  previously  adopted  for  the 
north  face  of  this  part  of  the  dam  was  the  same 
as  that  on  the  south  face  and,  after  the  slide  on 
the  south  face,  it  was  determined  to  flatten  the 
slope  on  the  north  face  also. 

This  work,  however,  had  only  been  started 
when,  on  August  28,  1912,  a  settlement  of  about 
20  feet  occurred  along  the  crest  of  the  dam  for  a 
length  of  about  800  feet.  This  settlement  was 
accompanied  by  a  lateral  movement  from  the  cen- 
ter out,  that  affected  the  entire  face  of  the  dam, 
bulging  up  the  material  north  of  it.  There  was 
no  movement  on  the  corresponding  part  of  the 
south  face,  the  slope  of  which  had  been  previously 
flattened.  The  dam  at  this  time  was  nearing  its 
full  height.  A  lateral  movement  of  about  20  feet 
on  the  30-foot  contour  was  recorded. 

In  the  earlier  period  of  construction  on  this 
246 


Fig.  16. — Removing  Cars  From  Wet  Fill,  Gatun  Dam. 


Fig.   17. — Spillway  Channel  During  Construction,  Gatun, 
Canal  Zone. 


V- 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

portion  of  the  dam,  all  the  dredges  had  been  con- 
centrated in  the  west  half  of  the  dam  in  order  to 
bring  it  above  any  expected  flood  during  a  rainy 
season  that  was  approaching.  The  dry  fill  in  this 
part  was  consequently  relatively  less  in  amount 
than  in  other  parts  of  the  dam.  After  investi- 
gations, similar  to  those  made  on  the  eastern 
half  of  the  dam,  it  was  concluded  that  the  most 
probable  cause  of  this  slide  was  the  pressure  due 
to  the  soft  material  in  the  center  of  the  dam.  The 
dry  fill  was  immediately  widened  and  other  steps 
taken  to  flatten  the  slope  on  this  fa^e  from  1  ver- 
tical on  5  horizontal  to  1  vertical  on  8  horizon- 
tal. After  this  was  accomplished  the  dam  was 
successfully  brought  to  its  full  height.  A  grad- 
ual settlement,  however,  of  the  dam  along  its  axis 
continued. 

After  the  completion  of  the  dam  similar  ex- 
plorations to  those  described  above  were  carried 
out  along  its  axis  for  its  entire  length.  The  rec- 
ords of  these  tests  show  a  gradual  consolidation 
both  in  the  hydraulic  fill  and  in  the  material  un- 
derlying the  dam,  the  entire  mass  during  this 
process  continually  becoming  more  compact  and 
more  stable. 

These  explorations  also  showed  that  the  orig- 
inal surface  of  the  ground  under  the  dam  was  in 
places  from  15  to  20  feet  lower  than  its  original 
position,  which  indicated  a  marked  compacting 

247 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

and  consequent  improvement  in  its  bearing  ca- 
pacity. 

Practically  all  the  difficulties  connected  with  a 
hydraulically  filled  dam  occur  during  the  period 
of  construction  when  the  material  is  largely  in 
solution  and  before  it  has  had  time  to  drain  and 
consolidate. 

If  such  a  dam  can  be  built — and  it  can  be  if  the 
slopes  be  made  flat  enough — its  stability  will  grad- 
ually increase  with  time.  It  may  be  necessary  to 
bring  the  crest  to  grade  occasionally  as  the  ma- 
terial  in  and  under  the  dam  consolidates  and  con- 
tracts. 

The  Gatun  Lake  has  been  filled  to  its  full 
height,  placing  against  the  dam  its  greatest  pres- 
sure without  the  slightest  indication  of  any  weak- 
ness. The  physical  condition  of  the  dam  will  con- 
tinue to  improve  with  time  and  its  factor  of  safe- 
ty continually  increase. 

There  is  probably  no  type  of  dam  that  could 
stand  any  unusual  disturbance,  such  as  earth- 
quake tremors,  as  well  as  an  earth  dam  with  such 
flat  slopes  as  those  employed  on  the  Gatun  Dam. 

In  building  this  dam  the  dredges,  with  two  re- 
lay pumps,  forced  material  through  two  miles  of 
pipe,  lifting  such  material  one  hundred  feet.  The 
necessity  of  this  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  ma- 
terial in  the  east  side  of  the  valley  had  a  larger 
proportion  of  sand  than  that  in  the  west  and,  con- 

248 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  GATUN  DAM 

sequently,  would  drain  and  consolidate  more 
quickly. 

This  method  of  making  a  hydraulic  fill  was  in 
many  respects  unusual,  concerning  which  the  de- 
tails are  too  technical  for  a  general  description 
such  as  this. 

In  general,  the  electrically  driven  relay  pumps 
were  so  placed  as  to  distribute  the  work  between 
themselves  and  the  pump  on  the  dredge.  The 
relays  were  placed  essentially  in  the  delivery  line. 
A  pipe-line  dredge  requires  next  to  it  a  certain 
length  of  flexible  pipe  line  in  order  that  she  may 
swing  freely  in  making  her  cut.  This  part  of  the 
line  is  expensive  on  account  of  the  rubber  sleeves 
jointing  the  sections  of  pipes. 

In  this  work  trestles  were  driven  in  the  water 
as  a  support  for  a  fixed  line  for  as  great  a  por- 
tion of  the  distance  from  the  dredge  to  the  shore, 
as  possible,  thus  reducing  to  a  minimum  the  ex- 
pensive floating  pipe  line.  The  point  of  discharge 
of  the  material  into  the  dam  was  changed  from 
time  to  time  so  as  to  insure  a  proper  mixture. 


CHAPTER  XV 

GATUN  LAKE 
SPILLWAY  DAM  AND  CHANNEL 

While  the  construction  of  the  channel  through 
Spillway  Hill  was  one  of  the  first  operations,  the 
construction  of  the  spillway  dam  was,  of  neces- 
sity, the  last ;  because  its  construction  would  com- 
plete the  barrier  across  the  Chagres  Valley  and 
cause  the  creation  of  Gatun  Lake.  It  was  not 
safe  to  allow  this  lake  to  exceed  a  certain  height 
before  the  earthen  parts  of  the  Gatun  Dam  had 
reached  their  final  heights,  nor  could  it  be  allowed 
to  rise  high  enough  to  overflow  the  miter-sills 
of  the  Gatun  Locks  before  the  gates  and  appli- 
ances were  erected  at  the  south  end  of  the  locks. 
Neither  could  the  lake  be  allowed  to  fill  until 
the  relocated  Panama  Railroad  had  been  prac- 
tically finished  and  the  work  in  Culebra  Cut  so 
advanced  that  it  could  be  completed  with  dredges. 

Li  making  the  cut  for  the  channel  through 
Spillway  Hill  it  was  necessary  to  make  it  big 
enough  to  permit  the  floods  of  the  Chagres  to 
pass  without  the  river  rising  high  enough  to  in- 
terfere with  construction  work  on  any  part  of 

250 


GATUN  LAKE 

the  Canal.  The  bottom  of  this  cut  was  10  feet 
above  sea-level  and  its  width  300  feet.  This  con- 
tracted outlet  caused  a  material  increase  in  the 
flood  height  of  the  Chagres.  The  earthen  parts 
of  the  dam  were  kept  well  above  such  possible 
flood  heights.  This  contracted  outlet  caused  the 
river  to  overflow  the  Panama  Eailroad  just  south 
of  Gatun,  and  necessitated  making  a  new  and 
partially  raised  connection  between  Gatun  and 
Lion  Hill  station.  To  have  dug  the  spillway 
channel  deeper  and  thus  give  the  Chagres  a  freer 
outlet  would  have  increased  the  height  of  the 
spillway  dam  and  increased  the  water  difficul- 
ties during  its  construction. 

There  was  nothing  unusual  in  excavating  this 
channel,  except  the  interference  of  the  Chagres 
Eiver  which,  on  one  occasion,  asserted  her  right 
to  go  where  she  pleased,  and  took  possession  of 
this  incompleted  channel  for  a  time,  sweeping  out 
all  appliances  and  materials  tliat  could  not  be 
removed.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  the  work 
at  Mindi  was  flooded  and  the  delivery  of  sand 
and  stone  to  Gatun  seriously  interfered  with  by 
strong  currents  developed  in  the  old  French 
canal. 

The  currents  developed  in  the  old  French  canal 
during  this  flood  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 
no  provision  had  been  made  in  the  adopted  proj- 
ect to  prevent  water  wasted  through  the  spillway 

251 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

finding  its  way  into  the  Canal  when  completed 
and  interfering  with  navigation. 

The  result  was  a  decision  to  construct  a  levee 
crossing  the  bed  of  the  old  Chagres,  extending 
from  Spillway  Hill  to  Mindi  Hills,  so  located  as 
to  force  all  water  wasted  over  the  spillway  dam 
from  Gatun  Lake  down  the  old  Chagres  River 
channel  to  the  sea  at  Fort  Lorenzo.  This  work 
involved  about  two  miles  of  levee  and  a  dam 
across  the  old  bed  of  the  Chagres.  The  excava- 
tion of  spillway  channel  involved  moving  1,544,- 
202  cubic  yards  of  material,  at  a  cost  of  seventy- 
one  cents  per  cubic  yard,  including  plant  and 
overhead  charges. 

All  work  done  in  this  channel,  after  the  Cha- 
gres River  was  once  diverted  into  it,  would,  bf 
course,  have  to  be  done  under  many  difficulties; 
consequently,  all  concrete  work  that  it  was  prac- 
ticable to  do  was  completed  before  this  diversion. 

The  bottom  and  sides  of  this  channel  were  ar- 
gillaceous sandstone,  a  soft  rock  that  could  be 
eroded  and  which  would  decompose  in  the  air. 
It  was  therefore  necessary  to  cover  all  exposed 
rock  surfaces  with  concrete — not  only  for  its  pro- 
tection but  to  prevent  seepage.  Above  the  site 
of  the  spillway  dam,  rock  was  uncovered  to  a 
depth  of  15  feet  below  sea-level  and  entirely  cov- 
ered with  concrete  and  back-filled  with  clay  to 
prevent  seepage. 

252 


GATUN  LAKE 

The  bottom  of  the  spillway  channel  was  lined 
with  concrete  throughout.  This  concrete  was  12 
feet  thick  just  below  the  dam  site.  Concrete  re- 
taining walls  were  built  along  the  sides  of  the 
channel,  and  th^  foundation  of  the  spillway  dam 
placed.  In  addition,  preparations  were  made  for 
resuming  work  on  the  dam  when  operations  on 
the  other  parts  of  the  Canal  had  advanced  to 
such  a  state  that  the  formation  of  the  lake  would 
not  interfere  with  their  completion. 

Stubs  of  small  piers  were  built  20  feet  apart 
along  the  upper  face  of  the  dam.  These  piers 
were  made  of  such  a  height  that  their  upper  sur- 
face-would be  out  of  water  during  the  dry  season 
and  would  thus  afford  a  starting-point  for  future 
work.  Grooves  were  made  in  the  face  of  these 
stubs.  After  all  this  had  been  accomplished  the 
Chagres  Eiver  was  turned  through  the  spillway 
channel  and  was  allowed  to  there  run  undis- 
turbed until  work  on  the  dam  was  resumed, 
which  was  done  when  the  formation  of  the  lake 
would  not  interfere  with  the  other  work  on  the 
Canal. 

When  the  time  arrived  to  complete  the  dam, 
the  first  operation  was  to  extend,  in  the  dry  sea- 
son, the  pier  stubs  referred  to  above  to  a  height 
of  35  feet,  continuing  the  grooves  to  the  top ;  then, 
on  these  piers,  erect  a  railroad  bridge. 

The  plan   of   construction   contemplated   first 
253 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

completing  about  two-thirds  of  the  dam  to  a 
height  of  50  feet  above  sea-level,  and  to  provide 
in  this  part  three  openings  each  8  by  18  feet, 
through  which  the  flow  of  the  Chagres  River 
could  pass  for  ten  months  of  the  year.  Valves 
with  operating  machinery  were  provided  for 
opening  and  closing  the  sluices,  thus  enabling  the 
construction  forces  to  regulate,  for  the  greater 
portion  of  the  year,  the  elevation  of  Gatun  Lake ; 
when  this  part  was  completed,  allow  the  water  to 
pass  through  the  sluices  and  complete  the  re- 
mainder of  the  dam  to  the  same  height.  All  this 
work  was  to  be  accomplished  during  the  dry  sea- 
son. Practically  all  of  the  concrete  used  in  build- 
ing the  dam  to  the  height  of  50  feet  above  sea  was 
placed  from  cars  on  the  railroad  bridge  described 
above,  by  dumping  it  directly  in  place  or  into 
chutes  that  carried  it  into  place. 

Figures  17  and  18  show  the  spillway  channel  be- 
fore the  water  entered;  show  it  during  construc- 
tion, and  show  the  use  of  the  openings  in  pass- 
ing the  waters  of  the  Chagres.  The  grooves  in 
the  small  piers  referred  to  above  enabled  the 
builders  to  easily  shut  the  flow  of  the  Chagres 
out  of  any  part  of  the  dam  by  dropping  water- 
tight curtains  down  these  grooves.  The  central 
part  of  the  dam  was  finished  to  a  height  of  fifty 
feet  above  sea;  the  lake  level  was  controlled  by 
the  valves  in  the  openings  through  the  dam  until 

254 


Fig.  18. — Gatun  Spillway  Dam  Under  Construction. 


Fig.  19. — Flood  Water  Passing  Over  Incompleted  Spillway  Dam 
AT  Gatun. 


GATUN  LAKE 

the  rainiest  part  of  the  year  came.  During  this 
time  it  was  expected  that  the  Chagres  Eiver 
would  rise,  in  spite  of  the  openings  in  the  dam, 
and  overflow  the  incompleted  part  of  the  dam, 
for  which  flow  provision  was  made.  Figure  19 
shows  the  water  flowing  over  the  dam  during 
this  period.  As  soon  as  the  rains  had  stopped 
sufficiently  to  allow  the  openings  through  the 
dam  to  lower  the  lake  below  +50  the  work  of 
completing  the  dam  was  resumed,  all  water  pass- 
ing under  the  dam  through  the  openings.  In  or- 
der to  build  the  piers  and  install  the  Stoney  gates 
composing  the  regulating  works,  a  heavy  trestle 
was  constructed  on  the  incompleted  dam,  as 
shown  in  Figure  18,  from  which  trestle  the  piers 
were  completed  and  the  spillway  gates  placed. 
These  gates  weighed  42  tons;  were  loaded  on 
cars  at  the  shop,  run  out  on  the  trestle  and  placed 
in  position  by  two  wrecking  cranes. 

Eunning  longitudinally  through  this  dam  is  a 
watertight  operating  tunnel  in  which  is  placed  all 
the  operating  machines  that  raise  and  lower  the 
fourteen  gates  forming  the  crest  of  the  dam.  The 
operation  of  regulating  works  on  the  top  of  the 
spillway  dam  is  one  of  the  most  spectacular 
sights  connected  with  the  entire  Canal.  While 
the  operating  machines  are  in  the  tunnel  referred 
to  above,  they  are  operated  from  a  switchboard 
in  the  power  house. 

255 


■^ 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

In  connection  with  the  construction  of  the  spill- 
way dam  a  hydro-electric  plant  was  built.  This 
plant  is  operated  with  water  from  Gatun  Lake 
which  has  a  fall  ordinarily  of  about  75  feet.  It 
is  expected  to  generate  at  this  plant  all  of  the 
power  necessary  to  operate  the  locks,  to  light  the 
Canal,  to  operate  the  Panama  Eailroad,  and  to 
do  such  other  work  as  experience  may  indicate. 
There  are  three  units  2,000  kilowatts  now  in- 
stalled in  the  power  house  and  provision  is  made 
for  doubling  this  capacity  of  plant,  if  such  ad- 
ditional power  is  ever  needed,  and  if  the  water 
supply  of  Gatun  Lake  is  sufficient  to  care  for  the 
increased  number  of  lockages  as  commerce  grows 
and  provide  water  for  the  extra  power  units. 

GATUN  LAKE 

On  June  27,  1913,  the  temporary  sluice-ways 
through  the  spillway  dam  were  closed  and  the 
lake,  which  had  been  held  in  the  neighborhood  of 
48  feet  above  sea-level  for  some  months,  was  al- 
lowed to  rise  to  its  normal  height.  This  stage 
was  reached  in  December,  1913.  The  rising  lake 
was  watched  with  interest  by  all.  On  the  water- 
tightness  of  the  lake  basin  depended  the  success 
of  the  entire  project.  While  all  practicable  in- 
vestigations had  been  made  to  determine  this 
question  in  those  parts  of  the  rim  of  the  lake 

256 


GATUN  LAKE 

where  the  distance  through  the  hills  was  small, 
and  while  it  was  known  that  the  general  lake  bot- 
tom was  composed  of  impermeable  material,  yet 
those  responsible  for  the  work  would  naturally 
anxiously  watch  the  rising  waters  in  fear  that 
there  might  somewhere  be  an  exposed  rock  sur- 
face through  which  material  leakage  might  go. 
Great  satisfaction  was  therefore  felt  when  the 
lake  rose  according  to  program. 

The  filling  of  this  lake  permanently  submerged 
164  square  miles  of  territory,  including  the  bed  of 
the  old  Panama  Eailroad  and  many  farms  and 
villages,  making  a  permanent  change  in  the  topog- 
raphy of  the  country. 

After  all  property  rights  had  been  adjusted  in 
this  area  it  was,  in  many  cases,  necessary  to  for- 
cibly remove  the  inhabitants.  They  could  not 
appreciate,  understand,  or  accept  the  proposed 
topographical  changes  l:hat  were  being  made  in 
this  section. 

Many  square  miles  of  swamp  were  permanent- 
ly flooded  by  the  lake,  and  a  large  portion  of  this 
old  swamp  bottom,  made  up  of  submerged  logs 
and  decayed  vegetation,  with  high  grass  growing 
therein,  rose  with  the  lake  and  gave  the  appear- 
ance of  large  bodies  of  land,  or  islands,  in  the 
lake.  Acres  of  this  old  swamp  bottom,  with  its 
green  grass  and  small  trees,  would  become  de- 
tached and  would  be  driven  by  the  winds  aimless- 

257 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

ly  across  the  waters.    Deer  were  found  on  some 
^  of  these  floating  islands. 

Where  the  sailing  channel  through  the  lake 
crossed  the  area  previously  known  as  the  *' Black 
Swamp/'  this  floating  material  completely 
blocked  the  channel.  It  was  in  some  places  four- 
teen feet  thick,  and  the  snags,  sticks,  and  living 
vegetation  were  so  completely  matted  as  to  be 
often  immovable.  The  floating  swamp  bottom 
was  evidently  connected  with  parts  that  did  not 
float.  The  only  practicable  way  to  rid  the  lake 
of  these  floating  islands  was  to  tow  them  to  the 
spillway  dam  and  let  them  be  drawn  over  that 
dam  and  sent  out  to  the  ocean.  It  was  an  odd 
sight  to  see  a  little  tug  chugging  along  pushing 
acres  of  apparent  land  before  her  en  route  to 
the  spillway  dam.  It  was  impossible  for  the 
tugs  to  move  the  obstruction  found  in  the  channel 
of  the  old  ^' Black  Swamp,''  and  it  was  necessary 
to  send  a  boat  there  with  sufficient  power  to  tear 
this  floating  mass  in  pieces  in  order  that  tugs 
might  carry  it  away. 

As  the  waters  of  the  lake  rose  the  more  at- 
tractive orchids,  that  had  grown  high  up  on  the 
big  trees,  where  they  could  not  be  reached,  be- 
came accessible  from  boats,  and  the  lovers  of 
flowers  in  and  about  Gatun  spent  their  Sundays 
rowing  through  the  forest  and  gathering  orchids. 
The  hornets  and  the  bees,  however  resented  this 

258 


GATUN  LAKE 

intrusion  of  man  in  the  tree-tops  and  some  of  the 
orchids  cost  dearly. 

We  have  often  heard  of  *^ blazed  trails''  for 
land  travel  in  new  countries,  but  it  is  probable 
that  on  Gatun  Lake  trails  were  first  blazed  for 
regular  boat  travel. 

The  rim  of  the  lake  at  two  places  was  only  a 
foot  or  so  above  lake  level  and  it  was  necessary 
to  increase  the  height  of  this  rim  at  those  places. 
One  of  these  low  saddles  was  on  the  Trinidad 
Eiver  and  no  work  was  attempted  at  this  saddle 
until  the  lake  was  nearing  its  full  height.  The 
place  was  practically  inaccessible  by  land. 

After  the  creation  of  the  lake  the  necessary 
plant  for  building  a  dam  on  this  saddle  could  be 
transported  to  the  site  by  water,  provided  a 
route  could  be  located,  cleaned  out  and  blazed 
so  that  boats  could  safely  follow  it.  It  was  no 
easy  matter  to  find  a  particular  place  under  such 
circumstances,  and  this  saddle  was  located,  after 
many  efforts,  by  finally  having  some  native  In- 
dians go  overland  to  the  place  and  build  fires, 
smoke  from  which  could  be  seen  long  distances. 
Each  day  in  this  search  the  boat  would  blaze  the 
route  that  she  came  so  as  to  guarantee  a  safe 
return.  It  was  a  queer  sensation  to  travel  in  a 
boat  through  the  tops  of  live  trees  in  a  wilder- 
ness. Of  course  the  water  soon  killed  the  tim- 
ber, and  the  aspect  changed  to  one  of  dreariness. 

259 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

For  nearly  a  year  the  Gatun  Lake  was  held 
at  an  elevation  of  about  thirty  feet  above  sea- 
level.  This  killed  the  trees  in  the  low  lands  along 
the  streams,  the  routes  that  would  be  followed  by 
any  boats  should  local  commerce  develop  on  the 
lake.  During  the  time  that  the  water  stood  at 
this  elevation  all  of  the  dead  timber  rotted.  With 
the  lake  at  its  full  height  the  water  will  be  free 
of  obstructions  for  navigable  depths  along  such 
routes. 

There  were  many  hills  in  the  lake  area  that 
were  not  covered  by  water.  These  became  islands 
as  the  lake  rose,  and  much  of  the  game  that  in- 
habited the  lake  area  congregated  on  these 
islands.  This  gave  the  huntsmen  on  the  Isthmus 
an  advantage  in  securing  game  that  the  thick 
jungle  had  denied  them  before,  and  their 
Sundays  were  spent  in  going  from  island  to 
island. 

The  game  in  this  section  consists  of  deer,  tapir, 
and  several  species  of  the  cat  family.  The  deer 
and  tapir,  being  especially  good  swimmers,  would 
take  to  the  water  when  pursued  by  dogs  and  a 
large  portion  of  them  finally  worked  their  way 
to  the  surrounding  high  lands.  A  tapir  some- 
times weighs  as  much  as  800  pounds  and  it  was 
most  exciting  to  watch  a  pack  of  hounds  follow 
him  in  the  water.  The  dogs  could  not  hurt  him — 
his  skin  was  too  thick  to  allow  that — and  when 

260 


Fig.  20. — Tug  Gatun;  the  First  Boat  to  Pass  from  Sea-Level  to 
Summit  Level  of  the  Panama  Canal.     September  26,  1913. 


.    \mt..       lifiaMWM 

■■^-:^    r  ""I  ^^;!:^: -  .-^   ■  -.oE^.*  ^  _„_..._' r 

L^, 

:-  w|^,^  ^    . 

SI 

^^^^ 

't\ 

Fig.   21. — Gatun   Upper    Locks,    Miter    Gate-Moving    Machine  ; 

Structuhal  Steel  Girders  for  To  wing-Locomotive 

Track  Supports  in  Foreground.    June,  1912. 


< 


GATUN  LAKE 

they  bothered  him  too  much  by  crawling  on  his 
back  three  or  four  at  a  time,  he  would  submerge 
himself  leaving  them  swimming  in  the  water. 
As  soon  as  he  emerged  some  distance  away  the 
hounds  would  start  for  him  again,  and  this  proc- 
ess would  be  continued  until  some  hunter  killed 
him. 

The  locks  at  Gatun  being  ready  for  the  passaged 
of  ships,  the  dam  having  been  finished  and  the 
lake  having  reached  the  elevation  of  about  sixty- 
four  feet  above  sea,  it  was  decided  on  September 
26,  1913,  to  pass  the'  tug  Gatun  from  the  sea-level 
section  of  the  Canal  to  the  summit  level.  Since 
all  the  locks  are  similar  in  structure  this  test  was 
a  test  for  all  locks.  A  test  of  the  locks  meant 
a  test  of  the  Canal.  No  formal  notice  was  given 
of  this  trial,  but  the  news  spread  over  the  Isth- 
mus and  thousands  of  people  gathered  to  see  this 
first  trial.  It  was  a  day  of  pride  for  all,  the  en- 
thusiasm surrounding  which  was  never  repeated 
at  the  subsequent  tests. 

This  trip  (see  Figure  20)  was  an  ocular  dem- 
onstration to  those  who  had  labored  so  long  that 
the  route  across  the  Isthmus  was  practically  open 
and  that  the  appliances  for  the  passage  of  ships 
between  the  various  levels  of  Canal  would  work 
as  planned.  The  steam-shovel  excavation  in  the 
Culebra  Cut  was  nearing  completion  and  the  locks 
on  the  Pacific  side  were  about  ready  for  opera- 

261 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

tion  and,  in  consequence,  all  could  see  a  success- 
ful termination  to  their  long  labors. 

The  construction  work  so  far  described  was  in 
the  Atlantic  Division. 

In  June,  1908,  the  construction  work  on  the  en- 
tire Canal  was  divided  into  three  grand  construc- 
tion divisions:  the  Atlantic,  Central,  and  Pacific. 

The  Atlantic  Division  extended  from  deep  wa- 
ter in  sea,  near  Colon,  to  Gatun,  and  included  the 
construction  of  the  Gatun  locks  and  dam. 

The  Central  Division  comprised  all  the  work 
between  Gatun  and  Pedro  Miguel. 

The  Pacific  Division  comprised  all  the  locks 
and  dams  on  the  Pacific  side,  together  with  the 
channel  from  Miraflores  Locks  to  the  Pacific. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CONSTRUCTION  FROM  GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL— 
CULEBRA  CUT 

The  work  to  be  described  in  this  chapter  was 
comprised  in  the  Central  Division,  which  extend- 
ed from  the  Gatun  Dam  to  the  Pedro  Miguel  Lock, 
a  total  distance  along  the  axis  of  the  Canal  of 
about  thirty  and  a  half  miles.  It  embraced  the 
former  Culebra  and  Chagres  divisions. 

While  the  work  in  the  Central  Division  has 
often  been  referred  to  as  a  *  transportation  job," 
yet  that  appellation  does  not  describe  it.  While 
efficient  transportation  in  some  form  or  other  un- 
derlies the  proper  solution  of  nearly  all  construc- 
tion problems,  it  is  only  one  of  the  elements  of 
success. 

A  larger  portion  of  the  plant  needed  for  the 
construction  of  this  part  of  the  Canal  had  been 
purchased  and  tried  out  than  for  any  other  part 
of  the  work.  During  the  year  1906  new  pieces 
of  plant  were  continuously  being  placed  upon  the 
work  and  tried  out.  The  useful  excavation  ac- 
complished during  such  try-out  increased  from 
month  to  month.  In  July,  1906,  159,789  cubic 
yards  of  material  were  removed  from  the  Cule- 

263 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

bra  Division,  whereas  in  March,  1907,  769,693 
cubic  yards  of  material  were  removed. 

At  the  beginning  of  this — the  construction  pe- 
riod— there  had  been  delivered,  erected,  and  ac- 
cepted, on  the  Central  Division,  52  steam-shovels, 
132  locomotives,  1,245  flat-cars,  and  32  dump-cars, 
with  the  necessary  accessories  for  work  of  exca- 
vation, such  as  spreaders,  plows,  unloaders,  etc. 
One  hundred  and  seven  miles  of  railroad  track 
had  been  built  in  connection  with  the  operations 
of  this  division.  In  the  bottom  of  the  Canal  from 
the  summit  level  near  Culebra  to  the  material 
yard  to  the  north  there  were  four  running  tracks, 
and  three  such  tracks  extended  from  the  summit 
to  the  material  yard  for  the  south-bound  traffic. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  fiscal  year  1907  there 
were  only  20  shovels  ready  for  work  and  only  66 
miles  of  track  in  operation. 

The  problem  given  during  the  construction  pe- 
riod in  the  Culebra  Cut  was  to  take  a  plant  large- 
ly erected,  partially  tried  out,  develop  it  and 
do  the  dry  excavation  work  of  the  Canal  with  it 
as  expeditiously  and  economically  as  possible. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  period  the  machine 
was  running — though  roughly — as  great  machines 
do  run  at  the  beginning  of  great  undertakings,  be- 
fore the  parts  have  reached  their  proper  bearing. 

One  of  the  first  problems  to  receive  attention 
in  connection  with  digging  the  cut  through  the 

264 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

Continental  Divide  at  Culebra  was  the  question  of 
diversion  of  flood-waters  of  small  streams  that 
crossed  the  line  of  the  cut  or  would  drain  into  it. 

The  bottom  of  Culebra  Cut  when  finished  was 
to  be  40  feet  above  sea-level.  The  low-water  sur- 
face of  the  Chagres  River  at  the  point  where  the 
Canal  leaves  the  Chagres  Valley  proper  is  44  feet 
above  sea-level.  The  extreme  flood-level  of  the 
Chagres  River  was  79.9  feet  above  sea-level. 

From  the  foregoing  facts  it  was  evident  from 
the  beginning  that  the  work  of  excavating  the 
Culebra  Cut  to  its  full  depth  involved,  during  the 
rainy  season,  pumping  a  large  amount  of  water 
from  the  excavation  which,  in  turn,  meant  leaving 
a  barrier  where  the  channel  left  the  Chagres  Val- 
ley, that  would  keep  the  waters  of  the  Chagres 
out  of  the  cut.  This  barrier  was  afterwards 
known  as  the  Gamboa  dike. 

The  above  condition  made  it  essential  that  the 
watershed  tributary  to  the  cut  should  be  as  small 
as  possible.  Diversion  channels  were  therefore 
planned  so  as  to  intercept  as  large  a  portion  of 
the  drainage  as  possible,  divert  it  from  the  cut 
and  send  it  to  the  Chagres  River. 

"While  the  diversion  of  this  water  during  con- 
struction was  an  essential,  its  permanent  diver- 
sion was  also  important,  because  it  would  facili- 
tate maintenance  after  the  completion  of  the  Ca- 
nal.   Streams  emptying  into  the  Canal,  when  com- 

265 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

pleted,  would  tend  to  block  the  channel  with  de- 
posit and  might  make  currents,  where  the  naviga- 
tion was  already  difficult. 

Permanent  diversion  channels  were  therefore 
decided  upon  for  both  sides  of  the  cut;  that  on 
the  west  side  is  known  as  the  Comacho  diversion, 
and  that  on  the  east  as  the  Obispo  diversion. 

The  Comacho  diversion  was  opened  up  on  the 
lines  originally  planned  by  the  French.  In  doing 
this  a  new  channel  was  cut  through  White  House 
Yard ;  a  dam  was  built  across  Obispo  River,  and 
the  old  French  tunnel  at  Bas  Obispo  was  cleaned 
out.  This  work,  in  connection  with  that  already 
done  by  the  French,  created  a  diversion  channel 
from  the  Continental  Divide  south  of  Culebra  Hill 
to  the  Chagres  River  near  Matachin. 

For  taking  care  of  the  water  on  the  east  side 
of  the  cut,  including  the  Obispo  River  and  other 
streams,  surveys  were  made  and  a  channel  lo- 
cated extending  from  Gold  Hill  to  the  Chagres 
River,  running  practically  parallel  to  the  Canal 
and  having  its  outlet  in  the  Chagres  River  near 
Gamboa.  This  diversion  drains  10  square  miles 
of  territory,  and  was  quite  expensive  to  build. 
Its  construction  involved  excavating  1,132,000  cu- 
bic yards  of  material,  two-fifths  of  which  was 
rock,  driving  sheet  piling  along  896  feet  of  dike, 
building  IJ  miles  of  embankment  containing 
1,260,000  cubic  yards  of  material. 

266 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

This  work  would  ordinarily  be  considered  quite 
an  undertaking,  but  the  magnitude  of  the  work  in 
the  Culebra  Cut  was  such  that  tasks  such  as  the 
Obispo  diversion  were  looked  upon  as  merely  side 
issues. 

The  French  did  not  contemplate  the  permanent 
diversion  of  the  water  on  the  east  side  of  this 
part  of  the  Canal,  but  expected, to  confine  their 
operations  to  diverting  such  water  during  the 
construction  period  only. 

In  accomplishing  this  they  proposed  to  gather, 
the  water  between  Gold  Hill  and  Empire  into  a 
channel  and  carry  the  same  by  an  aqueduct  across 
the  Canal  and  into  the  west  diversion  channel. 
From  Empire  north  on  the  east  side  it  was  pro- 
posed to  start  another  diversion  channel  and 
cross  the  Canal  again  with  this  water,  delivering 
it,  'as  before,  into  the  west  diversion  farther 
north.  Experience,  however,  has  shown  the  ad- 
vantage of  solving  the  problem  permanently  in 
the  beginning. 

LABOR  DIFFICULTIES 

About  the  only  labor  difficulty  that  threatened 
to  interfere  with  the  prosecution  of  the  work, 
happened  about  the  beginning  of  the  construction 
period. 

During  the  latter  part  of  1906,  the  President 
of  the  United  States  visited  the  work.    His  visit 

267 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

was  in  the  middle  of  the  rainy  season  during 
which  time  the  Chagres  reached  an  nnprecedent- 
edly  high  stage,  and  the  difficulties  and  hardships 
connected  with  the  work  were  many.  It  is  said 
that  the  President,  in  his  talks,  praised  the  men 
for  their  patriotism  and  enlarged  upon  their 
hardships  to  such  an  extent  that  immediately 
after  his  visit  the  steam-shovel  men  and  crane- 
men  asked  for  a  raise  in  wages.  The  former  were 
then  receiving  $210.00  per  month,  and  the  latter 
$185.00  per  month.  The  steam-shovel  engineers 
asked  for  an  increase  to  $300.00  per  month,  and 
the  cranemen  to  $250.00.  It  was  recognized,  of 
course,  that  if  unusually  high  wages  were  paid 
the  men  in  any  class  of  work  on  the  Oanal  that 
other  classes  would  claim,  and  would  have  a  right 
to,  a  correspondingly  high  wage. 

The  application  of  the  steam-shovel  engineers 
and  cranemen  was  referred  to  the  authorities  in 
Washington  and,  instead  of  granting  the  increase 
asked  for,  longevity  pay  was  authorized  for  all 
employees  in  the  mechanical  trades  and  in  the 
transportation  Department.  This  decision  au- 
thorized an  increase  of  5  per  cent,  per  annum  in 
the  pay  at  the  end  of  the  first  year's  service  and 
an  additional  increase  of  3  per  cent,  at  the  end 
of  each  succeeding  year  of  service.  This  decision 
was  unsatisfactory  to  the  steam-shovel  men  and 
^  large  number  of  them  stopped  work  in  May, 

268 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

1907.    The  number  of  steam-shovels  actually  work- 
ing was  reduced  to  thirteen. 

The  Government  would  not  yield  or  reconsider 
the  case,  but  gave  the  men  who  had  stopped 
work  the  privilege  of  returning.  Some  of  them 
did  this;  others  were  hired  in  the  States,  and 
many  deserving  subordinates  were  promoted,  with 
the  result  that  by  the  first  of  July,  1907,  the  work 
in  the  cut  was  on  a  normal  basis  and  the  full  num- 
ber of  steam-shovels  were  at  work.  There  was 
no  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  men  to  injure  or 
damage  anything  whatever:  it  was  merely  a 
peaceful  strike. 

CONSTRUCTION  EFFICIENCY 

The  best  measure  of  construction  efiSciency  in 
excavation  like  the  Culebra  Cut  is  the  cost  per 
cubic  yard  of  such  excavation.  Efficiency  finds 
expression  in  the  final  cost  fi'gure. 

With  a  total  annual  output  of  about  18,000,000 
cubic  yards,  the  saving  of  one  cent  a  cubic  yard 
of  material  meant  a  saving  of  $180,000  per  year 
to  the  United  States  in  the  excavation. 

The  table  on  the  following  page  gives  the  vari- 
ous items  of  excavation  cost  for  the  years  1908- 
1913,  inclusive. 

In  comparing  cost  of  work  done  in  connection 
with  building  the  Panama  Canal  with  work  in  the 

269 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


Class  of  Work 

1908 

1909 

1910 

1911 

1912 

1913 

Loading,  steam-shovels. 

Loading,  hand 

Drilling  and  blasting . . . 

Transportation 

Dumps 

$0.1150 

".uis 

.1854 
.1344 
.1190 

.0163 
.0008 
.0004 
.0002 

$0.1001 
.3993 
.1149 
.1452 
.0911 
.0838 

.0114 
.0001 
.0048 
.0012 

$0.0888 
.3442 
.1190 
.1522 
.0657 
.1001 

.0150 
.0003 
•     .0046 
.0013 
.0052 

$0.0717 
.2567 
.1048 
.1414 
.0541 
.1014 

.0120 

.0002 

.00005 

.0005 

.0038 

$0.0681 
.3056 
.1157 
.1331 
.0479 
.0885 

.0142 

'  '.666i 

.0003 
.0041 

$0.0863 
.3150 
.1069 
.1740 
0645 

Tracks 

0966 

Division  office  and  su- 

.0128 

General  surveys 

Division  structures .... 
Drainage  and  sumps. . . 

.0003 
.0091 

Total  division  cost . . . 

General  expense  and  ad- 
ministrative expense. 

Plant  arbitrary 

.7128 

.1882 
.1300 

.5517 

.1049 
.1300 

.5416 

.0646 
.1300 

.4880 

.0457 
.1000 

.4707 

.0361 
.0395 

.5505 

.0355 
.0040 

Total 

1.0310 

.7866 

.7362 

.6337 

.5463 

5900 

United  States,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
skilled  labor  was  paid  from  40  to  70  per  cent, 
more  on  the  Canal  than  in  the  States.  Eight 
hours  constituted  a  day's  work,  while  in  the 
greater  number  of  private  enterprises  the  day 
consists  of  ten  hours.  Fuel  cost  was  materially 
greater  than  in  the  States,  as  well  as  machinery 
and  supplies  of  all  classes. 

There  is  nothing  that  facilitates  the  study  of 
economy  in  the  performance  of  work  .so  much  as 
a  well-devised  system  of  cost-keeping.  In  a 
great  undertaking  such  as  the  one  under  discus- 
sion there  were  many  construction  units  doing 
the  same  class  of  work  which  made  a  direct  com- 
parison between  the  various  elements  of  cost 
practicable.  If  one  superintendent  had  a  less 
cost  than  the  others  on  any  particular  item  of 
work,  a  study  was  made  of  it  and  the  reason  de- 

270 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

termined.  If  the  lower  cost  were  due  to  any  par- 
ticular system  or  contrivance  of  that  superintend- 
ent, the  other  superintendents  were  expected  to 
profit  by  it.  It  is  easily  seen  how  strong  the  em- 
ulation became  between  the  various  construction 
units,  and  how  keenly  they  studied  and  worked  to 
reduce  costs. 

The  higher  official  devoted  his  time  to  the  sys- 
tem and  to  investigations  that  led  to  the  solution 
of  the  general  problems. 

With  the  plant  furnished  and  the  dumps  select- 
ed, the  problem  as  first  presented  was  to  so  plan 
the  general  operations,  such  as  drilling,  blasting, 
operation  of  shovels,  laying  of  tracks  and  hauling 
material,  that  no  element  of  the  work  would  seri- 
ously interfere  with  any  other  element,  or,  rather, 
that  the  interference  would  be  limited  as  much  as 
practicable.  This  required  most  careful  study. 
"With  all  the  drills,  tracks,  shovels,  etc.,  located 
daily  on  a  map,  an  accurate  estimate  could  be 
made  of  the  time  when  shovel  number  so-and-so 
would  finish  her  cut  and  must  have  a  new  posi- 
tion; or,  when  track  so-and-so  must  be  moved  so 
that  the  drilling  and  blasting  can  proceed  unin- 
terruptedly; or,  how  best  to  effect  a  change  in 
the  elevation  of  the  entire  system  of  running 
tracks  as  the  cut  was  deepened,  etc. 

The  first  of  these  general  studies  resulted  in 
abandoning  the  idea  of  general  yards  to  which 

271 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

cars  were  brought  as  soon  as  loaded  by  the  shovel, 
and  in  which  trains  were  made  up  and  then  run 
to  the  dumps. 

It  was  found  that  by  running  trains  direct  from 
the  shovels  to  the  dumps  the  same  railroad  equip- 
ment would  haul  more  material,  which  meant  a 
reduction  in  cost,  either  through  lessening  the 
number  of  trains  or  increasing  the  number  of 
shovels. 

The  next  question  to  receive  general  considera- 
tion was  the  method  of  blasting.  The  standard 
method  of  firing  holes  by  blasting  batteries  of 
the  usual  magneto-electric  type  was  being  fol- 
lowed. This  method,  under  the  climatic  con- 
ditions on  the  Isthmus,  resulted  in  a  large 
number  of  misfire  holes,  entailing  both  danger 
and  expense  in  removing  unexploded  dyna- 
mite. 

The  result  of  the  studies  and  investigations  led 
to  the  decision  to  install,  for  the  entire  length  of 
the  cut,  a  continuous  electric  firing-line  connected 
with  the  regular  lighting  station  at  Empire.  To 
this  line  were  connected  blasting  spurs,  on  the 
end  of  which  were  installed  transformers,  switch- 
boards, etc.  Fuses  were  thereafter  wired  in 
parallel.  One  of  the  greatest  advantages  result- 
ing from  this  method  of  firing  blasts  was  that 
a 'larger  number  of  holes  could  be  fired  at  one 
time,  and  the  various  holes  exploded  at  the  same 

272 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

instant,  thus  increasing  the  disruptive  effect  of 
the  dynamite. 

The  many  minds  in  the  various  districts  were 
continually  studying  ways  of  reducing  costs  under 
each  of  the  subheads  shown  on  cost  sheet.  These 
involved  the  spacing  of  drill  holes,  their  depth; 
explosives  best  suited  to  the  particular  material, 
etc. 

The  effect  of  the  concentrated  and  intelligent 
study  of  the  men  in  authority  in  the  Central  Divi- 
sion, from  the  division  engineer  to  the  fore- 
man, is  read  best  under  the  heading  of  the  total 
division  cost  in  the  table  on  page  270.  This  cost 
was  sixteen  cents  less  per  cubic  yard  in  1909 
than  in  1908.  About  18,400,000  cubic  yards  of 
material  was  excavated  in  1909.  A  saving  of  16 
cents  a  yard  on  this  amount  was  $2,944,000. 

A  further  reduction  of  one  cent  a  yard  was 
made  in  the  year  1910;  a  still  further  reduction 
of  five  cents  a  yard  was  made  in  1911,  and  an- 
other of  1.8  cents  in  1912.  In  1913  the  cost  was 
increased;  the  work  was  nearing  completion;  the 
output  was  reduced,  and  the  grades  over  which 
the  trains  passed  were  heavier. 

The  continued  efficiency  of  this  organization 
enabled  those  in  authority  to  complete  the  ex- 
cavation within  the  estimate,  notwithstanding  the 
large  additions  caused  by  slides. 

Sick  leave  or  injury  leave  was  charged  to  the 
273 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

particular  work  on  which  a  man  was  employed 
and,  consequently,  all  superintendents  labored  to 
reduce  accidents  and  preserve  health,  etc. 

There  were  about  23,000,000  pounds  of  high 
explosives  used  in  breaking  up  the  rock  in  the 
Central  Division,  and  only  eight  men  were  killed 
by  such  explosives,  which  speaks  volumes  for  the 
care  and  system  that  those  in  charge  exercised 
in  the  prosecution  of  the  work. 

The  work  was  divided  into  districts,  but  all 
those  features  that  were  common  to  all  the  dis- 
tricts were  handled  by  one  head.  In  this  cate- 
gory were  the  water  service,  the  compressed  air 
service,  the  delivery  of  high  explosives  into  the 
magazines,  etc. 

There  was  no  work  on  the  Canal  that  required 
such  a  comprehensive  knowledge  of  detail  as  that 
in  the  Central  Division,  if  a  systematic  effort 
were  to  be  made  to  reduce  cost. 

Such  questions  as  the  efficiency  of  shovels, 
measured  by  the  number  of  cubic  yards  of 
material  moved  per  hour  while  under  steam;  the 
efficiency  of  an  entire  working  unit  as  measured 
by  the  percentage  of  time  that  the  shovels  actu- 
ally operated,  were  studied;  in  fact  these  studies 
extended  to  the  performance  of  every  machine 
and  to  the  average  cost  of  its  repair  and  main- 
tenance. 

The  striving  for  efficiency  of  man  and  machine 
274 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

on  the  Panama  Canal  work  led  to  many  improve- 
ments in  appliances  that  had  hitherto  been  con- 
sidered standard.  No  job  before  this  had  sub- 
jected steam-shovels,  cars,  nnloaders,  spreaders, 
etc.,  to  such  exhaustive  tests. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  write  a  description  of  the 
work  in  the  cut.  The  operation  of  trains  over 
200  miles  of  track  is  nothing  unusual.  But  if 
those  tracks  are  never  permanently  located  it  may 
become  unusual.  With  the  ever-shifting  scene  of 
drilling,  blasting,  cutting  in  shovels,  and  hauling 
away  material,  one  can  hardly  imagine  the  track- 
laying  and  changing  essential  to  economical  work 
under  such  circumstances.  Maintaining  200  miles 
of  loading  and  running  tracks  on  this  job  in- 
volved, during  each  of  the  busiest  years,  removing 
about  150  miles  of  old  track  and  relaying  about 
225  miles  of  track.  It  also  involved  shifting  about 
1,400  miles  of  track,  removing  about  640  frogs 
and  switches  and  laying  1,000,  and  all  without 
seriously  interfering  with  the  movements  of  about 
160  trains  a  day.  Complicate  this  situation  with 
slides  that  at  times  disrupt  practically  every  track 
in  the  cut,  and  one  begins  to  see  the  difficulties 
that  confront  the  management  that  is  charged 
with  the  completion  of  such  a  work  in  a  specified 
time  and  for  a  specified  amount. 

On  account  of  unexpected  slides  the  estimate  of 
yardage  to  be  removed  was  increased  by  about 

275 


^CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

« 

26,000,000  cubic  yards  of  dry  excavation.  The 
additional  excavation  that  has  been  and  is  to  be 
done  by  dredging  is,  at  the  present  writing,  an 
unknown  quantity. 

As  long  as  there  was  room  for  the  full  use  of 
all  the  dry  excavation  plant  available  for  the 
Culebra  Cut,  that  plant  could  remove  more  ma- 
terial than  any  dredging  plant  available.  As  the 
work  approached  completion,  however,  the  num- 
ber of  shovels  were  reduced  as  the  number  of 
available  points  of  attack  were  reduced,  until 
finally  it  was  apparent  that  the  work  could  best 
be  completed  by  dredges. 

Arrangements  were  made  to  allow  Gatun  Lake 
to  rise  to  its  full  height,  and  it  was  calculated  that 
by  October,  1913,  its  height  would  be  such  that 
the  barrier  across  the  cut  at  Gamboa  would  be- 
come  ineffective  in  keeping  the  water  out  of  the 
cut.  October  10,  1913,  was  therefore  fixed  as  the 
date  for  blowing  aw^ay  this  barrier  and  thus  allow 
Gatun  Lake  to  extend  itself  through  the  cut  to 
Pedro  Miguel  Lock.  Prior  to  blowing  up  this 
dyke  the  cut  had  been  allowed  to  fill  to  within 
six  feet  of  the  level  of  the  lake  through  the  pipes 
that  remained  from  the  old  pumping  plant  located 
at  the  north  end  of  the  cut. 

While  there  was  nothing  unusual  in  the  opera- 
tion of  blowing  up  the  Gamboa  dike,  its  destruc- 
tion practically  removed  the  last  obstacle  to  the 

276 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

passage  of  ships  across  the  continent,  excepting 
the  Cucaracha  slide.  An  nnsnccessful  attempt 
was  made  on  the  same  day  to  blast  a  passage 
through  this  slide,  but  it  was  not  until  two  days 
later,  October  12,  1913,  that  such  a  passage  was 
made  and  a  line  of  water  established  across  the 
Isthmus. 

The  blast  that  made  an  opening  through  Gam- 
boa  dike  was  fired  by  President  Woodrow  Wil- 
son, at  Washington.  The  connections  had  been 
previously  made  through  land  telegraph  and  sub- 
marine cable  lines.  This  blast  made  a  hole  125 
feet  wide  through  the  Gamboa  dike,  which  open- 
ing was  immediately  widened  by  dredges.  On 
the  twentieth  of  October,  dredges  were  enabled 
to  proceed  to  the  Cucaracha  slide  from  the  north 
end,  and  by  the  twenty-fourth  from  the  south 
end. 

SLIDES 

Lieutenant-Colonel  D.  D.  Gaillard,  who  had 
charge  of  the  excavation  across  the  Continental 
Divide  practically  throughout  the  construction 
period,  divided  the  slides  that  interfered  with  the 
construction  of  the  Canal  into  two  classes — • 
natural  slides  and  breaks:  a  slide  being  simply 
the  moving  of  a  permeable  top  layer  generally 
composed  of  earth  or  clay  upon  a  smooth  surface 
of  some  harder,  more  impermeable  material,  the 

277 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

joint  between  these  two  classes  of  material  being 
often  lubricated  by  surface  water. 

The  movement  of  earth  designated  by  Colonel 
Gaillard  as  a  *^ break'*  resulted  from  removing 
the  lateral  support  from  the  material  alongside 
the  cut  by  digging  the  cut  itself.  As  the  cut  in- 
creased in  depth  the  pressure  of  the  high  banks 
crushed  the  underlying  layers  of  softer  material ; 
this  broken-up  underlying  material  was  squeezed 
toward  the  center  and  was  accompanied  by  an 
elevation  or  ^^ humping'*  of  the  bottom  of  the 
Canal. 

This  type  of  slide  has  occurred  more  frequently 
than  the  true  slide  described  above.  Only  one 
true  slide  has  given  serious  difficulty  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Canal — that  is  the  Cuca- 
racha  slide:  it  is  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Canal 
just  south  of  Gold  Hill:  it  involves  about  forty- 
seven  acres.  This  slide  commenced  to  give  trou- 
ble during  the  French  time  and,  in  the  fall  of 
1907,  just  after  the  beginning  of  the  construction 
period  proper,  it  again,  in  a  striking  manner,  dis- 
puted the  right  of  way  through  that  part  of  the 
cut  south  of  Gold  Hill  by  moving  entirely  across 
such  cut,  which  movement  continued  until  the  ma- 
terial rose  up  to  a  height  of  thirty  feet  along  the 
west  bank  of  the  Canal.  After  the  removal  of 
the  greater  part  of  the  material  brought  down 
from  the  cut  in  the  fall  of  1907  this  slide  gave  no 

278 


GATUN  TO  PEDRO  MIGUEL 

serious  trouble.  Of  course  it  continued  to  come  in 
gradually,  but  the  material  so  brought  in  could 
be  removed  by  the  steam-shovels  until  the  latter 
part  of  the  year  1913,  just  prior  to  the  time  that 
the  water  was  let  into  the  Culebra  Cut,  when  a 
final  protest  was  made  by  this  slide  against  the 
Panama  Canal  by  extending  itself  again  entirely 
across  the  cut.  In  this  last  movement  it  broke 
back  practically  to  the  crest  of  the  Divide  and  a 
limit  could  be  seen  as  to  the  amount  of  material 
that  could  be  brought  into  the  cut  through  the 
agency  of  this  slide. 

After  the  water  was  allowed  to  enter  the  cut^ 
dredges  attacked  this  slide  from  both  north  and 
south  and  have  so  far  removed  it  at  this  writing 
that  there  is  no  material  interference  with  naviga- 
tion at  this  place. 

The  ** breaks"  at  Culebra,  both  on  the  east  and 
west  side,  however,  continue  to  give  trouble.  The 
one  on  the  east  bank  just  north  of  Gold  Hill 
moved  considerably  in  October,  1914,  and  is  still 
active.  Since  that  time  about  2,500,000  cubic  yards 
of  material  have  been  dredged  from  this  slide 
and,  with  a  few  interruptions,  traffic  has  been 
maintained  through  it.  The  indications  are  that 
when  this  slide  comes  to  rest  there  will  be  a  slope 
of  about  1  on  6. 

There  are  no  indications  of  serious  slides  else- 
where, except  on  the  west  side  at  Culebra,  from 

279 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Zion  Hill  north.  If  this  slide  moves  into  the  Canal 
again  before  the  one  on  the  other  side  is  removed 
there  may  be  some  interference  with  navigation; 
but  from  present  indications,  when  these  two 
slides  or  breaks  are  cleaned  up,  those  in  authority 


/^«a/  f*eti9n  at  Ottorminf  anil  SH^inf  Ground  ntar   Cu/a.br»,  CZ. 


DIAGRAM  7 


on  the  Canal  feel  that  there  will  be  no  further 
serious  trouble  with  slides,  although  past  experi- 
ence has  indicated  that  the  prophet  concerning 
slides  on  the  Panama  Canal  has  often  been  mis- 
taken. 

The  geologist  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commis- 
sion, in  Diagram  7,  shows  his  idea  as  to  the  way 
the  material  moves  in  one  of  these  breaks. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

SOUTH  END  OF  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  THE  PACIFIC 
OCEAN 

The  water  level  of  the  lake  created  by  the  dam 
at  Gatun  extends  through  the  Culebra  Cut  across 
the  Continental  Divide  to  the  locks  at  Pedro 
Miguel  on  the  Pacific  slope. 

It  is  eleven  miles  from  Pedro  Miguel  to  deep 
water  in  the  Pacific.  During  the  building,  this 
part  of  the  Canal  was  known  as  the  Pacific  Con- 
struction Division. 

The  work  in  that  division  included  building 
duplicate  locks,  with  necessary  dams,  at  Pedro 
Miguel ;  a  duplicate  flight  of  two  locks,  with  neces- 
sary dams,  at  Miraflores;  a  connecting  channel 
between  these  locks  through  Miraflores  Lake,  and 
the  channel  from  Miraflores  Locks  to  deep  water 
in  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

While  the  mean  sea-level  in  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  is  essentially  the  same,  the  tidal  variation 
on  the  Pacific  is  about  20  feet  and  on  the  Atlantic 
about  2  feet;  consequently,  at  low  tide  on  the 
Pacific  it  is  necessary  to  lift  boats  about  9  feet 
more  in  placing  them  on  the  summit  level  than  in 
lifting  them  from  the  Atlantic  to  this  level.    At 

281 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

high  tide  the  lift  from  the  Pacific  to  the  lake 
would  be  about  9  feet  less  than  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  lake. 

Besides  the  changes  to  meet  these  tidal  varia- 
tions, the  plans  of  the  locks  on  the  two  ends  of  the 
Canal  are  essentially  the  same. 

As  stated  previously,  all  of  the  locks  on  the 
Atlantic  side  are  together,  forming  one  structure, 
whereas  those  on  the  Pacific  side  are  separated. 

The  dams  on  the  Pacific  side  have  less  head  of 
water  against  them,  are  shorter,  and  their  con- 
struction was  not  complicated  with  foundation 
difficulties  such  as  those  that  existed  at  Gatun. 


PEDEO  MIGUEL  DAMS 

The  dams  at  Pedro  Miguel  simply  connect  the 
locks  with  the  sides  of  the  cut.  On  the  east  side 
this  connection  was  made  by  a  core  wall  extend- 
ing back  into  the  bank ;  on  the  west  side  by  means 
of  a  dam  approximately  1,400  feet  long,  top  eleva- 
tion 105  feet  above  sea-level,  top  width  50  feet, 
side  slope  approximately  1  vertical  on  8  horizon- 
tal. The  maximum  pressure  to  which  this  dam 
is  subjected  is  that  due  to  a  head  of  40  feet ;  the 
average  head  is  from  25  to  30  feet.  In  its  con- 
struction two  rock  ridges  were  formed  near  the 
foot  of  the  slopes  on  both  faces  of  the  dam.  These 
ridges  were  made  of  spoil  from  the  lock  excava- 

282 


SOUTH  END  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  PACIFIC 

tion ;  between  them  clay  was  placed  and  well  pud- 
dled by  the  use  of  water  jets.  The  minimum 
thickness  at  the  bottom  of  this  clay  core  was  140 
feet.  The  material  underlying  the  dam  is  im- 
pervious, with  the  exception  of  a  stratum  of 
gravel  in  the  old  bed  of  the  Eio  Grande.  Through 
this  stratum  a  trench  was  cut  and  refilled  with 
clay.  This  dam  was  tied  to  the  hill  against  which 
it  abuts  and  to  the  west  wall  of  the  lock  chamber 
by  concrete  core  walls. 


PEDEO   MIGUEL   LOCKS 

The  Pedro  Miguel  Locks  are  founded  on  dur- 
able rock  of  ample  strength  to  bear  safely  the 
maximum  loads  that  have  been  brought  upon  it. 
There  was  no  underlying  water-bearing  stratum. 
The  floor  of  the  locks  was  made  about  one  foot 
thick  in  which  weep  holes,  about  10  feet  apart, 
were  placed. 

These  locks  are  at  the  end  of  a  long  narrow  cut 
in  which  there  would  normally  be  developed  a 
current  of  about  one  foot  per  second  when  the 
lock  was  being  filled,  which  condition  would  have 
caused  surges  in  the  cut  during  the  operation  of 
the  Canal,  surges  that  would  have  interfered  with 
the  handling  of  ships.  In  order  to  prevent  this, 
as  far  as  practicable  and  also  to  provide  as  much 
sea  room  as  possible  for  ships  entering  and  leav- 

283  , 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

ing  the  locks,  the  Canal  just  north  of  the  locks 
was  widened  to  600  feet.  This  width  was  gradu- 
ally reduced  to  300  feet  at  a  point  about  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  from  the  locks.  The  extra  supply 
of  water  in  this  basin  should  prevent  any  serious 
surges  in.  the  cut  when  a  lock  is  filled. 


MIRAFLOEES   LOCKS    AND   DAMS 

In  the  Eio  Grande  Valley,  about  one  and  three- 
quarter  miles  southeast  of  Pedro  Miguel,  the 
Miraflores  Locks  were  erected.  In  order  to  pro- 
vide the  requisite  depth  of  water  on  the  lower 
sills  of  the  Pedro  Miguel  Locks  it  was  necessary 
to  so  build  the  Miraflores  Locks  and  connect 
them  with  dams  to  the  high  land  on  both  sides  of 
the  Eio  Grande  Eiver  as  to  form  a  basin  for  a 
lake  extending  from  Miraflores  Locks  to  Pedro 
Miguel  Locks  with  its  surface  elevation  about  55 
feet  above  sea.  The  area  of  this  lake  is  very 
small,  being  only  about  1.6  square  miles — so  small, 
indeed,  that  the  amount  of  water  necessary  for 
one  lockage  would  cause  a  variation  in  the  surface 
of  the  lake  of  .12  of  a  foot.  Several  small  streams 
empty  into  this  lake — the  Cameron,  the  Caimito, 
the  Pedro  Miguel,  and  the  Cocoli.  While  the  flow 
of  these  streams  is  considerable  in  the  rainy  sea- 
son, such  flow  is  not  enough  in  the  dry  season  to 
more  than  provide  for  evaporation  in  the  lake 

284 


SOUTH  END  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  PACIFIC 

and  leakage  through  the  Miraflores  Locks,  the  re- 
sult being  that  the  principal  water  supply  of  the 
lake  comes  through  the  summit  level  cut  from 
Gatun  Lake. 

There  are  two  dams  at  these  locks,  one  to  the 
east  and  one  to  the  west.  The  west  dam  extends 
from  the  head  of  the  lock  wall  to  Cocoli  Hill 
in  a  direction  almost  parallel  to  the  axis  of  the 
lock.  It  has  a  length  of  approximately  2,300  feet 
with  a  top  width  of  40  feet  at  reference  70 :  side 
slopes  approximately  1  vertical  on  12  horizontal. 
The  average  head  to  which  this-  dam  is  subjected 
is  30  feet;  maximum  about  45  feet.  This  dam 
crosses  the  Cocoli  River  bed,  which  necessitated 
diverting  that  stream  into  Miraflores  Lake 
through  a  channel  cut  in  the  depression  in  the 
adjacent  hills. 

WEST    MIRAFLOEES   DAM 

This  dam  was  constructed  by  building  two  rock 
fills,  or  ridges,  near  the  foot  of  the  slopes  on  each 
face  in  the  manner  similar  to  that  followed  at 
Pedro  Miguel.  The  portion  of  the  dam,  however, 
between  these  rock  ridges  was  filled  by  the  hy- 
draulic method  with  material  obtained  from  below 
the  locks.  This  dam  contained  1,758,423  cubic 
yards  of  material;  its  crest  is  about  fifteen  feet 
above  normal  level  of  Miraflores  Lake.  The 
foundation  on  which  it  rests  is  compact  and  im- 

285 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

pervious,  except  where  it  crosses  tlie  bed  of  the 
Cocoli  Eiver.  At  this  crossing  a  wide  ditch  was 
dug  down  to  rock  and  afterwards  filled  with  clay 
puddle.  At  other  parts  of  the  foundation,  the 
usual  practice  of  bonding  the  hydraulic  fill  of 
the  dam  with  the  natural  surface  of  the  ground, 
by  ditches,  was  followed. 


EAST   DAM 

The  east  dam  connected  the  Miraflores  Locks 
with  the  east  side  of  Rio  Grande  Valley;  it  was 
built  of  concrete  and  founded  on  rock;  was  ap- 
proximately 500  feet  long,  and  was  provided  with 
regulating  works  similar  to  those  in  use  in  the 
spillway  at  Gatun  Dam. 

In  determining  the  capacity  of  this  spillway 
it  was  necessary  to  take  into  consideration  a  situa- 
tion resulting  from  the  destruction  of  one  of  the 
lock  gates  at  Pedro  Miguel  Lock,  allowing  a  free 
flow  of  water  through  such  chamber  into  the  lake 
between  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores.  This  flow 
has  been  calculated  to  be  approximately  100,000 
second  feet;  and  since  the  lock  grounds  at  Mira- 
flores would  be  flooded  in  twenty-five  minutes  if 
no  spillway  were  provided,  which  would  result 
in  great  damage,  it  Avas  thought  necessary  to  pro- 
vide a  discharge  capacity  of  100,000  second  feet 
through  the  spillway  and  culverts  of  the  lock: 

286 


SOUTH  END  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  PACIFIC 

the  spillway  itself  permits  a  discharge  of  75,000 
second  feet.  Were  it  not  for  this  possible  con- 
tingency a  very  small  spillway  would  have  suf- 
ficed at  Miraflores.  It  was  not  thought  necessary 
in  the  design  for  this  dam  to  provide  for  the 
remote  contingency  of  having  the  gates  broken 
in  both  of  the  locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  at  the  same 
time.  The  section  adopted  for  the  spillway  dif- 
fers from  that  at  Gatun  only  when  forced  on 
account  of  different  heights.  The  parabolic  form 
of  the  upper  part  of  the  dam  adopted  at  Gatun 
was  followed  at  Miraflores. 


MIRAFLORES   LOCKS 

There  are  two  locks  in  flight  at  Miraflores. 
The  condition  at  the  lower  lock  of  this  flight  was 
complicated  by  a  tidal  variation  of  20  feet.  If  a 
lockage  were  made  from  the  upper  lock  to  the 
lower,  at  low  tide,  a  certain  height  of  lock  wall 
would  be  necessary  to  contain  the  water ;  whereas, 
if  made  at  high  tide,  walls  of  greater  height  w^ould 
be  needed ;  otherwise  they  would  be  flooded.  Ex- 
cessively high  walls  meant  excessive  cost,  not  only 
in  gates  but  in  masonry.  The  question  of  gaining 
capacity  by  lengthening  the  walls  of  the  lower  lock 
was  considered  but  abandoned  on  account  of  cost. 

A  compromise  was  finally  reached:  the  lower 
lock  was  made  of  such  capacity  as  to  hold  all  the 

287 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

water  from  the  550-foot  portion  of  tlie  upper  lock, 
at  high  tide.  No  intermediate  gates  were  in- 
stalled. When  ships  of  size  sufficient  to  require 
the  entire  upper  lock  are  passed  at  stages  above 
mean  tide  it  will  of  course  be  necessary  to  waste 
a  certain  amount  of  water  through  the  lock  cul- 
verts. 

CONSTRUCTION    PLANT — ^LOCKS    ON    PACIFIC    SIDE 

The  plant  for  manufacturing  and  placing  con- 
crete at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores  Locks  was 
of  an  entirely  different  design  from  that  used 
in  the  construction  of  the  locks  on  the  Atlantic 
side. 

The  main  portion  of  the  plant  consisted  of  eight 
cantilever  cranes;  four  of  these  cranes  were 
placed  on  tracks  outside  and  parallel  to  the  lock 
excavation.  The  function  of  these  cranes  was  to 
handle  the  concrete  material  into  the  mixers  which 
were  on  the  cranes  and  to  deliver  mixed  concrete 
to  other  cranes.  These  latter  cranes  were  placed 
in  the  lock  chamber  on  tracks  and  were  of  such 
dimensions  as  to  enable  them  to  place  concrete  in 
any  part  of  the  lock  walls.  Those  cranes  work- 
ing outside  of  the  excavation  for  the  locks  were 
called  berm  cranes ;  those  working  in  the  chamber 
were  called  chamber  cranes.  All  of  these  cranes, 
working  together,  performed  the  same  functions 
at  Miraflores  Lock  that  the  four  duplex  cableways, 

288 


SOUTH  END  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  PACIFIC 

the  automatic  railroad,  and  the  electric  railroad 
performed  at  Gatnn  Lock. 


PEDRO    MIGUEL   CONSTRUCTION   PLANT 

The  high  and  unstable  banks  existing  after  the 
excavation  had  been  made  for  the  lock  pit  at 
Pedro  Miguel  did  not  permit  of  the  normal  in- 
stallation of  this  plant.  The  berm  cranes  and 
storage  piles  could  not  be  placed  upon  the  bank 
alongside  the  lock  excavation;  they  were  located 
in  the  forebay  of  the  lock  in  the  space  to  be  occu- 
pied subsequently  by  the  upper  or  north  center 
approach  wall. 

This  location  forced  the  introduction  of  another 
element  in  this  plant,  i.  e.,  some  means  of  handling 
the  mixed  concrete  from  these  cranes  to  the  plac- 
ing cranes.  This  was  accomplished  by  a  narrow- 
gauge  steam  railroad.  In  the  forebay  of  these 
locks  two  storage  trestles  were  erected  at  an  aver- 
age height  of  28  feet  and  length  of  800  feet.  Sand 
and  crushed  stone  were  delivered  on  these  trestles 
by  trains  made  up  of  dump-cars.  The  sand  was 
dumped  on  one  side  of  the  trestle  and  the  stone 
on  the  other — all  within  reach  of  one  arm  of  the 
berm  crane. 

The  same  system  of  storing  material  was 
adopted  at  Miraflores  except  that  the  storage  tres- 
tles were  built  in  a  normal  position  there. 

289 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  construction  plant  at  the  locks  on  the  Pa- 
cific side  proved  to  be  a  very  efficient  machine. 
The  cost  of  manufacturing  and  placing  the  con- 
crete, however,  did  not  materially  vary  at  the 
three  places — Gatun,  Pedro  Miguel,  and  Mira- 
flores.  The  handling  or  construction  plants  were, 
of  course,  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  cost  of 
sand  and  stone,  their  efficiency  being  measured  by 
the  cost  of  taking  materials  from  storage,  manu- 
facturing them  into  concrete,  and  placing  such 
concrete  in  structures.  The  records  show  that 
this  operation  was  performed  more  cheaply  at 
Gatun  than  at  Pedro  Miguel,  but  more  cheaply  at 
Miraflores  than  at  either  of  the  other  places. 
Upon  the  Gatun  handling  plant,  however,  was  im- 
posed the  additional  duty  of  transporting  mate- 
rial about  1,700  feet  and  lifting  it  about  60  feet. 
This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  sand  and  stone 
for  Gatun  was  delivered  by  water — not  by  rail — 
and  the  nearest  points  of  delivery  were  separated 
from  the  mixer  site  by  the  distances  given  above. 
The  cost  of  installing  and  operating  the  plant  nec- 
essary to  perform  this  extra  duty  was  19  cents  per 
cubic  yard.  Crediting  the  work  at  Gatun  with 
this  amount,  the  cost  of  taking  material  from 
storage  and  manufacturing  and  placing  concrete, 
was :  Gatun,  $2.42  per  cubic  yard ;  Pedro  Miguel, 
$2.59  per  cubic  yard;  Miraflores,  $2.14  per  cubic 
yard. 

290 


SOUTH  END  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  PACIFIC 

FORMS 

Collapsible  forms  were  used  on  the  Pacific  Divi- 
sion for  the  culverts  and  for  the  various  openings 
that  were  repeated  many  times.  The  wall  forms 
were  materially  different  from  those  on  the  Atlan- 
tic side  and  were  composed  of  wood  in  built-up 
panels  15  feet  long  and  6  feet  high;  to  these 
panels  were  secured  a  series  of  uprights  14  feet 
long;  the  lower  8  feet  of  these  uprights  acted  as 
cantilevers  and  were  anchored  by  bolts  to  the 
hardened  concrete  previously  placed. 

CHANNEL    EXCAVATION— MIRAFLORES    TO   THE    SEA 

In  addition  to  the  old  French  ladder  dredges 
and  the  modern  dipper  dredges,  there  were  util- 
ized, in  digging  the  sea-level  part  of  the  Canal  on 
the  Pacific  side,  the  Lobnitz  rock  breaker,  a  large 
modern  ladder  dredge,  and  a  hydraulic  excava- 
tion plant.  The  pipe-line  suction  dredge  was  not 
extensively  utilized  on  this  work. 

LOBNITZ   ROCK    BREAKER 

This  machine  is  a  device  for  breaking  rock  by 
the  impact  of  a  heavy  compressed  steel  ram  or 
spar,  alternately  hoisted  and  allowed  to  fall  and, 
by  its  own  weight,  disrupt  or  break  the  stone  to 

291 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

be  removed.  The  extreme  range  of  tide  in  connec- 
tion with  the  contemplated  depth  of  channel, 
caused  these  rams  to  be  long  and  heavy ;  the  heav- 
iest being  56  feet  long  and  weighing  19.5  tons. 
This  spar  is  lifted  up  and  let  fall  in  one  position 
until  it  penetrates  about  3  feet;  it  is  then  moved 
to  another  point  about  4  feet  away  and  the  process 
continued  until  the  entire  area  is  broken.  A 
dredge  then  removes  the  broken  rock  and  another 
layer  is  broken. 

DEEDGE   ^'COEOZAL'' 

Experience  with  the  old  French  ladder  dredges 
caused  a  decision  to  be  reached  to  procure,  as  late 
as  1912,  the  ^^Corozal,''  a  modern  sea-going  lad- 
der dredge  of  large  capacity.  Such  an  expensive 
piece  of  plant  would  probably  not  have  been 
bought,  in  connection  with  the  channel  excavation, 
at  that  stage  of  the  work,  had  its  use  not  been 
indicated  in  maintaining  the  Culebra  Cut.  It  was 
expected  that  the  slides  in  that  cut  would  continue 
for  a  year  or  two,  before  they  brought  about 
slopes  sufficiently  flat  for  stability. 

This  dredge  was  designed  to  excavate  sand  and 
mud  at  the  rate  of  1,200  cubic  yards  per  hour  from 
a  depth  of  50  feet.  It  was  utilized  in  completing 
the  channel,  and  has  found  continuous  occupation 
since  in  maintaining  the  cut. 

In  excavating  the  channel  from  Miraflores  to 
292 


SOUTH  END  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  PACIFIC 

the  sea,  39,962,470  cubic  yards  of  material  was 
removed,  at  a  cost  of  .2579  cent  per  cubic  yard. 


HYDEAULIC  EXCAVATION 

A  rather  novel  experiment  in  hydraulic  excava- 
tion was  made  in  the  channel  excavation  about 
1^  miles  south  of  Miraflores  Locks.  The  material 
to  be  excavated  consisted  of  about  8,000,000  cubic 
yards  of  soft  material  overlying  about  1,500,000 
cubic  yards  of  rock.  It  was  decided  to  remove  the 
overlying  soft  material  by  the  hydraulic  excavat- 
ing plant,  the  material  excavated  to  be  utilized 
in  building  the  impermeable  part  of  the  Miraflores 
Dam  and  in  raising  swamp  lands  adjacent  to  the 
excavation  to  a  height  sufficient  to  enable  the 
Sanitary  Department  to  drain  them  and  thus  elim- 
inate or  destroy  mosquito  breeding-places  which 
they  constitute. 

The  plan  proposed  was  to  break  up  the  material 
by  monitors  and  to  wash  it  into  sumps  where 
dredging  pumps  were  located.  These  dredging 
pumps  were  mounted  on  reenforced  concrete 
barges.  About  a  million  cubic  yards  of  material 
was  thus  pumped  into  the  west  dam  at  Mira- 
flores, and  after  a  part  of  the  soft  material  had 
been  removed  by  the  hydraulic  operations,  the  re- 
mainder, including  the  rock,  was  excavated  in  the 
dry  by  steam-shovels.    The  total  amount  of  ma- 

293 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

terial  thus  removed  was  1,549,904  cubic  yards,  at 
a  cost  of  72  cents  per  cubic  yard. 

A  portion  of  this  plant  was  afterwards  utilized 
in  removing  the  high  ground  in  the  vicinity  of 
slides  just  north  of  Gold  Hill  and  in  rear  of  the 
hill  back  of  the  Cucaracha  slide. 


AIDS    TO    NAVIGATION— RANGE    LIGHTS    AND    BUOYS 

Eange  lights  are  used  to  establish  directions 
throughout  the  Canal,  except  in  the  cut  and  on 
four  of  the  shorter  sailing  lines.  The  sides  of 
the  channel  are  marked  by  gas  buoys  spaced  about 
a  mile  apart.  Lights  will  be  placed  on  both  the 
west  and  east  breakwaters  in  Limon  Bay  and  a 
fog  signal  is  provided  for  the  west  breakwater. 
Ships  sailing  on  the  ranges  at  the  entrance  of  the 
Canal  will  follow  the  center  line  of  the  Canal; 
whereas  on  all  of  the  other  sailing  lines  ships  will 
follow  a  course  125  feet  to  their  starboard  of  the 
axis  of  the  Canal.  If  two  ships  pass  each  other, 
both  of  them  on  their  ranges,  there  will  be  250 
feet  between  the  center  lines  of  the  ships. 

Both  gas  and  electricity  will  be  used  as  illumi- 
nants — electricity  where  the  ranges  are  sufficiently 
accessible.  On  the  floating  buoys  and  inaccessible 
beacons  and  towers,  compressed  acetylene,  dis- 
solved in  acetone,  will  be  used  as  the  illuminant. 
White  lights  will  be  used  in  all  of  the  aids  to 

294 


SOUTH  END  CULEBRA  CUT  TO  PACIFIC 

navigation,  sucb.  aids  being  distingushed  from 
each  other  by  systems  of  flashes  and  combinations 
of  flashes. 

Prior  to  the  formation  of  the  lake,  visitors, 
traveling  on  the  railroad,  were  astonished  and 
nonplussed  at  times  when  they  saw  lighthouses, 
as  they  termed  them — ^but  really  towers  for  range 
lights — erected  in  the  jungle  and  on  the  hills  bor- 
dering the  lake  area. 

It  was,  of  course,  necessary  to  have  all  of  this 
work  completed  before  the  Canal  was  available 
for  use.  The  construction  of  many  of  these  tow- 
ers, however,  was  exceedingly  expensive,  there 
being  no  easy  means  of  transportation  for  neces- 
sary building  material  until  the  lake  was  partially 
formed. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
MUNICIPAL  ENGINEERING 

Municipal  engineering  and  sanitary  engineering 
comprise  many  of  the  same  subjects.  A  good  wa- 
ter supply,  an  efficient  sewerage  system,  and  well- 
paved  streets,  are  the  most  important  steps  in 
improving  the  health  of  a  city,  as  well  as  in  pro- 
viding the  necessary  comforts  of  modern  life. 

At  the  end  of  the  preparatory  period  there 
had  been  either  created,  or  enlarged,  four  reser- 
voirs and  two  pumping  stations,  sufficient  to  pro- 
vide water  for  the  various  settlements  along  the 
line  of  the  Canal,  including,  of  course,  the  cities 
of  Panama  and  Colon. 

The  reservoirs  were  located  at  Rio  Grande, 
Camacho,  Carabali,  and  Brazos  Brook  near,  re- 
spectively, the  towns  of  Culebra,  Empire,  Gor- 
gona  and  Colon. 

The  pumping  stations  were  located  at  Taber- 
nilla  and  Gatun.  There  were  other  pumping  sta- 
tions used  in  conjunction  with  the  water  service 
already  described — some  of  them  continuously 
used  and  some  occasionally  when  emergencies 
arose. 

For  purifying  the  water  at  Ancon  and  Colon, 
296 


MUNICIPAL  ENGINEERING 

filtration  plants,  of  the  pressure  type,  had  been 
provided  but  not  installed.  At  other  places  drink- 
ing water  was  to  be  distilled  and  distributed  to 
the  employees. 

The  temperature  of  the  water  on  the  Isthmus 
is  nearly  constant  and  practically  the  same  as  that 
of  the  atmosphere.  This  gave  rise  to  a  condition 
that  characterizes  stagnant  water  in  the  United 
States  in  the  summer  and  fall,  giving  to  the  lower 
strata  of  water  in  the  reservoirs  a  strong  odor 
and  disagreeable  taste. 

These  systems  of  water  supply  met  the  demand 
fairly  well,  with  occasional  assistance  from  the 
Chagres  Eiver,  except  at  Gatun  and  at  Colon  and 
Cristobal.  The  water  at  Gatun  was  pumped 
from  the  Gatuncilla  Eiver.  The  flood  height  of 
this  stream  was  very  much  increased  when  the 
entire  flow  of  the  Chagres  Eiver  was  diverted  into 
one  channel  to  the  west  of  the  spillway.  This 
flooded  the  pumping  station  to  such  an  extent 
that  at  times  it  was  necessary  to  build  watertight 
bulkheads  six  or  seven  feet  high  around  the  elec- 
trically driven  machinery  in  order  to  keep  up  the 
supply. 

In  addition  to  this  difficulty  a  typhoid  epidemic 
broke  out  in  Gatun,  due,  undoubtedly,  to  the 
human  pollution  of  its  water  supply  by  the  in- 
habitants of  construction  camps  established  in 
the  watershed  of  the  Gatuncilla  Eiver,  above  Ga- 

297 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

tun,  by  the  Panama  Eailroad  during  the  construc- 
tion of  its  new  line.  Due  to  these  troubles,  an 
immediate  solution  of  a  permanent  water-supply 
system  for  Gatun  was  undertaken. 

It  was  known  that  Gatun  would  be  a  permanent 
settlement  comprising,  at  least,  the  operating 
force  for  the  Gatun  Locks,  and  possibly  a  military 
•force  for  the  protection  of  such  locks.  A  per- 
manent water  supply  being  necessary  forT;his 
place,  it  was  decided  to  provide  such  supply  as 
early  as  practicable  so  as  to  profit  by  it  during 
the  construction  period.  This  supply  was  pro- 
vided by  building  a  dam  across  the  Agua  Clara,  a 
small  stream  about  one-half  mile  northeast  of 
Gatun,  thus  creating  a  reservoir  of  sujBScient 
capacity  to  safely  store  the  water  needed  at  Gatun 
and  vicinity  during  the  dry  season.  It  was  esti- 
mated that  two  million  gallons  per  day  would  be 
required  and  that  the  watershed  of  this  reservoir, 
which  was  only  676  acres,  would  be  ample  to  fur- 
nish this  water.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
annual  rainfall  in  this  vicinity  is  about  130  inches. 

Experience  proved  that  the  daily  average  use 
of  water  was  greater  thaii  anticipated,  being  more 
than  two  and  one-half  million  gallons  daily.  The 
reservoir,  however,  fully  met  all  of  the  calls  made 
upon  it. 

On  account  of  the  odor  and  taste  of  this  water 
it  was  decided  to  filter  it.     For  this  purpose  a 

298 


MUNICIPAL  ENGINEERING 

rapid  gravity  mechanical  filter  plant  was  con- 
structed. This  filter  plant  has  a  maximum  capac- 
ity of  3,300,000  gallons  of  water  per  day.  It  was 
built  along  the  lines  of  the  best  practice  in  the 
United  States,  and  provided  Gatun  with  a  most 
satisfactory  water  supply. 

Trouble  was  early  experienced  with  the  water 
supply  at  Colon  and  Cristobal.  Brazos  Brook 
Eeservoir  Dam  was  largely  built  of  material  taken 
from  the  bed  of  the  reservoir.  This  exposed  per- 
meable material,  with  the  result  that  there  was 
an  excessive  amount  of  leakage  from  this  reser- 
voir and  no  practicable  way  to  stop  it. 

During  ordinary  years  this  water  supply  was 
augmented  by  pumping  water  from  the  east  diver- 
sion, a  channel  excavated  by  the  French  to  divert 
the  Gatuncilla  water  from  the  Canal  and  carry  it 
independently  to  the  sea.  During  the  year  1912, 
even  with  this  assistance,  the  water  supply  for 
Colon  and  Cristobal  was  practically  exhausted, 
and  it  became  necessary  to  haul  water  in  barges 
from  Gatun  to  Cristobal.  From  May  10  to  June 
24,  of  that  year,  550,000  gallons  a  day  were  thus 
delivered.  This  water  was  piped  into  the  barges 
from  the  Gatun  Reservoir  and  pumped  from  such 
barges  into  the  Cristobal  main. 

The  operation  of  the  pressure  filters  at  Mount 
Hope  was  very  unsatisfactory,  largely  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  amount  of  water  forced  through 

299 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

them  exceeded  their  maximum  capacity  by  nearly 
50  per  cent.  This  situation  led  to  an  investiga- 
tion that  had  in  view  a  plant  for  providing  an 
adequate  supply  of  filtered  water  for  Colon  and 
Cristobal. 

These  investigations  indicated  that  it  would  be 
very  expensive  to  provide  such  a  supply  before 
the  formation  of  Gatun  Lake,  but  that  after  such 
a  lake  was  formed  it  would  be  feasible,  at  a  small 
expense,  to  deliver  any  amount  of  water  from 
such  lake  into  Brazos  Brook  Reservoir  for  use  in 
Colon  and  Cristobal,  and  that  this  could  be  done 
^  y  driving  an  inexpensive  tunnel  six  hundred  feet 
long  through  the  divide  separating  the  lake  from 
the  reservoir. 

Such  a  project  was  adopted  and  provision  was 
made  for  filtering  a  maximum  of  7,500,000  gallons 
of  water  per  day.  This  involved  the  construction 
of  an  entirely  new  plant.  In  this  plant  the  water 
was  brought  from  the  reservoir  through  two 
20-inch  mains  to  an  aeration  basin  where,  by 
means  of  specially  designed  sprinkling  nozzles,  it 
was  thoroughly  aerated.  From  the  aeration  basin 
the  water  was  passed  to  the  head  house  and  mix- 
ing chambers  where  it  was  mixed  with  a  solution 
of  aluminum  sulphate  (common  alum)  and  then 
passed  into  sedimentation  basins  where  the  alum 
caused  the  coagulation  and  settlement  of  nearly 
all  sediment  in  the  water ;  after  sedimentation  the 

300 


MUNICIPAL  ENGINEERING 

water  passed  into  the  filter  building  and  through 
the  filters  into  the  clear-water  basin.  This  plant 
was  finished  during  the  construction  period  and 
constitutes  a  satisfactory  and  permanent  water 
supply,  not  only  for  the  Atlantic  end  of  the  Canal 
proper,  but  for  all  ships  that  call  at  that  port. 

The  water-supply  system  provided  for  the 
Panama  end  of  the  Canal  became  inadequate  by 
the  beginning  of  the  year  1910,  the  Kio  Grande 
Eeservoir  proving  to  be  inadequate.  Investiga- 
tion showed  that  the  Eio  Grande  watershed  could 
not  be  counted  upon  to  furnish  more  than  three 
million  gallons  of  water  per  day.  This  deficiency 
was  supplied  from  Cocoli  Lake,  which  had  been 
formed  by  the  preliminary  work  of  construction 
already  done  at  Miraflores.  This  involved  the 
creation  of  a  pumping  and  filtration  plant  of 
capacity  sufficient  to  furnish  the  additional  water 
needed  for  Panama  and  adjacent  towns.  This 
provision  successfully  met  the  situation  until  the 
early  spring  of  1913,  when  the  Canal  construction 
had  advanced  to  such  a  stage  as  to  cause  the  crea- 
tion of  Miraflores  Lake  and  the  flooding  of  the 
Cocoli  pumping  station. 

The  adopted  plans  for  the  operation  of  the 
Canal  contemplated  the  concentration  of  the 
heads  of  all  departments  at  the  Pacific  end  of  the 
Canal.  This,  with  the  development  of  the  ter- 
minal facilities  and  shops  at  Balboa  and  the  con- 

301 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

sequent  growth  of  the  city  of  Panama  made  the 
solution  of  a  permanent  and  adequate  water  sup- 
ply for  this  section  an  urgent  problem. 

The  preliminary  studies  concerning  this  prob- 
lem led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  design  should 
be  based  upon  a  plant  with  a  maximum  capacity 
of  about  twelve  million  gallons  of  filtered  water 
per  day  which  water  could  best  be  treated  in  a 
purification  plant  of  the  rapid  mechanical  gravity 
type.  The  source  of  the  water  supply,  however, 
was  a  puzzling  question. 

The  project  as  first  decided  upon  contemplated 
obtaining  the  water  from  Miraflores  Lake — an 
artificial  body  of  water  created  by  dams  extending 
from  Miraflores  Locks  to  the  high  ground  on 
either  side  of  the  Eio  Grande  Valley.  Compara- 
tive estimates  indicated  that  this  would  be  the 
cheapest  source  of  supply.  The  question  of  a 
material  increase  in  the  chlorine  or  salt  content 
of  the  water  of  this  lake,  on  account  of  the  opera- 
tion of  the  Miraflores  Locks,  was  considered,  but 
it  was  decided  that  the  chance  was  remote  of  this 
happening  to  a  hurtful  extent,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  plant  for  pumping  water  from  Miraflores 
Lake  was  commenced.  The  purification  plant 
planned  for  this  place  was  modeled  largely  after 
the  plant  that  had  just  been  completed  at  Mt. 
Hope  for  Colon  and  Cristobal. 

"Work  was  commenced  on  this  general  project 
302 


MUNICIPAL  ENGINEERING 

in  August,  1913,  but  by  January,  1914,  trouble 
was  experienced  with  the  boilers  in  the  Miraflores 
power  plant  on  account  of  the  salt  content  of  the 
water.  This  led  to  the  establishment  of  sampling 
stations  to  determine  the  chlorine  content  in  the 
water.  The  records  of  these  stations  showed  that 
the  chlorine  content  continued  to  increase  at  such 
a  rate  as  to  render  Miraflores  Lake  an  unsuitable 
water  supply.  The  surface  of  this  lake  is  55  feet 
above  sea  and  is  connected  by  a  flight  of  two 
locks  with  the  sea-level  portion  of  the  Panama 
Canal  on  the  Pacific  side ;  the  bottom  of  the  upper 
lock  being  13  feet  below  sea-level.  The  upper  sill 
of  this  lock,  however,  is  about  11  feet  above  mean 
sea. 

The  situation  as  described  caused  the  approval 
of  the  proposition  to  obtain  the  w^ater  supply  from 
the  Chagres  Eiver  area  of  Gatun  Lake,  near  Gam- 
boa  ;  the  water  to  be  pumped  to  the  summit  of  the 
Continental  Divide  through  pipes  of  suitable  size, 
from  which  pbint  it  is  allowed  to  run  by  grav- 
ity to  the  Miraflores  purification  plant;  the  loca- 
tion of  this  purification  plant  being  equally  avail- 
able for  water  coming  from  Gamboa  or  directly 
from  the  Miraflores  Lake. 

This  permanent  water-supply  system  for  the 
south  end  of  Panama  Canal  was  not  completed 
during  the  construction  period  proper,  but  has 
since  been  completed  and  is  now  in  operation. 

303 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  purification  plants  at  Gatun,  Mount  Hope, 
and  Miraflores,  are  in  all  essentials  siniilar  to 
plants  of  like  character  built  in  the  United  States, 
except  the  system  of  aeration  which,  it  is  thought, 
has  not  been  previously  embodied  in  plants  of 
this  character. 

This  aeration  of  the  water  not  only  assists  in 
improving  the  taste  and  odor,  but  it  so  changes 
the  iron  content  of  the  water  as  to  reduce  the 
amount  of  aluminum  sulphate  needed  in  the  puri- 
fication process. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

SHOPS  AND  TERMINAL  FACILITIES 

SHOPS 

It  is  only  the  completed  structures  that  remain 
as  permanent  monuments  in  any  great  engineer- 
ing  undertaking  like  the  building  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  Practically  all  of  the  appliances  that  as- 
sist in  such  construction  are  lost  sight  of  in  his- 
tory; among  these  are  plant  and  the  shops  in 
which  such  plant  was  erected,  maintained,  and 
repaired;  all  of  which  soon  find  their  way  to  the 
scrap  heap.  The  ability  shown  by  the  employees 
in  meeting  emergencies  in  the  construction  and 
repair  of  tools  needed  in  shaping  the  permanent 
structures  is  also  soon  forgotten. 

The  importance  of  the  shops  during  the  con- 
struction period  of  the  Panama  Canal  cannot  be 
portrayed  in  a  general  description  such  as  this, 
but  an  approximate  idea  of  the  scope  of  such 
shops  can  be  obtained  by  remembering  that  the 
following  pla^t  was  in  the  service  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  during  the  average  year  of 
the  construction  period :  4,400  cars ;  277  locomo- 
tives ;  92  steam-shovels ;  55  cranes ;  25  spreaders ; 

305 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

27  nnloaders ;  10  track-shifters ;  17  pile-drivers,  in 
connection  with  steam-shovel  excavation;  and  76 
barges;  33  clapets ;  launches,  etc.;  20  dredges;  12 
tugs,  and  quite  a  variety  of  general  equipment, 
in  connection  with  dredging  operations  and  trans- 
portation of  material  by  water. 

In  the  shops  of  the  various  classes  all  of  this 
equipment  was  erected  and  afterwards  kept  in 
repair.  The  magnitude  of  the  problem  was 
largely  increased  by  the  distance  of  such  shops 
from  needed  supplies,  which  meant  that  many 
things  had  to  be  manufactured  on  the  job. 

There  were  handled  in  the  great  Gorgona  shops 
a  monthly  average  of  work,  as  follows :  heavy  and 
general  repairs  to  locomotives,  17;  repairs  to  all 
classes  of  cars,  1,500 ;  repairs  to  equipment  other 
than  locomotives  and  cars,  204. 

In  addition,  there  were  at  this  shop  a  monthly 
average  of  about  nine  hundred  shop  and  casting 
orders  for  repairs  to  stationary  equipment,  manu- 
facture of  repair  parts  and  for  special  equipment. 

Time  is  often  the  controlling  element  in  shops 
on  a  construction  job.  A  day's  delay  may  mean 
more  than  cost  of  the  machine,  and  the  shop's 
predictions  as  to  time  that  completed  work  can 
be  expected  are  of  unusual  importance.  Each 
construction  official  of  course  thinks  his  work  the 
most  important  in  the  shop. 

When  orders  were  sent  in  from  the  construc- 
306 


SHOPS  AND  TERMINAL  FACILITIES 

tion  divisions  a  date  of  delivery  was  always  re- 
quested by  those  divisions,  and  to  meet  these 
requests  required  a  remarkable  coordination  of 
the  various  elements  of  work  in  the  shop  and  an 
unusually  close  supervision  on  the  part  of  those 
in  authority.  When  a  new  order  was  received 
it  first  passed  through  the  planning  department 
where  all  drawings  were  checked  and  requisitions 
made  for  material ;  these  requisitions,  with  bill  of 
material  and  drawings,  were  all  then  forwarded 
to  the  shop ;  copies  of  these  were  sent  to  each  fore- 
man who  would  take  part  in  the  accomplishment 
of  the  order  in  question.  A  meeting  of  these 
foremen  was  called  each  day  at  a  certain  specified 
hour  for  the  purpose  of  checking  all  orders  over- 
due and  all  new  orders.  It  was  at  these  meet- 
ings that  the  data  for  the  estimate  as  to  the  time 
of  completion  of  each  order  were  obtained;  and 
now  after  the  dust  and  smoke  have  all  cleared 
away  and  each  construction  official  can  view  the 
total  demand  made  upon  the  shops  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  he  will,  it  is  thought,  testify  that  such 
shops  did  their  full  share  toward  the  completion 
of  the  work  in  the  specified  time. 


TEEMINAL   FACILITIES 

A  decision  was  reached  in  1911  that  the  Panama 
Canal  should  provide  berthing  space  for  vessels 

307 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

using  the  terminal  ports  and  the  Canal  itself; 
that  the  Canal  should  provide  facilities  for  dock- 
ing and  repairing  vessels  of  all  classes  and  for 
supplying  them  with  fuel,  water,  foodstuffs,  ship 
chandlery,  etc. ;  all  of  these  facilities  being  for  the 
joint  use  of  the  ships  of  commerce  and  of  the  ships 
of  war. 

The  design  of  these  facilities  was  primarily 
such  as  to  make  the  structures  suitable  for  mili- 
tary use. 

The  general  plan  adopted  called  for  a  main 
coaling  plant  at  the  Atlantic  end  of  the  Canal, 
capable  of  handling  and  storing  200,000  tons  of 
coal,  having  a  subaqueous  storage  of  100,000  tons, 
to  be  connected  with  the  railroad  and  of  course 
convenient  for  ships. 

This  plant  was  to  be  supplemented  by  a  sub- 
sidiary coaling  plant  at  the  Pacific  terminus  of 
the  Canal,  capable  of  handling  and  storing  100,- 
000  tons  of  coal,  50,000  tons  of  this  to  have  sub- 
aqueous storage. 

In  addition  to  the  coaling  plants  described 
above  the  general  plan  provided  that  a  fuel  oil 
supply  be  maintained  at  each  end  of  the  Canal 
mth  an  initial  storage  capacity  of  80,000  barrels 
at  each  point,  the  design  for  these  plants  to  be 
so  made  that  their  capacity  could  be  increased 
if  required. 

Plans  for  the  necessary  commercial  docks  at 
308 


SHOPS  AND  TERMINAL  FACILITIES 

each  end  of  the  Canal  were  so  drawn  as  to  permit 
of  an  extension  in  number  of  such  docks  if  com- 
merce demands  it. 

All  commercial  docks  are  to  have  steel  super- 
structures and  suitable  loading  and  unloading  de- 
vices to  facilitate  the  handling  and  caring  for 
commerce. 

Those  on  the  Pacific  side  are  constructed  of 
reenf orced  concrete  throughout  and  supported  by 
concrete  piers.  The  piers  were  composed  of 
reenforced  concrete  caisson  shells,  6  feet  inside 
and  8  feet  outside  diameter,  cast  in  6-foot  sections 
on  the  ground  near  the  mixing  plant,  sunk  to  rock 
and  filled  with  concrete.  The  bottom  section  was 
provided  with  a  steel  cutting  edge  which  is  im- 
bedded about  1  foot  in  the  rock.  A  section  was 
put  in  place  and  the  material  excavated  from  the 
inside,  the  section  sinking  from  its  own  weight  as 
the  excavation  progressed,  until  other  sections 
could  be  added.  The  firm  material  was  excavated 
by  hand  into  buckets  and  removed  from  the  cais- 
son. The  soft  material  was  excavated  by  orange 
peel  buckets  operated  from  cranes.  The  piers 
were  reenforced  against  bending  by  old  French 
rails.  These  docks  were  located  in  low  ground 
and  none  of  the  caissons  were  sunk  through  open 
water.  The  basin  in  front  of  the  docks  was  ex- 
cavated after  their  completion. 

For  docks  at  the  Atlantic  terminals  a  different 
309 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

design  and  plan  was  adopted.  The  docks  were 
constructed  of  steel  beams  and  girders  encased  in 
concrete,  for  protection  against  corrosion,  and 
the  decking  of  reenforced  concrete.  The  piers 
were  sunk  largely  through  open  water  and  were 
composed  of  steel  plate  cylinders,  6  feet  in  diame- 
ter, in  6-foot  sections,  driven  with  a  pile-driver, 
excavated  by  hand,  and  filled  with  concrete.  The 
material  through  which  they  were  driven  was 
coral  rock,  rotten  at  the  top  but  increasing  in 
hardness  as  the  depth  increased. 

At  the  Pacific  end  of  the  Canal  were  to  be 
erected  the  great  permanent  shops  and  the  docks 
for  large  ships.  These  docks  were  to  have  a 
usable  length  of  1,000  feet,  with  a  width  of  110 
feet,  thus  providing  for  docking  the  largest  ship 
that  could  pass  through  the  Panama  Canal.  An 
auxiliary  dock  was  also  planned,  with  a  usable 
length  of  350  feet  and  a  width  of  71  feet.  Both 
of  the  docks  have  a  hard  rock  foundation  and 
there  were  no  unusual  construction  difficulties. 

An  idea  of  the  extent  and  use  of  the  permanent 
shops  erected  at  Balboa  can  probably  best  be 
drawn  from  the  following  statement,  giving  the 
use  of  the  shop  and  its  floor  area  in  square  feet : 

Floor  Area 
Building  Square  Feet 

Machine,  erecting,  and  tool  shops 67,420 

Forge,  pipefitters',  tinsmiths',  and  copper  shop . .  31,650 

310 


SHOPS  AND  TERMINAL  FACILITIES 

Floor  Area 
Building  Square  Feet 

Steel  storage  shed 18,080 

Boiler  and  shopfitters'  shop 45,940 

General  storehouse 89.920 

Paint    shop 12,760 

Car  shop 38,800 

Joiner,  carpenter,  and  pattern  shop 48,240 

Galvanizing  shop 5,620 

Lumber  and  equipment  store  shed 67,060 

Steel,  iron,  and  brass  foundry 37,060 

Coke  shed 3,070 

Boiler   house 2,380 

Pattern   storage  building 13,870 

Office  building 9,500 

Total 491,370 

The  erection  of  these  terminal  facilities  was 
commenced  but  not  completed  during  the  con- 
struction period  of  the  Canal.  Enough  of  the 
shop  buildings,  however,  were  finished  for  the  in- 
stallation of  the  machines  that  had  occupied  the 
construction  shop  buildings,  all  of  such  shops 
being  dismantled  prior  to  the  completion  of  the 
Canal,  the  site  of  the  shops  at  Gorgona  being 
now  covered  by  the  Gatun  Lake. 


CHAPTER  XX 
OPERATION  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

As  soon  as  a  ship  arrives  at  either  end  of  the 
Canal  she  is  boarded  by  a  pilot,  a  quarantine 
officer,  and  snch  other  officials  as  have  duty  con- 
nected with  the  passage  of  this  particular  ship. 
All  ships  that  have  not  prepaid  their  tolls  are  re- 
quired to  pay  in  cash.  The  passage  of  ships  is 
facilitated,  however,  by  paying  the  tolls  before 
reaching  the  Canal.  These  tolls  can  be  paid 
through  the  various  subtreasuries  in  the  United 
States  or  through  the  Panama  Railroad  Company, 
in  New  York. 

If  the  boat  has  a  through  cargo  and  requires 
no  supplies,  the  pilot  proceeds  with  her  across 
the  Isthmus,  otherwise  the  necessary  business  is 
done,  or  arranged  for,  before  she  proceeds.  The 
most  important  operations  in  connection  with  the 
journey  from  ocean  to  ocean  is  the  passage 
through  the  locks. 

LOCK   OPERATION 

While  locks  have  been  in  use  for  many  cen- 
turies and  the  devices  for  operating  them  have 
undergone  a  gradual  growth,  the  operating  condi- 
tions, especially  with  respect  to  safety  imposed 

312 


OPERATION  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

upon  the  Panama  locks,  caused  the  development  of 
several  new  designs  to  meet  these  conditions, 
namely :  a  new  device  for  opening  and  closing  the 
lock  gates ;  another  for  forcing  the  gates  to  close 
tightly  and  to  lock  them  in  this  position ;  another 
for  towing  ships  through  the  lock  by  electric  tow- 
ing apparatus ;  and  still  another  for  operating  all 
machinery  of  the  lock  by  remote  electrical  control. 

In  swinging  a  heavy  lock  gate,  slow  motion  and 
great  power  are  needed  at  the  beginning  and  end 
of  the  operation.  Slow  motion  is  required  in 
bringing  the  gates  together  with  their  miter  faces 
in  contact  and  in  moving  the  gate  into  or  out  of 
its  recess  in  the  wall  to  give  time  for  the  water 
displaced  by  the  movement  of  the  gate  to  flow  to 
or  from  the  recess  without  creating  an  objection- 
able head  to  resist  the  movement.  Great  power 
is  necessary  in  breaking  the  miter  seals,  fre- 
quently against  a  small  head,  and  in  forcing  the 
gate  into  or  out  of  its  recess  against  a  small  head 
of  water. 

These  requirements  were  met  most  effectually 
in  a  simple  but  new  and  patentable  design  consist- 
ing of  a  large  horizontal  gear  wheel,  to  the  rim 
of  which  is  attached  a  strut,  the  other  end  of  this 
strut  being  attached  to  the  gate.  See  Figure  21. 
The  large  wheel  revolves  through  an  arc  of  197° 
and  the  strut  is  so  connected  to  it  that  at  the  be- 
ginning and  end  of  the  revolution  the  maximum 

313 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

force  can  be  exerted  with  a  minimum  movement  of 
the  gate.  The  maximum  movement  being  when 
the  gates  are  swinging  free  in  the  lock  chamber. 

A  perfect  closing  of  the  gates  is  insured  by 
means  of  a  special  device  called  the  miter  forcing 
and  locking  machine.  This  device  consists  of  a 
pair  of  movable  jaws  on  the  end  of  one  leaf  that 
engages  a  large  pin  on  the  end  of  the  other  leaf. 
The  application  of  power  closes  these  jaws  and 
forces  and  holds  the  gates  to  their  proper  position. 

TOWING  LOCOMOTIVES 

More  precautions  have  been  taken  to  avoid  acci- 
dent in  the  operation  of  the  locks  on  the  Panama 
Canal  than  upon  any  locks  in  the  world.  The 
most  effective  of  these  precautions  is  probably 
the  electric  towing  locomotives.  By  means  of 
these  locomotives  ships  can  pass  through  the  locks 
without  using  their  own  power,  which  use,  as 
previously  pointed  out,  has  been  the  source  of  the 
majority  of  accidents  to  lock  gates.  Vessels  are 
expected  to  land  alongside  the  guide  walls  at 
either  end  of  the  locks.  But  in  practice  they  do 
not  always  actually  land  but  do  approach  these 
walls  at  a  very  slow  speed  and,  while  thus  pro- 
ceeding, take  the  tow  lines  from  the  locomotives 
on  the  middle  wall.  If  the  gates  are  not  open 
and  everything  ready  for  the  entrance  of  the  ship, 
it  would,  of  course,  be  required  to  land  alongside 

314 


OPERATION  OF  PANAIVIA  CANAL 

the  guide  wall.  If  the  gates  are  open  the  ship  will 
probably  not  land  but  will  slow  down  and  take  the 
lines  from  the  locomotives  on  the  center  wall,  as 
described  above,  and  will  proceed  along  the  cen- 
ter wall  under  the  control  of  the  towing  locomo- 
tive, aided  slightly  by  her  own  engines,  until  the 
lines  from  the  locomotives  on  the  flare  wall  can  be 
passed  to  the  ship.  This  is  ordinarily  done  by 
means  of  a  skiff. 

As  soon  as  the  ship  is  under  the  control  of  the 
towing  locomotives  on  both  walls  no  further  use 
is  made  of  her  own  engines.  It  was  expected  that 
four  locomotives  would  be  sufficient  to  safely  tow 
any  ship  through  the  locks  of  the  Panama  Canal 
and  hold  such  ship  in  the  center  of  the  lock  dur- 
ing the  filling  and  emptying  process.  In  practice, 
however,  six  locomotives  are  used  on  the  larger 
vessels — three  on  each  side  of  the  ship — one  for- 
ward, one  aft,  and  one  nearly  amidships.  The 
movements  of  these  towing  locomotives  are  con- 
trolled by  a  lock  pilot  on  the  bridge  of  the  vessel, 
by  a  system  of  signals.  These  towing  locomotives 
are  simply  moving  capstans. 


OPEEATION   OF   LOCK    MACHINEEY   BY   EEMOTE 
CONTROL 

The  switchboard  in  the  control  house  is  essen- 
tially a  combination  of  a  switchboard  with  a  model 

315 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

of  the  lock.  All  operations  in  the  lock  proper 
are  reproduced  on  the  switchboard,  so  that  the 
operator  can  see  at  any  moment  the  exact  situa- 
tion as  to  machines,  stage  of  water,  etc.,  in  the 
lock  that  he  is  operating. 

It  is  an  impressive  and  never  to  be  forgotten 
sight  to  stand  in  the  control  house  at  the  lower 
end  of  the  upper  lock  at  Gatun  and  watch  the 
operator  at  the  switchboard  when  a  ship  is  pass- 
ing from  lake  to  sea-level,  for  instance.  A  touch 
of  his  hand  sets  in  motion  the  powerful  machines 
which,  in  their  proper  order,  lower  the  huge  fen- 
der chain  and  swing  the  ponderous  gates,  making 
an  opening  as  wide  as  a  city  street.  These  move- 
ments of  the  chain  and  gates  can  be  observed 
through  the  windows  of  the  control  house  in  addi- 
tion to  their  reproduction  on  the  switchboard. 
The  slow  entry  into  the  lock  of  a  gigantic  steam- 
ship in  tow  of  two  electric  locomotives  can  also  be 
seen  from  the  same  window.  These  locomotives 
are  so  small  in  comparison  with  the  size  of  the 
ship  that  they  appear  like  pigmies  attempting 
the  impossible,  but  their  combined  pull  of  50,000 
pounds  on  the  tow  lines  slowly  but  surely  draws 
the  ship  until  her  stern  is  past  the  open  gates.  As 
soon  as  this  comes  to  pass  two  other  locomotives, 
which  have  been  trailing  close  behind  with  their 
tow  lines  at  such  an  angle  as  to  keep  the  ship 
steady  on  her  course,  begin  to  pull  backward  and 

316 


Fig.  22. — Ship  Passing  Through  Gatun  Locks. 


Fig.  23. — Gatun  Spillway  as  Seen  from  the  Lake. 


OPERATION  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

just  as  slowly  and  surely,  stop  the  ship  and  hold 
her  securely  in  the  middle  of  the  lock  chamber. 
The  operator  then  closes  the  gates  behind  the  ship 
and  pulls  another  lever  which  opens  the  valves  in 
the  filling  and  emptying  culverts.  You  soon  no- 
tice that  the  ship  is  slowly  being  lowered  in  the 
lock  chamber  as  the  water-level  lowers.  See 
Figure  22.  Turning  around  and  looking  into  the 
lock  below,  you  see  the  water  surface  in  violent 
agitation  caused  by  the  water  rushing  up  through 
the  holes  in  the  floor  from  the  culverts  under- 
neath. The  water  in  the  two  locks  soon  comes 
to  rest  at  the  same  elevation,  another  chain  is 
lowered,  the  gates  ahead  opened,  the  ship  towed 
into  the  middle  lock,  the  gates  closed  behind  her, 
the  culvert  valves  at  the  upper  end  closed  and 
those  at  the  lower  end  opened,  and  in  the  same 
way  the  ship  is  lowered  and  passed  into  the  lower 
lock  where  similar  operations  finally  lower  her  to 
sea-level.  The  locomotives  take  her  out  of  the 
lock,  the  tow  lines  are  cast  off  and  she  steams 
away  at  increased  speed  as  though  glad  to  be  at 
last  rid  of  those  controlling  cables  and  confining 
lock  walls. 

This  task  of  raising  or  lowering  the  largest  ship 
that  floats  85  feet  in  one  hour's  time  is  accom- 
plished with  no  more  human  energy  than  is  pos- 
sessed by  a  child,  the  only  requirement  being  the 
pulling  of  switches. 

.317 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  lock  operating  switchboard  in  the  control 
houses  of  the  locks  is  about  64  feet  long  and  5 
feet,  4  inches  wide,  and  upon  it  are  the  levers 
which  operate  the  switches.  On  this  board  are 
indicators  in  proper  relation  to  each  other  that 
represent  the  various  parts  of  the  lock-operating 
mechanism;  such  as  miniature  fender  chains, 
swinging  arms  to  represent  gates,  members  which 
move  vertically  and  show  the  exact  position  of 
the  moving  parts  of  valves,  and  indicators  which 
show  by  moving  pointers  the  height  of  the  water 
in  the  various  locks;  thus  enabling  the  operator 
at  a  single  glance  over  the  switchboard  to  know 
the  exact  position  of  any  machine  about  the  locks, 
as  well  as  the  water-level  in  the  locks. 

The  operations  required  to  pass  a  vessel 
through  the  locks  must  necessarily  be  made  in  a 
progressive  order.  To  avoid  accidents,  the  prone- 
ness  of  man  to  err  is  eliminated  by  having  certain 
important  switches  so  interlocked  that  the  opera- 
tor cannot  make  a  mistake  and  operate  the  wrong 
switch. 


POWEE    HOUSE— ELECTRICAL 

"While  steam  and  compressed  air  found  quite 
general  use  during  the  construction  period  in  all 
parts  of  the  CanaV  except  at  the  locks,  electricity 
will  be  almost  solely  used  in  operating  the  Canal; 

318 


OPERATION  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

largely  on  account  of  the  fact  that  there  is  a  fall 
of  about  75  feet  at  the  Gatun  Spillway,  and  that 
power  can  be  generated  cheaply  by  using  the  sur- 
plus water.  There  will,  therefore,  be  about  one 
thousand  individual  motors  installed  in  connection 
with  the  operation  of  the  locks  and  their  appur- 
tenances. Many  of  these  motors  will  only  be  used 
occasionally.  The  Isthmian  climate  being  exceed- 
ingly humid  the  management  was  confronted  with 
a  condition  in  this  connection  which  forced  special 
study  covering,  in  particular,  questions  of  corro- 
sion of  metallic  parts  and  of  insulation. 

The  entire  fall  from  the  summit  level  of  the 
Canal  to  near  sea-level  is  at  one  place  on  the 
Atlantic  side,  while  on  the  Pacific  it  is  divided; 
consequently  greater  power  can  be  developed  with 
the  same  amount  of  water  on  the  Atlantic  side 
than  on  the  Pacific.  For  this  reason  the  only 
hydro-electric  plant  is  at  Gatun,  and  the  power 
needed  on  the  Pacific  side  is  transmitted  across 
the  Isthmus.  A  reserve  steam  plant,  however,  is 
kept  ready  for  service  on  the  Pacific  side. 

While  the  Panama  Eailroad  is  still  a  steam 
road,  the  towers  for  the  transmission  line  across 
the  Isthmus  were  designed  with  a  view  to  electri- 
fying the  road. 

The  Panama  Eailroad  may  prove  to  be  almost 
as  important  an  element  in  operating  the  Canal 
as  it  was  in  building  it.    This  railroad,  although 

319 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

operated  under  a  charter  granted  by  the  state  of 
New  York,  is  essentially  a  government- owned 
road,  all  of  its  stock  being  owned  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States.  While  it  is  true  that 
each  director  is  required,  by  the  charter,  to  be  a 
stockholder,  such  stock  ownership  is  merely 
nominal.  On  purchasing  it  the  director  enters 
into  a  contract  to  sell  the  stock  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  accepts  part  payment.  This  railroad 
has  been  referred  to  as  a  convenient  device  for 
avoiding  many  of  the  restrictions  imposed  on  the 
transaction  of  Government  business  by  law  and 
regulations. 

During  the  construction  period  the  laundry, 
bakery,  cold-storage  plant,  and  commissary  stores 
were  all  operated  through  the  Panama  Eailroad, 
and  there  are  many  advantages  in  continuing 
these  operations  through  this  same  agency  and  en- 
larging it  into  a  general  shipping  supply  busi- 
ness, including  fuel.  This  railroad  is  also  acting 
as  agent  for  companies  operating  ships  through 
the  Canal ;  and  since  the  governor  of  the  Canal  is 
also  president  of  the  Panama  Eailroad,  probably 
the  most  advantageous  way  to  arrange  for  pass- 
ing a  ship  through  the  Canal  and  supplying  her 
while  en  route  is  through  the  agency  of  this  road 
and  directly  with  the  Marine  Department  of  the 
Panama  Canal. 

It  is  quite  probable  that  a  larger  force  will  be 
320 


OPERATION  OF  PANAMA  CANAL 

required  in  connection  with  supplying  and  repair- 
ing ships  than  with  the  actual  passage  of  such 
ships  through  the  Canal.  All  instruments  for 
supplying  and  repairing  ships  should,  however, 
be  self-supporting. 

It  will  probably  be  some  years  before  the  banks 
of  the  .Canal  are  entirely  stable  and  the  cost  of 
maintenance  approximately  constant.  "When  such 
a  condition  comes  to  pass  the  operation  of  the 
Canal  proper  will  be  an  easy  task  and  relatively 
an  inexpensive  one. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  WORK  AND  ITS  COST 

Practically  all  of  the  work  involved  in  the  build- 
ing of  the  Panama  Canal  was  performed  by  em- 
ployees serving  directly  under  the  United  States. 
The  only  work  of  consequence  not  performed  in 
this  manner  was  that  of  the  lock  gates  and  emer- 
gency dams.  These  structures  were  erected  by 
contract,  it  being  thought  practically  necessary 
that  the  firm  fabricating  these  structures  should 
erect  them.  No  work  on  the  Canal  required 
greater  accuracy  than  that  of  the  lock  gates,  and 
the  responsibility  could  be  more  clearly  fixed  if 
the  same  contractor  both  fabricated  and  erected 
the  structures. 

The  wisdom  of  abandoning  the  idea  of  build- 
ing the  Panama  Canal  by  contract  became  more 
and  more  apparent  as  the  work  progressed.  In 
the  first  place,  the  power  of  the  Government  was 
necessary  in  enforcing  all  needed  sanitary  regula- 
tions, and  the  credit  of  the  Government  was  neces- 
sary in  launching  the  work  upon  a  scale  that 
would  insure  its  completion  in  the  specified  time. 

Contractors  would  have  hesitated  in  investing 
the  necessary  millions  in  plant  long  before  any 

322 


THE  WORK  AND  ITS  COST 

estimates  were  in  sight.  The  needed  changes  in 
plans  and  projects,  the  innumerable  slides  in  the 
Culebra  Cut,  and  other  unforeseen  and  unspecifi- 
able  difficulties  would  have  together  probably- 
formed  the  basis  for  lawsuits  that  would  have 
extended  over  many  years. 

There  never  would  have  been  the  same  esprit 
de  corps  in  the  force  working  for  contractors  as 
existed  in  the  force  working  for  the  Government. 
Every  man  was  proud  to  be  a  member  of  the 
force ;  proud  of  the  fact  that  his  Government  had 
undertaken  to  build  the  Canal  after  others  had 
failed.  He  felt  that  the  job  was  commensurate 
with  the  strength  of  his  Government,  and  his 
loyalty  to  the  job  was  one  of  the  most  striking 
features  of  the  undertaking.  It  was  not  a  loyalty 
to  individuals — ^because  the  same  force  exhibited 
it  through  three  administrations — but  a  loyalty  to 
the  country. 

The  Panama  Canal  is  one  of  the  few  Govern- 
ment undertakings  that  were  essentially  com- 
pleted within  the  estimate  both  as  to  time  and 
money.  The  greatest  reason  for  this  was  the  fact 
that  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  provided 
the  money  as  fast  as  it  could  be  properly  used. 
Those  in  authority  knew  that  they  could  plan 
the  construction  work  on  a  scale  that  would  insure 
its  completion  on  time  and  that  the  money  would 
be  available  to  pay  for  the  plant,  material,  and 

323 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

labor.  The  entire  force  felt  that  positions  were 
secure  and  that  employment  would  be  continuous 
for  the  man  who  did  his  work  and  that  there 
would  be  no  cessation  of  work  for  lack  of  funds. 

A  Comparison  op  Costs  : 
May,  1904,  to  June  30,  1914 


Dry  Excavation 


Cu.  Yds.  Unit  Cost 

Gatun  to  sea    2,181,998  .6746 

Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel 110,261,883  .7800 

Pedro  Miguel  to  sea 4,819,969  .7287 

Gatun  Spillway  1,544,202  .7131 

Gatun  Locks    4,660,055  .6776 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks 1,133,280  .9136 

Miraflores  Locks 2,222,582  .9302 

Hydraulic  Excavation 

Gatun  to  sea   29,605  .3942 

Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel 1,441,729  .2179 

Pedro  Miguel  to  sea 1,549,904  .7233 

Miraflores  Locks 332,703  .5870 

Dredging  Excavation 

A^tlantic  entrance 39,032,400  .    .2325 

Pacific  entrance 39,962,470  .2579 

Preparing  Foundations 

Gatun  Spillway 44,715  2.2086 

Gatun  Locks ^    228,376  1.9880 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks 175,987  2.7242 

Miraflores  Locks   415,981  1.9065 

324 


THE  WORK  AND  ITS  COST 

Plain  Concrete 

Cu.  Yds.  Unit  Cost 

Gatun  Spillway  228,723  7.9316 

Miraflores  Spillway 73,277  6.7568 

Gatun  Locks 1,945,487  7.2200 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks 839,398  5.5932 

Miraflores  Locks    1,408,484  5.0487 

Cost  of  Concrete  Material 

Gatun  Locks 4.8808 

Pedro  Locks 2.8850 

Miraflores  Locks  2.8550 

Reenforced  Concrete 

Gatun  Spillway 2,456  16.7212 

Miraflores  Spillway '. 977  17.1484 

Gatun  Locks 95,753  12.6151 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks 67,777  9.6558 

Miraflores  Locks   71,255  11.8570 

Dry  Fill 

Gatun  Dam 12,229,104  .4374 

Pedro  Miguel  Dam 699,518  .4815 

Miraflores  Dam  1,758,423  .4986 

Back  Fill 

Gatun  Spillway 50,183  .5940 

Gatun  Locks 2,119,406  .5539 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks 834,288  .4470 

Miraflores  Locks  2,366,252  .4225 

Filling  Center  Wall 

Gatun  Locks 113,163  .8020 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks 220,768  .5239 

Miraflores  Locks  249,457  .6433 

325 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Total  Division  Cost  of  Certain  Items  of  Locks,  Dams,  and 
Spillways 

Gatun  Locks — complete  $28,607,286.51 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks— complete 12,433,768.81 

Miraflores  Locks — complete 17,975,260.41 

Gatun  Dam,  except  spillway 7,570,228.03 

Gatun  Spillway — complete   3,159,204.49 

Pedro  Miguel  Dam 341,627.72 

Miraflores  Dam,  except  spillway 905,032.29 

Miraflores  Spilhvay — complete 992,015.73 

Lock  gates  (most  of  the  expense  of  fixed  iron- 
work not  included),  46 6,194,846.17 

Spillway  gates,  22 126,774.51 

Emergency  dams   (including  operating  machin- 
ery), 6 2,453,430.88 

Chain  fenders  and  machines,  24 1,021,846.37 

Lock  irons  *   2,106,589.55 

Towing  track  system,  except  locomotives 1,400,627.08 

Electrical  distribution  system : 

Transformer  rooms,  high  tension  switch  cham- 
bers, power  cables,  lighting  cables  and  fix- 
tures     $1,317,562.50 

Lamp  posts 137,431.27 

1,454,993.77 

Towing  locomotives,  40 598,082.79 

Control  boards,  3 108,324.33 

Miter  gate-moving  machines,  92 1,005,384.20 

Miter  gate-forcing  machines,  46 69,904.02 

Rising  stem  and  guard  valve  machines,  134 1,076,151.47 

Cylindrical  and  auxiliary  culvert  valve  machines, 
132   229.267.54 

*  Includes  purchase  and  installation  of  fixed  irons  for  quoins 
and  sills  of  gates  and  caissons;  snubbing  irons,  buffer  castings, 
etc.;  and  installation  of  Stoney  valve  frames  and  cylindrical  and 
auxiliary  culvert  valves. 

326 


THE  WORK  AND  ITS  COST 

Smaller  machines: 

Miter  gate  handrail,  92 $36,237.95 

Miter  gate  sump  pumps,  92 34,849.65 

Culvert  sump  pumps,  3 12,746.14 

Drainage  sump  pumps,  9 4,036.98 

Machinery  and  cable  pit  pumps,  7. .     3,542.04 
Float  well,  46 25,298.74 


116,711.50 


Rising   stem   and   guard   valves,   moving   parts 

only,  installed,  134 448,132.58 

Fixed  irons  for  same,  contract   price,   not  in- 
stalled    392,600.00 

Cylindrical  and  auxiliary  culvert  valves,  contract 

price,  not  installed,  132 236,000.00 

Spillway  gate  machines,  22 209,924.15 

Gatun  Locks— masonry,  2,068,636.4    cu.  yds...  14,942,706.17 
Pedro    Miguel    Lock — masonry,    929,405.15    cu. 

yds 5,304,758.46 

Miraflores  Locks— masonry,  1,509,469.17  cu.  yds.  7,865,085.30 

Gatun  Spillway— masonry,  231,179  cu.  yds 1,740,085.54 

Miraflores  Spillway — masonry,  74,313  cu.  yds..  464,751.95 


INDEX 


Abbot,  Henry  L.,  17,  19,  22, 

142 
Accidents  in  locks,  142-146 

prevention  of,  180-183 
Agua  Clara  Reservoir,  298 

Balboa,   dry  docks  at,  164 
French  excavation  work  at, 

12 
machine  shops  at,  162-164, 

310,  311 
Panama  Railroad  terminal 

at,  55 
water  supply  for,  301 
Barnes,  M.  G.,  3 
Bates,  Lindon  W.,  18,  20 
Belding,  William  M.,  3 
Bierd,  William  G.,  3 
Blackburn,  J.  C.  S.,  4,  6 
Blasting  in  Culebra  Cut,  272, 

273 
Bohio,      French      excavation 

work  at,  11 
Bolick,  D.  W.,  3,  8 
Brazos  Brook  Reservoir,  296, 

299,  300 
Breakwater     construction     at 

Colon,  160,  190-192 
Brooke,  George  D.,  3,  8 
Building  construction,  division 

of,  96,  100,  101 


Bunau-Varilla,  P.,  18,  20 
Burr,  William  H.,  1,  17,  19, 
22 


Cableways  for  concrete  plac- 
ing, 216-219 
Camacho  Reservoir,  296 
Carabali  Reservoir,  296 
Chagres  River,  control  of,  25, 
27,  152,  153,  229-235, 
252,  253 
diversion  dams  for,  229- 

235 
Gamboa  dike  for,  9,  27, 

265 
Gatun  spillways  for,  28, 
184-186,   229-233,  250- 
255 
diversion  of,  from  Culebra 

Cut,  27,  265 
floods  of,  effect  of,  on  ex- 
cavation, 193,  194,  234, 
235,  251 
height  of,  27,  184,  185 
Panama  Railroad  and,  50, 
251 
Civil  Service  in  Panama,  119 
Coaling  plants,  308 
Cole,  H.  0.,  8 
Colon,  bakery  at,  48,  104 
commissary  store  at,  48, 104 


329 


INDEX 


Colon,  laundry  at,  48,  104 

municipal    engineering    in, 
f  59,  60,  296,  299,  300 

Panama  Railroad  terminal 

at,  55 
refrigeration  plant  at,  47 
water  supply  in,  45,  46,  59, 
60 
Colon     Harbor,     breakwater 
construction     in,     160, 
190,  191,  192 
military  value  of,  159,  160, 
161 
Comber,  W.  G.,  3,  8 
Commissary  bakery,  48,  104, 

320 
Commissary  laundry,  48,  104, 

320 
Commissary      refrigeration 

plant,  47,  104,  320 
Commissary    store,    48,    103, 

104,  320 
Concrete    in    canal    construc- 
tion,  84,   85,   173-176, 
196,  207,  212-222,  252- 
254,  309,  310 
Concrete     forms,     218,     219, 

291 
Concrete  materials,  storage  of, 
215,  216,  289 
transportation  of,  65,  200- 
202,  215,  290 
Concrete-mixing    plant,    200, 
201,  212-216,  220,  221 
Concrete    placing,    cableways 
for,  216-219 
cranes  for,  288 


Concrete     placing,     rate     of 
work  in,  188,  213,  221, 
222 
Cornish,  L.  D.,  8 
Corse,  W.  B.,  8 
Cost,  of  excavation  in  Cule- 
bra  Cut,  269-271,  273 
of  living  in  Panama,  107, 

108,  119,  120 
of   lock    construction,    141, 

147,  290 
of  Panama  Canal,  construc- 
tion of,  324-327 
of  transportation  for  con- 
crete materials,  200-202 
Cotton,  Frank,  8 
Cranes,  288 

Cristobal,  commissary  and  re- 
frigeration    plant     at, 
104,  105 
French  excavation  work  at, 

11,  12 
water  supply  for,  299,  300 
Cucaracha  slide,  277-280 
Culebra     Cut,     accidents     in 
channel  of,  144,  145 
cost  of  excavation  in,  269- 

271,  273 
dimensions  of,  147,  151 
diversion  of  Chagres  River 

from,  27,  265 
drainage  system  in,  265-267 
excavation  of,  7,  62-64,  75- 

77,  83,  84,  87,  89,  90, 

263-280 
method    of    blasting    in, 

272,  273 


330 


INDEX 


Culebra    Cut,    slides    in,    31, 
151,  275,  277-280 
track-shifting  in,  275 
French  excavation  work  in, 

76 
side  slopes  of,  165,  166,  279 
Culverts,  drainage,  173,  174 
for  lock  water  supply,  166, 
178,  179,  180,  185,  204, 
214 

Dam,   emergency,   180,   181 
Gatun,  32,  34,  73,  84,  85, 

134,  152,  223,  224,  229- 

231,  233,  234,  250-255 
Miraflores,  7,  285-287 
Pedro  Miguel,  7,  282,  283 
Dam  design  and  construction, 

74,  154,  155 
Dauchy,  W.  E.,  3 
Davis,  George  W.,  1, 17, 19,  22 
De  Lesseps,  69,  70,  92 
Devol,  C.  A.,  9 
Dickson,  T.  C,  9 
Diversion  dams,  229-235 
Docks,  162-164,  309,  310 
Drainage   system,   for   Gatun 

Dam,    construction   of, 

239-241 
for  locks,  173,  174 
in  Culebra  Cut,  265-267 
Dredge  as  sanitary  aid,  195, 

293 
Dredges,   60,   61,  82,   86,  87, 

192-195,   203,   206-211, 

235-237,  239,  248,  249, 

276/291,  292 


Dredges,  types  of,  194,  195 

Drills,  83,  84,  87 

Dumping  cars,  89,  90 

Dumping  machinery,  89,  90, 
155,  156,  190-192,  2C8, 
231-233,  234,  236,  249, 
255 

Electric  control  of  lock  oper- 
ation, 174,  316-319 
Electric  power  plant,  256,  319 
Emergency  dams,  180,  181 
Endicott,  Mordecai  T.,  2,  24 
Engineering   department,    or- 
ganization of,  121,  122, 
123 
Ernst,  Oswald  H.,  2 
Excavation,  for  Gatun  locks, 
203,  204,  205,  206-211, 
212 
French  company's  work  on, 

11-13,  60,  61,  76 
of   Culebra   Cut,   7,   62-64, 
75-77,  83,  84,  87,   89, 
90,  263-280 
of     sea-level     sections     of 
canal,    192,    193,    194, 
291-294 
rate  of  work  in,  188,  204, 
273 
Excavation     experiments     at 
Gatun,   167,  168,   169, 
170 
Excavation     waste,     disposal 
of,  40,  41,  76,  77,  80, 
88-90,  238 
suggestions  for,  76 


331 


INDEX 


Fender  chains,  182 

Filtration  plants,  296-304 

Floating  islands  in  Gatun 
Lake,  257-261 

Floods,  control  of,  along  Pan- 
ama Canal  route,  25- 
28,  152,  153,  184,  185, 
229-235,  252,  253 

Food  supply,   and  efficiency, 
113,  114 
for  Canal  employees,  46-48, 
103,  104,  113,  114 
cost  of,  107,  108 
distribution  of,  105 

Fortifications  on  Panama 
Canal,  164 

French  machinery  in  Canal 
construction,  60,  61,  79, 
86 

French  sanitation  in  Panama, 
93,  94 

French  work  on  Canal,  11-14, 
60,  61,  65,  69,  70,  71, 
92 

Fuel  oil  plants,  308 

GaiUard,  D.  D.,  4,  6-10,  277 
Gamboa  dike,  27,  265 

removal  of,  9,  276,  277 
Gatun,  village  of,  223,  224 
typhoid  epidemic  in,  297 
water  supply  of,  298 
Gatun  Dam,  construction  of, 
control      of      Chagres 
River  during,  228-235 
drainage   system   during, 
239-241 


Gatun  Dam,  fill  materials  for, 

41,    154-156,    232-242, 

247,  249 

preliminary      tests      for, 

167-172,  226-228,  244 

slides    during,    234,    237, 

241,  242-247 
slopes   in,   152-158,   245- 
248 
dimensions  of,  157,  229 
foundation  materials  of,  34, 
73,   153,   156-158,  228, 
243-246 
stability  of,  32,  34,  247,  248 
Gatun  Lake,  construction  of, 
134,  250,  256,  257 
preliminary  tests  for,  228 
control   of  water  level   of, 

33,  134,  183,  185,  254 
floating  islands  in,  257-261 
huntmg  on,  260,  261 
Panama  Railroad  and,  50, 

57,  202 
spillways  at,  250-255 
water  pressure  of,  172,  173 
water    supply    from,    303, 
304 
Gatun  Locks,  construction  of, 
65,  73,  85,  203-220 
preliminary      tests      for, 

167-170,  172 
slides    during,   205,   209- 
212 
foundation  material  under, 

34,  73,    167-170,    172, 
176,  203,  205,  207-212 

trial  passage  through,  261 


332 


INDEX 


Gatun  Locks,  walls  of,  173, 

176,  208-211,  214,  218 

Gatun  spillways,  28,  184-186, 

229-233 
Gerig,  William,  3,  8 
Goethals,  George  R.,  9 
Goethals,  George  W.,  4,  5 
Goldmark,  Henry  H.,  8 
Gorgas,  W.  C,  4,  6 
Grunsky,  Carl  E.,  1 
Guerard,  Adolph,  17,  19 

Hains,  Peter  C,  2 
Harding,  Chester,  8 
Harrod,  Benjamin  M.,  1 
Hecker,  Frank  J.,  1 
Hodges,  H.  F.,  4,  6,  8 
Hoffman,  George  M.,  8 
Holeombe,  J.  G.,  3,  8 
Hospitals  in  Panama,  6 
Housing  rules  for  Canal  em- 
ployees,     95-99,     101, 
102 
Hunter,   William  Henry,   17, 

19 
Hydraulic  excavation,  60,  61, 
82,  86,  87,  192-195, 
203,  206-211,  235-237, 
239,  248,  249,  276,  291, 
292 

International  Board  of  Con- 
sulting Engineers,  17, 
135,  153,  225 

in  Brussels,  22 

inspection  of  Panama  Ca- 
nal route  by,  19,  20 


Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 
3,  4 

distribution  of  work  among 
members  of,  6,  7,  8,  9 

duties  of,  5 

inspection  of  Panama  Ca- 
nal route  by,  19,  20 

lock-canal  plan  indorsed  by, 
24 

Jadwin,  Edgar,  8 
Jervey,  James  P.,  8 

Kiel  Canal  locks,  150 

La  Boca.     See  Balboa 
Labor,  Chinese,  111,  115,  116 
Civil  Service,  119 
food  supply  for,  46,  47,  48, 

103,  104,  108,  109 
housing    rules    for,    95-99, 

101,  102,  108,  109 
Negro,  110-115 
on  Panama  Railroad,  54,  55 
"open  shop"  policy  for,  on 

Canal,  125 
skilled  mechanic,  125,  306, 

307 
social  life  of,  119-121 
Spanish,  117,  118 
wages    of,    112,    113,    119, 
270 
Labor  and  Quarters,  Division 

of,  100,  106,  124 
Limon  Bay  channel,  160,  207 
Lobnitz    rock    breaker,    291, 
292 


333 


INDEX 


Lock    canal    at    St.    Mary's      MacFarland,  James,  8 


Falls,  136 
Lock-canal    project,    21,    23- 

25,  135, 137 
dimensions    and    route    of, 

29,  132-134 
Lock  design  and  construction, 

74,  66-174 
Lock   gates,    construction   of, 

166,  167,  180,  181,  183, 

322 
operation  of,  180,  182,  183, 

313 
Lock   walls,    construction   of, 

173-176,  214,  218 
Locks,  accidents  in,  142-146 
dimensions  of,  149,  150 
for  sea-level  canal  plan,  26 
Gatun,   7,   34,   65,   73,  85, 

132,  133,  176,  203 
Miraflores,  7,  86,  137,  139, 

140,  175,  176,  284,  285 
operation  of,  166,  167,  174, 

178-180,   312-314 
electric   control   of,    174, 

316-319 
Pedro    Miguel,    7,    65,    86, 

132,     133,     148,     175, 

176 
safety  of  shipping  in,  180- 

182 
separate    and    flight    locks 

discussed,  140-143,  146 
Sosa  Hill,  133-135 
water  supply  for,  33,  34, 

141, 142,  150, 151, 178- 

180 


Machine  shops  during  Canal 
construction,     305-307, 
310,  311 
Machinery,  63,  65,  66,  74,  79, 
80,    81,     83,    88,    91, 
188 
average  amount  of,  used  in 
Canal     construction, 
305-307 
efficiency   in   operation   of, 

77,  78,  271-275 
for     breakwater     construc- 
tion, 190,  191,  192 
for  lock  operation,  167, 174, 

312-319 
for  water  supply  for  locks, 

178,  179,  180 
in    Panama    Railroad    con- 
struction, 54 
of  French  company,  13,  14, 
60,  61,  79,  86, 193 
Magoon,  Charles  E.,  1 
Maltby,  F.  B.,  3 
Metcalf,  Richard  L.,  4,  6 
Mindi   Hills   Cut,   excavation 

of,  192,  193 
Miraflores,  French  excavation 

work  at,  12 
Miraflores  Dams,   285-287 
Miraflores    Lake,    control    of 
water  level  of,  184 
water  supply  for,  285 
water    supply    from,    302, 
303 
Miraflores     Locks,     accidents 
in,  145 


334 


INDEX 


Miraflores  Locks,  construction      Panama  Canal,  coaling  plants 


of,   86,   175,   176,  284, 

285,  288 
foundation  material  under, 

139,  140 
tidal  variations  in,  287 
Miraflores      Spillways,      186, 

286,  287 
Monnicke,  T.  B.,  8 
Mosquito   destruction   by   sea 

dredge,   195,   293 
Mosquito  problem  in  Panama, 

67,  95,  99 
Municipal      engineering      in 

Panama,  6,  7,  59,  296 

Navigation  aids  in  canal,  294, 

295 
Necaxa   Dam,   slide   at,    237, 

238 
Nichols,  A.  B.,  3,  9 
Noble,    Alfred,    17,    19,    22, 

23 
Nombre    de    Dios,    196,    200, 

201 

Panama,  hotels  in,  108,  109 
mosquito    problem    in,    67, 

95,  99 
water  supply  in,  296 
Panama   Canal,  accidents  in, 
142-146 
prevention  of,  180-182 
aids  to  navigation  through, 

294,  295 
arrangement    of    locks    in, 
133 


at  terminals  of,  308 
commissary  of,  103,  104 
construction     of,     concrete 

work  in,   84,   85,   173- 

175,  196,  207,  212-222 
construction  plant  in,  63, 

65,  66,  74,  75,  79,  80, 

81,  83,  88,  91,  188,  305- 

307 
cost  of,  324-327 
difficulties  and  uncertain- 
ties of,  37,  38,  39,  71, 

72 
effect  of  slides  on,  20,  31, 

73 
employees*  housing  rules 

during,  95-99,  101,  102 
employees'     interest     in, 

323,  324 
food  supply  for  employ- 
ees during,  46,  47,  48, 

103,  105 
French  work  on,  11,  65, 

69,  70,  71 
"Government    job"    idea 

in,  126 
machine     shops     during, 

306 
night     work     considered 

for,  66,  67,  68 
rates  of  work  on,  188 
surveying  for,  73 
dimensions   of   channel   of, 

133 
docks  at  terminals  of,  309, 

310 


335 


INDEX 


Panama  Canal,  electric  plant 
for  operation  of,  256 
engineering  department  of, 

121,  122,  123^ 
fortifications  on,  164 
fuel  oil  plants  on,  308 
labor     conditions     on,     91, 

110-112,  125-127 
maintenance  of,  321 
military  value  of,  163 
official  inspection  of  route 

of,  19,  20 
operation  of,  162 
payment  of  tolls  of,  312 
route  laid  out  for,  72,  73, 

133,  134 
Sanitary    Department    of, 
95,  96,  97,  99, 100, 101, 
102,  132 
terminals  of,  308-310 
tidal     variations     through 

locks  of,  281,  282 
tourists  and  visitors  to,  108, 

109 
water  supply  for  locks  of, 
33,  34,  141,  142,  150, 
151,  178,  179, 180,  184, 
185 
Panama    Canal    plans,    sea- 
level  and  lock  types  of, 
discussed,   29,   30,   31, 
32,  135,  137 
Panama  Railroad,  administra- 
tion of,  320,  321 
as  water  supply  plant,  to 

Colon,  45,  46 
commissary  of,  103,  320 


Panama  Railroad,  cost  of  re- 
building, 51,  52 
disposal     of     accumulated 

freight  of,  44 
excavation  traffic  of,  40,  41, 

77,88 
food  supply  traffic  of,  46, 

47,  48,  105 
French  purchase  of,  70 
Gatun    Lake    and,    50,    57, 

202,  250 
high  standards  of,  55-56,  88 
labor  situation  of,  54,  55 
original  route  of,  49 
relocation  of  tracks  of,  50, 

52 
reorganization    of,    42,   43, 

44 
roadbed  of,  53 
slides  on,  52,  155 
terminals  of,  55 
traffic  conditions   of,  1905, 
41. 
Panama  Steamship  Company, 

46,  82, 103 
Parsons,  William  Barclay,  1, 

17,  19 
Pedro  Miguel  Dams,  282,  283 
Pedro  Miguel  Locks,  accidents 
in,  144 
construction  of,  65,  86,  175, 
176,  283,  284,  289 
Plant.    See  Machinery 
Porto  Bello  quarry,  190,  191, 

196,  200 
Pumps,   193,   194,   248,   249, 
293,  296 


336 


INDEX 


Quarantine  in  Panama,  6 
Quellennec,  E.,  18,  19 

Rainfall  in  Panama,  173,  174, 

184 
Randolph,  Isham,  17,  19,  22 
Refrigeration  of  food  in  Pan- 
ama, 47 
Report    on    Isthmian    Canal 

plans,  18,  21,  22,  135, 

137 
Reservoirs  for  Panama  water 

supply,  296 
Rio    Grande    reservoir,    296, 

301 
Ripley,  Joseph,  3,  17,  19,  22 
Robinson,  A.  L.,  3,  9 
Rock-crushing  plants,  84,  86, 

196 
Roosevelt,  Theodore,  5 
Ross,  David  W.,  3 
Rourke,  L.  K.,  8 
Rousseau,  H.  H.,  4,  p,  7,  8 

Safety  devices  in  Canal  op- 
eration, 180-185 

St.  Mary's  Falls  Canal,  136, 
180,  181 

San  Bias  Indians,  196,  197, 
198,  199 

Sanitary  Department,  60,  67, 

73,  93,  94,  132 

housing  rules  of,  95-102 

Sanitation  in  Panama,  6,  58- 
60,  93-95,  132,  296- 
304 

Schildhauer,  Edward,  8 


Schussler,  Herman,  17 
Sea-level  canal,  locks  for,  26 
Sea-level  canal  plans,  26,  27, 

28,  29,  136 
Sea-level  sections,  excavation 

of,  192-194,  291-294 
Sewers  in  Panama  and  Colon, 

59 
Sherman,  E.  C,  8 
Shonts,  Theodore  P.,  1 
Shops    at    Balboa,    162-164, 

310,  311 
Sibert,  WilHam  L.,  4,  6,  7,  8 
Slide   at   Necaxa   Dam,   237, 

238 
Slides,    in    Culebra    Cut,    31, 

151,  275,  277-280 
during  construction  of  Ga- 

tun  Dam,  234,  237,  241, 

242-247 
during  construction  of  Ga- 

tun    Locks,    205,    209- 

212 
geology  of,  278-280 
on  Panama  Canal  route,  20, 

31 
on   Panama  Railroad   line, 

52, 155 
Smith,  Jackson,  3,  4 
Social  life  in  Panama,  119, 

120,  121      • 
Sosa  Hill  Locks,  133,  134 

objections  to,  135 
Spillway    channel,    construc- 
tion of,  250-254 
diversion  of  Chagres  River 

into,  229-231 


337 


INDEX 


Spillway    Dam,    construction 
of,    229-235,    250-251, 
253,  254 
operation  of  gates  of,  186, 
255 
Spillway  Hill,  water-pressure 
experiments     at,     170, 
171 
Spillways,  167,  184-186,  250- 

255,  286,  287 
Statistics : 
cost  of  Panama  Canal  con- 
struction, 324-327 
Culebra  Cut,  excavation  of, 

270 
French     excavation     work, 

13,  14 
water    supply    for    locks, 
33 
Steam  shovels,  63,  64,  65,  77, 
78,  82,  87,  88, 192,  193, 

194,  203,  204,  205,  228, 
236 

efficiency   in   operation   of, 

77,  78,  274 
Steams,  Frederick  P.,  17,  19, 

22 
Stevens,  John  F.,  2,  3,  20 

on  lock-canal  plan,  25 
Stickle,  Horton  W.,  8 
Storage  of  concrete  material, 

215,  216,  289 
Street-paving  in  Panama  and 

Colon,  59 
Sullivan,  John  G.,  3 
Swamp   drainage  by  dredge, 

195,  293 


Telephones,  83 

Thatcher,  Maurice  H.,  4,  6 

Tidal  variations,  between  At- 
lantic      and       Pacific 
Oceans,  281,  282 
in  Miraflores  Locks,  287 

Time  of  passage  through  Pan- 
ama Canal,  35,  36 

Tincauzer,  Eugen,  17,  19 

Tolls,  312 

Toro  Point  quarry,  190 

Towing  locomotives,  174,  182, 
183,  314,  315 

Track-shifting  in  Culebra  Cut, 
275 

Transportation,  of  Colon  wa- 
ter supply,  45,  46 
of  concrete  materials,  200- 

202,  215,  290 
of     construction     material, 

40,  41,  188-192 
of  food  supplies,  46,  47,  48, 
105 

Trestles,  for  concrete  storage, 
289 
for  dumping  fill,  155,  156, 
190-192,   208,  231-234, 
236,  249,  255 

Tubby,  William  G.,  3 

Typhoid  epidemic  in  Gatun, 
297 

Unloaders,  90 

Valves  at  lock  gates,  179,  180 

Walker,  John  G.,  1 
Wallace,  John  F.,  2,  20 


338 


INDEX 


Water-pressure     experiments, 

169-172 
Water   supply,    filtration    of, 
296-304 
for  locks,  33,  34,  141,  142, 
150,  151,  184,  185 
machinery   of,   178,   179, 
180 
from     Gatun     Lake,     303, 

304 
from  Miraflores  Lake,  302, 

303 
in  Colon,  59,  296,  299 


Water  supply,  in  Gatun,  297 
pumping    plants    for,    296, 
301 
Watt,  J.  M.  G.,  8 
Welcker,  J.  W.,  18,  19 
Wells,  George  W.,  8 
Williams,   Edward  J.,  3,  9 
Williamson,  S.  B.,  7,  8 
Wilson,  Eugene  T.,  9 
Wood,  R.  E.,  3,  9 
Wright,  P.  0.,  Jr.,  3,  9 

Zinn,  A.  S.,  8 


(1) 


! 


